Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in California Courts of Appeal
Zissler v. Saville
Montecito neighbors had a dispute over an easement created by recording in 1994, which contained an unpaved road. The owner of the burdened property wanted the easement limited to historical use; a new owner of the other property wanted to use the road for construction traffic and asserted that he might pave the road. The trial court “interpreted” the easement, ruled that the easement was ambiguous, decided the case based upon extrinsic evidence of historic use, and added language limiting the easement. The court of appeal reversed and remanded with directions, noting that the use of the easement for construction traffic has become a moot issue. An ambiguity is not apparent from the “failure” to specify how frequently the road can be used or the type of vehicle allowed on the road, but ambiguity is not the test for admission of extrinsic evidence. A bona fide purchaser could reasonably rely on the language of the grant of the easement, which gave him “a use limited only by the requirement that it be reasonably necessary and consistent with the purpose[] for which the easement was granted,” i.e., “access, ingress, and egress to vehicles and pedestrians.” View "Zissler v. Saville" on Justia Law
San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Commission
In 1998, the State Lands Commission granted Hanson’s predecessor 10-year leases, authorizing commercial sand mining from sovereign lands, owned by the state subject to the public trust, and managed by the Commission, under the Central San Francisco Bay, Suisun Bay, and the western Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta. In 2006, Hanson requested extensions of several leases, but they expired before the Commission made its decision. The Commission granted four new 10-year leases covering essentially the same parcels in the San Francisco Bay. In 2012, opponents sought a writ of mandate to compel the Commission to set aside its approval of the project. In 2015, a different panel of the court of appeal found that the Commission’s environmental review of the project complied with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code 21000), but that the Commission violated the public trust doctrine by approving the project without considering whether the sand mining leases were a proper use of public trust lands. The Commission reapproved the project; the court discharged a writ of mandate. The court of appeal affirmed. While the Commission erred by concluding that private commercial sand mining constitutes a public trust use of sovereign lands, there is substantial evidence that the project will not impair the public trust. View "San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Commission" on Justia Law
Alliance of Concerned Citizens Organized for Responsible Development v. City of San Juan Bautista
The Alliance challenged the approval of a project comprising a fuel station, convenience store, and quick serve restaurant on The Alameda and the adoption of a mitigated negative declaration for the project. The Alliance sought to compel the preparation of an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code 21000). In March 2016, the trial court issued a “Peremptory Writ of Mandate of Interlocutory Remand for Reconsideration of Potential Noise Impacts,” requiring the city to set aside the resolutions, reconsider the significance of potential noise impacts, and take further action consistent with CEQA. The Alliance did not appeal from that decision but appealed from the December 2016 “Final Judgment on Petition for Writ of Mandamus,” which determined that the city’s supplemental return complied with the peremptory writ and with CEQA. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that the March 2016 decision was the final judgment and the December 2016 decision was a post-judgment order. The court rejected claims that the city was required to prepare an EIR because there was substantial evidence in the record supporting a fair argument that the proposed project may have significant, unmitigated traffic and noise impacts and that the project violated the municipal code governing “formula retail businesses.” View "Alliance of Concerned Citizens Organized for Responsible Development v. City of San Juan Bautista" on Justia Law
Rasooly v. City of Oakley
Rasooly unsuccessfully appealed a 2015 “Notice and Order to Repair or Demolish Structure" for his vacant Oakley building, then sought judicial review. The city agreed to rescind the Notice; Rasooly was to provide plans responsive to city comments and complete all required work by April 2017. Rasooly’s counsel said more time was required for the work. The city replied that at least stabilization work must be done within the time requested. Rasooly’s counsel did not respond. For several months, Rasooly and the city’s permit center manager communicated by e-mail. On March 1, 2017, the city issued a new notice and order that the property be repaired or demolished, physically posted the notice on the property, and sent it by certified mail to a post office box listed as Rasooly’s address on county tax rolls. The mailing was returned undelivered. After the 20-day period for administrative appeal lapsed, the city advised Rasooly’s attorney of the notice on April 4, 2017. On April 5, Rasooly filed suit. The city cited Rasooly’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of Rasooly's petition, finding that the city complied with the Code and rejecting an argument that the “nail & mail” procedures were constitutionally deficient in the absence of efforts at personal service. View "Rasooly v. City of Oakley" on Justia Law
Professional Tax Appeal v. Kennedy-Wilson Holdings
Plaintiff filed suit against defendants for unjust enrichment and conversion, alleging that it had no remedy at law against the original property owner after it lost the property in foreclosure, and that defendants had unjustly retained the full benefit of the reduction in taxes owed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order sustaining defendants' demurrer to the conversion cause of action.However, the court reversed as to the unjust enrichment claim. The court held that the complaint stated sufficient facts that defendants knew or had reason to know of plaintiff's right and interest in a percentage of the tax refund, they benefited in the form of a reduced tax liability, and their retention of those benefits without payment to plaintiff was unjust. View "Professional Tax Appeal v. Kennedy-Wilson Holdings" on Justia Law
Kohler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County
Class actions are not allowed under the Right to Repair Act except in one limited context: to assert claims that address solely the incorporation into a residence of a defective component, unless that component is a product that is completely manufactured offsite. The Court of Appeal held that, because the claim here involved allegedly defective products that were completely manufactured offsite, the claim alleged under the Act could not be litigated as a class action. In this case, homeowners could not bring a class action asserting a claim under the Act against Kohler, the manufacturer of an allegedly defective plumbing fixture used in the construction of class members' homes. Therefore, the court granted Kohler's writ petition and issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order to the extent it denied in part Kohler's anti-class certification motion and to enter a new order granting the motion in its entirety. View "Kohler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law
Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc.
Lloyd Copenbarger, as Trustee of the Hazel I. Maag Trust (the Maag Trust), sued Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc. (MCWE) for declaratory relief and breach of a settlement agreement made to resolve various disputes, including an unlawful detainer action. MCWE was the lessee of a 50-year ground lease (the Ground Lease) of real property (the Property) in Newport Beach. The Property was improved with an office building and marina (the Improvements). The Ground Lease was set to terminate on December 1, 2018. In 2004, MCWE subleased the Property and sold all of the Improvements to NHOM (the Sublease). Starting in 2009, NHOM experienced cash flow problems due to “a shortage of rents.” In June 2011, MCWE commenced an unlawful detainer action against NHOM based on allegations NHOM failed to maintain and undertake required repairs to the Improvements. Six months later, the Maag Trust intervened in the UD Action as a party defendant under the theory that if NHOM were evicted and the Sublease terminated, then the Maag Trust’s security interest created by the Maag Deed of Trust would be destroyed. In August 2012, MCWE, Plaza del Sol, and the Maag Trust entered into a settlement agreement (the Settlement Agreement). The Maag Trust alleged MCWE breached the settlement agreement by failing to dismiss with prejudice the unlawful detainer action and sought, as damages, attorney fees incurred in that action from the date of the settlement agreement to the date on which MCWE did dismiss the action. Following a bench trial, the trial court found MCWE had breached the settlement agreement by not timely dismissing with prejudice the unlawful detainer action. As damages, the court awarded the Maag Trust attorney fees it claimed to have incurred during the relevant time period. On appeal, MCWE did not challenge the finding that its failure to dismiss the unlawful detainer action constituted a breach of the settlement agreement. Instead, MCWE made a number of arguments challenging the damages awarded. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment against MCWE because there was a wholesale failure of proof of the amount of damages on the part of the Maag Trust. Therefore, the Court reversed with directions to enter judgment in favor of MCWE on the Maag Trust’s complaint. View "Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc." on Justia Law
Schmidt v. Citibank, N.A.
Plaintiffs David and Hedda Schmidt appeal from a judgment entered in favor of defendants Citibank, N.A., as Trustee for Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2007-AR3 Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2007-AR3, and Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (defendants). In January 2007, the Schmidts obtained a $1,820,000 loan, secured by a residence at 2415 Rue Denise in La Jolla, California (the Property). The deed of trust was assigned to Citibank, N.A., as Trustee for Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2007-AR3 Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2007-AR3. The Schmidts defaulted on the loan and entered into a loan modification agreement in February 2013 with their loan servicer at the time, JPMorgan Chase Bank. Within approximately seven months, the Schmidts defaulted on the loan modification agreement. The Schmidts would apply for and be denied loan modification every year from 2013 to 2017. They sued defendants, alleging violations of the Homeowners' Bill of Rights and Business and Professions Code section 17200, seeking to prevent the completion of a trustee's sale of their residence. The defendants moved for summary judgment and presented evidence of extensive and numerous telephone calls between the Schmidts and Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., the loan servicer, during which the Schmidts' financial situation was discussed, as were possible options to avoid foreclosure. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in their favor. On appeal, the Schmidts contended summary judgment should not have been granted because there remained triable issues of fact to be determined. The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment. View "Schmidt v. Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law
Bear Creek Master Assn. v. Southern Cal. Investors, Inc.
In this case, the parties disputed which of their recorded liens against a golf course property had priority. In 2013, defendant, cross-complainant, and respondent, Southern California Investors, Inc. (SCI), recorded a third deed of trust against the golf course property. In 2014, plaintiff, cross-defendant, and appellant, Bear Creek Master Association (BCMA), a homeowners association, recorded an assessment lien against the property. The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of SCI after determining that SCI’s third deed of trust had priority over BCMA’s later-recorded assessment lien. BCMA appealed, claiming its assessment lien was created by the covenants, conditions, and restrictions governing the golf course property (the GCC&R’s) and “relates back” to their 1984 recordation. The Court of Appeal disagreed: according to the lien provisions of the GCC&R’s, the assessment lien was neither created nor perfected until it was recorded in 2014. Nonetheless, the Court agreed with BCMA’s alternative claim that its assessment lien had priority over SCI’s previously-recorded third deed of trust pursuant to the priority and subordination provisions of the GCC&R’s, even though the assessment lien was recorded after SCI’s third deed of trust was recorded. View "Bear Creek Master Assn. v. Southern Cal. Investors, Inc." on Justia Law
Thee Sombrero, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.
Thee Sombrero, Inc. (Sombrero) owned commercial property. Pursuant to a conditional use permit (CUP), Sombrero’s lessees operated the property as a nightclub called El Sombrero. Crime Enforcement Services (CES) provided security guard services at the club. In 2007, after a fatal shooting, the CUP was revoked and replaced with a modified CUP, which provided that the property could be operated only as a banquet hall. In a previous action, Sombrero sued CES, alleging that CES’s negligence caused the shooting, which in turn caused the revocation of the CUP, which in turn caused a diminution in value of the property. It won a default judgment against CES. Sombrero then filed this direct action against Scottsdale Insurance Company (Scottsdale), CES’s liability insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Scottsdale, ruling that Sombrero’s claim against CES was for an economic loss, rather than for “property damage” as defined in and covered under the policy. The Court of Appeal held Sombrero’s loss of the ability to use the property as a nightclub constituted property damage, which was defined in the policy as including a loss of use of tangible property. View "Thee Sombrero, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co." on Justia Law