Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2016, San Francisco barred no-fault evictions (for owner move-in, condominium conversion, permanent removal of the unit from housing use, capital improvements, or substantial rehabilitation) of families with children and educators during the school year. The trial court concluded state law preempted this ordinance. The court of appeal reversed. The purpose of the unlawful detainer statutes is procedural; they implement the landlord’s property rights by permitting him to recover possession once the consensual basis for the tenant’s occupancy ends. The ordinance is a limitation upon the landlord’s property rights under the police power, giving rise to a substantive ground of defense in unlawful detainer proceedings. The ordinance does not specify an amount of notice required to terminate a tenancy but only establishes a permissible substantive defense to eviction that (like some other substantive defenses to eviction) impacts when landlords may evict. It regulates in an area within the municipality’s police powers and does not conflict with a state statute, its incidental impact on the timing of landlord-tenant relations does not alone render it preempted. View "San Francisco Apartment Association. v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Tenant leased a two-unit San Francisco commercial building and sublet one unit to Peng. Peng later secured a $46.545 judgment against Tenant with an award of attorney fees of $47,800. Peng collected $46,500 in partial satisfaction. While trying to collect the judgment, Peng learned that the owner and Tenant had terminated the master lease. In 2009, a new tenant continued the same business that had been conducted by Tenant. Peng claimed the change was a fraudulent conveyance to prevent her from collecting the judgment through a setoff of rent. Peng remained in possession of the premises without paying rent and, by operation of law, became a tenant at the rental rate of $4,725 per month. The owner served Peng with a notice of change in terms of tenancy. Peng paid rent in March and April 2011 then became delinquent. The owner was awarded summary judgment, directing Peng to pay $4,725 in back-due rent plus attorney fees. The owner then filed a breach of contract suit, seeking back-due rent for 2009-2011. Peng filed a cross-complaint and counterclaim. The court of appeal held the owner was not precluded from pursuing a separate civil action for back-due rent that accrued in months other than the month for which damages were awarded in the unlawful detainer action and modified the attorney fee award. View "Hong Sang Market, Inc. v. Peng" on Justia Law

John and Denise Lane jointly owned a piece of rural property together with Denise's mother, Joan Bell. In 2011, the Lanes filed a lawsuit (the property action) against Bell arising out of disputes over the property. Bell cross-complained, seeking among other things a declaration of the extent of her interest in the property and an order for partition. The Lanes prevailed on most of Bell's claims, but a judgment was ultimately entered in Bell's favor valuing her interest in the property and granting her claim for partition. Because Bell prevailed on at least one of her claims was that the Lanes cannot demonstrate a "favorable termination" of the underlying action, which is fatal to their malicious prosecution action. In its most recent discussion of the issue, the California Supreme Court emphasized that "lack of probable cause" and "favorable termination" were distinct requirements in a malicious prosecution action: "'[T]hat a malicious prosecution suit may be maintained where only one of several claims in the prior action lacked probable cause [citation] does not alter the rule there must first be a favorable termination of the entire action.'" (Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal.4th 666 (1994). Thus, if the defendant in the underlying action prevails on all of the plaintiff's claims, he or she may successfully sue for malicious prosecution if any one of those claims was subjectively malicious and objectively unreasonable. But if the underlying plaintiff succeeds on any of his or her claims, the favorable termination requirement is unsatisfied and the malicious prosecution action cannot be maintained. The Lanes suggested in their appeal that the Court of Appeal decline to apply the dicta of Crowley in favor of their reading of Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal.2d 375 (1956), which held that, at least in certain cases, a malicious prosecution plaintiff could satisfy the "favorable termination" element by succeeding on some causes of action in the underlying case, even though a partial judgment was entered against him or her on a different claim. In the absence of further guidance from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal believed Crowley correctly addressed the issue presented by the facts of this case, and the trial court properly relied on Crowley in granting summary judgment. View "Lane v. Bell" on Justia Law

Payment in the amount of the judgment to plaintiff by a third party for something collaterally related to the judgment did not constitute satisfaction of the judgment. In this case, the Court of Appeal held that CTIC's payment to Jacob Tikosky was not payment on Tikosky's judgment against Yoram Yehuda, but rather was payment for Tikosky refraining from having Yehuda's property sold. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of Yehuda's motion to compel acknowledgment of partial satisfaction of the judgment. View "Tikosky v. Yehuda" on Justia Law

The Association filed suit against Metro and Foothill Transit for inverse condemnation and other torts arising from the construction and maintenance of part of the Metro Gold Line railway that runs adjacent to the condominium complex Sierra Palms manages. The trial court sustained Metro and Foothill Transit's demurrers and granted Metro and Foothill Transit's motions to strike the remainder of the second amended complaint. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment as to Metro, holding that Sierra Palms has demonstrated on appeal that it can amend its complaint to allege facts sufficient to support standing for an inverse condemnation claim against Metro. However, Sierra Palms has failed to make such a showing in regards to Foothill Transit. View "Sierra Palms Homeowners Association v. Metro Gold Line Foothill Extension Construction Authority" on Justia Law

The Association filed suit against Metro and Foothill Transit for inverse condemnation and other torts arising from the construction and maintenance of part of the Metro Gold Line railway that runs adjacent to the condominium complex Sierra Palms manages. The trial court sustained Metro and Foothill Transit's demurrers and granted Metro and Foothill Transit's motions to strike the remainder of the second amended complaint. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment as to Metro, holding that Sierra Palms has demonstrated on appeal that it can amend its complaint to allege facts sufficient to support standing for an inverse condemnation claim against Metro. However, Sierra Palms has failed to make such a showing in regards to Foothill Transit. View "Sierra Palms Homeowners Association v. Metro Gold Line Foothill Extension Construction Authority" on Justia Law

In 2004, U.S. Bank made a business loan to B2B, guaranteed by B2B’s principals, the Yousufs, and secured by a second deed of trust on the Yousufs's property. In 2011, U.S. Bank assigned the note and deed of trust to SMS. SMS, B2B and the Yousufs later executed a “Forbearance Agreement,” reciting that the loan was in default and agreeing that SMS would not exercise its rights as long as B2B made payments according to the agreement’s schedule. Months later, B2B failed to make the required payments. In 2014, SMS was preparing to initiate foreclosure when it learned that in 2007, without the knowledge of U.S. Bank, Cornerstone Title had, under Civil Code 2941(b)(3), recorded a release of the obligation secured by the deed of trust. SMS alleges that Cornerstone had no authority to do so, and that contrary to the release’s language, the secured obligation had not been satisfied or discharged. The court of appeal reversed dismissal of SMS’s suit against Cornerstone. Section 2941(b)(6) imposes broad liability on any title insurance company that issues and records a release under subdivision (b)(3). SMS, as the holder of an obligation, has the right to prove damages against Cornerstone, as a title company that recorded a release of that obligation. That SMS acquired the obligation from U.S. Bank is irrelevant. View "SMS Financial XXIII, LLC v. Cornerstone Tile Co." on Justia Law

The 260-unit San Francisco condominium property is subject to the Davis-Stirling Common Interests Development Act, Civ. Code, 4000. Artus, a J.D., Ph.D., owns three condominiums. The homeowner’s association (HOA) is governed by a board, previously elected by cumulative voting: a member would receive a number of votes equal to the total number of directors to be elected and could cast all her ballots for one candidate. Artus was elected to the board three times. The HOA voted by a substantial majority to eliminate cumulative voting. Artus sued, citing the Act, and obtained preliminary injunctive relief, preventing a board election under the new, direct vote rule. In the meantime, the HOA held another election and again approved direct voting by a substantial margin. Finding that the second election addressed “whatever valid objections [Artus] may have had” and the HOA had made good faith efforts to comply with the law, the court denied relief after trial. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Artus’ claim for statutory fees and costs. Neither the Davis-Stirling Act nor the legislative history of the fee provision at issue evidences any intent to depart from well-established principles that fees and costs are ordinarily not granted for interim success. View "Artus v. Gramercy Towers Condominium Association" on Justia Law

Sparrow obtained two loans from Countrywide, each secured by a deed of trust on Hercules, California property: a residential mortgage of $205,080 and a home equity line of credit (HELOC) of $15,000. Both deeds of trust were recorded on December 16, 2003, with the Contra Costa County Recorder’s Office; the HELOC deed as instrument 0603657 and the mortgage deed of trust as 0603058. The HELOC was assigned to the Bank and the mortgage was assigned to Nationstar. Following Sparrow’s default on the HELOC, the trustee conducted a nonjudicial sale of the property and received $105,000. After payment to the Bank and of the costs of the sale, a surplus of $73,085.50 remained, which was claimed by Sparrow, the Owners’ Association, and Nationstar. The trustee deposited the funds with the court. The court of appeal affirmed that Nationstar, as a senior lienholder, was not entitled to any of the proceeds of the sale under Civil Code section 2924k. Absent evidence of timing that was determinative, the trial court reasonably relied on the apparent intent of the parties to determine the priority of the two liens. Given that Countrywide was the lender on both loans, the reasonable expectation is that it would secure the larger mortgage loan in the primary position. View "MTC Financial, Inc. v. Nationstar Mortgage" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant for causes of action arising out of defendant's breach of contract, and for fraud. Plaintiff and defendant had entered into a contract under which plaintiff paid the purchase price for a Malibu residence to be held by defendant as the "nominal owner." The trial court rejected plaintiff's fraud claim, but found that defendant had breached the contract. The trial court denied plaintiff's request for rescission, but ordered that the property be sold and the proceeds apportioned between the parties in accordance with the contract. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not err by granting plaintiff relief based on defendant's breach of contract; defendant's challenge to particular provisions of the judgment were rejected; and plaintiff's appeal from an order denying his motion for leave to amend was moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Guan v. Hu" on Justia Law