Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

After a shopping center tenant defaulted on a secured loan, the lender took possession of the premises through foreclosure and transferred its interest to a third party. The third party then surrendered the premises and the landord filed suit against the lender to enforce the lease obligations. The Court of Appeal reversed the grant of summary adjudication for the landlord, holding that the purchase of the leasehold estate in this case—identified in the deed of trust by reference to the lease—did not constitute an express agreement to assume the obligations of the lease. In this case, the record showed that the lender did not expressly assume the lease. View "BRE DDR BR Whittwood CA, LLC v. Farmers & Merchants Bank" on Justia Law

The Attards own an undeveloped 5-acre parcel in unincorporated Contra Costa County (Fish Ranch Road) on the north side of Highway 24, near the east portal of the Caldecott Tunnel, approximately one mile west of Orinda. The property is designated open space in the county’s general plan, its zoning allows the construction of one single family home. They also own two parcels constituting the 3-acre Old Tunnel Road property near the tunnel's east portal, on the opposite side of Highway 24. The chief barrier to the development of the properties was sewage treatment. In 2005, the Attards contracted with the state Department of Transportation, agreeing to reconstruct the tunnel’s sewage disposal system and pay for upkeep, in return for the right to connect the properties. The tunnel then had a single restroom, served by a septic system. Although they failed to obtain the necessary regulatory approvals, the county issued a permit for construction of an 8400-square-foot home. Before the county discovered its error and notified the Attards, they made substantial progress toward installing a foundation. The county revoked the permits. The court of appeal affirmed the rejection of their petition for mandamus, rejecting claims of vested rights and equitable estoppel; that the Attards were exempt from local regulatory authority because of sovereign immunity; and that they were denied due process by the evident bias of one Board member. View "Attard v. Board of Supervisors of Contra Costa County" on Justia Law

In 2010, Omni, the landowner and developer, sought approval for construction of a shopping center on 11 acres of property zoned commercial, to consist of 10 retail buildings. Monterey County approved the project. An association of community members challenged the approval under the California Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code 21000 (CEQA). The trial court denied the petition as to the claimed CEQA violations but ordered an interlocutory remand to allow the county to clarify whether the project was consistent with the county’s general plan requirement that the project have a long-term, sustainable water supply. On remand, the Board of Supervisors clarified that the project “has a long-term sustainable water supply, both in quality and quantity to serve the development in accordance with the 2010 Monterey County General Plan Policies. The court entered judgment in favor of the county and Omni. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting claims that the county violated the association’s right to procedural due process on interlocutory remand and violated CEQA because the water supply analysis was inadequate, the analysis of the project’s consistency with the general plan was inadequate, the environmental impact report’s traffic analysis was inadequate, and environmental review of Omni’s project was improperly segmented. View "Highway 68 Coalition v. County of Monterey" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Amber Retzloff, James Franklin, and Nancy Stewart sued defendant Moulton Parkway Residents’ Association No. One (the association), twice for alleged violations of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act. The first suit was dismissed without prejudice by plaintiffs; the trial court sustained the association’s demurrer to the second suit without leave to amend. The court further concluded that plaintiffs’ second action was frivolous and awarded the association costs and attorney fees under Civil Code section 52351(c). Plaintiffs appealed the award. Finding no abuse of discretion in dismissed the second action as frivolous, thereby making the association entitled to fees, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Retzloff v. Moulton Parkway Residents' Assn." on Justia Law

This case arose from competing claims to a portion of the Yuba Goldfields, a 10,000-acre valley on both sides of the Yuba River near Marysville. At issue was whether an arbitration award resolving a dispute between plaintiff Cal Sierra Development, Inc. (Cal Sierra), and Western Aggregates, Inc., served as res judicata to bar Cal Sierra’s lawsuit against Western Aggregates’ licensee George Reed, Inc., and the licensee’s parent Basic Resources, Inc. The Court of Appeal concluded yes. View "Cal Sierra Development v. George Reed, Inc." on Justia Law

Litigation under the Public Records Act (PRA) (Gov. Code, sec. 6250 et seq.) is one of the rare instances where a losing party may still be deemed a prevailing party entitled to an attorney fee award. Ponani Sukumar appeals an order denying his motion for prevailing party attorney fees against the City of San Diego (City). Sukumar owns a home in San Diego (the Property). In about 1992, Sukumar's neighbors began complaining to the City about Sukumar's use of the Property. These complaints mostly involved parking issues and noise. In 2006 the City ordered Sukumar to take "immediate action to correct" municipal code violations occurring on the Property that constituted "a public nuisance." However, the City decided to not pursue the matter absent additional neighbor complaints. In 2015, Sukumar's attorney delivered a request to the City for "production of documents and information" under the PRA. The request sought 54 separate categories of documents, all relating to any neighbor's complaints about Sukumar. Twenty-four days after the request, the City wrote to Sukumar's attorney, stating that some potentially responsive documents were exempt from disclosure, and responsive, nonexempt records would be made available for Sukumar's review. Sukumar's attorney remained unconvinced that the City had produced all documents responsive to its request, and sought a writ of mandate or used other mechanisms to compel the documents' production. Though every time the City offered to certify it produced "everything," it would release additional documents. The trial court ultimately denied Sukumar's writ petition, finding that by 2016, the City had "in some fashion" produced all responsive documents. After stating Sukumar's writ petition was "moot" because all responsive documents had now been produced, the court stated, "Now, you might argue that you're the prevailing party, because the City didn't comply until after the lawsuit was filed. That's another issue." Asserting the litigation "motivated productions of a substantial amount of responsive public documents, even after the City represented to this [c]ourt there was nothing left to produce," Sukumar sought $93,695 in fees (plus $5,390 incurred in preparing the fee motion). Sukumar appealed the order denying his motion for prevailing party attorney fees against the City. The Court of Appeal reversed because the undisputed evidence established the City produced, among other things, five photographs of Sukumar's property and 146 pages of e-mails directly as a result of court-ordered depositions in this litigation. The Court remanded for the trial court to determine the amount of attorney fees to which Sukumar is entitled. View "Sukumar v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Defendant Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company (Coldwell) marketed a vacant, bank-owned property in Simi Valley for sale. The property had a backyard with an empty swimming pool and diving board. While plaintiffs Jacques and Xenia Jacobs were viewing the property as potential buyers, Jacques stepped onto the diving board to look over the fence. The diving board base collapsed and Jacques fell into the empty pool. Plaintiffs sued Coldwell for negligence and loss of consortium. The trial court granted Coldwell’s motion for summary judgment, finding Coldwell was entitled to judgment on plaintiffs’ claim regarding the negligent condition of the diving board. Plaintiffs argued that they also were claiming that the empty pool was a dangerous condition. The court rejected this unpled, undisclosed theory of liability, concluding that even if the theory had been pled, Coldwell could not be held liable for failing to remedy the dangerous condition of the empty pool because Jacques’ accident was not reasonably foreseeable. The Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co." on Justia Law

Property owners who purchased through a foreclosure sale sued the bank that sold the house, alleging that they were mislead the bank’s deed of trust was the first deed of trust, when another remained on the property, and was not extinguished by the foreclosure sale. Wells Fargo assigned any claim against the title insurer it had to David and Lina Hovannisian (the property owners), and the Hovannisians sued First American Title Insurance Company, alleging breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. First American moved for summary judgment, arguing its title insurance coverage had terminated, and no benefits were due. The motion was granted, and the Hovannisians appealed, arguing First American failed to establish that coverage did not continue under the title policy or there were no benefits due under the policy. They also contended triable issues of fact existed regarding their bad faith claim. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding First American showed, based on the facts Wells Fargo and the Hovannisians presented before and after the underlying action was filed, that there was no potential for coverage under the policy. The Hovannisians did not learn about the first deed of trust until after they purchased the property at the foreclosure sale without warranty. Thus, the only potential claim they had against Wells Fargo was for the alleged misrepresentations for which there was no liability or loss under the policy. View "Hovannisian v. First American Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Before appellants purchased Martins Beach, the public was permitted to access the coast by driving down Martins Beach Road and parking along the coast, usually upon payment of a fee. Because it is sheltered by high cliffs, Martins Beach lacks lateral land access. In 2008, appellants purchased Martins Beach and adjacent land including Martins Beach Road. A year or two later, appellants closed the only public access to the coast at that site. Surfrider, a non-profit organization dedicated to the preservation of access for recreation, brought suit. The trial court held the California Coastal Act (Pub. Res. Code, 30000–30900) applied and the appellants were required to apply for a coastal development permit (CDP) before closing public access. The court issued an injunction that requires appellants to allow public coastal access at the same level that existed when appellants bought the Martins Beach property. The court of appeal affirmed. Appellants‘ conduct is “development” requiring a CDP under section 30106 of the Coastal Act. Appellants‘ constitutional challenge to the Coastal Act‘s permitting requirement under the state and federal takings clauses is not ripe, The injunction is not a per se taking. The court affirmed an award of attorney fees to Surfrider. View "Surfrider Foundation v. Martins Beach 1, LLC" on Justia Law

PGA West Residential Association, Inc. (PGA West) alleged defendant Dempsey Mork tried to fraudulently insulate the equity in his condominium from creditors by naming Hulven International, Inc. (Hulven), a sham corporation entirely owned and controlled by Mork, as the beneficiary of a deed of trust and note, and by later directing Hulven to foreclose on the condominium. Hulven demurred to the complaint, arguing PGA West's lawsuit was barred by a seven-year limitations period for actions under the former Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The superior court overruled the demurrer and, after conducting a bench trial, entered judgment for PGA West. In this appeal, Hulven argued the superior court erred by overruling its demurrer. According to Hulven, the allegedly fraudulent activities by Mork and Hulven were a “transfer” for purposes of the UFTA and, therefore, this lawsuit was governed by that act and its seven-year limitations period. Because PGA West filed its lawsuit more than seven years after the alleged fraudulent transfer, Hulven contends PGA West's claims were completely extinguished. The Court of Appeal agreed with Hulven that Mork's alleged fraudulent attempt to insulate the equity in his condominium from creditors by naming a sham corporation as the beneficiary on the deed of trust constituted a “transfer” for purposes of the UFTA and that the act's limitations period applied here: "the seven-year limitations period for actions under the UFTA is not simply a procedural statute of limitations that bars a remedy and is forfeited if not properly raised by a defendant. Rather, the UFTA's seven-year limitations period is a substantive statute of repose that completely extinguishes a right or obligation and, under the majority view that we adopt, a statute of repose is not subject to forfeiture." Because PGA West filed its lawsuit after the UFTA's statute of repose had run, its rights under the act were completely extinguished. Therefore, the Court concluded the superior court erred as a matter of law by overruling Hulven's demurrer. View "PGA West Residential Assn. v. Hulven International" on Justia Law