Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 1999, Ayala, unable to qualify for a mortgage to buy a five-unit Vacaville residential property, sought assistance from Dawson, a real estate broker. According to Ayala, they orally agreed that Dawson would obtain the loan and buy the property in Dawson’s name for $330,000; Ayala would pay the 20% downpayment and pay Dawson a $200 per month fee, plus the monthly principal and interest on the mortgage. The parties executed a written contract provided by Dawson, which Ayala claims he understood to confirm an installment contract on terms the two had previously discussed. Ayala moved into one of the units and claims he spent hundreds of thousands of dollars improving the property. From 2000-2008, he paid Dawson $2,700 per month; from 2008-2012, he paid $2,900 per month. Ayala actually had signed a standard form lease/option; the option expired in 2004. In 2011 Dawson offered to sell Ayala the property for $330,000, with a credit for the down payment. In Dawson’s unlawful detainer action, Ayala defended by claiming he held equitable title. Dawson prevailed. In Ayala's separate action against Dawson for fraud, the court granted Dawson summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Ayala is barred from relitigating his fraud-in-the-inducement theory. View "Ayala v. Dawson" on Justia Law

In 2005, Nicholas and Mary Conroy refinanced their home with a mortgage loan secured by a deed of trust on the property. Five years later, the Conroys stopped making payments and defaulted on their loan. In an effort to avoid foreclosure, the Conroys filed suit against defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., successor by merger to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.; Fidelity National Title Insurance Company aka Default Resolution Network, LLC; and HSBC Bank USA, N.A. as trustee for Merrill Lynch Mortgage Backed Securities Trust, Series 2007-2 (Wells Fargo). The trial court sustained Wells Fargo’s demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. On appeal, the Conroys contended the trial court erroneously dismissed their claims. After review, the Court of Appeal found the Conroys’ operative complaint did not state valid causes of action for intentional or negligent misrepresentation because they did not properly plead actual reliance or damages proximately caused by Wells Fargo. The trial court properly determined the Conroys could not assert a tort claim for negligence arising out of a contract with Well Fargo. For lack of detrimental reliance on any of Wells Fargo’s alleged promises, the Conroys did not set forth a viable cause of action for promissory estoppel even under a liberal construction of the operative complaint. Because Wells Fargo considered and rejected a loan modification for the Conroys before that date, section 2923.6 does not apply to them. The plain language of section 2923.7 requires a borrower to expressly request a single point of contact with the loan servicer. The Conroys’ operative complaint did not allege they ever requested a single point of contact, and the Conroys did not state they could amend their cause of action to allege they actually requested one. The trial court properly dismissed the Conroys’ Unfair Competition Law claim because it was merely derivative of other causes of action that were properly dismissed. View "Conroy v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Mission Bay Park was the largest man-made aquatic park in the country. While Lorin Toeppe was walking through Mission Bay Park with her boyfriend, a branch fell off a eucalyptus tree and struck her. Toeppe sustained serious injuries. She filed suit against the City of San Diego (City) alleging the existence of a dangerous condition on public property, namely a negligently maintained eucalyptus tree. The City prevailed on summary judgment, arguing that Toeppe was struck by the tree branch while standing on a trail; thus, the City could not be liable under Government Code section 831.4 (trail immunity). Toeppe appealed the subsequent final judgment following the City's successful motion for summary judgment. Toeppe argued: (1) trail immunity did not apply under the facts of this case because her claim of a dangerous condition was based on a negligently maintained eucalyptus tree, not the condition of the trail passing through the park; and (2) even if trail immunity did apply, a disputed issue of material fact existed as to where she was located when the branch struck her. The Court of Appeal agreed with her on both grounds, and thus reversed. View "Toeppe v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

The land underlying the 100-unit condominium project was owned and used by Shell as a fuel distribution terminal from 1925-1980, then owned by others. Petroleum products were delivered to the property and stored in aboveground and underground storage tanks. The Estuary Owners Association (EOA) and individual unit owners sued, alleging contamination of the soil and groundwater at the site and improper construction of the condominiums. After the plaintiffs settled with developers and other defendants, the court granted Shell summary judgment, reasoning that the causes of action for negligence and nuisance were barred by a 10-year statute of repose; the negligence claims also were barred by a three-year statute of limitations; and Shell did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs. The court of appeal affirmed as to negligence and reversed as to nuisance. The trial court erred in finding the statute of repose applicable but was correct with respect to the statute of limitations. Any claim of negligence causing damage to real property accrued in favor of prior landowners and cannot be pursued by plaintiffs now. Rejecting Shell’s assertion that the plaintiffs were only claiming construction defects as the basis of nuisance, the court noted a possible argument that Shell‘s negligent mishandling of petroleum products and subsequent failure to remediate created a continuing nuisance. View "Estuary Owners Association. v. Shell Oil Co." on Justia Law

A 72-foot diseased tree fell on a sleeping child’s tent, in a campground within a 499-acre public wilderness park, owned by San Mateo County. The county claimed immunity as a matter of law for the allegedly dangerous condition of its property under Government Code section 831.2, “natural condition immunity,” which states: “Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a natural condition of any unimproved public property, including but not limited to any natural condition of any lake, stream, bay, river or beach.” The court of appeal upheld the trial court’s denial of the county’s motion for summary judgment. There are triable issues of fact as to whether the property was “unimproved.” The heavily wooded park has trails. Its campsites are cleared of trees. The campground area has amenities including paved roads, telephones, restrooms (with electricity, sinks and flush toilets), showers, dedicated parking areas, a dumping station and a store. Plaintiffs’ campsite had two picnic tables, a fire pit, and a metal food locker. A professional land surveyor determined there were 34 man-made improvements within 126 feet of where the tree stood. View "County of San Mateo v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2009, Dessel, Dessel’s daughter (Seal), and Cummings purchased land in Fieldbrook containing a small and dilapidated residence with a carport, planning to remodel the residence, converting it to a vacation rental. Cummings made a downpayment of $80,000, and the seller agreed to carry a note for the balance of $120,000, to be due in full in June 2015. The parties committed to make monthly interest-only payments to the seller of about $700 and to pay all insurance and property taxes. After disputes arose, Cummings sought partition of the property. The court ordered partition by the appraisal method: each half-owner could bid to purchase the other half-owner‟s interest, with the minimum bid set by appraisal. The court of appeal affirmed. While the trial court erred when it ordered partition of the property by appraisal because the parties had not agreed to that method, as is required by the statute, the defendants have not shown the error was prejudicial. View "Cummings v. Dessel" on Justia Law

In 2004 Denise Saluto recorded a grant deed to real property. In early 2007 Saluto defaulted on the loan encumbering the Property. Plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company acquired the Property at a trustee's sale. Before the purchase was complete, Saluto recorded a number of documents purporting to convey an interest in the Property. In August 2007 Deutsche Bank recorded its trustee's deed upon sale. Saluto again recorded a number of documents. Deutsche Bank sought to gain possession of the Property through an unlawful detainer action, but Saluto filed for bankruptcy protection. Saluto sued Deutsche Bank (and other parties) to cancel, set aside and vacate the trustee's deed and cancel the DOT; Saluto did not allege a quiet title claim. Saluto also recorded more documents purporting to convey an interest in the Property, then sold the Property to defendants Cora Broadhurst and her husband, Alan Pyle. Deutsche Bank successfully moved the trial court to set aside the default judgment. A grant deed was ultimately recorded, and title in the Property was conveyed to Broadhurst and Pyle. Deutsche Bank filed suit against defendants for quiet title, cancellation of instruments, declaratory and injunctive relief, slander of title, and forcible entry and detainer. Defendants filed a cross-complaint seeking to quiet title to the Property in their favor. Deutsche Bank argued that defendants' claim for quiet title and affirmative defense of bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer failed as a matter of law. The trial court denied defendants' motion and granted Deutsche Bank's, concluding that defendants did not qualify as bona fide purchasers as a matter of law based on the void default judgment in the chain of title. The Court of Appeal found a void judgment does not pass title free of the lien purportedly cancelled by the void judgment; rather, "a void judgment in the chain of title has the effect of nullifying a subsequent transfer, including a transfer to a purported bona fide purchaser." The Court of Appeal concluded the void default judgment did not quiet title to the property. View "Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust v. Pyle" on Justia Law

In 2004, Hesperia began acquiring vacant property in its downtown for development of a Civic Plaza, with a city hall, public library, other government buildings and “complimentary retail, restaurant, and entertainment establishments.” Cinema West articulated a plan to develop a cinema immediately west of the Civic Plaza Park: the city would convey 54,000 square feet of real property to Cinema for $102,529, the property‘s fair market value; Cinema would construct a 38,000-square foot, 12-screen digital theatre; the city would construct the necessary parking lot, develop a water retention system for the theater and the parking lot, and install off-site improvements including curb, gutter and sidewalks. Cinema would execute a 10-year operating agreement with the city. The city later made a $250,000 forgivable loan to Cinema to aid with a $700,000 anticipated shortfall. As development of the theater and parking lot was nearing completion, the Electrical Workers Union requested a public works coverage determination under California‘s prevailing wage law (Lab. Code, 1720–18611 ) The State Department of Industrial Relations concluded that the project was subject to the prevailing wage requirement. The court of appeal affirmed, noting that Cinema received the benefit of a new, publicly-funded parking lot adjacent to the theater, which, though owned by the city, is Cinema‘s to use for as long as it operates the theater. View "Cinema West v. Baker" on Justia Law

A trustee's acts in recording a notice of default, a notice of sale, and a trustee's deed upon sale in the course of a nonjudicial foreclosure are privileged under Civil Code section 47. The Court of Appeal held that plaintiff did not state a cause of action for slander of title based on the recording of those documents. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's order sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff's slander of title claim without leave to amend. View "Schep v. Capital One" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Aristea Hupp (Aristea) appealed after the trial court granted defendants Solera Oak Valley Greens Association and City of Beaumont Animal Control Officer Jack Huntsman’s ex parte application to dismiss Aristea’s first amended complaint (FAC) as a vexatious litigant. Aristea argued: (1) the trial court’s order granting Solera’s ex parte application to dismiss deprived her of her due process rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard; (2) Solera waived its vexatious litigant defense by not raising it in its first responsive pleading; and (3) under the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act (Davis-Stirling Act), she was authorized to seek recovery of damages sustained by her son, Paul Hupp (Paul), from violations of Solera’s Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). In 2014, Paul was declared a vexatious litigant. In 2015, Aristea and Paul filed a complaint against Solera over enforcing a community rule regarding muzzling of Pit Bulls on properties within the Solera community. The Hupps walked their dogs through the community without a muzzle. The Hupps argued the rule was only applied to the Hupps, and that Solera could not single out any one breed. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal as to all claims alleged in the FAC which were brought by or for the benefit of Paul, on the ground he has been declared a vexatious litigant. Because Aristea had not been declared a vexatious litigant, the judgment of dismissal was reversed as to all claims in the FAC that were solely personal to Aristea. View "Hupp v. Solera Oak Valley Greens Assn." on Justia Law