Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around the Casa Blanca Beach Estates Owners’ Association (Casa Blanca) and its dispute with the County of Santa Barbara (County) and the California Coastal Commission (Commission). Over 30 years ago, the County approved the development of a 12-lot oceanfront subdivision in Carpinteria, managed by Casa Blanca. One of the conditions for approval was the construction of a public beach access walkway. The County accepted the offer to dedicate the walkway in 2011. In 2017, the County and Commission alleged that Casa Blanca had missed the deadline to construct the walkway. Casa Blanca submitted construction plans but was told it needed a coastal development permit from the Commission. The Commission deemed the application incomplete, leading to a series of unsuccessful attempts to complete the application.The trial court found that Casa Blanca had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The court granted the County's motion for summary judgment on all causes of action and denied Casa Blanca's. The court found that the offer to dedicate had been timely accepted by the County. As for the second cause of action seeking a determination regarding the deadline for Casa Blanca to construct the walkway, the court found it had no jurisdiction because Casa Blanca had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Commission demurred on grounds Casa Blanca failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment in favor of the County and Commission.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Six affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that Casa Blanca's action was not ripe because it had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The court also disagreed with Casa Blanca's argument that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to its claim for declaratory relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1060. The court concluded that a party may not evade the exhaustion requirement by filing an action for declaratory or injunctive relief. View "Casa Blanca Beach Estates Owners’ Assn v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

The case involves Lusardi Construction Company (Lusardi), a prime contractor, and its subcontractor, Pro Works Contracting Inc. (Pro Works). Pro Works violated certain Labor Code provisions by failing to hire apprentices for a construction project. The Department of Industrial Relations and the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) cited Pro Works for these violations and ordered Lusardi to pay penalties. Lusardi's administrative appeal was unsuccessful, and it subsequently filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus, which the superior court denied. Lusardi argued that the superior court erroneously concluded that it knew of Pro Works's violations and that the joint and several liability provision applied.The Superior Court of San Diego County affirmed the DLSE's decision, concluding that Lusardi had knowledge of Pro Works's violations and was liable for the penalties. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the findings relating to the amount of the penalty assessment. The court rejected Lusardi's claim of due process violations, stating that Lusardi was put on notice of the potential for being held jointly and severally liable for Pro Works’s apprentice hiring violations.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the superior court did not err in interpreting the statute, which provides two inclusive and alternative ways for imposing liability on a prime contractor for penalties resulting from the subcontractor’s violations. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the penalty imposed. The court concluded that Lusardi was not denied due process when it refused to enforce its subpoena or ask for a continuance to secure the witness’s attendance. View "Lusardi Construction Co. v. Dept. of Industrial Rel." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between neighbors over alleged violations of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) related to landscaping and hedges. The plaintiffs, Thomas and Lisa Schwartz, claimed that their neighbors, Charles and Katyna Cohen, maintained landscaping and hedges on their property in violation of certain provisions of the LAMC. The Schwartzes sought redress for these alleged violations based on section 36900, subdivision (a) of the California Government Code, which states that a violation of a city ordinance may be redressed by civil action. The Schwartzes relied on a prior court decision, Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., which interpreted this provision as allowing any private citizen to sue to redress violations of municipal ordinances.The trial court overruled the Cohens' demurrer to the second and third causes of action, which were based on the alleged LAMC violations. The court applied the Riley decision and concluded that the Schwartzes could assert private causes of action for violations of the LAMC. The Cohens petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, arguing that the Riley decision was wrongly decided and that section 36900, subdivision (a) does not create a private right of action.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Four agreed with the Cohens. The court found that the language of section 36900, subdivision (a) is ambiguous and that its legislative history shows that the Legislature did not intend to afford members of the public the right to bring suit to redress violations of local ordinances. The court concluded that the trial court erred by overruling the Cohens' demurrer to the second and third causes of action. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the trial court to vacate the portion of its order overruling the Cohens' demurrer to these causes of action and to enter an order sustaining their demurrer without leave to amend. The court also overruled the Riley decision to the extent that it recognized a private right of action under section 36900, subdivision (a). View "Cohen v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Regents of the University of California (Regents) approved the construction of a new hospital at the University of California San Francisco (UCSF) Parnassus Heights campus. The proposed hospital was alleged to exceed local building height and bulk restrictions. The Parnassus Neighborhood Coalition (the Coalition), a group of property owners residing near the proposed hospital, sued to halt the construction, claiming it was a “threatened nuisance per se.” The Regents argued that as a state entity, they were immune from complying with local building and zoning regulations when engaging in a governmental activity such as constructing university buildings.The trial court disagreed with the Regents, concluding that their immunity depended on whether the proposed construction constituted a governmental or proprietary activity, a question of fact that could not be resolved on a demurrer. The Regents petitioned for a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s order.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three reviewed the case. The court concluded that the proposed hospital would facilitate the provision of clinical services, thereby advancing UCSF’s academic mission and the Regents’ educational purpose, which is a governmental activity. The court held that the Regents are exempt from the local regulations at issue, and the demurrer should have been sustained. The court issued the writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the Regents’ demurrer and to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer. View "The Regents of the University of California v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between neighbors over alleged violations of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) related to landscaping and hedges. The plaintiffs, Thomas and Lisa Schwartz, claimed that their neighbors, Charles and Katyna Cohen, violated certain provisions of the LAMC by maintaining landscaping and hedges on their property that exceeded height limits and were non-compliant with the Residential Parkway Landscaping Guidelines. The Schwartzes sought redress for these alleged violations under Government Code section 36900, subdivision (a), which provides that a violation of a city ordinance may be redressed by civil action.The trial court sustained the Cohens' demurrer to the Schwartzes' first and fourth causes of action, but overruled the demurrer to the second and third causes of action, which were based on alleged violations of the LAMC. The trial court relied on a previous decision, Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., which held that anyone can sue to redress violations of municipal ordinances under section 36900. The Cohens petitioned for a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order overruling their demurrer to the second and third causes of action and to enter an order sustaining their demurrer to these causes of action without leave to amend.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, granted the Cohens' petition. The court disagreed with the interpretation of section 36900 in Riley, finding that the statute only grants city authorities, not private parties, the right to redress violations of municipal ordinances via either criminal prosecution or civil action. The court overruled Riley and held that section 36900 does not authorize private parties to bring civil suits to enforce local ordinances. The court clarified that its holding does not disturb caselaw recognizing that a defendant's violation of a local ordinance may be relevant to, or provide an element of, some other cause of action by a private party, such as nuisance or public nuisance. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order overruling the Cohens' demurrer to the second and third causes of action and to enter an order sustaining their demurrer to these causes of action without leave to amend. View "Cohen v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Jake Johnson, an electrician, was injured while working on a construction project in a building owned by Property Reserve, Inc. (PRI) and managed by CBRE. Johnson was employed by PCF Electric, a subcontractor hired by Crew Builders, the general contractor for the project. Johnson filed a complaint against PRI, CBRE, Crew, and PCF for damages. PRI and CBRE moved for summary judgment based on the Privette doctrine, which generally protects entities that hire independent contractors from liability for injuries sustained by the employees of the independent contractor. The trial court denied the motion, finding a triable issue of fact as to when PRI and CBRE hired Crew for the project.The trial court's decision was based on the execution date of the written contract between PRI, CBRE, and Crew. The court found that there was a triable issue of fact as to when PRI and CBRE hired Crew for the project. The court also granted Crew’s and PCF’s motions for summary judgment, concluding that the Privette doctrine barred Johnson’s claims against them.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, disagreed with the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that a written contract is not required to invoke the Privette doctrine, and the undisputed facts established that PRI and CBRE delegated control over the tenant improvements to Crew prior to Johnson’s injury. The court also found that no exception to the Privette doctrine applied. The court concluded that no triable issues of material fact precluded summary judgment and granted PRI and CBRE’s requested relief. View "CBRE v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Simple Avo Paradise Ranch, LLC (Simple Avo), an avocado farm, and Southern California Edison Company (SCE), a utility company. Simple Avo claimed that SCE was responsible for damages caused by the 2017 Thomas Fire in Southern California due to SCE's alleged negligence in maintaining its electrical infrastructure. The case was part of a larger coordinated proceeding involving hundreds of similar lawsuits against SCE.Before Simple Avo filed its lawsuit, the trial court had overruled SCE's demurrer to the cause of action for inverse condemnation in the master complaints filed by each of the plaintiff groups. Simple Avo did not participate in the briefing or argument on SCE’s demurrer before the trial court. Instead, Simple Avo and SCE settled for an undisclosed amount and entered into a stipulated judgment whereby SCE would pay $1.75 million to Simple Avo on the inverse condemnation claim, subject to SCE’s appeal of the demurrer ruling.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the stipulated judgment was appealable and justiciable, and that the trial court correctly overruled the demurrer. The court found that SCE could be liable for inverse condemnation as a public entity, and that the master complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action for inverse condemnation. View "Simple Avo Paradise Ranch, LLC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co." on Justia Law

This case revolves around a dispute between California Specialty Insulation, Inc. (CSI) and Allied World Surplus Lines Insurance Company (Allied World) over a commercial general liability insurance policy. The policy was issued by Allied World to CSI. The dispute arose when Allied World refused to defend and indemnify CSI against a negligence claim following a construction site accident. The parties disagreed on whether one of the policy’s exclusions for bodily injury liability applied in this situation. The policy excluded coverage for bodily injury to the employees of any “contractor,” but the term “contractor” was not defined in the policy. Allied World argued that the term was unambiguous and the exclusion precluded coverage for the negligence claim, while CSI argued that the term was ambiguous and the exclusion did not apply to the negligence claim.The trial court ruled in favor of CSI, granting its motion for summary judgment and denying Allied World’s. The court found that the term “contractor” in the disputed exclusion was ambiguous and interpreted the term in favor of CSI.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the term “contractor” in the disputed exclusion was ambiguous. The court interpreted the term based on CSI’s objectively reasonable expectations and concluded that the exclusion did not apply to the negligence claim in question. Therefore, Allied World was obligated to defend and indemnify CSI against the negligence claim. View "California Specialty Insulation, Inc. v. Allied World Surplus Lines Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit filed by plaintiff Harold Malmquist against the City of Folsom (City). The plaintiff alleged that the City failed to maintain proper corrosion control measures at its water treatment plant, causing the pH level of its water to rise and become corrosive. This, in turn, led to pinhole leaks in copper pipes receiving the water, damaging persons and property. The plaintiff sought class certification, defining the class as all individuals and entities who have owned or leased real property in the City, plumbed with copper piping receiving water from the City’s plant since February 23, 2015.The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification. The court found that the plaintiff had not shown that common issues predominated over individual ones. The court reasoned that the existence, cause, and extent of damage to copper piping required individual proof. The court also overruled the plaintiff's objections to the City's expert witness, concluding that the expert was qualified and his opinion was founded on reliable information.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. The court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that individual issues predominated over common ones. The court also found no error in the trial court's decision to overrule the plaintiff's objections to the City's expert witness. The court concluded that the expert was qualified and his opinion was founded on reliable information. View "Malmquist v. City of Folsom" on Justia Law

In 2015, GPT Maple Avenue Owner, LP (GPT) purchased a property that was subject to a lease to Equinix, LLC (Equinix). At the time of GPT’s acquisition, the remaining term of the lease was 26 years. The Los Angeles County Assessor’s Office (Assessor) determined that GPT’s acquisition resulted in a “change in ownership” permitting reassessment for property tax purposes because, at the time of the sale, the remaining term of the lease was under 35 years. This was based on the statutes implementing Proposition 13, which state that whether the transfer of a lessor’s interest in taxable real property results in a change in ownership generally depends on the length of the remaining lease term at the time of the transfer.Equinix appealed the Assessor’s 2015 change in ownership determination to the Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board, which found in favor of the county. Equinix and GPT then presented a refund claim to the county, which the county denied. Equinix and GPT filed a lawsuit, and the trial court ruled in favor of the county, concluding that, under the “express language” of the relevant statutes, the sale of the Property to GPT in March 2015 resulted in a change in ownership because at the time of sale the remaining term of Equinix’s lease was less than 35 years.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division One, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court found that under the unambiguous language of the relevant statute, the 2015 transaction is a change in ownership permitting reassessment. The court rejected the appellants' arguments that the statute is inconsistent with Proposition 13 and another section in the statutory scheme. The court also rejected the appellants' argument that the statute is inconsistent with the overarching rules set forth in another section of the law. The court concluded that the Legislature was not required to adhere to the task force’s recommendations and that the statute as enacted did not render the law illogical. View "Equinix LLC v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law