Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The 1976 Magnuson–Stevens Act contemplated “[a] national program for the conservation and management of the fishery resources of the United States,” 16 U.S.C. 1801(a)(6), and established the United States 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A 2007 amendment established national criteria for quota-based fishing programs, (limited access privilege programs) and authorized the quota-based fishing permits and licenses at issue in this Fifth Amendment takings claim, in which fishing businesses challenged four different permitting, licensing, and endorsement requirementsThe Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for lack of a cognizable property interest in the fishing endorsements, licenses, and permits, separate from or appurtenant to their fishing vessels. Precedent establishes that fishing permits and licenses issued under the Act are revocable privileges, not compensable property interests. The Magnuson–Stevens Act refers to “congressional intent not to confer any right, title, or interest, and to preserve the government’s authority to revoke privileges enjoyed in” fishing licenses and permits. The National Marine Fisheries Service’s regulations did not create compensable property rights in permits or licenses. licenses; permits did not have the essential characteristics of compensable property—transferability and the right to exclude others. There is no inherent right in vessel ownership to fish within the EEZ. View "Fishermen's Finest, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant and dismissing Plaintiff's claim that Iowa's tax-sale statute violates due process because it doesn't require personal service of a written notice that the taxpayer will lose his or her land, holding that the court did not err.Plaintiff stopped paying property taxes on a parcel of farm land he obtained, and the parcel was sold at a tax sale. Defendant paid Defendant's overdue taxes and received a certificate of purchase. When Plaintiff did not redeem the parcel Defendant sent Plaintiff notice by regular mail and certified mail to the parcel itself and to Plaintiff's last known address. After ninety days the county treasurer issued a tax sale deed to Defendant. Plaintiff brought this action claiming he did not timely receive actual notice of the tax sale proceedings and that Iowa Code 447 violates constitutional due process guarantees because it does not require effective notice. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to show a due process violation in this case. View "Kluender v. Plum Grove Investments, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1993 the Village of Channahon approved the plat of a residential subdivision lying within the DuPage River Special Flood Hazard Area. The Village subsequently issued permits for the construction of houses in this subdivision, all of which experience flooded basements when the river is at high water. The current owners of these houses contend that the Village violated the Constitution either by granting the permits to build or by failing to construct dykes to keep water away.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their suit, noting the plaintiffs do not contend that the Village required them to build where they did or dig basements, or took any steps after the houses’ construction that made flooding worse. The Constitution establishes rights to be free of governmental interference but does not compel governmental intervention to assist persons. Even if the Village violated a local ordinance and a federal regulation, 44 C.F.R. §60.3(c)(7), by granting the applications without insisting that the houses be built higher, the Constitution does not entitle private parties to accurate enforcement of local, state, or federal law. The Village did not take anyone’s property, either by physical invasion or by regulation that prevented the land’s use. The river, which did invade their basements, is not a governmental body. Government-induced flooding of limited duration may be compensable but the -plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the water in their basements is “government-induced.” View "Billie v. Village of Channahon" on Justia Law

Residents of the Royal Palm Village Mobile Home Park in Haines City, Florida, sued the Park’s owners in federal court. The residents alleged that the owners had engaged in fraud by, among other things, illegally passing on costs to the residents, embellishing lot descriptions to justify increased rents, and falsely promising to upgrade roads and other common areas. The residents filed an amended complaint alleging violations of a slightly different collection of state and federal statutes: four counts under both the federal and Florida RICO statutes—as well as one under the ADA. The owners moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed the amended complaint for essentially the same reasons that it had dismissed the initial complaint. The owners now appeal the district court’s rejection of their fee requests pertaining to the first and second amended complaints. Those complaints, the owners argue, were also “to enforce” the FMHA because the residents predicated the RICO claims in those complaints on violations of the FMHA.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that here the alleged FMHA violations set out in the residents’ amended complaints were not independent legal claims, but rather components of other claims (e.g., the RICO claims). The amended complaints did not seek any relief under the FMHA. Nor did they request compliance with the FMHA. Those complaints, therefore, were not “proceeding[s] to enforce provisions” of the FMHA. The district court correctly denied fees to the owners as to those complaints under Section 723.068. View "Royal Palm Village Residents, Inc., et al v. Monica Slider, et al" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded this matter for a new trial, holding that the district court erred in proceeding to a trial without a jury on Plaintiff's causes of action for breach of contract, breach of guaranty, and unjust enrichment.Plaintiff's brought this complaint against Defendants for, among other causes of action, forcible entry and detainer. The district court granted relief on the forcible entry and detainer claim, ordering restitution. After a bench trial, the district court heard the remaining causes of action and awarded damages to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff's remaining causes of action were legal in nature, and the issues of fact that arose thereunder entitled Defendants to a jury trial unless waived; and (2) there was no waiver of Defendants' right to a jury trial. View "132 Ventures, LLC v. Active Spine Physical Therapy, LLC" on Justia Law

Detroit prohibits street vendors from selling their goods within 300 feet of sports arenas or stadiums. After the completion of Little Caesar’s Arena in 2017, the new home of the Red Wings and Pistons, Detroit refused to renew three vendor licenses for locations that fell within the 300-foot exclusion zone. The licenses had been in place since 2008. The displaced vendors sued, claiming due process violations.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Detroit. The ordinance does not create a property interest in a vendor’s license; it never says that applicants will receive licenses for the places they choose but requires that they apply “for an approved location,” and warns that the city may “terminate[] or eliminate[]” a vendor location. Detroit retains the discretion to deny or suspend licenses to prevent a violation of the rules or to protect public safety. Even a protected property interest would not suffice to defeat Detroit’s decision. Detroit had rational reasons for denying these vendor applications: its interest in preventing congestion on its sidewalks, ensuring sidewalk safety, eliminating blight and litter, and protecting arena operators from competition. A 300-foot buffer zone around arenas is a rational way to advance Detroit’s interest in preventing congestion. View "Williams v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the grants of dismissal and summary judgment as to claims of improper actions taken by the Regional Transportation Commission of Washoe County (RTC) during the completion of a construction project on Appellants' party following condemnation proceedings, holding that the district court erred in part.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing Appellants' claim for waste; (2) did not err in dismissing Appellants' separate cause of action for injunctive relief; (3) did not err in granting the RTC's motion for summary judgment as to Appellants' contract-based claims; and (4) erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the RTC as to Appellants' trespass claim and their request for declaratory relief. The Court vacated the order awarding RTC attorney fees and costs because, after remand, the RTC might not be the prevailing party. View "Iliescu v. Regional Transportation Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss the criminal case against him based on an alleged violation of his statutory speedy-trial right, holding that the State did not violate Defendant's speedy-trial rights.The day before trial was set to begin, Defendant moved to dismiss the case base on an alleged violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, Defendant entered a plea of no contest to a single felony count. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no violation of Defendant's statutory speedy-trial rights in this case. View "State v. Belville" on Justia Law

Oakland County took title to the plaintiffs’ homes under the Michigan General Property Tax Act, which (after a redemption period) required the state court to enter a foreclosure judgment that vested “absolute title” to the property in the governmental entity upon payment of the amount of the tax delinquency or “its fair market value.” The entity could then sell it at a public auction. No matter what the sale price, the property’s former owner had no right to any of the proceeds.In February 2018, under the Act, Oakland County foreclosed on Hall’s home to collect a tax delinquency of $22,642; the County then conveyed the property to the City of Southfield for that price. Southfield conveyed the property for $1 to a for-profit entity, the Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative, which later sold it for $308,000. Other plaintiffs had similar experiences.The plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. The “Michigan statute is not only self-dealing: it is also an aberration from some 300 years of decisions.” The government may not decline to recognize long-established interests in property as a device to take them. The County took the property without just compensation. View "Hall v. Meisner" on Justia Law

The Watters moved into the Preserve as the only black couple in the subdivision. Kate and Ed Mamaril have each been president of the Homeowners’ Association (HOA). When the Watters began construction, Ed told them that they were not welcome. There was a dispute about the Maramils’ cats. Subsequent encounters involved shoving and racial epithets. When the Watters asked for copies of the HOA’s restrictive covenants, Marmaril, as HOA president, refused to provide copies. The Watters had disputes with the HOA concerning mailboxes, paint colors, and porch posts. The HOA has a rule against privacy fences. Watters is a veteran who was diagnosed with PTSD after being trapped in a cave, with a dog. He is unable to work because of a terminal lung condition that further exacerbates his reactivity to dogs. Watters states that his doctors advised him to get a privacy fence to mitigate his PTSD triggers. He unsuccessfully requested the privacy fence as a reasonable and necessary accommodation. A subsequent dispute involved the Watters’ plan to construct a pool.In a suit under Fair Housing Act and 42 U.S.C. 1982, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The Watters can proceed with their race discrimination claim under the Act and section 1982 against the Mamarils, but not against the HOA. Without any evidence showing that the HOA knew about Watters’s PTSD, the Watters’ failure-to-accommodate claim cannot survive. View "Watters v. Homeowners Association at the Preserve at Bridgewater" on Justia Law