Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Landowners filed a complaint against the City of North Las Vegas for inverse condemnation and precondemnation damages. The district court awarded Landowners precondemnation damages and attorney fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders with the exception of the prejudgment interest award, which the Court reversed, concluding that the district court erred in failing to calculate prejudgment interest from the date on which the resulting injury arose. The City sought rehearing of that order on the prejudgment issue and on issues concerning the statute of limitations and standing. Although rehearing was not warranted, the Court took the opportunity to clarify the relevant law, holding (1) the Court’s dispositional order properly concluded that prejudgment interest should be calculated from the date of taking, which was the first date of compensable injury; (2) the City could not raise its statute of limitations argument for the first time on rehearing, and even if it could, that defense was inapplicable to the facts of this case; and (3) rehearing was not warranted to clarify whether the City can assert a standing defense on remand. View "City of N. Las Vegas v. 5th & Centennial, LLC" on Justia Law

The Porretto family owned several acres of property between the Galveston Seawall and the Gulf of Mexico. Due to the State’s repeated recharacterization of the Porretto’s property as public property, the Porrettos had difficulty selling the property. The Porrettos sued the State, arguing that the State’s claims made it impossible for them to sell their property and therefore amounted to a compensable taking. The trial court held that the State’s actions had resulted in a compensable taking and awarded the Porrettos $5.012 million as damages for the lost market value of the property taken. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the State’s actions did not constitute a taking. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that the State’s conduct did not constitute a taking and affirmed. View "Porretto v. Tex. Gen. Land Office" on Justia Law

Hescott, a U.S. Army pilot, has been routinely deployed to the Middle East. He and his son own a rental property in Saginaw, Michigan. When the property became vacant and they were unable to sell it in 2008, they planned to remodel it. In 2009 Hescott found that the basement wall had given way. He hired contractors to repair the foundation and returned to his post. Before the contractors could begin work, a police officer noticed children playing at the house and contacted the Dangerous Buildings Inspector. The Inspector and the Fire Marshal, determined that the house should be demolished immediately due to the threat to public safety. The city did not notify Hescott before or after the demolition. The house was demolished and all fixtures and materials were taken to a landfill. The city did not take an inventory or consider whether any salvageable items remained. When Hescott returned to assist his contractors with purchasing supplies, he realized his house was gone. The Hescotts sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Partial summary judgment left a viable claim under the Fourth Amendment for unlawful seizure of aluminum siding following demolition. Before trial, the Hescotts rejected an FRCP rule 68 offer of judgment of $15,000. The jury rejected inverse-condemnation and punitive damages claims, based on exigent circumstances, but awarded $5,000 for the aluminum. The court awarded costs to the Hescotts as “prevailing parties” on their Fourth Amendment claim, but denied attorney fees based on “the degree of success obtained,” and denied the city sanctions under Rule 68. The Sixth circuit reversed in part, holding that no special circumstances warranted denial of the Hescotts’ attorneys’ fees, but that attorneys’ fees are not awardable to a losing party, even one otherwise entitled to post-settlement-offer costs under Rule 68.View "Hescott v. City of Saginaw" on Justia Law

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) condemned a fifteen-acre parcel owned by Michael Carlson despite the fact that it needed just over one acre for its planned project. At issue in this case was whether Utah Code 72-5-113 authorized UDOT’s condemnation of the excess property and whether the taking failed for lack of a “public use” as required under the Takings Clause of the Utah Constitution or United States Constitution. The Supreme Court agreed with UDOT’s construction of section 113 and granted summary judgment in favor of UDOT without expressly addressing the constitutionality of the taking. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s endorsement of UDOT’s statutory authority to condemn excess property for transportation purposes; but (2) reversed and remanded to allow the district court to determine the constitutionality of UDOT’s condemnation of Carlson’s excess property. View "Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Appellant owned property located within the heart of a planned development. The City of Baltimore sought to condemn the property. When the City and Appellant were unable to agree upon a price to be paid for the property, the City filed a petition for condemnation. Prior to trial, the City filed a petition for immediate possession and title, alleging that immediate possession of the property was necessary. Ultimately, the circuit court concluded that Appellant was a “hold-out,” which justified a “quick-take” condemnation of the property. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the facts of this case justified a “quick-take” condemnation action. View "Makowski v. Mayor & City of Baltimore" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this eminent domain action seeking damages from the Commonwealth on account of land takings that the Commonwealth made in connection with the Sagamore Bridge Flyover Project in Bourne that eliminated a traffic rotary north of the bridge. Plaintiff owned parcels of land near the former rotary and operated a gas station on one of the parcels. After a jury trial, Plaintiff was awarded almost $3 million in damages. The Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) because the flyover project was not laid over a public way that directly abutted Plaintiff’s property, Plaintiff was not entitled to damages under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 81, 7C as a matter of law; and (2) because Plaintiff retained reasonable and appropriate access to and from the gas station parcel, Plaintiff was not entitled to impairment of access damages under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 79, 12. View "Sorenti Bros., Inc. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Through its power of eminent domain, the State of Nebraska Department of Roads (NDOR) took real property owned by Leo and Joanna Hike for a highway project. The parties were unable to agree on compensation, and the case proceeded to trial for a determination of damages. The principal issue disputed at trial was the fair market value of the Hikes’ property immediately prior to the taking, which depended on whether the property’s highest and best use at the time was residential or commercial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Hikes for $53,209, which suggested that the jury agreed with NDOR that the property must be valued as residential property. The Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict, holding (1) the district court did not commit prejudicial error with respect to the evidentiary issues raised by the Hikes; (2) the district court did not err in instructing the jury; and (3) the prosecutor made an improper comment during closing argument, but the comment did not prevent a fair verdict. View "Hike v. State" on Justia Law

Ozark Mountain Regional Public Water Authority filed a complaint for condemnation and declaration of taking, seeking to take property owned by Appellants. That same day, Ozark deposited $66,986, the fair-market-appraisal amount of the property, with the clerk of court. Appellants challenged the amount deposited, claiming it was not sufficient compensation. After a trial, the jury awarded Appellants $341,500 in compensation for the property. Thereafter, Appellants filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 18-15-605(b). The circuit court denied the motion, finding that section 18-15-605(b) was not applicable to Appellants’ case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that section 18-15-605(b) was not applicable to Appellants’ case and in thereby denying Appellants’ motion for attorney’s fees. View "Giles v. Ozark Mountain Reg'l Pub. Water Auth." on Justia Law

In 2006, the City of Phoenix started installing light rail tracks along Jefferson Street, which abutted Appellant’s property. As part of the installation, the City erected a permanent concrete barrier between the tracks and Appellant’s property, thus blocking two driveways providing vehicular access from Jefferson Street to Appellant’s property. The property, however, still had access via Madison Street. The City subsequently filed an eminent domain action to determine the compensation it owed to Appellant for a temporary construction easement Appellant granted the City. Appellant counterclaimed, seeking damages for his permanent loss of access to Jefferson Street. The superior court granted summary judgment to the City on that claim, concluding that a property owner is not entitled to compensation for loss of access if he retains “free and convenient access” to the property. The court of appeals vacated the superior court’s ruling, concluding that the government may not eliminate a property owner’s established access to an abutting roadway without providing just compensation to the property owner. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under these circumstances, an owner may claim compensable damage to private property within the meaning of Ariz. Const. art. II, 17, even if other streets provide access to the property. View "City of Phoenix v. Garretson" on Justia Law

By 2013, the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) had purchased several hundred properties for the construction of a highway project known as the Northern Beltway. In 2010, Plaintiffs filed a complaint and declaratory judgment against NCDOT, asserting claims for, inter alia, inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs also sought class certification for themselves and all others similarly situated whose property NCDOT was “obliged to purchase.” The proposed class included over 800 property owners within the Northern Beltway. The trial court denied NCDOT’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim of inverse condemnation but denied class certification. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals, holding (1) the courts below erred in analyzing the substantive merits of Plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim at the class certification stage; and (2) the court of appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification because the unique nature of property, coupled with the large number of diverse tracts involved in this litigation, would make individual issues predominate over common issues of law and fact in a trial on the merits. View "Beroth Oil Co. v. N.C. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law