Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The city of Laredo filed suit to condemn Respondents' property. A jury found that the City had no authorized public use for the property and awarded Respondents attorney's fees and expenses under Tex. Prop. Code 21.019(c), a fee-shifting statute that authorizes the trial court to award a property owner reasonable and necessary fees and expenses when condemnation is denied. The court of appeals reformed the award in part and, as reformed, affirmed. The City appealed, asking the Supreme Court to remand the attorney's fees award for reconsideration because of inadequacies in Respondents' proof. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that deficiencies remained in Respondents' proof of attorney's fees. Remanded. View "City of Laredo v. Montano" on Justia Law

The City of Conway and Conway Corporation (collectively, "Conway") filed a land condemnation action against Petitioners, property owners. The morning of trial, Petitioners requested a continuance. The circuit court granted the continuance on the condition that Petitioners would be responsible for Conway's attorney's fees and costs associated with preparing for the trial. The continuance order also prohibited Petitioners from filing any additional pleadings until the attorneys' fees and costs were paid. Petitioners subsequently filed this motion for writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, writ of certiorari to rescind the order. The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition but granted the writ of certiorari, holding that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction and committed a manifest, clear and gross abuse of discretion in ordering Petitioners to pay Conway's attorney's fees and costs. View "Cooper v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Appellant Laura Lee Neva sued Appellee Jim Bates, arguing he violated Montana's Human Rights Act by halting necessary repairs to a commercial building she rented from him because she rebuffed his sexual advances. In her complaint to the Human Rights Commission, Appellant alleged violation of the Public Accommodations Provision but made no mention of the Real-Estate Transaction Provision. The Commission nevertheless found that Appellee violated the Real-Estate Transaction Provision by sexually harassing Appellant while she was leasing the space from him. The District Court reversed that decision, holding that the Commission’s action violated Appellee's right to due process. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the District Court erred in its conclusion that Appellee was not afforded due process when Appellant brought claims under section 49-2-304 of the Act, but that the Commission did not find he violated section 49-2-305. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, finding that the essential difference between a 49-2-304 claim and a 49-2-305 claim was the setting of the discrimination: a place of public accommodation as opposed to a real-estate transaction. "The setting here was fully litigated, as was the discrimination- Bates' sexual harassment of Neva." The Court concluded Appellee understood the issues as was afforded full opportunity to justify his conduct. Therefore, his due process rights were not violated. View "Bates v. Neva" on Justia Law

This case concerned efforts by the Town of Nags Head, North Carolina, to declare beachfront properties that encroach onto "public trust lands" a nuisance, and regulate them accordingly. In the related appeal of Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, the district court adjudicated the claims but concluded that it was inappropriate for a "federal court to intervene in such delicate state-law matters," and abstained from decision under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. The court reversed the district court's decision to abstain in this case where resolving the claims in this case was not sufficiently difficult or disruptive of that policy to free the district court from its "unflagging obligation to exercise its jurisdiction." Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko" on Justia Law

A 2010 fire at an apartment in Erie, Pennsylvania took the lives of a tenant and her guest. The third-floor bedroom purportedly lacked a smoke detector and an alternate means of egress, both of which are required under the Section 8 housing choice voucher program (42 U.S.C. 1437f) in which Richardson participated. The district court rejected a defense of qualified immunity in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by the estates of the deceased. The Third Circuit reversed. State officials’ approval and subsidization of the apartment for the Section 8 program, even though the apartment allegedly failed to comply with Section 8’s standards, did not constitute a state-created danger toward the apartment’s tenant and her guest in violation of their constitutional substantive due process rights. View "Henry v. City of Erie" on Justia Law

Frey has owned the Peoria commercial property, which contains a shopping center, for more than 40 years, without prior incident. In 2009, a tenant, ShopRite, was found to be illegally selling Viagra without a licensed pharmacist. The city took legal action against Patel (the franchisee) personally, and the business, then revoked the liquor license for the store and “site approval for the retail sale of alcoholic liquors at the location.” Frey asserted due process violations. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected the claims. Frey did not adequately explain a substantive due process claim and had no property right such that it was entitled to any process at all before revocation of its site approval, but Frey nonetheless received due process of law before the Peoria Liquor Commission. View "Frey Corp. v. City of Peoria" on Justia Law

African-American and Hispanic borrowers under National City Bank mortgages, 2006-2007, sued, alleging violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3605, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 1691, by an established pattern or practice of racial discrimination in the financing of home purchases. They cited National’s “Discretionary Pricing Policy,” under which brokers and loan officers could add a subjective surcharge of points, fees, and credit costs to an otherwise objective, risk-based rate, so that minority applicants were “charged a disproportionately greater amount in non-risk-related charges than similarly-situated Caucasian persons.” During discovery, National provided data on more than two million loans issued from 2001 to 2008. After mediation, the parties reached a proposed settlement: National did not concede wrongdoing, but would pay $7,500 to each named plaintiff, $200 to each class payee, $75,000 to two organizations for counseling and other services for the class, and $2,100,000 in attorneys’ fees. After granting preliminary approval and certification of the proposed class, the district court considered the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, and held that the class failed to meet Rule 23(a)’s commonality and typicality requirements and denied certification. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the proposed class is national, with 153,000 plaintiffs who obtained loans at more than 1,400 branches; significant disparity in one branch or region could skew the average, producing results indicating national disparity, when the problem may be more localized. View "Rodriguez v. Nat'l City Bank" on Justia Law

Petitioners, residents of Maui, challenged the Maui County Council's (MCC) passage of two bills related to the development of a residential community on 670 acres of land in Wailea (Wailea 670 project), arguing that MCC and its committee, the Land Use Committee (LUC) failed to satisfy the requirements of the State open meetings law, known as the Sunshine Law. Specifically, Petitioners claimed (1) the recessing and reconvening of two meetings without providing additional notice and opportunity for public oral testimony violated the Sunshine Law; and (2) the circulation of memoranda among the board membership outside a duly noticed meeting violated the Sunshine Law. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of Respondents, MCC, County of Maui, and the land developer. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the LUC and MCC did not violate the Sunshine Law by reconvening the two meetings beyond a single continuance without posting a new agenda and without accepting public oral testimony at every reconvened meeting; and (2) the MCC violated the Sunshine Law by distributing written memoranda among its members outside of a duly noticed meeting, but the violation did not require invalidation of MCC's passage of the Wailea 670 bills. View "Kanahele v. Maui County Council" on Justia Law

The City of Papillion condemned property owned by Appellant for a road project. The City built a new road on Appellant's new property along with an iron fence on the north side of the road, which abutted Appellant's remaining property. Appellant brought suit. The trial court concluded that the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and that the City's building of the fence was not a second taking that limited Appellant's access to the new road. Appellant appealed these issues. The City cross appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting Appellant interest, fees, expenses, and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to timely appeal its claims that the trial court erred in concluding the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and the City's building of the fence was not a second taking; and (2) the court's award of interest, fees, expenses, and costs was proper. View "Pinnacle Enters. v. City of Papillion" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Town after the Town declared plaintiffs' cottages to be in violation of its nuisance ordinance. The cottages were considered nuisances as a result of storm or erosion damage. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' procedural due process claims because plaintiffs' procedural due process rights were not violated where the Town never deprived plaintiffs of any property interest; affirmed the grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' equal protection claims because plaintiffs' equal protection rights were not violated where the Town had a rational basis for its decision to declare plaintiffs' cottages nuisances under the Town's ordinance; and remanded the takings claims based on the court's conclusion that a state and its political subdivisions waived the state-litigation requirement by removing a case to federal court. View "Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head" on Justia Law