Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case were two agreements: a ground lease agreement between ASC Utah, Inc. (ASCU) and Wolf Mountain Resorts, and a specifically planned area (SPA) development agreement, which had thirty-six signatories, including ASCU, Wolf Mountain, the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership (Osguthorpe). ASCU and Wolf Mountain began litigating claims involving both the ground lease and the SPA agreement. Shortly thereafter, Osguthorpe sued ASCU and Wolf Mountain, alleging that each party had breached a land-lease agreement distinct from the ground lease or the SPA agreement. The district court consolidated Osguthorpe's separate actions into ASCU's litigation. Osguthorpe later moved to compel arbitration on all the claims related to the SPA agreement, including the claims between ASCU and Wolf Mountain, to which Osguthrope was not a party. The district court denied Osguthrope's motion. Osguthrope withdrew its SPA claims from the case, leaving for appeal only Osguthrope's motion to compel arbitration of the SPA claims between ASCU and Wolf Mountain. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the disputes for which Osguthrope sought to compel arbitration were not subject to the SPA agreement's arbitration provision; and (2) furthermore, as a non-party to the disputes, Osguthrope had no contractual right to compel their arbitration. View "Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C." on Justia Law

The Town of Madawaska foreclosed on Jeffrey and Jeanne Stoops' property after the Stoops failed to pay municipal taxes. The Town then conveyed the property to Richard and Betty Nelson by municipal quitclaim deed. The Stoopses subsequently filed a complaint against Richard Nelson seeking to quiet title to the property and asking the court to declare the respective rights of the parties to the property. The superior court granted the Nelsons' motion for summary judgment. The Stoopses appealed, arguing (1) the Town failed to give the Stoopses proper notice of the pending foreclosure in violation of their due process rights, and (2) the Town failed to adhere strictly to the requirements of the statutorily outlined steps a municipality must take to foreclose on a municipal tax lien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Town complied with the requirements of the statutory scheme and gave the Stoopses sufficient notice, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Nelsons. View "Stoops v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The owner (an Asian Indian) of 60-room hotel in a manufacturing district near a major highway in Oak Forest, a Chicago suburb, sued the city, charging racial discrimination in zoning (42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982) and that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, based on the city’s refusal to allow it to sell the hotel for conversion to a retirement home to be owned by a church in which most of the membership is African-American. The city claimed that a retirement home would not be “highway oriented” and, after the plan was proposed, amended its ordinance so that the hotel became nonconforming, and denied a special use permit. The owner later lost the hotel in foreclosure; it is now operating as a hotel under new ownership. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting numerous irregularities in the zoning process, but stating that the owner presented no evidence that any comparable facility, serving a white clientele, has ever been permitted by Oak Forest in a comparable district. View "Parvati Corp. v. City of Oak Forest" on Justia Law

In 1994, Plaintiff granted a drainage easement to Pennington County on land he owned. In 1996, silt began to accumulate near the bottom of the canyon on part of Plaintiff's land due to the County's repair of a section of road abutting Plaintiff's land. In 2010, Plaintiff filed suit against the County for nuisance, constructive taking, trespass, and unlawful taking. The trial court granted summary judgment for the County, determining that there was no continuing tort and that the statute of limitations had run. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for the County, as the County's actions did not constitute a continuing tort, and thus, Plaintiff's action was untimely filed. View "Brandt v. County of Pennington" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were a group of landowners who owned properties abutting South Avenue in the City of Missoula. This lawsuit arose out of dispute between Plaintiffs and the City concerning the width of a public right-of-way constituting South Avenue. Following a bench trial, the district court determined that the right-of-way was sixty feet wide. Because the City's recent improvements to South Avenue extended beyond this sixty-foot parameter, the district court concluded that the City had effected a taking of property and awarded Plaintiffs compensation for the taking as well as their requested costs and attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court on all but two issues, holding that the district court (1) applied an incorrect measure of compensation; and (2) erroneously barred Plaintiffs' counsel from passing on to his clients the costs and fees incurred in proving underlying litigation expenses other than attorney's fees. Remanded. View "Wohl v. City of Missoula" on Justia Law

Petitioner Charlene Burnett filed this action against James H. Woodall, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., and fifty unnamed individuals. The complaint asserted violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (USCPA), and other related claims arising out of the foreclosure of her home. The district court dismissed Petitioner's complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and she appealed that decision. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court: "We will not review an issue in the absence of reasoned arguments advanced by the appellant as to the grounds for its appeal." View "Burnett v. Mortgage Electronic, et al" on Justia Law

The City of Rapid City applied a deicer to the streets adjacent to property owned by the Ruperts. The Ruperts sued the City, claiming that the deicer ran onto their property and destroyed several pine trees. The trial court granted the Ruperts' motion for summary judgment on their inverse condemnation claim, and a jury awarded the Ruperts $126,530 to compensate them for the damage to their property. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Ruperts on their inverse condemnation claim, but the measure of damages used at trial for purposes of calculating the just compensation award was erroneous; (2) the trial court properly denied the Ruperts' request for attorney fees; and (3) the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City on the Ruperts' claims of negligence and trespass did not constitute reversible error. Remanded for a new trial on damages. View "Rupert v. City of Rapid City" on Justia Law

The City brought an eminent domain action to acquire a forty-foot-wide strip of real property from Respondent. Respondent's predecessor-in-interest originally acquired title to this property through a federal land patent that reserved a thirty-three-foot-wide easement across the strip of property for "roadway and public utilities purposes." The City asserted that it sought to utilize its existing rights to the thirty-three-foot right-of-way under the federal land patent's easement and to attain, by condemnation, the remaining seven-foot portion of land. The district court granted Respondent partial summary judgment and awarded Respondent $394,490 in compensation, concluding that the City lacked any right to use the easement because the federal patent did not specifically name the City. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in (1) determining that the federal land patent did not create a thirty-three-foot-wide easement, as the plain meaning of the patent's language created a valid public easement; (2) determining that the City's proposed use of the easement constituted a taking, as the use of this easement was within its scope and did not strip Respondent of a property interest; and (3) awarding Respondent just compensation and attorney fees. View "City of Las Vegas v. Cliff Shadows Prof'l Plaza, LLC" on Justia Law

Mariner's Cove Townhomes Association appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the pleadings for the United States. The district court held that the Association was not entitled to just compensation for the diminution of its assessment base resulting from the government's condemnation of fourteen properties in the Mariner's Cove Development. The court found that the Association's right to collect assessments was a property interest, but the loss of the Association's assessment base was incidental to the condemnation and was barred by the consequential loss rule. Accordingly, the court held that the loss of the Association's right to collect assessments on those properties was not compensable under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. View "United States v. Land" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a petition for judicial review of the Baltimore City Council's approval of a planned unit development (PUD) with a Wal-Mart supercenter. Both Petitioners' residences were approximately 0.4 miles away from the PUD. The Mayor and City Council of the City, the owners of the property, and the developers of the PUD (Respondents) filed motions to dismiss, alleging that Petitioners lacked standing to challenge the PUD. The circuit court granted Respondents' motions and dismissed Petitioners' petition for review. The court of special appeals affirmed, concluding that Petitioners did not qualify for prima facie aggrieved status and that they had failed to show any special aggrievement different from the general public. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the circuit court did not err in its judgment, as Petitioners failed to allege specific facts that they had been specially aggrieved in a manner different than the public generally. View "Ray v. Baltimore" on Justia Law