Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This eminent domain proceeding involved City's condemnation of a tract of land owned by Landowner. Company leased from Landowner approximately 500 square feet of the property for operation of a billboard. The tract was valued at $1,075,600 with no compensation given for the billboard structure and no consideration as to the advertising income produced by Company's leasehold. City and Landowner accepted the appraisers' award, but Company appealed. The district court granted City's motion for summary judgment and affirmed the appraisers' award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for City, as (1) evidence of advertising income generated by the billboard was irrelevant to the value of the property under any authorized valuation approach; and (2) Company did not come forward with relevant and admissible evidence that could alter the appraisers' valuation of the land at issue. View "City of Wichita v. Denton" on Justia Law

MCR, LLC filed an action for condemnation of a compressor station site on property owned by Appellees. Appellees counterclaimed against MCR for damage to their property and claimed punitive damages. Appellees sought restoration costs as the measure of damages for their contract, trespass, and nuisance claims. The parties stipulated to the substitution of MCR Transmission, LLC (MCR-T) for MCR on the condemnation claim. The district court dismissed MCR-T's condemnation claim and granted Appellees' summary judgment motion allowing Appellees to seek restoration costs. The jury awarded restoration costs and punitive damages to Appellees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court (1) erred in dismissing MCR-T's motion to condemn Appellees' property for a compressor station, as genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Appellees' property was necessary for the compressor station; (2) properly determined that Appellees were entitled to seek restoration costs as the measure of their damages; and (3) properly admitted evidence at trial that MCR had jumped Appellees' bid on state trust land leases. View "McEwen v. MCR, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal was the third in the course of this litigation. Plaintiffs were a group of landowners with properties on the shores of Flathead Lake and a portion of the upper Flathead River. Plaintiffs commenced this action in 1999 against Montana Power Company (MPC) and MPC's successor, PPL Montana, LLC, asserting claims of trespass, nuisance, a taking of property, and breach of easements. In Mattson II, Plaintiffs filed motions to certify the lawsuit as a class action. The district court granted the motions as to both Defendants. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's orders concerning class certification. On remand, the district court denied Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in its application of Mattson II to the class-certification question under Mont. R. Civ. P. 23; and (2) the six criteria for certification of a class action under Rule 23 were satisfied in this case. Remanded with instructions to certify the class. View "Mattson v. Mont. Power Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned a home on Grassy Pond Road in Hopkinton, Rhode Island. The Hopkinton Planning Board granted a developer's application to develop a residential subdivision on a tract adjacent to Plaintiff's land on the condition that Grassy Pond Road be reconfigured and reconstructed. The reconstruction required a permit from the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM), which was issued. Plaintiff attempted to appeal the issuance of the permit. In the meantime, the developer sold its land, and the DEM permit expired. The subdivision proposal was subsequently abandoned, and Plaintiff's state-court appeal was dismissed as moot. Plaintiff, however, filed suit in federal district court against the State of Rhode Island, the DEM, the town of Hopkinton, the Board, the developer, and others, alleging various constitutional and pendent state-law claims, including a takings claim. The district court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss, holding, among other things, that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff's takings claim because Plaintiff failed to pursue available state procedures in an endeavor to secure just compensation. The First Circuit Court of affirmed for substantially the reasons limned in the district court's opinion. View "Marek v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were owners of real property in the Town of Chester (Town), New York. Plaintiffs then lived in New Jersey, and their address there appeared on the deed. Plaintiffs subsequently moved without informing the Town taxing authorities of their new address. After Plaintiffs failed to pay taxes on their New York property for three years, Plaintiffs defaulted in a foreclosure proceeding brought by the County on their New York property. The property was later sold. Plaintiffs subsequently sued the County, asserting that the attempts to give them notice of the foreclosure were constitutionally inadequate and seeking a declaration that they still owned the property. Supreme Court granted the County's motion for summary judgment, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) when notice mail to Plaintiffs at their last known address proved undeliverable, the tax collector was not constitutionally required to find some means of making personal service on them, or to address a notice to "occupant" at the former address, or to search New Jersey public records for a new address; and (2) therefore, Plaintiffs were not deprived of their property without due process of law. View "Naughton v. Warren County" on Justia Law

This was an original action by Relators, property owners, for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, the Department of Natural Resources and its director, to initiate appropriation proceedings for the physical taking of their property resulting from flooding caused by a spillway constructed by Respondents and the state's lake-level-management practices. On December 1, 2011, the court granted a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents to commence appropriation proceedings to determine the amount of their taking of the property. Following failed settlement negotiations, the State filed appropriation cases for the property of two of the relators. All of the relators with the exception of the two then filed a motion for an order for Respondents to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of the court's December 1, 2011 writ. The Supreme Court held that Relators established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents were in contempt of the court's December 1, 2011 writ and ordered Respondents to file appropriation cases for Respondents' parcels. View "State ex rel. Doner v. Zehringer" on Justia Law

Helena Sand and Gravel, Inc. (HSG) challenged Lewis and Clark County's decision to adopt a citizen-initiated proposal to configure a zoning district that favored residential uses and prohibited mining. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the County had properly adopted the zoning pattern and regulations creating the district, and the County's zoning decision did not constitute a taking of HSG's property. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded, holding (1) the County's decision to adopt the zoning pattern and regulations for the district was not clearly unreasonable or an abuse of discretion; (2) the County's adoption of zoning regulations prohibiting sand and gravel mining did not constitute illegal reverse spot zoning; and (3) because HSG had a constitutionally protected property interest in property within the district, the Court granted HSG's request for remand to the district court for the parties to brief the Penn Central takings test, narrowly limited to whether the County's adoption of the zoning pattern and regulations in the district constituted a taking of HSG's real property interest without just compensation. View "Helena Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a circuit court judgment affirming the classification of real property for tax purposes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly found that the Arkansas Constitution and the Assessment Coordination Rules and Regulations allowed the land at issue to be classified as residential and not timber land; (2) ad hoc requirements were not imposed only on Appellants by Appellee Pope County Board of Equalization (BOE); (3) Appellants failed to demonstrate that they were similarly situated to any other taxpayer or landowner within the city limits, and therefore, Appellants' equal-protection claim that the circuit court erred in denying Appellants' petition without considering similarly situated property owners with similar property classified as timber and pasture within city limits was without merit; and (4) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a site visit by BOE's expert witness between the first day of trial and the second day of trial. View "McWilliams v. Pope County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Applicant Marilyn Clifford appealed the denial of long-term home-care benefits under the Medicaid-funded Choices for Care program, arguing that a second home on an adjacent piece of property should have been excluded from the financial-eligibility calculation. Given the language of the regulation, the legislative history that led to its promulgation, and the policy considerations attending the Medicaid program, the Supreme Court concluded that the Secretary correctly interpreted the home-exclusion rule when he reinstated the determination of the Department of Children and Families denying the benefits. Thus, the Court found no compelling indication of error in the Secretary’s determination and affirmed. View "In re Marilyn Clifford" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was (1) whether an ordinance authorizing the acquisition of an easement by condemnation also confers the authority to acquire the easement by an action to quiet title, and (2) whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the circuit court's ruling that the City of Virginia Beach proved an implied dedication of the disputed easements and whether the court erred in ruling that Lynnhaven Dunes Condominium Association was not entitled to compensation for its loss of riparian rights. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the authorizing ordinance fully encompassed the City's actions in bringing this condemnation proceeding, and the evidence was sufficient to support the circuit court's ruling that the City had proven it had acquired the easements by implied dedication; but (2) the circuit court erred in ruling that Lynnhaven's loss of riparian rights was non-compensable. View "Lynnhaven Dunes Condo. Ass'n v. City of Virginia Beach" on Justia Law