Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Letitia Kilby filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, claiming unlawful housing discrimination by Defendants, the town housing authority and a property management company. The Commission found reasonable cause to believe that unlawful discrimination occurred. The trial court then granted Defendants' request to file a civil action in the trial court. Kilby moved to intervene, claiming both intervention as of right and permissive intervention. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court reversed, concluding that although the statute at issue, Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-83(d)(2), did not expressly grant Kilby a right of intervention, it impliedly granted Kilby a right of intervention. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' petition for certification to appeal, but while the case was pending, the legislature enacted Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, which amended the text of section 46a-83 to allow a complainant to intervene as of right in a housing discrimination action brought by the commission on behalf of the complainant. The Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the significance of Defendants' appeal was substantially undermined by Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, and, thus, certification was improvidently granted.

Plaintiff sued defendants, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the Alaska Department of Transportation (Alaska), and the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska), in federal court, alleging causes of action for inverse condemnation, injunctive relief, nuisance, breach of fiduciary duties, and civil rights violations. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the action against the BLM and Alaska on the basis of sovereign immunity. The court held that federal sovereign immunity barred plaintiff's inverse condemnation, injunctive relief, and civil rights violations claims against the United States, but that the Federal Tort Claims Act, 25 U.S.C. 345, could provide a waiver of the government sovereign immunity for plaintiff's nuisance and breach of fiduciary duties claims. Additionally, the court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred plaintiff's action against Alaska in its entirety. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.

Tiffany Lewis and Ryan Gran, neither of whom had a real estate brokerage license, founded Kansas City Premier Apartments, a business devoted to assisting owners of rental property in locating prospective renters. After the Missouri Real Estate Commission informed Lewis that KCPA was conducting real estate activity without a Missouri real estate license in violation of Missouri law, KCPA filed a lawsuit requesting a declaratory judgment that Mo. Rev. Stat. 339 did not encompass its business activities, that it was exempted from licensure requirements, and that the Commission's interpretation of chapter 339 violated KCPA's rights under the United States and Missouri constitutions. The Commission filed a petition for a preliminary injunction, and the two cases were consolidated. The trial court issued an injunction against KCPA. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) KCPA failed to meet its burden that it qualified for an exemption; (2) the challenged provisions of chapter 339 did not violate KCPA's freedom of speech under either the Missouri or United States constitutions; (3) the exemptions listed in chapter 339 did not violate the equal protection clause of the Missouri Constitution; and (5) the challenged provisions of the law were not unconstitutionally vague.

Plaintiff sued the Wild Rose Casino and an agent of the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation alleging violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as state law claims for false arrest and imprisonment where plaintiff was arrested for trespass when she entered the casino after having signed two voluntary exclusion forms at the casino's predecessor establishment. Charges against plaintiff were subsequently dropped. Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the agent and the casino. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that the agent was entitled to qualified immunity where he had an objectively reasonable belief that plaintiff was trespassing. The court also held that the release contained in the 2005 form that plaintiff signed was valid and enforceable and therefore, absolved the casino of any liability from plaintiff's constitutional and state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff sued the Wild Rose Casino and an agent of the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation alleging violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as state law claims for false arrest and imprisonment where plaintiff was arrested for trespass when she entered the casino after having signed two voluntary exclusion forms at the casino's predecessor establishment. Charges against plaintiff were subsequently dropped. Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the agent and the casino. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that the agent was entitled to qualified immunity where he had an objectively reasonable belief that plaintiff was trespassing. The court also held that the release contained in the 2005 form that plaintiff signed was valid and enforceable and therefore, absolved the casino of any liability from plaintiff's constitutional and state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff, a Christian congregation church, sued the City of Yuma when the city prevented the church from conducting church services in a building it had bought for that purpose. At issue was the "equal terms" provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The court held that the church's claims for declaratory judgment and injunction were moot where the church no longer owned the building, so the city could not be required to issue a conditional use permit for the building to the church. Nor could the church be entitled to a declaration that a code provision and statute violated federal law because they no longer affected the church. The court also held that, because the city required religious assemblies to obtain a conditional use permit, and did not require similarly situated secular membership assemblies to do the same, it violated RLUIPA's equal terms provision. Therefore, the court did not reach the church's argument that the ordinance violated the Free Exercise Clause. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to adjudicate the church's claims as to damages.

Subdivision residents claimed that a retention pond's problems with algae, mosquitoes, and flooding would be exacerbated by proposed expansion of the subdivision. The residents, most of whom are African-American, claimed that the town was unresponsive to their concerns, but responded to similar concerns from white residents of another subdivision. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, as modified. The residents did not have any evidence that a subdivision, similar except for the race of the residents, was treated differently, but relied solely on allegations. State law claims should have been dismissed, not remanded.

Plaintiff claims that in 2005 county officials told his mobile home park tenants to stop paying rent and vacate. In 2006 the health department obtained a court order to remove the remaining 13 units. Plaintiff claims that he did not appeal because he is bipolar and the county caused him stress. The owner alleges numerous illegal actions in connection with the demolition of the units and that the sheriff refused to investigate. In 2009 and 2010 the district court dismissed claims and amended claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying the two-year Indiana statute of limitations. The court rejected claims of fraudulent concealment of conspiracy; the owner did not state facts sufficient to establish post-2007 conspiracy.

Plaintiff claims that in 2005 county officials told his mobile home park tenants to stop paying rent and vacate. In 2006 the health department obtained a court order to remove the remaining 13 units. Plaintiff claims that he did not appeal because he is bipolar and the county caused him stress. The owner alleges numerous illegal actions in connection with the demolition of the units and that the sheriff refused to investigate. In 2009 and 2010 the district court dismissed claims and amended claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying the two-year Indiana statute of limitations. The court rejected claims of fraudulent concealment of conspiracy; the owner did not state facts sufficient to establish post-2007 conspiracy.

In 2000 the planning board approved a development and the developer began purchasing land. In 2002, the Department of Justice issued an opinion that the land could be sold without legislative action, although it was gained from the sea. Construction began; the developer invested $200 million. Because of protests, the legislature investigated and concluded that the developer lacked valid title. A 2007 Department of Justice opinion stated that the land belonged to the public domain. The governor suspended permits and froze construction. Pending a hearing, the developer filed a quiet title action. The Regulations and Permits Administration upheld suspension of construction. The Puerto Rico appeals court ordered the administration to hold an evidentiary hearing (which did not occur), but did not lift the stay on construction. The developer succeeded in its quiet title action; in 2008 construction resumed. The supreme court held that the developer's due process rights had been violated. The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed. Although the plaintiff did state a procedural due process claim, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The defendants were not on clear notice they they were required to hold a meaningful pre-deprivation hearing.