Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Luster was buying a house on contract and had already paid the owner at least 20 percent of the price of the home. The village contacted Luster to obtain the property to create a municipal park. Luster rebuffed this offer. The village then contacted the seller. Luster claims the village knew of his contract but convinced the seller to convey a warranty deed to the village without notifying Luster. The village then sent a letter to Luster demanding immediate possession of the property. According to Luster, he was unable to insure the house because of the ownership dispute. The house burned down while Luster was attempting to quiet title, destroying his family’s possessions and leaving them homeless. Luster sued the village under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking damages for his lost property and the village’s “malicious conduct.” He alleged that the village took the home without adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.The Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal of the complaint. Luster’s complaint does not allege or permit a reasonable inference that he was deprived of his property by the random, unauthorized acts of any village employee. Absent any obvious reason why the village could not have provided advance notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before it seized Luster’s property interest, the adequacy of a post-deprivation remedy is irrelevant. View "Luster v. Village of Ashmore" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Relator's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Department Transportation and its director (collectively, ODOT) to begin appropriation proceedings for the taking of real property owned by Relator, holding that appropriation proceedings were necessary.ODOT's roadway construction project resulted in Relator's property being inaccessible from any road. Relator filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 163. ODOT argued in response that Relator could obtain a permit from the city of Cleveland to connect the property to a road and that Relator must apply for and be denied such a permit before he was entitled to mandamus. The Supreme Court granted Relator's request for a writ of mandamus and ordered ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings, holding that Relator was entitled to a writ compelling ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings. View "State ex rel. Balunek v. Marchbanks" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals determining that the Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District Board of Commissioners failed to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 1545.11 when it initiated appropriation proceedings to take private property owed by Landowner, holding that the trial court's orders denying Landowner's motions for summary judgment were not final, appealable orders.The Park District initiated appropriation proceedings against Landowner. Landowner answered by denying the necessity of the appropriation and the Park District's authority to appropriate the property. The trial court denied Landowner's motions for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for Landowner. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment, holding that the court erred in determining that the trial court's orders denying Landowner's motions for summary judgment were final, appealable orders. View "Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District Bd. of Commissioners v. Less" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's ruling in this eminent domain case between Tenants and City involving the requirement that a condemning authority provide certain relocation benefits and assistance to those displaced by the government's exercise of eminent domain, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Tenants' petition to recover relocation expenses.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Tenants' petition because the Kansas Eminent Domain Procedure Act (EDPA), Kan. Stat. Ann. 26-501 et seq., neither provides a private right of action to recover relocation benefits nor authorizes judicial review of relocation-benefit determinations in eminent-domain appeals; (2) while the Kansas Relocation Assistance for Persons Displayed by Acquisition of Real Property Act (KRA), Kan. Stat. Ann. 58-3501 et seq., does provide an administrative remedy to vindicate the statutory right to relocation benefits, Tenants' failure to exhaust this administrative remedy deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction under the KRA; and (3) while Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-2101(d) authorizes appeals to the district court from certain final judgments and orders of a political subdivision, the statute did not apply in this case. View "Kan. Fire & Safety Equipment v. City of Topeka" on Justia Law

Jenkins purchased a 1987 Oldsmobile and a 2001 Chevrolet and transferred the titles to his mother, Buchanan, retaining exclusive use of both vehicles. The DEA, investigating Jenkins for drug conspiracy crimes, seized the vehicles, which were towed to an impound lot. The DEA obtained a search warrant, which was executed in October 2012. In April 2013, Jenkins pled guilty and was sentenced to 252 months of imprisonment. In October, the impound lot sent letters to the address on file for Buchanan notifying her that the vehicles could be reclaimed upon payment of towing and storage charges. Buchanan did not receive the letters, having moved. No letter was addressed to Jenkins. Jenkins acknowledged that he “was informed" to pick up the vehicles. In February 2014, the impound lot sent final notices to Buchanan, who was incarcerated, then sold the vehicles, retaining the proceeds.In 2017, Jenkins moved in his criminal case for the return of the cars (FRCP 41(g)). The government responded that the cars “are available for return.” The court dismissed the motion. In 2019, Jenkins unsuccessfully sought monetary compensation in excess of $10,000, then filed a civil action under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2), alleging a physical taking of his vehicles. The Sixth Circuit vacated summary judgment. While the government’s police power may preclude liability for an initial seizure, there is no police power exception that precludes takings liability for the period after the property is not needed for criminal proceedings. The court noted a factual issue of abandonment and affirmed the dismissal of the due process clause for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice. View "Jenkins v. United States" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from the tragic death of a man who died while in custody. Appellants appealed the district court’s orders dismissing their claims against the Sheriff and granting summary judgment to the Fulton County Sheriff’s Department Officers, NaphCare, and a NaphCare employee.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the Sheriff and its grant of summary judgment to both the Officers and the employee. However, the court vacated and remanded the district court’s summary judgment in favor of NaphCare. The court explained that in Appellants’ response to NaphCare’s motion for summary judgment, Appellants relied mainly on the medical report and deposition of Dr. Timothy Hughes but also referred to the report and deposition of two other witnesses, as required by O.C.G.A. Section 9-11-9.1. Dr. Hughes’s report concluded the failure of NaphCare medical staff to properly screen, examine, and treat the decedent was the proximate cause of his death. This testimony is supported by the other witnesses. The court agreed with Appellants that, based on Dr. Hughes’s testimony, there is enough of a genuine issue of material fact for NaphCare’s liability to reach a jury. Dr. Hughes did not solely rest his argument on NaphCare’s failure to sedate the decedent. It was the failure of the staff to follow through with the decedent at all that was the problem. While this included the need for sedation, it also included immediate classification to suicide watch and observation. View "April Myrick, et al v. Fulton County, Georgia, et al" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Matthew Haney's complaint, brought as the Trustee of the Gooseberry Island Trust, against the Town of Mashpee and its Zoning Board of Appeals, holding that Haney's arguments on appeal were either waived or meritless.Haney brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that Defendants' actions constituted uncompensated taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution due to an unconstitutional taking and the Massachusetts Constitution due to inverse condemnation. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the claims were not ripe for review. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Haney waived his argument relative to whether the government had reached a final decision on the Trust's request for variances; and (2) Haney's remaining arguments were meritless. View "Haney v. Town of Mashpee" on Justia Law

Tyler's Hennepin County, Minnesota condominium accumulated about $15,000 in unpaid real estate taxes plus interest and penalties. The County seized the condo and sold it for $40,000, keeping the $25,000 excess over Tyler’s tax debt for itself, Minn. Stat. 281.18, 282.07, 282.08. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Tyler’s suit.The Supreme Court reversed. Tyler plausibly alleges that Hennepin County’s retention of the excess value of her home above her debt violated the Takings Clause. Whether the remaining value from a tax sale is property protected under the Takings Clause depends on state law, “traditional property law principles,” historical practice, and Supreme Court precedents. Though state law is an important source of property rights, it cannot “sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property interests” in assets it wishes to appropriate. The County's use of its power to sell Tyler’s home to recover the unpaid property taxes to confiscate more property than was due effected a “classic taking in which the government directly appropriates private property for its own use.” Supreme Court precedent recognizes that a taxpayer is entitled to any surplus in excess of the debt owed. Minnesota law itself recognizes in other contexts that a property owner is entitled to any surplus in excess of her debt. The Court rejected an argument that Tyler had no property interest in the surplus because she constructively abandoned her home by failing to pay her taxes. View "Tyler v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law

In this action brought by Utah Stream Access Coalition (USAC) after USAC members were cited for trespass for wading in the Provo River on property owned by VR Acquisitions the Supreme Court held that the district court correctly entered judgment against USAC.In its complaint, USAC claimed that the Public Waters Access Act (PWAA) violated Utah Const. art. XVII and XX and federal common law. The district court entered summary judgment against USAC on its article XVII and federal common law claims but, after a bench trial, determined that the PWAA violated article XX. On appeal, the Supreme Court determined that the district court made a threshold error in reaching its article XX determination and remanded with instruction that the court address the threshold question of whether the easement identified in Conaster v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897 (Utah 2008), had a historical basis as a public easement at the time the Utah Constitution was framed. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for VR Acquisitions and the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because USAC did not identify an affirmative, 19th-century legal basis for a Conaster easement, the district court correctly ruled that USAC did not make the threshold showing. View "Utah Stream Access Coalition v. VR Acquisitions, LLC" on Justia Law

Nashville passed a “sidewalk ordinance.” To obtain a building permit, an owner must grant an easement across their land and agree to build a sidewalk on the easement or pay an “in-lieu” fee that Nashville will use to build sidewalks elsewhere.In a challenge to the ordinance under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, the landowner plaintiffs asked the court to apply the “unconstitutional-conditions” test that the Supreme Court adopted in 1987 to assess conditions on building permits (Nollan v. California Coastal Commission). Nashville argued that the Court has applied Nollan’s test only to ad hoc administrative conditions that zoning officials impose on specific permit applicants—not generally applicable legislative conditions that city councils impose on all permit applicants. For legislative conditions, Nashville argued in favor of the application of the deferential “balancing” test that the Court adopted to assess zoning restrictions in “Penn Central” (1978). The district court granted Nashville summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the landowners. Nothing in the relevant constitutional text, history, or precedent supports Nashville’s distinction between administrative and legislative conditions. Nollan’s test should apply to both types, including those imposed by the sidewalk ordinance. View "Knight v. e Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County" on Justia Law