Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A small group of landowners sought to certify a class composed of all owners of any real property interests in a twelve-mile stretch of land located adjacent to the Canadian River to litigate alleged takings claims against the State. The trial court denied certification, finding that the landowners failed to satisfy two prerequisites required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(a) and any one of the three Rule 42(b) requirements. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that certain conflicts identified by the trial court prevented the landowners from satisfying Rule 42(a)(4)'s adequacy-of-representation prerequisite. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the conflicts identified in its order denying class certification to establish that the landowners failed to satisfy Rule 42(a)(4)'s adequacy-of-representation prerequisite; and (2) the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's order on the same grounds. View "Riemer v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a developer, helped construct a planned development (the "community"). The community HOA sued the developers, sellers, and builders of the development, including Petitioner, on behalf of the individual homeowners, alleging construction-defect-based claims for breach of implied and express warranties and negligence. Thereafter, the community HOA filed a motion for the district court to determine that its claims satisfied the class action requirements of Nev. R. Civ. P. 23. The district court concluded that the HOA did not need to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 and thus allowed the action to proceed without conducting a class action analysis. Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus or prohibition, claiming that the district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously by refusing to undertake a class action analysis. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition to the extent that it directed the district court to analyze the Rule 23 factors in this case. In so doing, the Court clarified the application of D.R. Horton v. District Court when a homeowners' association seeks to litigate construction-defect claims on behalf of its members under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3102(1)(d). View "Beazer Homes Holding Corp. v. Dist. Court " on Justia Law

This appeal was the third in the course of this litigation. Plaintiffs were a group of landowners with properties on the shores of Flathead Lake and a portion of the upper Flathead River. Plaintiffs commenced this action in 1999 against Montana Power Company (MPC) and MPC's successor, PPL Montana, LLC, asserting claims of trespass, nuisance, a taking of property, and breach of easements. In Mattson II, Plaintiffs filed motions to certify the lawsuit as a class action. The district court granted the motions as to both Defendants. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's orders concerning class certification. On remand, the district court denied Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in its application of Mattson II to the class-certification question under Mont. R. Civ. P. 23; and (2) the six criteria for certification of a class action under Rule 23 were satisfied in this case. Remanded with instructions to certify the class. View "Mattson v. Mont. Power Co." on Justia Law

Homeowners, who were represented by the Mostyn Law Firm, filed claims against State Farm in Texas state court after Hurricane Ike. State Farm removed several cases to federal court on diversity grounds. The Firm and State Farm then entered into an agreement whereby the Firm promised to abandon its clients' claims against individual adjusters and forgo suing them in the future in exchange for State Farm's promise not to remove any Hurricane Ike cases to federal court. At issue on appeal was whether the phrase "any Hurricane Ike cases," in a contract covering "all Hurricane Ike cases that either have been filed or will be filed in the future," encompassed class-action lawsuits. The court affirmed and agreed with the district court's conclusion that the negotiated contract covered all past, present, and future lawsuits filed by the Firm against State Farm on behalf of homeowners, as individuals or part of a class, whose properties were damaged during Hurricane Ike. View "Horn, et al v. State Farm Lloyds" on Justia Law

Diana Albrecht brought a class-action lawsuit against Alaska Trustee, LLC, on behalf of a group of Alaska homeowners who had faced foreclosure on their homes. Alaska Trustee, acting as foreclosure trustee, had provided Albrecht and the other homeowners reinstatement quotes that included the costs of foreclosure. Albrecht maintained that the inclusion of foreclosure costs in her reinstatement quote violated her right to cure under a former version of AS 34.20.070(b), the non-judicial foreclosure statute, which provided that a homeowner’s "default may be cured by payment of the sum in default other than the principal that would not then be due if no default had occurred, plus attorney fees or court costs actually incurred by the trustee due to the default." According to Albrecht, Alaska Trustee's inclusion of foreclosure costs in addition to "attorney's fees or court costs" constituted a violation of not only the non-judicial foreclosure statute but also Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA). The superior court concluded that Albrecht lacked standing to sue and denied her motion for class certification. The superior court further ruled that Alaska Trustee's practice of including various fees and charges as foreclosure costs was permitted under the statute. The superior court awarded attorney's fees to Alaska Trustee as the prevailing party, enhancing those fees under AS 45.50.537(b) on the ground that Albrecht's claims were frivolous. Because the inclusion of foreclosure costs in a reinstatement quote did not violate AS 34.20.070, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court in most respects. But because the Court concluded that Albrecht’s claims were not frivolous and attorney's fees could not be awarded under Rule 82 for time spent litigating the structure of a class action, the Court remanded for recalculation of fees awarded. View "Albrecht v. Alaska Trustee, LLC" on Justia Law

Countrywide appealed a class certification order of the bankruptcy court. Plaintiffs are former chapter 13 debtors with mortgages serviced by Countrywide. Plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that the fees Countrywide charged while plaintiffs' bankruptcy cases were still pending were unreasonable, unapproved, and undisclosed under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2016(a). Because the bankruptcy court's decision was not an abuse of discretion, the court affirmed its grant of class certification for plaintiff's injunctive relief claim. Because the court's precedence rejected the fail-safe class prohibition, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when it defined the class in the present case. Because the court concluded that Countrywide's Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration was not based on newly discovered evidence, the court did not revisit the bankruptcy court's separate merits denial of the motion. View "Rodriguez, et al v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue here was national assets stolen by President Ferdinand Marcos. Victims of Marcos' human rights abuses ("Pimentel class") obtained a judgment against Marcos' estate and, in enforcing the judgment, sought to obtain assets also sought by the Republic of the Philippines and its commission organized to retrieve the assets (collectively, Republic). In dispute was the assets of Arelma, a Panamanian corporation, which were held in a brokerage account. The brokerage firm commenced an interpleader action in federal court. The district court awarded ownership of the Arelma assets to the Pimentel claimants. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the assertion of sovereign immunity by the Republic required dismissal for lack of a required party. Petitioner then commenced this turnover proceeding seeking to execute the Pimental judgment against the Arelma account. Meanwhile, a Philippine court determined the assets had been forfeited to the Republic. PNB and Arelma moved to intervene, requesting dismissal. Supreme Court denied the motion. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate division did not err in concluding that dismissal was required under N.Y.C.P.L.R. 1001, as the Republic was a necessary party but could not be subject to joinder in light of the assertion of sovereign immunity.

In this purported class action on behalf of borrowers holding home mortgage loans serviced by Bayview, plaintiffs claimed that Bayview improperly added fees to borrowers' accounts in violation of the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act, W. Va. Code 46A-1-101 through 46A-8-102. At issue was whether, under the statute of limitations, "the due date of the last scheduled payment of the agreement" was June 5, 2007, the loan acceleration date set by Bayview. The court concluded that the acceleration date was the operative date for purposes of applying the statute of limitations, because no further payments were scheduled after that date. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that the statute of limitations began to run from the acceleration date, and that, therefore, plaintiffs' claims were time barred.

Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of themselves and others who purchased houses from a builder, Ryland, in the Newport subdivision of Vista Lakes, a residential development in Orlando, Florida. The Newport subdivision was adjacent to land known as "Pinecastle." Pinecastle was used as a bombing range during World War II and remained laden with, among other things, unexploded bombs. When plaintiffs bought houses from Ryland, they were unaware of Pinecastle. Later, after Pinecastle's existence became public, plaintiffs' houses lost considerable market value and plaintiffs brought this lawsuit to compensate for the loss. Counts 1, 3, and 4 sought compensation for the loss of value plaintiffs' houses sustained due to their close proximity to Pinecastle. Count 2 sought recovery of 1.5 percent of the purchase price of every home Ryland sold in the Newport subdivision. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Counts 1 and 2 with prejudice and Count 3 without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on Count 4, pursuant to Rule 56.

This case involved two putative class actions, consolidated on interlocutory appeal, brought by purchasers of real estate brokerage services in South Carolina. Each complaint alleged that the real estate brokerages serving as board members of the local multiple listing service (MLS) conspired to unfairly restrain market competition in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. The court held that plaintiffs sufficiently pled the plurality of actors necessary for section 1 to apply. At this early stage of the litigation, the court was not in a position to weigh the alleged anticompetitve risks of the MLS rules against their procompetitive justifications. This rule of reason inquiry was best conducted with the benefit of discovery and the court expressed no view on the merits of the litigation beyond recognizing the sufficiency of the complaints. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.