Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Colorado Supreme Court
by
The case involves a dispute between a railroad company and La Plata County over land use changes made by the railroad at its Rockwood Station. The railroad made several modifications to accommodate increased passenger traffic, including enlarging a parking lot and adding portable toilets and tents. The County claimed these changes violated its land use code and demanded compliance or corrective action.The railroad initially sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction in La Plata County District Court, arguing that the County lacked jurisdiction over its operations. While this case was pending, the County petitioned the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for a declaratory ruling that the changes required compliance with the County's land use code. The PUC accepted the petition, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" under the relevant statute, thus requiring compliance with the County's code. The PUC upheld the ALJ's decision, and the district court affirmed the PUC's ruling.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case and addressed several issues raised by the railroad. The court concluded that the PUC had jurisdiction to interpret the relevant land use statute, the County had standing to petition the PUC, and the PUC did not violate the railroad's due process rights. The court also found that the PUC's determination that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" was just and reasonable and supported by the evidence. Consequently, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the PUC's decision. View "Am. Heritage Ry.s v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

by
The Town of Firestone applied for conditional groundwater rights and an augmentation plan to support its growing water needs. The application included five well fields, but Firestone did not provide specific well locations for three of these fields, instead proposing to use the water court's retained jurisdiction to provide more specific details later. St. Vrain Sanitation District opposed the application, arguing that Firestone's lack of specific well locations made its depletion calculations unreliable and that relying on retained jurisdiction to prove non-injury later was legally impermissible.The District Court for Water Division 1 partially granted St. Vrain's motion to dismiss, finding that Firestone's evidence was insufficient to establish that the proposed well fields would not injure senior water rights holders. The court dismissed without prejudice the claims for the three well fields with unspecified locations and declined to retain jurisdiction, as it could not make a threshold finding of non-injury. The court also allowed St. Vrain to contest the non-injury issue at trial, despite a prior conditional stipulation.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the water court's decision, holding that the water court correctly evaluated the application on a case-by-case basis and did not create a new bright-line rule requiring completed wells for conditional groundwater rights. The court also upheld the water court's refusal to retain jurisdiction without a non-injury finding and found no abuse of discretion in allowing St. Vrain to contest the non-injury issue. The Supreme Court concluded that the water court's factual findings were supported by the trial record and were not clearly erroneous. View "Town of Firestone v. BCL Colo., LP" on Justia Law

by
HIVE Construction, Inc. served as the general contractor for the construction of Masterpiece Kitchen, a restaurant. The contract required HIVE to follow specific architectural plans, including installing two layers of drywall on a wall separating the kitchen and dining area. Instead, HIVE installed one layer of drywall and one layer of combustible plywood without approval. A fire started within the wall, causing significant damage and forcing the restaurant to close. Mid-Century Insurance Company, as the property insurer and subrogee of Masterpiece Kitchen, paid for the damages and then sued HIVE for negligence, alleging willful and wanton conduct.The district court initially allowed Mid-Century to amend its complaint to include a breach of contract claim but later reversed this decision, requiring Mid-Century to proceed with the negligence claim. At trial, the jury found HIVE's conduct to be willful and wanton, awarding damages to Mid-Century. HIVE appealed, arguing that the economic loss rule barred the negligence claim. The Colorado Court of Appeals agreed, reversing the district court's decision and instructing a verdict in HIVE's favor.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that the economic loss rule does not provide an exception for willful and wanton conduct. The court held that the rule barred Mid-Century's negligence claim because the duty HIVE allegedly breached was not independent of its contractual obligations. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals, upholding the application of the economic loss rule to bar the negligence claim. View "Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. HIVE Construction" on Justia Law

by
Independence Water and Sanitation District (Independence) sought to amend an augmentation plan to provide water services for a proposed residential development in Elbert County, Colorado. The original 2006 decree allowed Independence to withdraw groundwater from the Denver Basin and included an augmentation plan for not-nontributary groundwater from the Upper Dawson aquifer for specific uses on the property. Independence applied to amend this plan to include additional uses both on and off the property.The Division 1 water court faced opposition from Franktown Citizens Coalition II, Inc. and West Elbert County Well Users Association (Opposers), who argued that the anti-speculation doctrine should apply, requiring Independence to show a non-speculative intent to use the water. The water court denied Opposers' motion for summary judgment, agreeing with Independence that the anti-speculation doctrine did not apply to the amendment of the augmentation plan, based on the precedent set in East Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation District v. Rangeview Metropolitan District.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the water court's decision. The court held that the anti-speculation doctrine does not apply to applications to amend augmentation plans for not-nontributary groundwater. The court reasoned that the anti-speculation doctrine and augmentation plans serve different purposes: the former prevents water hoarding within the prior appropriation system, while the latter allows out-of-priority diversions without injuring existing water rights. The court concluded that the sole inquiry for a water court reviewing an augmentation plan is whether the plan will cause injury to existing water rights, not the applicant's intent to use the water. The court found no clear error in the water court's determination that Independence's amended augmentation plan would not result in injury to existing water rights. View "Franktown Citizens Coal. II v. Indep. Water & Sanitation Dist." on Justia Law

by
Parker Water and Sanitation District, a Colorado special district, applied for six permits to construct wells to withdraw nontributary groundwater from the Denver Basin aquifers. The State Engineer approved the applications and issued the permits, including an allowed average annual withdrawal rate and, for the first time, an explicit condition limiting the total volume of groundwater that could be withdrawn over the life of the permits. Parker challenged this condition, arguing that the State Engineer lacked the authority to impose such a limit.The Water Division One court found in favor of the State Engineer, concluding that section 37-90-137, C.R.S. (2024), and the Statewide Nontributary Ground Water Rules unambiguously set forth a total volumetric limit on the amount of nontributary Denver Basin groundwater a permittee may withdraw. The court determined that the statute and rules require a total volumetric limit equal to the quantity of nontributary groundwater underlying the land owned by the applicant, as determined by the State Engineer at the time the well permit is issued.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the water court's decision, holding that section 37-90-137 unambiguously imposes a total volumetric limit on nontributary groundwater withdrawals over the lifetime of a well permit. The court also held that this limit applies to well permits issued under both the current statute and the earlier version enacted through Senate Bill 213. Additionally, the court concluded that the Statewide Nontributary Ground Water Rules unambiguously impose a total volumetric limit and that the State Engineer has the authority to include such a limit in well permits. The court further held that water court decrees determining use rights for nontributary Denver Basin groundwater set forth a total volumetric limit on withdrawals unless an underlying decree explicitly provides otherwise. Finally, the court found that the water court did not abuse its discretion in staying discovery. View "Parker Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Rein" on Justia Law

by
Naomi Bermudez, a tenant in a federally subsidized housing complex managed by Mercy Housing Management Group Inc., faced eviction after Mercy Housing alleged she violated her lease by having an unauthorized guest who stayed beyond the allowed period, repaired vehicles on the property, and harassed another resident. Bermudez denied these allegations and requested a jury trial to resolve the factual disputes.The Denver County Court denied Bermudez's request for a jury trial, stating that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in civil matters in Colorado. Bermudez then filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Colorado, arguing that she was entitled to a jury trial under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and the statutory framework governing forcible entry and detainer (FED) actions.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that Bermudez is entitled to a jury trial on the factual disputes in the FED-possession action. The court found that the right to a jury trial in such cases is rooted in the statutory framework and the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically C.R.C.P. 338(a), which provides for a jury trial in actions for the recovery of specific real property. The court also determined that the FED statute and C.R.C.P. 338(a) are compatible and that the statutory right to a jury trial applies to factual disputes in FED-possession actions.The court acknowledged concerns about the potential burden on the county courts but concluded that the limited nature of the jury-trial right would not prove unworkable. The court reversed the county court's denial of Bermudez's jury demand, made absolute the order to show cause, and remanded the case with instructions for the county court to schedule a jury trial on the factual issues related to the possession dispute. View "Mercy Housing Management Group Inc. v. Bermudez" on Justia Law

by
Lazy D Grazing Association manages a 25,000-acre ranch along the Colorado-Wyoming border, which lacks sufficient surface water for irrigation. In 2020, Lazy D sought a determination from the water court that the groundwater beneath the ranch in the Upper Laramie Aquifer is nontributary, meaning it is not subject to Colorado's prior appropriation system. This designation would allow Lazy D to control the use of the groundwater. The State Engineer determined that the groundwater was nontributary, prompting opposition from various entities, including the Cities of Sterling and Fort Collins, who feared it would harm their water rights.The District Court for Water Division 1 in Greeley found in favor of Lazy D, determining that the groundwater was nontributary. The Cities of Sterling and Fort Collins appealed, arguing that the State Engineer exceeded his authority, the water court improperly presumed the truth of the State Engineer's findings, and that the court relied on sources not in evidence while discrediting expert testimony without justification.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the water court's decision. The court held that the State Engineer was within his rights to determine the facts regarding whether the groundwater is nontributary, but the final determination is a mixed question of fact and law for the water court. Although the water court erred in giving a presumption of truth to the State Engineer's legal conclusion, this error was deemed harmless as the water court independently concluded that the groundwater was nontributary. The court also found that the water court did not improperly shift the burden of proof to the Cities and did not rely on information outside the record. The water court's reliance on expert testimony was found to be appropriate, and the decision to allow Lazy D to use the nontributary groundwater was upheld. View "City of Sterling v. Lazy D Grazing Association" on Justia Law

by
Jamie Edward Bock was charged with nine counts of theft for actions occurring between November 2014 and November 2016. He was accused of taking initial payments from homeowners for construction work, some of which he started but did not complete, and others he did not begin at all. Bock requested and received additional funds for four projects but failed to complete any of them or return the money.The trial court joined five cases into a single trial and instructed the jury that Bock could not be convicted of four counts unless the prosecution proved multiple acts of theft within six months of each other. Bock argued that this instruction constructively amended his charges, which were originally under a statute punishing single acts of theft, and claimed this amendment was a structural error requiring reversal. The jury convicted Bock on all counts, and he was sentenced to twenty years in prison. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals agreed that the jury instructions constituted a constructive amendment but held that it did not require reversal, applying plain error review.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and agreed that the jury instructions constructively amended the charges. However, the court held that such an amendment is not a structural error and should be reviewed for plain error. The court concluded that Bock did not demonstrate plain error because he had sufficient notice to mount a defense, and the prosecution's burden of proof was not materially lessened. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals and upheld Bock's convictions. View "Bock v. People" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado was asked to review a case involving a dispute between the City of Aspen and the Burlingame Ranch II Condominium Owners Association, Inc. The dispute centered around alleged construction defects in an affordable housing project overseen by the City of Aspen. The Association claimed that Aspen had breached express and implied warranties, and Aspen argued that the claims were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), which provides immunity to public entities from claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort.The lower court agreed with Aspen, ruling that the Association's claims sounded in tort, or could sound in tort, and were thus barred by the CGIA. The Association appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court reasoned that the Association's claims could only sound in contract, and thus were not barred by the CGIA. The court relied on the economic loss rule, which generally provides that a party suffering only economic loss from the breach of a contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of care under tort law.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that the economic loss rule has no bearing on whether the CGIA bars a plaintiff’s claims. The court clarified that the CGIA bars claims that could arise in both tort and contract, and that the economic loss rule cannot rescue an otherwise CGIA-barred claim. The case was remanded back to the lower court for further proceedings. View "City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II" on Justia Law

by
The case revolves around a dispute over the definition of a "dwelling" in the context of Colorado's "force-against-intruders" statute. The defendant, Joseph Howell, was involved in a physical altercation with J.M. outside his mother's apartment. At some point, Howell went inside the apartment, leaving J.M. outside on the doorstep. Howell fired a shot from inside the apartment, hitting J.M. in the face. Howell was charged with two counts of attempted first-degree murder, among other crimes. He moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the "force-against-intruders" statute immunized him from prosecution.The district court denied Howell's motion to dismiss, finding that because J.M. never entered inside the threshold of the doorway, there was never an "unlawful entry into a dwelling," and thus, the statute does not apply. Howell appealed this decision, leading to the case being reviewed by the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that an uncovered, unenclosed, and unsecured doorstep is not part of a “dwelling” for the purposes of the "force-against-intruders" statute. The court reasoned that a “dwelling” must be a “building,” and a “building” is “a structure which has the capacity to contain.” Since the doorstep has no roof, walls, or gate, it does not have the capacity to contain, and therefore, it is not a “building.” The court concluded that Howell's use of force against J.M., who was standing on the doorstep and was a “non-entrant,” was not shielded by immunity under the "force-against-intruders" statute. Therefore, the court discharged the rule to show cause. View "People v. Howell" on Justia Law