Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Colorado Supreme Court
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In this case from the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, petitioner Claire E. Miller and respondent Jesse A. Amos were involved in a dispute related to eviction proceedings. Miller was a tenant who lived in a home owned and occupied by Amos. Their arrangement was an oral tenancy agreement where Miller agreed to provide pet care and light housekeeping services instead of paying rent. After six months, Amos served Miller with a notice to quit, alleging breach of their oral agreement. Miller refused to move out, and Amos filed a forcible entry and detainer (FED) complaint seeking eviction. Miller contended that her eviction was due to her refusal to engage in sexual acts with Amos, which she stated was a form of sex discrimination and retaliation under the Colorado Fair Housing Act (CFHA).The county court ruled in favor of Amos, stating that a landlord can serve a notice to quit for “no reason or any reason,” dismissing the CFHA violation claim as an affirmative defense for eviction. The district court affirmed this decision.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the lower court's ruling. The court held that a tenant can assert a landlord’s alleged violation of the CFHA as an affirmative defense to an FED eviction. The court noted that the purpose of the CFHA is to prevent discriminatory practices, and therefore, a tenant must be able to use it as a shield against a discriminatory eviction. The court also emphasized that a tenant's right to due process must be preserved even in eviction proceedings, which are intended to be expedited. This decision allows tenants in Colorado to assert discrimination or retaliation under the CFHA as a defense in eviction cases. View "Miller v. Amos" on Justia Law

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In this case, Beverly Stickle sued Jefferson County after sustaining an injury from a fall in a parking structure adjacent to a county building. She claimed that a poorly marked curb, which created an optical illusion and made the walkway and parking area appear as a single flat surface, was a dangerous condition that caused her injury. The county argued for dismissal on the grounds of immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), asserting that the parking structure was not a "building" and that the condition causing the injury was solely due to the parking lot's design. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the parking structure qualified as a "building" under the CGIA. The court also held that the optical illusion was not solely attributable to the parking lot's design but was also, at least in part, a result of the maintenance of the facility. As such, the county was not immune from the lawsuit under the CGIA, and Stickle's claim could proceed. View "County of Jefferson v. Stickle" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether Respondent Roger Hill had a legally protected interest that gave him standing to pursue his claim for a declaratory judgment “that a river segment was navigable for title at statehood and belongs to the State.” To this, the Court concluded he did not: Hill had no legally protected right independent of the State’s alleged ownership of the riverbed onto which he could hook his declaratory judgment claim. Hill's favorite fishing hole was on a riverbed along the Arkansas River. The record owners of the land abutting the river were Mark Warsewa and Linda Joseph, who had a home overlooking the fishing hole. Hill alleged that for several years, he repeatedly attempted to fish there and Warsewa and Joseph chased him off the property, sometimes with force. Hill asserted the riverbed was not in fact owned by Warsewa and Joseph, but instead public land owned by the State of Colorado and held in trust for the people. In both federal and state proceedings, the State argued that it alone could decide whether and when to pursue its property rights and that Hill did not have standing to bring these claims. Hill appealed, arguing that the riverbed was public land as a matter of federal law, and invoking the equal footing doctrine: that the segment of the Arkansas River that traversed the subject property was navigable at statehood, and therefore title to the riverbed transferred to the State by operation of law when Colorado achieved statehood in 1876. Because the federal government did not own the riverbed, it could not have transferred its title to Warsewa and Joseph’s predecessors in interest. A division of the court of appeals upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the quiet title claim, concluding that Hill could not pursue the property rights of the State because he did not himself have any claim to title. The Colorado Supreme Court concurred and affirmed dismissal. View "Colorado v. Hill" on Justia Law

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This was one of several similar cases filed in the fall of 2020 by the owners of hundreds of commercial properties in eleven different Colorado counties seeking to compel the assessors in each of the counties to revalue their properties and lower their property tax assessments for the 2020 tax year. This matter involved the valuation of over 60 parcels of commercial property in Douglas County, Colorado. The taxpayers here—and in the other cases—contended that the pandemic and various state and local public health orders issued in response were “unusual conditions” that required revaluation of their properties under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2022). To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the orders were not "unusual conditions:" COVID-19 was not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” and the orders issued in response to COVID-19 were not “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Therefore, section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) did not require the Douglas County property assessors to revalue the taxpayers’ 2020 property valuations. View "Educhildren v. City of Douglas" on Justia Law

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This was one of several cases filed in Colorado in which commercial property owners have sued to compel the county assessor to revalue their properties and lower their property tax assessments for the 2020 tax year to account for the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. This case concerned the valuation of commercial real property located in the City and County of Broomfield, Colorado. The taxpayers here—and in the other cases—contended that the pandemic and various state and local public health orders issued in response were “unusual conditions” that required revaluation of their properties under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2022). To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the orders were not "unusual conditions:" COVID-19 was not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” and the orders issued in response to COVID-19 were not “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Therefore, section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) did not require the City and County of Broomfield Assessor to revalue the taxpayers’ 2020 property valuations, and it did not require the Board of Equalization to correct the Assessor’s valuations. View "Hunter Douglas v. City & County of Broomfield" on Justia Law

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This was one of several similar cases filed in the fall of 2020 by the owners of hundreds of commercial properties in eleven different Colorado counties seeking to compel the assessors in each of the counties to revalue their properties and lower their property tax assessments for the 2020 tax year. This matter involved the valuation of 130 parcels of commercial property in Larimer County, Colorado. The taxpayers here—and in the other cases—contended that the pandemic and various state and local public health orders issued in response were “unusual conditions” that required revaluation of their properties under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2022). To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the orders were not "unusual conditions:" COVID-19 was not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” and the orders issued in response to COVID-19 were not “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Therefore, section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) did not require the Larimer County property assessors to revalue the taxpayers’ 2020 property valuations. View "Larimer County v. 1303 Frontage Holdings" on Justia Law

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This was one of several cases filed in Colorado in which commercial property owners sued to compel the county assessor to revalue their properties and lower their property tax assessments for the 2020 tax year to account for the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. This case concerned the valuation of hundreds of parcels of commercial real property located in Jefferson County, Colorado. The taxpayers here—and in the other cases—contended that the pandemic and various state and local public health orders issued in response were “unusual conditions” that required revaluation of their properties under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2022). To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the orders were not "unusual conditions:" COVID-19 was not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” and the orders issued in response to COVID-19 were not “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Therefore, section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) did not require the Jefferson County Assessor to revalue the taxpayers’ 2020 property valuations, and it did not require the Board of Equalization to correct the Assessor’s valuations. View " MJB Motel v. County of Jefferson" on Justia Law

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In 2006, Respondent Jerome Silvernagel took out a second mortgage on a home. He agreed to make monthly payments to pay down the principal and 10% annual interest, with any remaining balance due in 2036. Silvernagel alone signed the promissory note, agreeing to repay the underlying loan. But both he and Respondent Dan Wu signed the deed of trust securing payment of the note. The deed of trust contained an acceleration clause, giving the lender the power to declare the entire loan immediately due and payable upon default. When exercised, acceleration authorized the lender to foreclose on the property to satisfy the outstanding debt and any related fees. In 2012, a bankruptcy court discharged Silvernagel’s personal liability on the mortgage under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Silvernagel had stopped making payments on the note before the discharge and made no payments since. The discharge prohibited creditors from attempting to collect the debt from Silvernagel directly, but it did not extinguish “the right to enforce a valid lien, such as a mortgage or security interest, against the debtor’s property after the bankruptcy.” In 2019, US Bank allegedly threatened to foreclose on the property if Silvernagel did not make payments on his mortgage. Silvernagel and Wu (hereinafter collectively, “Silvernagel”) filed this case in response, requesting declaratory relief to prevent US Bank’s enforcement of the deed of trust. He argued that US Bank’s interest was extinguished by the six-year statute of limitations on debt collection. Alternatively, he asserted that the doctrine of laches prevented enforcement of the agreement. The trial court dismissed the case, determining that US Bank’s claim had not accrued (meaning that the six-year limitation period hadn’t even commenced). A division of the court of appeals reversed, holding that the statute of limitations began to run upon Silvernagel’s 2012 bankruptcy discharge, barring US Bank’s claim. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals: when there is no evidence that the lender accelerated payment on the mortgage agreement, a claim for any future payment doesn’t accrue until that payment is missed under the agreement’s original terms. View "US Bank, N.A. v. Silvernagel, et al." on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on the valuation for real property tax purposes of the Lodge at Vail (“the Lodge”), a luxury resort property that included a hotel, privately owned condominiums, and amenities. The Court granted certiorari to consider whether: (1) fees paid by the condominium owners to a third-party company that managed the rental of their condominiums to overnight guests was intangible personal property that had to be excluded from the actual value of the Lodge under the income approach to valuation; and (2) the net income generated from such fees should have been included in the Lodge’s actual value under the income approach. The Supreme Court concluded the net income generated from rentals of the individually and separately owned condominium units was not income generated by the Lodge and therefore should not have been included in the Lodge’s actual value under the income approach to valuation. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the division below, and did not consider whether the contractual right to net rental management income generated from the condominiums constituted intangible personal property that had to be excluded from the Lodge’s actual value under the income approach to valuation. View "Lodge Properties v. Eagle County" on Justia Law

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This appeal stemmed from an application for a conditional water storage right filed by United Water and Sanitation District, a special water district formed in Elbert County, Colorado, acting through the United Water Acquisition Project Water Activity Enterprise (“United”). United sought to secure various water rights in Weld County. United’s original applications were consolidated in a set of four cases. In response to a motion for determination of questions of law from opposer Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Company (“FRICO”) in the consolidated cases, the District Court for Water Division 1 (“water court”) concluded that United’s applications failed to demonstrate non-speculative intent to appropriate water. In response to this ruling, United withdrew its applications in the consolidated cases and, a week later, filed a new application in Case No. 16CW3053 for a conditional water storage right that was the subject of this appeal. Pertinent here, United sought to appropriate water for use in a proposed residential development in another county. In support of its new application for a conditional storage right, United offered a new, purportedly binding contract with the landowners of the proposed development. United also claimed for the first time that its status as a special district qualified it for the governmental planning exception to the anti-speculation doctrine. FRICO opposed United's application, and the water court determined United's new application likewise failed to demonstrated non-speculative intent to appropriate water. The water court found that United was acting as a water broker to sell to third parties for their use, and not as a governmental agency seeking to procure water to serve its own municipal customers. Consequently, the water court held, United did not qualify for the governmental planning exception to the anti-speculation doctrine. United appealed. But concurring with the water court's judgment, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed: United was ineligible for the governmental planning exception to the anti-speculation doctrine. View "United Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co." on Justia Law