Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Decedent entered into a contract for the sale of a parcel of real property to Buyer. Before entering into the contract, Decedent specifically devised the property to Plaintiff, a church, in his will. After Decedent died, a botanical garden and museum claimed entitlement to the proceeds from the sale of the property by the by the coexecutors of Decedent’s estate, due to a charitable pledge made by Decedent prior to his death. The trial court concluded that title to the property passed to Buyer at the signing of the contract under the doctrine of equitable conversion. The appellate court reversed, concluding that equitable conversion did not apply because Decedent died prior to the fulfillment or expiration of a mortgage contingency clause in the contract. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the mortgage contingency clause did not preclude the application of equitable conversion, and equitable title passed to Buyer at the execution of the contract. View "Southport Congregational Church-United Church of Christ v. Hadley" on Justia Law

Defendant executed a promissory note secured by a mortgage and security agreement on Defendant's property. Guarantors guaranteed the note and mortgage. Plaintiff later foreclosed on the property. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a timely motion seeking a deficiency judgment against Defendant and Guarantors. The trial court found the fair market value of the mortgaged property to be $5.3 million and rendered a deficiency judgment in the amount of $13,264,318. Defendant and Guarantors appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly relied on the appraisal report submitted by the substitute plaintiff and the testimony of Plaintiff’s appraiser because they expressed an opinion on the value of the leased fee interest in the mortgaged property, and Plaintiff was required to establish the value of the fee simple interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court’s fair market value finding was not erroneous, and Plaintiff satisfied its burden of establishing the value of the mortgaged property. View "J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Applicant applied for zoning variances allowing for the vertical expansion of a nonconforming building. There was no showing, however, that the strict application of the zoning regulations would destroy the property’s value for any of the uses to which it could reasonably be put. The Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Fairfield granted the application, concluding that the strict application of the zoning regulations would produce an unusual hardship. The trial court rejected Plaintiff’s claims and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly determined that the strict application of the zoning regulations would produce an undue hardship for Applicant, justifying the variances. Remanded to the Board with direction to deny Applicant’s application for the variances. View "E and F Assocs., LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant executed a promissory note in favor of Bank that was secured by a mortgage deed on certain property. The mortgage was subsequently assigned to Plaintiff, which was also the holder of the note. In 2012, Plaintiff declared the note to be in default and sought to foreclose on the property. The trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default against Defendant for failure to appear and ordered a judgment of foreclosure by sale. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to open and vacate the judgment of foreclosure by sale. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in applying Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-12 in denying her motion to open and vacate the judgment of foreclosure by sale and should have applied the standard articulated in Conn. Gen. Stat. 49-15. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that even if Plaintiff were to prevail on her claim, the trial court ruled that there was no good cause to warrant the opening of the judgment against her, and therefore, Defendant could be afforded no practical relief if the matter were to be remanded to the trial court. View "JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Mendez" on Justia Law

A mortgagee (Plaintiff) obtained a judgment of strict foreclosure against the mortgagor of certain property. More than thirty days after the time in which to redeem the subject property had expired, Plaintiff filed a motion for a deficiency judgment seeking to collect money damages from the guarantors of the mortgage note. The guarantors objected to the request for a hearing in damages, arguing that Plaintiff was barred from obtaining any additional remedy from the guarantors under Conn. Gen. Stat. 49-1, under which the foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to further action against persons liable for the payment of the mortgage debt, note or obligation who are, or may be, made parties to the foreclosure. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment in favor of the guarantors, holding that section 49-1 had no effect on Plaintiff’s ability to recover the remaining unpaid debt from the guarantors because the guarantors were not parties to the foreclosure claim, as the guarantors’ liability arose separately under their guarantee. View "JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA v. Winthrop Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a series of agreements pursuant to which (1) Defendant agreed to transfer the management and, at the option of Plaintiff, the ownership of two automobile repair shops to Plaintiff; and (2) Plaintiff had the option to purchase the realty on which the shops were located on the condition that Plaintiff was in compliance with the terms of the agreements. When Plaintiff sought to exercise the options, Defendant refused to convey the properties, asserting that Plaintiff had not strictly complied with the agreements’ terms. The trial court determined that Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of the options because it had substantially complied with the terms of the agreements. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding (1) the agreements were subject to a strict compliance standard, rather than a substantial compliance standard; and (2) Plaintiff had not strictly complied with the agreements' terms. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) properly applied a standard of substantial rather than strict compliance with the terms of the parties’ agreements in resolving Plaintiffs’ claim; and (2) properly determined that Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of the options because it had substantially complied with the terms of the parties’ agreements. View "Pack 2000, Inc. v. Cushman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff property owner sent a letter to a zoning enforcement officer for the Town of Darien, asserting that permits obtained by her adjoining neighbor had been illegally issued. Plaintiff received no response to that letter. Plaintiff filed an application to appeal. The town zoning board of appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s application for lack of a timely appeal and lack of a “decision” from which an appeal could lie. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal from the decision of the board, concluding that substantial evidence supported the board’s determination that the town zoning enforcement officer did not make a decision that could be appealed. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the zoning enforcement officer rendered a decision that could be appealed either because (1) he actually made a determination regarding the merit of the violations alleged in her letter that he declined to communicate, or (2) because town zoning regulations obligated him to respond to or act upon the illegality alleged in Plaintiff's letter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the zoning enforcement officer’s action or inaction with respect to Plaintiff’s letter did not give rise to an independent “decision” from which an appeal to the board would lie. View "Reardon v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

Plaintiff successfully bid at a combined foreclosure sale of real estate and secured party auction of personal property owned by Debtors. Bank held mortgage and security interests in the real and personal property. Auctioneer conducted the auction. After purchasing the property, Plaintiff discovered he would not receive much of the personal property he believed to be in the sale. Plaintiff and the current owner of the property (Plaintiffs) brought this action against Debtors, Bank, and Auctioneer (collectively, Defendants), claiming that Defendants' failure to inform Plaintiffs there were conflicting claims as to the ownership of the property constituted negligence and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), among other causes of action. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs on four of their counts. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) improperly concluded that Defendants had a common-law duty to Plaintiffs to properly identify the personal property that was subject to the secured party sale; and (2) lacked the authority to award nontaxable costs pursuant to CUTPA. View "Ulbrich v. Groth" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff initiated a foreclosure action against defendant. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court had authority to open a judgment of foreclosure by sale and related supplemental judgments after title had passed to the purchaser when a series of errors by the court and the parties caused the purchaser to buy a property that, unbeknownst to him but actually known by the second mortgagee, was in fact subject to a first mortgage that was to be foreclosed shortly thereafter. The court concluded that the appellate court incorrectly determined that the purchaser lacked standing under the circumstances of the present case; defendants inadequately briefed the issue of 17 Ridge Road, LLC's standing to intervene as a defendant and, therefore, the issue was deemed abandoned; and the appellate court correctly determined that the passing of title divested the trial court of jurisdiction to open the judgment of foreclosure by sale. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the appellate court insofar as that court concluded that the trial court lacked authority to open the supplemental judgments. View "Citibank, N.A. v. Lindland" on Justia Law

Defendant executed a promissory note secured by a mortgage deed. Plaintiff subsequently sought to foreclose on the mortgage, claiming it was the holder of the note and mortgage. The trial court rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale. Defendant filed an objection to the foreclosure, alleging that because he was no longer in default, Plaintiff did not have standing to foreclose the mortgage. Defendant also requested that the court direct Plaintiff to produce the original note to prove Plaintiff had standing to institute the foreclosure action. The court determined Plaintiff had standing and rendered judgment of strict foreclosure. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Plaintiff had standing to bring this action after Defendant challenged Plaintiff's standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances, Defendant failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on the issue of Plaintiff's standing where the trial court's determination that Plaintiff had standing to commence this action was not in error. Remanded. View "Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers" on Justia Law