Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff owned real property on a highway. In 2006, the board of selectmen of the town of Lyme (board) concluded that the highway extended through and across Plaintiff's property. Plaintiff brought an administrative appeal in the superior court. The superior court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, concluding (1) it was entitled to consider the appeal in a trial de novo, and therefore, the motion for summary judgment was procedurally appropriate; and (2) the board exceeded its authority by determining the length of the highway rather than its width. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court properly concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to a trial de novo; but (2) the board was statutorily authorized to determine the width of the highway as well as its length. Remanded. View "Marchesi v. Bd. of Selectmen of Town of Lyme" on Justia Law

Signature Properties executed a promissory note payable to JPMorgan Chase Bank. The loan was secured by a mortgage and security interest on Signature's commercial property. The loan was guaranteed by Signature's members (guarantors). JPMorgan later assigned Signature's note and mortgage to LaSalle Bank National Association. A pooling agreement established a mortgage back security wherein LaSalle was identified as trustee and paying agent and J.E. Robert Company as loan servicer for Signature's mortgage loans. After Signature ceased to make payments on the loan, J.E. Robert brought a foreclosure action against Signature. LaSalle subsequently assigned the note to Shaw's New London, and Shaw's was substituted as the plaintiff. The guarantors were then added as defendants. The trial court ordered strict foreclosure of Signature's property and a deficient judgment against the defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly determined that, under the facts of this case, J.E. Robert had standing to institute this foreclosure action in its own name. The Court rejected the remainder of the defendants' claims. View "J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the town assessor's interim valuations of his property. The Board of Assessment Appeals upheld the assessor's interim valuations. The trial court concluded (1) the assessor improperly relied on Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-55 as authority to conduct the interim assessments and that she should have been guided by Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-53a instead; and (2) because section 12-53a only applied to "completed new construction," the assessor did not have authority to assign value to partially completed construction on the grand lists. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 12-55 provides assessors with broad authority to conduct interim assessments of real property, and the plain language of section 12-53a is applicable only to completed new construction; and (2) therefore, the assessor had the authority, pursuant to section 12-55, to conduct the interim assessments of Plaintiff's property and to assign value to the partially completed construction. View "Kasica v. Town of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs installed a gabion seawall on their property to mitigate the effects of erosion. Plaintiffs did not seek approval from the town or the department of environmental protection (department) before constructing the seawall. The town subsequently issued a cease and desist order to Plaintiffs, and the department issued a notice of violation to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs submitted a permit application to the department attempting to obtain permission to retain the seawall. The department denied the application and ordered Plaintiffs to remove the seawall. Plaintiffs challenged the removal order. A department hearing officer determined that the department properly exercised jurisdiction and that the department had the authority to order the wall to be removed. The trial court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the department properly asserted jurisdiction over the seawall; (2) the department properly asserted jurisdiction under the Coastal Management Act; (3) substantial evidence supported the department's findings and conclusions; and (4) the hearing officer's decision to order the removal of the entire seawall was not an abuse of discretion. View "Sams v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs obtained a variance from the zoning board of appeals (board) to construct a single-family house on their lakefront property. Plaintiffs then applied for and received a zoning permit and building permit from the town of Lebanon (town) to construct the house. After construction was completed, Plaintiffs constructed a deck. Plaintiffs did not receive the required building permits for the deck, nor did they notify the town of the deck's construction. Several years later, the zoning enforcement officer discovered the deck violated the town's zoning regulations and issued a notice of violation and cease and desist order to Plaintiffs requiring them to abate the setback violation. The board denied Plaintiffs' appeal. The superior court reversed, concluding that the deck at issue was a "building" as that term is used in Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-13a(a) and, therefore, Defendants' enforcement action was untimely under the three year statute of limitations set forth in section 8-13a(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deck was not a "building" under the statute. Remanded. View "Tine v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Lebanon" on Justia Law

This case concerned the valuation of property owned by Plaintiff on which Plaintiff built a continuing care retirement community. In 2007, the assessor determined that Plaintiff's property had a fair market value of $117,621,000 and an assessment value of $82,334,600. Plaintiff challenged the valuation. The board of assessment appeals upheld the assessor's valuation. Plaintiff appealed, alleging it was aggrieved by the actions of the board because the assessor's valuation of the property exceeded seventy percent of its true and actual value on the assessment date. The trial court denied the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's determination that Plaintiff failed to establish aggrievement under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-117a was not clearly erroneous; and (2) the trial court properly determined that Plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proving the town's assessment of the property was manifestly excessive under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-119. View "Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a negligence action against a management company and condominium association after she fell and was injured on the premises of the condominium building where she resided. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of subsequent remedial measures taken by Defendants following Plaintiff's injury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence of subsequent remedial measures was improperly admitted; but (2) the error was harmless, and therefore, the appellate court improperly concluded that a new trial was warranted. View "Duncan v. Mill Mgmt. Co. of Greenwich, Inc." on Justia Law

The zoning board of appeals of the town of Madison (board) approved a variance to replace Plaintiffs' house on the footprint of the prior structure. After Plaintiffs built a new house on the property, Plaintiffs submitted an application for a certificate of zoning compliance seeking approval to convert their present balcony into a large, uncovered deck. The proposed deck would fully comply with the zoning regulations but arguably would not comply with the previously approved variance. The zoning officer denied the application, and the board upheld the decision. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the board could not deny Plaintiffs' application because the footprint limitation was not expressly described in the certificate of variance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) conditions attached to the granting of a variance are not to be construed solely on the basis of the language in the certificate of variance; and (2) the board properly denied Plaintiffs' application for a certificate of zoning compliance. Remanded. View "Anatra v. Town of Madison Zoning Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants seeking a declaratory judgment that, under the doctrine of adverse possession, Plaintiffs were the owners of a parcel of land bordering Defendants' property. The parties reached a settlement agreement providing for a new boundary line between their properties. The agreement provided that Defendants would apply for and pursue a variance from the town zoning board of appeals because the new boundary line left Defendants with slightly less than the minimum frontage requirement. Plaintiffs later filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, which the trial court granted. The trial court ultimately conveyed the property to Plaintiffs. The appellate court reversed in part and remanded to the trial court with direction to render a judgment of adverse possession in favor of Plaintiffs contingent on the parties' compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' petition for certification to appeal. However, after examining the record, the Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that certification was improvidently granted. View "Vance v. Tassmer" on Justia Law

In two separate cases, Plaintiffs, property owners, filed virtually identical complaints against the Town of Cheshire after a massive sinkhole developed on their properties. The complaints alleged the town failed to disclose information regarding the presence of a discontinued barite mine and a series of sinkholes caused by the mine beneath, and in the vicinity of, the properties prior to their purchase by Plaintiffs. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the Town. In this consolidated appeal, the Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgments of the trial court insofar as the trial court granted the Town's motions to strike count three of Plaintiffs' complaints alleging negligent inspection, and (2) affirmed in all other respects. Remanded. View "Ugrin v. Cheshire" on Justia Law