Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a development company, brought an action against Defendants, several entities including the City, alleging Defendants had violated the Connecticut Antitrust Act by engaging in an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade. The trial court granted Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's amended complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to allege an antitrust injury. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's allegation that Defendants took bribes and kickbacks in exchange for steering public contracts did not state a cognizable antitrust claim, and therefore, the appellate court and trial court properly granted Defendants' motions to strike Plaintiff's amended complaint.

This was the second of two appeals arising from a property dispute between Plaintiffs, members of a local parish of the Episcopal church and the church, and Defendants, several present or former officers or vestry members of the parish. Plaintiffs brought an action against Defendants, alleging breach of trust for the wrongful failure to relinquish to Plaintiffs all of the real and personal property of the parish following a decision by a majority of the voting members of the parish, including Defendants, to withdraw from the diocese and to affiliate the parish with an ecclesiastical society that was not part of the Episcopal church. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the trial court properly (1) granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and declared that the disputed property was held in trust for the Episcopal church, and that Defendants had no right or authority to occupy, use or possess the property; (2) ordered Defendants to relinquish possession, custody and control of the property to the Plaintiffs; and (3) permitted Plaintiffs to move for an order of accounting.

This was the first of two appeals arising from a property dispute between members of a local parish of the Episcopal church and several present or former officers or vestry members of the parish. An unincorporated voluntary association attempted unsuccessfully to intervene in the action to protect its alleged ownership interest in the property. The association appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming that the trial court improperly denied its motion to intervene and its request for an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the motion because (1) the issues raised by the association were fully and fairly raised by the present pleadings, and (2) the association did not seek to intervene to assert a claim against Defendants. In addition, the Court held that there was a presumption of adequate representation because the record demonstrated that the identities of the association members and Defendants were overlapping and that they had the same ultimate objective.

This case centered on the scope of an implied easement located on a lawn that lay between a beachfront development and Long Island Sound. Plaintiffs owned waterfront lots in the development and Defendants owned rear lots. The trial court concluded that the implied easement over the lawn in favor of Defendants conferred only a right-of-way to access the shoreline. Defendants appealed, and an intervening plaintiff cross appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed with respect to the Defendants' appeals, and (2) reversed with respect to the cross appeal, holding that the trial court improperly ordered, in a supplemental memorandum of decision, that the right-of-way could also be used for the purpose of accessing areas other than the shoreline as the record disclosed no support for this finding.

The present matter arose from three related tax appeals involving Plaintiff Goodspeed Airport's property that consisted of a commercial utility airport and forty-three acres of open fields. The superior court denied relief on Plaintiff's claim seeking reclassification and assessment of certain of its real property as open space and disposed of all three appeals. The appellate court concluded that (1) 13.08 acres of Plaintiff's property were ineligible for open space classification; and (2) Plaintiff, notwithstanding the ongoing improper classification of its property by Defendant, the town of East Haddam, was not entitled to judicial relief from the improper assessment of its forty-three acres. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that the trial court properly determined that the 13.08 acres were ineligible for open space classification and that Plaintiff was not aggrieved pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-117a on the basis of Defendant's ongoing overassessment of the forty-three acres. Remanded.

Fanetta Arnold agreed to provide a guarantee in lieu of cash to satisfy the security deposit for an apartment for rent owned by Defendants, the Forvils. When Arnold attempted to move into the apartment on the agreed-upon date, Defendants prevented Arnold from taking possession because the security deposit had not been paid in cash. The Commission on Human Rights brought this action against Defendant on Arnold's behalf, alleging discrimination against Arnold based on her lawful source of income in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-64c. The trial court found in favor of the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that (1) because the judgment was rendered in a timely manner, the trial court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Defendants; and (2) a security deposit guarantee is a lawful source of income within the meaning of the housing discrimination statutes.

Plaintiff, landowner of property consisting in part of wetland soil, filed a petition for a declaratory ruling with the Fairfield town conservation commission, seeking a determination that certain activities, including the construction of roads, were permitted as of right pursuant to section 4.1(a) of the town's inland wetlands and watercourses regulations. The commission, acting it its capacity as the town's inland wetlands and watercourses agency, denied the petition. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's administrative appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly determined that Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-40(a)(1) and section 4.1(a) of the regulations did not permit, as of right, the filling of wetlands to construct roads, irrespective of whether the roads are directly related to the farming operation.

Letitia Kilby filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, claiming unlawful housing discrimination by Defendants, the town housing authority and a property management company. The Commission found reasonable cause to believe that unlawful discrimination occurred. The trial court then granted Defendants' request to file a civil action in the trial court. Kilby moved to intervene, claiming both intervention as of right and permissive intervention. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court reversed, concluding that although the statute at issue, Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-83(d)(2), did not expressly grant Kilby a right of intervention, it impliedly granted Kilby a right of intervention. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' petition for certification to appeal, but while the case was pending, the legislature enacted Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, which amended the text of section 46a-83 to allow a complainant to intervene as of right in a housing discrimination action brought by the commission on behalf of the complainant. The Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the significance of Defendants' appeal was substantially undermined by Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, and, thus, certification was improvidently granted.

Letitia Kilby filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, claiming unlawful housing discrimination by Defendants, the town housing authority and a property management company. The Commission found reasonable cause to believe that unlawful discrimination occurred. The trial court then granted Defendants' request to file a civil action in the trial court. Kilby moved to intervene, claiming both intervention as of right and permissive intervention. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court reversed, concluding that although the statute at issue, Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-83(d)(2), did not expressly grant Kilby a right of intervention, it impliedly granted Kilby a right of intervention. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' petition for certification to appeal, but while the case was pending, the legislature enacted Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, which amended the text of section 46a-83 to allow a complainant to intervene as of right in a housing discrimination action brought by the commission on behalf of the complainant. The Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the significance of Defendants' appeal was substantially undermined by Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, and, thus, certification was improvidently granted.

Plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court upholding the zoning board of appeals of the city of Stamford's ("board") decision that a dock located on the waters of Stamford Harbor was a neighborhood dock rather than a marina, and therefore, improvements to the dock were not subject to the city's zoning regulations. At issue was whether the trial court properly upheld the board's decision that the Southfield Point Associations' construction of a 196 foot dock and the use of Cook Road Extension for access to and connection with the dock were entirely immune from local zoning regulation merely because they related to water dependent use. The court held that the trial court properly upheld the board's decision and agreed with defendants when the dock and its intersection with Cook Road Extension were located waterward of the mean high water line, where the city normally had no jurisdiction, and when the zoning regulations did not apply to activities that took place on Cook Road Extension.