Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

SCS Carbon Transport, LLC (SCS) plans to develop a pipeline network to transport carbon dioxide (CO2) through South Dakota. Several landowners (Landowners) along the proposed route refused to allow SCS pre-condemnation survey access, which SCS claims is authorized by SDCL 21-35-31. Landowners sued in both the Third and Fifth Judicial Circuits, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the surveys. These proceedings resulted in a consolidated appeal from six lawsuits filed by Landowners and one by SCS.The Third Circuit granted SCS summary judgment, determining that SCS was a common carrier and that SDCL 21-35-31 was constitutional. The Fifth Circuit also granted SCS summary judgment, adopting the Third Circuit’s reasoning. Landowners appealed, arguing that SCS is not a common carrier, CO2 is not a commodity, and that SDCL 21-35-31 violates the takings and due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the circuit courts’ grants of summary judgment on the common carrier issues. The court held that SCS’s ability to conduct pre-condemnation surveys depends on whether it is a common carrier vested with the power of eminent domain. The record did not demonstrate that SCS is holding itself out to the general public as transporting a commodity for hire. The court also found that the circuit courts abused their discretion in denying Landowners’ request for further discovery.The court further held that SDCL 21-35-31 only authorizes limited pre-condemnation standard surveys, which are minimally invasive superficial inspections. The statute, as strictly interpreted, does not violate the federal or state constitutions. The court concluded that any actual damage caused by the surveys must be justly compensated, with the amount determined by a jury. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Strom Trust v. SCS Carbon Transport, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2002, a 208-acre estate in Jessamine County was divided into four parcels. In 2004, the owner of Parcel 2 planned residential development, including a bridge and road extension, which was approved by the Nicholasville Planning Commission (NPC). By 2017, LPW Redevelopment, LLC owned Parcels 2 and 3, sought a zone change, and submitted a development plan, which was approved. Boone Development, LLC purchased Parcel 3 in 2018 and began construction. The NPC required Boone to include the bridge and road extension in a letter of credit, which Boone disputed, leading to this litigation.The Jessamine Circuit Court ruled in favor of Boone, stating the NPC had not made a decision, necessitating a declaratory action. The NPC then issued a Notice of Decision affirming its requirements, which the Board of Adjustment upheld. Boone appealed, and the Jessamine Circuit Court affirmed the Board’s decision, finding the Board’s actions were within its legislative powers, provided due process, and were supported by substantial evidence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case, focusing on the constitutionality of the appeal bond requirement in KRS 100.3471. The Court found the statute unconstitutional, referencing its decision in Bluegrass Trust v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government. The Court also addressed the merits of the case, affirming the Jessamine Circuit Court’s decision that Boone was responsible for the bridge and road extension as per the development plan. The Court found no procedural due process violations and determined the Board’s decision was not arbitrary or unreasonable. The Court of Appeals’ dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was reversed, and the Jessamine Circuit Court’s judgment was affirmed. View "RAZ, INC. V. MERCER COUNTY FISCAL COURT" on Justia Law

The case involves the Commonwealth Building, located in the South Hill Historic District in Lexington, Kentucky. Built in the late 1950s, the building was purchased by The Residences at South Hill, LLC in 2017. The Residences sought approval from the Board of Architectural Review (BOAR) to demolish the building and construct a five-story apartment complex. The BOAR approved the demolition, leading to several appeals. The Historic South Hill Neighborhood Association (HSHNA) and Bluegrass Trust for Historic Preservation (Bluegrass Trust) were among the appellants, with Bluegrass Trust arguing that the building contributed to the historic character of the district and could provide economic return if renovated.The Fayette Circuit Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Planning Commission's decision to uphold the BOAR's approval was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the Planning Commission had considered various testimonies and evidence, including expert opinions, and found that the Commonwealth Building did not contribute to the historic character of the district. Bluegrass Trust appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals but did not post the required appeal bond, arguing financial incapacity. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to the failure to post the bond and stated in dictum that it would have affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 100.3471, which mandates an appeal bond in zoning and land use disputes, is unconstitutional. The court found that the statute infringes on the constitutional right of Kentuckians to at least one appeal to the next highest court, as guaranteed by Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the appeal but affirmed the circuit court's decision on the merits, upholding the Planning Commission's approval of the demolition. View "BLUEGRASS TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION V. LEXINGTON FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT PLANNING COMMISSION" on Justia Law

In 2002, a 208-acre estate in Jessamine County was divided into four parcels. In 2004, the owner of Parcel 2 planned residential development, including a bridge and road extension, which was approved by the Nicholasville Planning Commission (NPC). However, these were not built. LPW Redevelopment, LLC later acquired Parcels 2 and 3, sought a zone change, and submitted a development plan, which included the bridge and road extension. Boone Development, LLC purchased Parcel 3 in 2018 and began construction. The City of Nicholasville then informed Boone it was responsible for the bridge and road extension, which Boone disputed.Boone filed a declaratory action in Jessamine Circuit Court, which ruled in Boone's favor, instructing the NPC to make a decision. The NPC affirmed its letter of credit requirements, including the bridge and road extension. The Board of Adjustment upheld the NPC's decision. Boone appealed, and the Jessamine Circuit Court affirmed the Board's decision, finding the Board's actions were within its legislative powers, provided procedural due process, and were supported by substantial evidence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case, focusing on the constitutionality of the appeal bond requirement in KRS 100.3471. The Court held that the statute imposed an unconstitutional burden on the right to appeal, referencing its contemporaneous decision in Bluegrass Trust v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Boone's appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to the bond issue. On the merits, the Supreme Court affirmed the Jessamine Circuit Court's decision, finding the NPC's requirements for the bridge and road extension were not clearly unreasonable. View "BOONE DEVELOPMENT, LLC V. NICHOLASVILLE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellants, Dr. Simon and Toby Galapo, placed signs with anti-hate and anti-racist messages on their property after a neighbor, Denise Oberholzer, called Dr. Galapo an anti-Semitic slur. The signs were visible from the Oberholzers' property and other neighbors' homes. The Oberholzers filed a civil complaint seeking to enjoin the signs, claiming they constituted a private nuisance, intrusion upon seclusion, defamation, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas granted a permanent injunction, ordering the Galapos to reposition the signs so they did not face the Oberholzers' property. The court found the signs severely impacted the Oberholzers' well-being and quiet enjoyment of their home. The court also determined the injunction was a permissible time, place, and manner restriction on speech.The Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the injunction, holding that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard. The Superior Court concluded the injunction was content-neutral but remanded the case for the trial court to apply the more rigorous standard from Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., which requires that the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that the injunction constituted an impermissible prior restraint under Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court emphasized that the signs were pure speech on matters of public concern and that the trial court lacked the power to enjoin such speech. The Court also held that the publication of language giving rise to tort claims other than defamation cannot be enjoined under Article I, Section 7. The Court concluded that the signs did not invade the Oberholzers' substantial privacy interests in an essentially intolerable manner. View "Oberholzer v. Galapo" on Justia Law

Gary and Mary Wolfe own property in Muhlenberg Township, which includes a roofing business and several rental homes. Reading Blue Mountain and Northern Railroad Company (RBMN) sought to condemn a portion of the Wolfes' property to reestablish a rail siding to serve Russell Standard, an asphalt company. The Wolfes objected, arguing the taking was for a private benefit rather than a public purpose.The Berks County Court of Common Pleas sustained the Wolfes' objections, finding the condemnation was intended solely to benefit Russell Standard and not the public. The court noted that the rail siding would disrupt the Wolfes' property and existing businesses, and that Russell Standard could use its own property for the rail connection. RBMN's refusal to consider alternative routes further indicated a private benefit.The Commonwealth Court reversed, relying on older case law that generally supported railroad takings for public use. The panel presumed RBMN's taking was for a public purpose, emphasizing the historical importance of railroads in serving public needs.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision. The Court held that the taking did not serve a public purpose as required by the Constitution. The Court emphasized that the public must be the primary and paramount beneficiary of the taking, which was not demonstrated in this case. The evidence showed the taking primarily benefited Russell Standard, with no significant public advantage. The Court remanded the case for reinstatement of the trial court's order dismissing the condemnation action. View "Wolfe v. Reading Blue Mountain" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the sale of surplus state property owned by the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD). The property, located at 3311 West State Street in Boise, was declared surplus after a flood rendered its largest building unusable. The Idaho Department of Administration (DOA) initiated a bidding process, and the petitioners, a group of business entities, submitted the highest bid. Despite negotiating a purchase and sale agreement, the DOA did not finalize the sale due to legislative actions that revoked its authority to dispose of the property and transferred control back to the ITD Board.The petitioners filed an original action in the Idaho Supreme Court seeking writs of prohibition and mandate. They argued that the legislative provisions revoking the DOA's authority were unconstitutional, violating the single-subject rule of the Idaho Constitution. They sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate these provisions and compel the DOA to complete the sale. The Idaho House of Representatives and its Speaker intervened, and the State Board of Examiners disclaimed further participation, having fulfilled its statutory duties.The Idaho Supreme Court held that the petitioners lacked standing to bring the action. The court found that while the petitioners demonstrated a distinct and palpable injury from the halted sale, they failed to show that a favorable decision would redress their injury. The court noted that the petitioners did not have a legally enforceable right to purchase the property, as the DOA had discretion in concluding the sale. Additionally, the court determined that the petitioners did not meet the criteria for relaxed standing, as other parties, such as the DOA and ITD, could potentially bring the constitutional claim. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for writs of prohibition and mandate. View "Hawkins Companies, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

In September 2020, the CDC issued a nationwide order temporarily halting residential evictions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This eviction moratorium remained effective for nearly a year. Owners of residential rental properties sued the government, claiming that the CDC’s order constituted a physical taking of their property for public use, requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.The U.S. Court of Federal Claims dismissed the property owners' complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court agreed with the government’s argument that a takings claim cannot be premised on government action that was unauthorized, and it concluded that the CDC’s order was unauthorized because it exceeded the CDC’s statutory authority under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the lower court’s decision. The Federal Circuit concluded that the CDC’s order was “authorized” for takings-claim purposes because it was issued within the normal scope of the CDC’s duties and pursuant to a good faith implementation of the PHSA. The court also determined that the order did not contravene any explicit prohibition or positively expressed congressional intent. Furthermore, the court held that the property owners’ complaint stated a claim for a physical taking, as the CDC’s order prevented them from evicting non-rent-paying tenants, thus infringing on their fundamental right to exclude others from their property. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "DARBY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Word Seed Church, now known as Grace Fellowship Covenant Church, sought to establish a permanent location in the Village of Hazel Crest but faced difficulties due to the village's zoning ordinance. The church claimed that the ordinance discriminated against religious assemblies by not listing churches as a permitted use in any zoning district and requiring a special use permit for churches in certain residential districts. The church argued that this process was burdensome and discriminatory, violating the Equal Protection Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially denied the church's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the church had standing but was unlikely to succeed on the merits. Later, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the village, concluding that the church did not have a property interest in Hazel Crest and had not shown that comparable secular organizations were treated more favorably. The court also rejected the church's vagueness challenge to the zoning ordinance. The church did not appeal the summary judgment but instead filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, arguing that the district court had evaluated the wrong version of the zoning ordinance. The district court denied this motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The appellate court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its decision. The court noted that the church's argument regarding the zoning ordinance amendments was not raised during the summary judgment proceedings and that the church had waived any challenge to the B-2 district, which was affected by the 2008 amendment. The appellate court concluded that the church's difficulties in finding a property were due to the lack of suitable parcels, not the zoning ordinance. View "Word Seed Church v. Village of Hazel Crest" on Justia Law

In the first case, Kent County foreclosed on the homes of Matthew Schafer and Harry and Lilly Hucklebury for unpaid taxes. The properties were sold at auction in 2017, and the county retained the surplus proceeds beyond the owed taxes. Following the Michigan Supreme Court's 2020 decision in Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Co, which held that retaining surplus proceeds from tax-foreclosure sales is an unconstitutional taking, the Schafer plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking those proceeds. The Kent Circuit Court denied the county's motion to dismiss, ruling that Rafaeli applied retroactively. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.In the second case, the state of Michigan, acting as the foreclosing governmental unit (FGU) for Shiawassee County, foreclosed on property owned by Lynette Hathon and Amy Jo Denkins in 2018. The state retained the surplus proceeds from the sale. The Hathon plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in the Court of Claims, which certified the class and denied the state's motion for summary disposition. After Rafaeli, the plaintiffs moved for summary disposition, and the state moved to revoke class certification. The Court of Claims granted the state's motion to revoke class certification but later recertified an amended class. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Claims' decisions.The Michigan Supreme Court held that Rafaeli applies retroactively to claims not yet final as of July 17, 2020. The court also ruled that MCL 211.78t, which provides a procedure for processing claims under Rafaeli, applies retroactively, while the new two-year limitations period in MCL 211.78l applies prospectively. Claims that arose before December 22, 2020, but expired between that date and the court's decision must be allowed to proceed if filed within a reasonable time. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in Schafer and remanded the case for further proceedings. In Hathon, the court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming class recertification and remanded the case to the Court of Claims for reconsideration. View "Schafer v. Kent County" on Justia Law