Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued the Wild Rose Casino and an agent of the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation alleging violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as state law claims for false arrest and imprisonment where plaintiff was arrested for trespass when she entered the casino after having signed two voluntary exclusion forms at the casino's predecessor establishment. Charges against plaintiff were subsequently dropped. Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the agent and the casino. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that the agent was entitled to qualified immunity where he had an objectively reasonable belief that plaintiff was trespassing. The court also held that the release contained in the 2005 form that plaintiff signed was valid and enforceable and therefore, absolved the casino of any liability from plaintiff's constitutional and state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff sued the City of Jonesboro, its mayor, and the members of its city council, alleging that methane gas from a city landfill invaded a tract of land owned by plaintiff and so reduced its value which amounted to a taking of the property by the city. Plaintiff sought just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, other compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief. At issue was whether the district court properly granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, holding that plaintiff's claims were barred by issue preclusion and, in the alternative, that the court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court held that plaintiff's claims did not complain of injuries caused by the state court judgment, but of injuries caused by the invasion of plaintiff's land by methane emanating from the city's landfill. Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply to those claims. The court found that the parties and the district court focused on issue preclusion, but the court held that the case was more readily resolved based on claim preclusion. Thus, the court held that plaintiff's claims were barred by claim preclusion and that plaintiff did not avoid claim preclusion through the reservation of federal rights that he included in the third amended complaint in the state court action. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Petitioners appealed from a Memorandum and Order and Final Order of Forfeiture entered by the district court dismissing their petition for an ancillary hearing and rejecting their claim as beneficiaries of a putative constructive trust in defendant's forfeiture assets. At issue was whether the remission provision of 21 U.S.C. 853(i) precluded the imposition of a constructive trust in petitioners' favor and whether imposing a constructive trust would be consistent with a forfeiture statutory scheme provided by section 853. Because the court concluded that section 853(i) did not preclude, as a matter of law, recognizing a constructive trust and because a constructive trust was not inconsistent with the forfeiture statute, the court vacated the Final Order of Forfeiture and remanded the case to the district court to consider whether, pursuant to Vermont law, a constructive trust should be recognized in favor of petitioners.

Plaintiff, a Christian congregation church, sued the City of Yuma when the city prevented the church from conducting church services in a building it had bought for that purpose. At issue was the "equal terms" provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The court held that the church's claims for declaratory judgment and injunction were moot where the church no longer owned the building, so the city could not be required to issue a conditional use permit for the building to the church. Nor could the church be entitled to a declaration that a code provision and statute violated federal law because they no longer affected the church. The court also held that, because the city required religious assemblies to obtain a conditional use permit, and did not require similarly situated secular membership assemblies to do the same, it violated RLUIPA's equal terms provision. Therefore, the court did not reach the church's argument that the ordinance violated the Free Exercise Clause. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to adjudicate the church's claims as to damages.

Subdivision residents claimed that a retention pond's problems with algae, mosquitoes, and flooding would be exacerbated by proposed expansion of the subdivision. The residents, most of whom are African-American, claimed that the town was unresponsive to their concerns, but responded to similar concerns from white residents of another subdivision. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, as modified. The residents did not have any evidence that a subdivision, similar except for the race of the residents, was treated differently, but relied solely on allegations. State law claims should have been dismissed, not remanded.

Respondent appealed the Dallas Urban Rehabilitation Standards Board's decision that her house was a nuisance and order of demolition, alleging a due process claim and a claim for an unconstitutional taking. The trial court, on substantial evidence review, affirmed the Board's findings. The court of appeals affirmed but held that the Board's nuisance finding could not be preclusive because of the brief delay between the nuisance finding and the house's demolition. The city petitioned the court for review, arguing that the lower courts erred in failing to give the Board's nuisance determination preclusive effect in respondent's taking claim. The court held that a system that permitted constitutional issues of this importance to be decided by an administrative board, whose decisions were essentially conclusive, did not correctly balance the need to abate nuisances against the rights accorded to property owners under the Texas Constitution. Accordingly, independent court review was a necessity and affirmed the court of appeals but on different grounds.

The City of Dallas seized vehicles, which it alleged were stolen, from a company that was entitled to petition for their return. Instead of pursuing its statutory remedy, the company sued, alleging that its interest in those vehicles had been taken without just compensation. The court held that because the company had actual knowledge of the vehicles seizure the company knew the cars were seized from its lots, and it knew who seized them, it was required to pursue a chapter 47 proceeding. Accordingly, the court held that the availability of the statutory remedy precluded a takings claims and reversed the court of appeals judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the suit.

Petitioner Beverly Scannelly petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate all orders it entered after she filed a notice of dismissal. Furthermore, Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to restrain the lower court from future attempts to exercise jurisdiction over her case. Petitioner sued her brother, Respondent Gary Toxey, in 2009, seeking to void certain real-estate transfers her father made to Mr. Toxey. Petitioner filed, sought dismissal, and refilled her complaint three times in three different circuit courts. Mr. Toxey "answered" Petitionerâs complaint approximately one year later by filing a responsive pleading that collaterally attacked her complaint under "res judicata." The circuit court dismissed her case in 2010, finding that Mr. Toxey essentially filed a motion for summary judgment and that Petitionerâs claims presented no issues of material fact. In affirming the circuit courtâs decision, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner failed to demonstrate she had a clear legal right to her requested writs. Accordingly, the Court denied her petition.

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant seeking a declaratory injunction that defendant did not have an easement on their property, damages for trespass and conversion for a 2007 and 2008 incident, an injunction against further trespass, and attorney fees. Defendant asserted as a defense that the lawsuit was filed after the one-year statute of limitations under OCGA 46-3-204. At issue was whether summary judgment against plaintiffs was proper. The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the one-year statute of limitations. The court then affirmed in part and reversed in part the grant of summary judgment because issues of material fact remained regarding the existence of a valid prescriptive easement and plaintiffs' trespass and conversion claims based on defendant's 2008 actions were not barred by OCGA 46-3-204.

In 2000 the planning board approved a development and the developer began purchasing land. In 2002, the Department of Justice issued an opinion that the land could be sold without legislative action, although it was gained from the sea. Construction began; the developer invested $200 million. Because of protests, the legislature investigated and concluded that the developer lacked valid title. A 2007 Department of Justice opinion stated that the land belonged to the public domain. The governor suspended permits and froze construction. Pending a hearing, the developer filed a quiet title action. The Regulations and Permits Administration upheld suspension of construction. The Puerto Rico appeals court ordered the administration to hold an evidentiary hearing (which did not occur), but did not lift the stay on construction. The developer succeeded in its quiet title action; in 2008 construction resumed. The supreme court held that the developer's due process rights had been violated. The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed. Although the plaintiff did state a procedural due process claim, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The defendants were not on clear notice they they were required to hold a meaningful pre-deprivation hearing.