Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2002, a 208-acre estate in Jessamine County was divided into four parcels. In 2004, the owner of Parcel 2 planned residential development, including a bridge and road extension, which was approved by the Nicholasville Planning Commission (NPC). However, these were not built. LPW Redevelopment, LLC later acquired Parcels 2 and 3, sought a zone change, and submitted a development plan, which included the bridge and road extension. Boone Development, LLC purchased Parcel 3 in 2018 and began construction. The City of Nicholasville then informed Boone it was responsible for the bridge and road extension, which Boone disputed.Boone filed a declaratory action in Jessamine Circuit Court, which ruled in Boone's favor, instructing the NPC to make a decision. The NPC affirmed its letter of credit requirements, including the bridge and road extension. The Board of Adjustment upheld the NPC's decision. Boone appealed, and the Jessamine Circuit Court affirmed the Board's decision, finding the Board's actions were within its legislative powers, provided procedural due process, and were supported by substantial evidence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case, focusing on the constitutionality of the appeal bond requirement in KRS 100.3471. The Court held that the statute imposed an unconstitutional burden on the right to appeal, referencing its contemporaneous decision in Bluegrass Trust v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Boone's appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to the bond issue. On the merits, the Supreme Court affirmed the Jessamine Circuit Court's decision, finding the NPC's requirements for the bridge and road extension were not clearly unreasonable. View "BOONE DEVELOPMENT, LLC V. NICHOLASVILLE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellants, Dr. Simon and Toby Galapo, placed signs with anti-hate and anti-racist messages on their property after a neighbor, Denise Oberholzer, called Dr. Galapo an anti-Semitic slur. The signs were visible from the Oberholzers' property and other neighbors' homes. The Oberholzers filed a civil complaint seeking to enjoin the signs, claiming they constituted a private nuisance, intrusion upon seclusion, defamation, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas granted a permanent injunction, ordering the Galapos to reposition the signs so they did not face the Oberholzers' property. The court found the signs severely impacted the Oberholzers' well-being and quiet enjoyment of their home. The court also determined the injunction was a permissible time, place, and manner restriction on speech.The Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the injunction, holding that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard. The Superior Court concluded the injunction was content-neutral but remanded the case for the trial court to apply the more rigorous standard from Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., which requires that the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that the injunction constituted an impermissible prior restraint under Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court emphasized that the signs were pure speech on matters of public concern and that the trial court lacked the power to enjoin such speech. The Court also held that the publication of language giving rise to tort claims other than defamation cannot be enjoined under Article I, Section 7. The Court concluded that the signs did not invade the Oberholzers' substantial privacy interests in an essentially intolerable manner. View "Oberholzer v. Galapo" on Justia Law

Gary and Mary Wolfe own property in Muhlenberg Township, which includes a roofing business and several rental homes. Reading Blue Mountain and Northern Railroad Company (RBMN) sought to condemn a portion of the Wolfes' property to reestablish a rail siding to serve Russell Standard, an asphalt company. The Wolfes objected, arguing the taking was for a private benefit rather than a public purpose.The Berks County Court of Common Pleas sustained the Wolfes' objections, finding the condemnation was intended solely to benefit Russell Standard and not the public. The court noted that the rail siding would disrupt the Wolfes' property and existing businesses, and that Russell Standard could use its own property for the rail connection. RBMN's refusal to consider alternative routes further indicated a private benefit.The Commonwealth Court reversed, relying on older case law that generally supported railroad takings for public use. The panel presumed RBMN's taking was for a public purpose, emphasizing the historical importance of railroads in serving public needs.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision. The Court held that the taking did not serve a public purpose as required by the Constitution. The Court emphasized that the public must be the primary and paramount beneficiary of the taking, which was not demonstrated in this case. The evidence showed the taking primarily benefited Russell Standard, with no significant public advantage. The Court remanded the case for reinstatement of the trial court's order dismissing the condemnation action. View "Wolfe v. Reading Blue Mountain" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the sale of surplus state property owned by the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD). The property, located at 3311 West State Street in Boise, was declared surplus after a flood rendered its largest building unusable. The Idaho Department of Administration (DOA) initiated a bidding process, and the petitioners, a group of business entities, submitted the highest bid. Despite negotiating a purchase and sale agreement, the DOA did not finalize the sale due to legislative actions that revoked its authority to dispose of the property and transferred control back to the ITD Board.The petitioners filed an original action in the Idaho Supreme Court seeking writs of prohibition and mandate. They argued that the legislative provisions revoking the DOA's authority were unconstitutional, violating the single-subject rule of the Idaho Constitution. They sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate these provisions and compel the DOA to complete the sale. The Idaho House of Representatives and its Speaker intervened, and the State Board of Examiners disclaimed further participation, having fulfilled its statutory duties.The Idaho Supreme Court held that the petitioners lacked standing to bring the action. The court found that while the petitioners demonstrated a distinct and palpable injury from the halted sale, they failed to show that a favorable decision would redress their injury. The court noted that the petitioners did not have a legally enforceable right to purchase the property, as the DOA had discretion in concluding the sale. Additionally, the court determined that the petitioners did not meet the criteria for relaxed standing, as other parties, such as the DOA and ITD, could potentially bring the constitutional claim. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for writs of prohibition and mandate. View "Hawkins Companies, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

In September 2020, the CDC issued a nationwide order temporarily halting residential evictions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This eviction moratorium remained effective for nearly a year. Owners of residential rental properties sued the government, claiming that the CDC’s order constituted a physical taking of their property for public use, requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.The U.S. Court of Federal Claims dismissed the property owners' complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court agreed with the government’s argument that a takings claim cannot be premised on government action that was unauthorized, and it concluded that the CDC’s order was unauthorized because it exceeded the CDC’s statutory authority under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the lower court’s decision. The Federal Circuit concluded that the CDC’s order was “authorized” for takings-claim purposes because it was issued within the normal scope of the CDC’s duties and pursuant to a good faith implementation of the PHSA. The court also determined that the order did not contravene any explicit prohibition or positively expressed congressional intent. Furthermore, the court held that the property owners’ complaint stated a claim for a physical taking, as the CDC’s order prevented them from evicting non-rent-paying tenants, thus infringing on their fundamental right to exclude others from their property. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "DARBY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Word Seed Church, now known as Grace Fellowship Covenant Church, sought to establish a permanent location in the Village of Hazel Crest but faced difficulties due to the village's zoning ordinance. The church claimed that the ordinance discriminated against religious assemblies by not listing churches as a permitted use in any zoning district and requiring a special use permit for churches in certain residential districts. The church argued that this process was burdensome and discriminatory, violating the Equal Protection Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially denied the church's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the church had standing but was unlikely to succeed on the merits. Later, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the village, concluding that the church did not have a property interest in Hazel Crest and had not shown that comparable secular organizations were treated more favorably. The court also rejected the church's vagueness challenge to the zoning ordinance. The church did not appeal the summary judgment but instead filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, arguing that the district court had evaluated the wrong version of the zoning ordinance. The district court denied this motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The appellate court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its decision. The court noted that the church's argument regarding the zoning ordinance amendments was not raised during the summary judgment proceedings and that the church had waived any challenge to the B-2 district, which was affected by the 2008 amendment. The appellate court concluded that the church's difficulties in finding a property were due to the lack of suitable parcels, not the zoning ordinance. View "Word Seed Church v. Village of Hazel Crest" on Justia Law

In the first case, Kent County foreclosed on the homes of Matthew Schafer and Harry and Lilly Hucklebury for unpaid taxes. The properties were sold at auction in 2017, and the county retained the surplus proceeds beyond the owed taxes. Following the Michigan Supreme Court's 2020 decision in Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Co, which held that retaining surplus proceeds from tax-foreclosure sales is an unconstitutional taking, the Schafer plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking those proceeds. The Kent Circuit Court denied the county's motion to dismiss, ruling that Rafaeli applied retroactively. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.In the second case, the state of Michigan, acting as the foreclosing governmental unit (FGU) for Shiawassee County, foreclosed on property owned by Lynette Hathon and Amy Jo Denkins in 2018. The state retained the surplus proceeds from the sale. The Hathon plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in the Court of Claims, which certified the class and denied the state's motion for summary disposition. After Rafaeli, the plaintiffs moved for summary disposition, and the state moved to revoke class certification. The Court of Claims granted the state's motion to revoke class certification but later recertified an amended class. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Claims' decisions.The Michigan Supreme Court held that Rafaeli applies retroactively to claims not yet final as of July 17, 2020. The court also ruled that MCL 211.78t, which provides a procedure for processing claims under Rafaeli, applies retroactively, while the new two-year limitations period in MCL 211.78l applies prospectively. Claims that arose before December 22, 2020, but expired between that date and the court's decision must be allowed to proceed if filed within a reasonable time. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in Schafer and remanded the case for further proceedings. In Hathon, the court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming class recertification and remanded the case to the Court of Claims for reconsideration. View "Schafer v. Kent County" on Justia Law

The case involves two nonprofit organizations, the National Federation of the Blind of Texas and Arms of Hope, which use donation boxes to collect items for fundraising. The City of Arlington, Texas, enacted an ordinance regulating the placement and maintenance of these donation boxes, including zoning restrictions and setback requirements. The nonprofits challenged the ordinance, claiming it violated the First Amendment by restricting their ability to place donation boxes in certain areas of the city.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas reviewed the case. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Arlington on several counts, including the constitutionality of the setback requirement and the ordinance not being overbroad or a prior restraint. However, the court ruled in favor of the nonprofits on the zoning provision, finding it was not narrowly tailored and thus violated the First Amendment. The court enjoined Arlington from enforcing the zoning provision against the nonprofits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the ordinance was content-neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny. It found that the zoning provision, which limited donation boxes to three of the city's 28 zoning districts, was narrowly tailored to serve Arlington's significant interests in public health, safety, welfare, and community aesthetics. The court also upheld the setback requirement, finding it did not burden more speech than necessary and left ample alternative channels of communication. The court concluded that the ordinance's permitting provisions did not constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment regarding the zoning provision and rendered judgment in favor of Arlington on that part. The rest of the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "National Federation of the Blind of Texas, Incorporated v. City of Arlington" on Justia Law

The case involves a property owned by Indiana Land Trust #3082, located in Hammond, Indiana, which houses a lucrative fireworks and tobacco business operated by Omar and Haitham Abuzir. The City of Hammond seeks to use its eminent domain power to take this property to build a road connecting Indianapolis Boulevard and the Water Gardens neighborhood. The Abuzirs allege that the City’s actions are part of a conspiracy involving political motives and favoritism towards competitors who support the mayor.The Hammond Redevelopment Commission initially offered to purchase the property in 2018, but the Abuzirs declined. Consequently, the Commission initiated a condemnation action in Indiana state court under the state’s eminent domain statute. The Abuzirs objected, arguing that the taking was for a private purpose and motivated by ill will. Unable to assert counterclaims in state court, they filed a federal lawsuit alleging constitutional and federal law violations, including claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana dismissed the Abuzirs' third amended complaint with prejudice, finding that the City had a legitimate government interest in building a road and that the Abuzirs failed to state a claim for equal protection, substantive due process, or civil conspiracy. The court noted that the Abuzirs' complaint itself provided a rational basis for the City’s actions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the Abuzirs failed to state a class-of-one equal protection claim because the City’s actions had a rational basis. The court also found that the proposed substantive due process claim was futile as the Abuzirs did not allege a deprivation of a protected interest. Lastly, the court upheld the denial of leave to add a § 1983 conspiracy claim, as the Abuzirs failed to establish any underlying constitutional violation. View "Indiana Land Trust #3082 v. Hammond Redevelopment Commission" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County and Rita M. Leach-Lewis, trustee of the Rita M. Leach-Lewis Trust, which owns several homes in Fairfax County. These homes are used by members of the New World Church of the Christ, including Leach-Lewis, for activities such as handling correspondence, preparing spiritual teachings, and storing files and boxes. The homes are located in a residential-conservation zone, which prohibits office uses. After a zoning official conducted a search of the residences, a notice of violation of the zoning ordinance was issued, stating that the homes were being used as an "office."The notice of violation was appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), which upheld the zoning administrator's decision. Leach-Lewis then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the BZA's decision, arguing that the residences were not being used as an "office" and that the notice of violation was based on an improper search under the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court upheld the BZA's decision, and Leach-Lewis appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that the BZA had a duty to interpret and apply a provision of the zoning ordinance that states that no part of the ordinance may be construed to authorize an unconstitutional inspection or search. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the BZA to determine whether the zoning ordinance was violated by the search of the church's property.The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the BZA was not required to examine the constitutionality of the search underlying the notice of violation. The court also concluded that the residences were being used as an "office" as defined in the zoning ordinance. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment in favor of the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County. View "Board of Supervisors v. Leach-Lewis" on Justia Law