Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute that limits reimbursement of reestablishment expenses in condemnation proceedings to $50,000. The appellant, Applied Building Sciences, Inc., an engineering firm, was forced to move its operations when its leased building was condemned for public use by the South Carolina Department of Commerce, Division of Public Railways. The company sought reimbursement for reestablishment expenses exceeding $560,000 but was limited by state statute to $50,000. The company argued that the cap was unconstitutional under the Takings Clauses of the South Carolina and United States Constitutions. The court found that reestablishment expenses are separate from damages awardable as just compensation under both constitutions, thus upholding the constitutionality of the statutory cap. The court affirmed the lower court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the Department of Commerce, Division of Public Railways. View "Applied Building Sciences v. SC Dept of Commerce" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, the plaintiffs, Dallen and Rachel Worthington, filed an expedited unlawful detainer action against the defendant, Carlene Crazy Thunder, for failure to pay rent. Crazy Thunder requested a jury trial, which was denied by the magistrate court. Following a bench trial, the magistrate court ruled that Crazy Thunder had unlawfully detained the Worthingtons’ property and ordered her to vacate the residence. Crazy Thunder appealed to the district court, arguing she had a right to a jury trial under Idaho’s constitution and Idaho Code section 6313. The district court agreed, concluding that section 6-311A conflicted with section 6-313, and that section 6-311A violated Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution. The Worthingtons then appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho.The Supreme Court of Idaho held that Idaho Code section 6-311A does not violate the Idaho Constitution. The court reasoned that an action for unlawful detainer is an equitable claim, and under Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution, the right to trial by jury only exists for legal claims, not equitable ones. However, the court also ruled that Crazy Thunder was entitled to a jury trial on her legal claims. The court held that in wrongful detainer cases like this one, when issues of fact are presented by the pleadings, those issues must be tried by a jury, unless such a jury is waived. As such, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision, though on different grounds. The court further ruled that Crazy Thunder, as the prevailing party on appeal, was entitled to costs, but neither party was entitled to attorney fees. View "Worthington v. Crazy Thunder" on Justia Law

In September 2021, Aaron Welch died intestate, leaving behind a widow, Kristin Welch, and two minor children from his previous marriage. Kristin Welch, appointed as the administratrix of Aaron Welch's estate, filed an application for reservation of homestead & dower with the Pope County Circuit Court, claiming a homestead interest in the mortgaged home she had lived in with her late husband. Katelyn Gipson, the natural guardian of the minor children, argued that Kristin Welch did not have such an interest based on Arkansas Code Ann. § 28-39-201. This statute requires a surviving spouse to have been continuously married to the deceased for more than a year to have a homestead interest. Kristin Welch challenged the constitutionality of this statute, but the circuit court found it constitutional and ruled that she did not have a homestead interest in the property.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court noted that the Arkansas Constitution's provision on homestead rights was gender-based and had been previously declared unconstitutional for violating the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Consequently, the statutory provision, Ark. Code Ann. § 28-39-201(d), which is gender-neutral and requires the continuous marriage condition, stands as the controlling law. The court found no error in the circuit court's application of this statute and concluded that Kristin Welch, having been married to the decedent for less than a year, did not have a statutory homestead interest in the property. View "WELCH ex rel. ESTATE OF AARON WELCH v. GIPSON" on Justia Law

In 1882-1883, the Railway acquired property and constructed the now-abandoned railroad line. In 2008, the Railway filed a notice of exemption from formal abandonment proceedings with the Surface Transportation Board (STB). The Illinois Department of Natural Resources showed interest in railbanking and interim trail use under the 1983 National Trails System Act Amendments, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d). The STB issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU). The owners of property adjoining the railroad line sued, alleging takings by operation of the Trails Act with respect to 51 parcels; 22 parcels were conveyed by instruments including the words “right of way” (ROW Agreements); three were conveyed by instruments including the words “for railroad purposes” (Purpose Agreements); and three are those for which no instruments were produced.The Claims Court granted the government summary judgment, finding that the Railway held the ROW Agreement and Purpose Agreement parcels in fee simple and that the owners failed to show that they had cognizable property interests in the non-instrument parcels. The Federal Circuit reversed. The court rejected the government’s argument that using the term “right of way” in the ROW Agreements referred to the land conveyed, not a limitation on the interest conveyed. For the Purpose Agreements, the Claims Court mistakenly relied on cases discussing deeds that did not include an expression of purpose in the granting clause. Illinois law indicates that the Railway obtained, at most, an easement over the non-instrument parcels. View "Barlow v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the Utah State Tax Commission that the Property Tax Division correctly followed the requirements of the Aircraft Valuation Law, Utah Code 59-2-201 subsection 4, in determining the 2017 value of Delta Air Lines' aircraft, holding that Salt Lake County failed to demonstrate that the Law, as applied to Delta's 2017 assessment, violated the fair market value provision of the Utah Constitution.For tax year 2017, the Division valued Delta's aircraft according to section 59-2-201's preferred methodology. The County appealed, arguing that the valuation did not reflect the fair market value of Delta's aircraft, in violation of the Utah Constitution. The Commission upheld the assessment, concluding that the County did not establish that the Legislature's preferred method of valuation did not reasonably reflect fair market value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Aircraft Valuation Law was not unconstitutional as applied by the Commission to assess the value of Delta's aircraft for tax year 2017. View "Salt Lake County v. Utah State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Steven Dixon appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants the City of Auburn ("the City"); Ron Anders, in his official capacity as the mayor of the City; and Beth Witten, in her official capacity as an Auburn City Council member who served as mayor pro tempore of the City. The underlying action arose from a dispute between Dixon and defendants over Ordinance No. 3288, which amended the City's zoning ordinance to expressly regulate short-term rentals of residential property within the City's geographical limits. Dixon claimed that the adoption and enforcement of the short-term-rental ordinance violated his right to due process and also violated his right to equal protection as guaranteed by the Alabama Constitution. Finding that the trial court properly entered summary judgment in defendants' favor, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dixon v. City of Auburn, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court in this real property dispute, holding that the escheat provision of Va. Code 58.1-3967, as applied to the factual circumstances of this case, violated Va. Const. art. I, 11.The City of Richmond obtained a judicial sale of a parcel of property that was subject to a statutory lien for delinquent taxes. The circuit court confirmed the sale and directed that the City's lien for delinquent taxes, along with its costs and legal fees, be fully paid by the purchase proceeds. Although the sale proceeds satisfied the tax lien, the circuit court concluded that section 58.1-3967 required it to award a portion of the surplus sale proceeds to the City instead of an unsatisfied junior lienor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as applied to this particular case, section 58.1-3967 unconstitutionally authorized the City to take the proceeds and keep them for itself. View "McKeithen v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

Michigan’s Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (UUPA) allows the state to take custody—not ownership—of unclaimed property “in trust for the benefit of the rightful owner” After publishing required notices, the state sells or liquidates the unclaimed property within three years of receiving it, unless the owner brings a valid claim, then deposits the proceeds into its general fund, subtracting reasonable administration costs; the owner can no longer reclaim his property, but can still recover the “net proceeds” from its sale. UUPA apermits owners to recover the interest earned on their property and post-liquidation interest if the property accrued interest before the state took custody of it.Two companies delivered O’Connor’s properties—checks collectively worth no more than $350— to the state after he failed to claim them. The state liquidated them. O’Connor filed a claim for compensation. Michigan reimbursed O’Connor for the value of his property, but not any post-liquidation interest. O’Connor alleges that neither the state nor the third-party holders provided him with the statutorily required notices. O’Connor sued Michigan under the Fifth Amendment; Michigan’s Treasurer, and the Administrative Manager of the Unclaimed Property Program, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit held that the officials are entitled to qualified immunity on O’Connor’s taking claims but not his due process claims. The district court correctly dismissed O’Connor’s claims against the state but should not have dismissed them with prejudice. View "O'Connor v. Eubanks" on Justia Law

Willow purchased a house that needed repairs. Bids for the work exceeded $100,000. Renovations began in 2017 but soon halted. After several years passed, with the house remaining empty, the Village proposed its demolition as a nuisance. The Village published notice, posted notices on the house, and mailed notice to Willow, which concedes having actual knowledge of the impending demolition. Willow did not respond until the week scheduled for the demolition when its lawyer proposed a meeting. The parcel was sold at auction to satisfy the Village’s lien for demolition expenses.Willow sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming a taking without compensation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Village. Demolition of a dilapidated structure that constitutes a public nuisance is not problematic under the Due Process Clause and does not require compensation. The protection that the federal Constitution offers to property owners is notice and an opportunity for a hearing. The Village gave such a notice to Willow, which did not ask for a hearing. Illinois law offers procedures that are constitutionally adequate; someone wanting to stop a demolition need only file suit in state court, which automatically blocks action until the judge decides whether the building meets the statutory criteria for demolition. The district court was not required to decide a state law inverse-condemnation claim. View "Willow Way, LLC v. Village of Lyons, Illinois" on Justia Law

In 1907, the then-owner executed the “Stimson deed,” transferring to the Railroad “its successors and assigns, the right to cross said right of way at any point or points where such crossing is desired” the land at issue. POTB later took ownership of the railroad. A 2007 storm caused severe damage to the railroad tracks. POTB did not repair the damage, resulting in the disbandment of the Oregon Tillamook Railroad Authority. POTB, with governmental entities, established the Salmonberry Trail Intergovernmental Agency, to construct “a new multi-use trail” that would “connect[] to a wide network of existing recreation[al] trails and parks, educational opportunities, and heritage sites” over portions of the railroad line. In 2016, POTB filed a notice of intent to abandon service of the portions of the railroad line at issue with the Surface Transportation Board, which issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) allowing interim trail use and railbanking under the National Trails System Act Amendments, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d).The Claims Court and Federal Circuit rejected Stimson’s claim that the creation of the trail constituted a Fifth Amendment taking. Railbanking and interim trail use are within the scope of the easement. Stimson failed to show abandonment for all purposes and had no compensable property interest in the land to which the deed pertained. View "Stimson Lumber Co. v. United States" on Justia Law