Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In California, a lawsuit was brought against the state by the AIDS Healthcare Foundation and the City of Redondo Beach. The plaintiffs argued that Senate Bill 10, which allowed local governments to bypass housing density restrictions, violated the initiative power of the California Constitution. The trial court ruled against the plaintiffs, leading them to appeal.Senate Bill 10 was enacted to address the severe shortage of housing in California. It provided local legislative bodies the authority to supersede local housing density caps, including those enacted by voter initiatives, in order to allow for more housing units per parcel of land. This power was not absolute; it could only be exercised in certain areas and required a supermajority vote to supersede caps adopted by local voter initiatives.The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, concluding that Senate Bill 10 did not violate the initiative power of the California Constitution. The appellate court reasoned that the housing shortage was a matter of statewide concern and that the bill conflicted with, and hence preempted, local initiatives that mandated housing density caps. Furthermore, the court determined that the bill's mechanism of granting local legislative bodies the discretion to supersede such caps was not constitutionally problematic.The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that existing voter initiatives constituted a preemptive exercise of the local legislative body’s discretion under Senate Bill 10, such that the body lacked the power to supersede such initiatives. The court found no textual support for this argument in the bill and concluded that such an interpretation would frustrate the purpose of Senate Bill 10. View "AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Bonta" on Justia Law

In Arizona, condominium unit owners Jie Cao and Haining Xia challenged the forced sale of their unit by their condominium association (the “Association”) following the dissolution of the condominium. The Association, which had been given power to sell under the Arizona Condominium Act, sold the unit to PFP Dorsey Investments, a company that had previously acquired the majority of units in the condominium.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona held that the Arizona Condominium Act, which authorized the sale, did not violate the eminent domain provision of the Arizona Constitution. The court stated that the Act was incorporated into the condominium declaration, to which the owners had agreed. However, the court also held that in these circumstances, the Act required the sale of all property, rather than individual units as occurred in this case.The court noted that the Association's power to sell derived from the condominium declaration that all unit owners had signed. Thus, the Act didn't effect a taking of the owners' property. As such, the forced sale of the owners’ unit alone rather than as part of a sale of all common elements and units of the condominium was impermissible under the Act.The court vacated the court of appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court also granted the owners reasonable attorney fees for amounts expended to enforce the Declaration, excluding those attributable to the unsuccessful eminent domain claims. View "CAO v PFP DORSEY" on Justia Law

A private Catholic high school in Madison, Wisconsin, sued the city and other defendants, claiming that the city's decision to deny the school permission to install lights for nighttime athletic events violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The school also claimed a vested property right under Wisconsin law.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the school argued that the city's actions amounted to unequal treatment and a substantial burden on its religious exercise. However, the court found that the school, as a master plan institution under the city's Campus-Institutional District ordinance, was not comparably situated to other institutions that had been granted lighting permits. The court also ruled that the city's denial of the permit did not amount to a substantial burden on the school's religious exercise under RLUIPA.Furthermore, the court found that the school's Free Exercise claim provided no additional protections beyond those under RLUIPA and thus could be dismissed. Lastly, the court rejected the school's vested rights claim, as the lighting permit application did not conform to the municipal zoning requirements in effect at the time. Consequently, the court affirmed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the city. View "Edgewood High School of the Sacred Heart, Incorpor v. City of Madison, Wisconsin" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, several construction industry associations challenged a 2018 law (RCW 39.12.015(3)) that changed the method for determining prevailing wage rates on public works projects. Prior to the law, the State used wage and hour surveys to establish the prevailing wage rates. The 2018 law directed the State to adopt the wage rates established in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) for those trades and occupations that have CBAs.The plaintiffs argued that the new law violated a provision of the Washington Constitution (article II, section 37) because it conflicted with an older law (RCW 39.12.026(1)) that restricted the use of wage data collected by the State to the county in which the work was performed. The Court of Appeals agreed and declared the new law unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the older law's restriction on the use of wage data applied only to data collected through wage and hour surveys, not to wage rates adopted from CBAs. Therefore, the older law did not conflict with the new law, and the new law did not violate the state constitution. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Associated General Contractors Of Washington v. State" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs, Ben and Hank Brinkmann and their company Mattituck 12500 LLC, had alleged that the Town of Southold, New York's use of eminent domain to take their land for public park purposes was a pretextual and bad faith exercise of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs argued that the real motive was to prevent them from constructing a hardware store on the property.The Court of Appeals ruled that if a property is taken for a public purpose, in this case, the creation of a park, courts do not inquire into alleged pretexts and motives. The court found that a public park serves a public purpose, and thus, the taking of the property was permissible under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations of pretext and bad faith did not violate the Takings Clause as the intended use of the property was for a public park. The court stated that a pretextual taking would only violate the Takings Clause if the actual purpose of the taking was for a non-public (i.e., private) use, which was not the case here. View "Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, New York" on Justia Law

The case involves Sanimax USA, LLC, who sued the City of South Saint Paul, Minnesota, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the city's zoning and odor ordinances violated the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause. Sanimax contended that the city enacted these ordinances in retaliation for Sanimax challenging prior ordinances and that the ordinances unfairly singled out Sanimax. The district court granted the city's motion for summary judgment on all counts.Sanimax operates a rendering plant in South Saint Paul that processes animal carcasses and organic byproducts, emitting pungent, foul odors that have drawn numerous complaints from nearby residents and businesses. Sanimax was designated as a "Significant Odor Generator" by the city, and later challenged the constitutionality of the city's odor ordinance, alleging that it was unconstitutionally vague.The United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Court found that Sanimax failed to show that the city's actions were a direct retaliation for Sanimax's prior lawsuits challenging the city's ordinances. Additionally, the Court rejected Sanimax's argument that it was unfairly singled out, finding that Sanimax was not similarly situated to other businesses due to the significantly higher number of odor complaints it generated. Lastly, the Court rejected Sanimax's argument that the city's odor ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, finding that the ordinance provided sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct and did not lend itself to arbitrary enforcement. View "Sanimax USA, LLC v. City of South St. Paul" on Justia Law

The case involves a zoning enforcement action initiated by the Town of Pawlet against landowner Daniel Banyai. Banyai launched a firearms training facility on his property in 2017, which was found to be in violation of the town's Uniform Zoning Bylaws. The Environmental Division issued a judgment in 2021, ordering Banyai to remove unpermitted structures and have his property surveyed within 30 days. Banyai failed to comply with these orders, leading to the imposition of contempt sanctions.The contempt sanctions included fines of $200 per day until all violations were rectified, and the potential for Banyai's arrest. The court also granted the town permission to enter Banyai's property to remove the unpermitted structures if he continued to ignore the orders.Banyai appealed, arguing that the sanctions were punitive and violated the excessive fines clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision, deeming Banyai’s arguments an impermissible collateral attack on a final order. The court stated that Banyai had failed to challenge the February 2023 contempt order or denial of reconsideration by a timely direct appeal, which would have been the appropriate channel for his grievances. As a result, his attempt to challenge the determinations now were considered an impermissible collateral attack on the February 2023 contempt order. View "Town of Pawlet v. Banyai" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed a dispute involving the owners of two parcels of real estate in Chicago who contended that banks tried to collect notes and mortgages that belonged to different financial institutions. The state judiciary had ruled that the banks were entitled to foreclose on both parcels, but the properties had not yet been sold and no final judgments defining the debt were in place. The plaintiffs attempted to initiate federal litigation under the holding of Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., arguing that their case was still pending. However, the district court dismissed the case, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which states that only the Supreme Court of the United States can review the judgments of state courts in civil suits.The Appeals court held that the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was incorrect in this case because the foreclosure litigation in Illinois was not yet "final". According to the court, the foreclosure process in Illinois continues until the property is sold, the sale is confirmed, and the court either enters a deficiency judgment or distributes the surplus. Since these steps had not occurred, the plaintiffs had not yet "lost the war", and thus parallel state and federal litigation could be pursued as per Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.However, by the time the district court dismissed this suit, the state litigation about one parcel was over because a sale had occurred and been confirmed, and by the time the Appeals court heard oral argument that was true for the second parcel as well. The Appeals court stated that Illinois law forbids sequential litigation about the same claim even when the plaintiff in the second case offers novel arguments. The court found that the plaintiffs could have presented their constitutional arguments in the state court system and were not free to shift what is effectively an appellate argument to a different judicial system.The court also noted that Joel Chupack, the lead defendant, was the trial judge in the state case and was not a party to either state case. He did not claim the benefit of preclusion. Judge Chupack was found to be entitled to absolute immunity from damages, as he acted in a judicial capacity.The judgment of the district court was modified to reflect a dismissal with prejudice rather than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and as so modified it was affirmed. View "Bryant v. Chupack" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld a township ordinance that regulated the discharging of firearms within the township, except at indoor and outdoor shooting ranges. The plaintiff, a resident of the township, challenged the ordinance, claiming it violated his Second Amendment rights by limiting his ability to practice and maintain proficiency in firearm use. The court determined that the ordinance does not violate the Second Amendment. Applying the historical tradition test outlined by the United States Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc., Inc. v. Bruen, the court found the ordinance to be consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, which includes restrictions on when and where firearms can be discharged. The court also found that the ordinance does not interfere with the plaintiff's right to bear arms as it does not prevent him from owning or possessing firearms, but simply regulates where they can be discharged. The court also noted that the ordinance allows for shooting ranges in certain areas of the township, providing opportunities for individuals to gain proficiency in firearm use. View "Barris v. Stroud Township" on Justia Law

In October 2018, Warren G. Treme, a member of AJSJS Development, LLC, leased minerals on a tract of land in St. John the Baptist Parish, Louisiana, from Dr. Christy Montegut and his siblings. AJSJS intended to join a joint venture formed in 2010 between Treme, AIMS Group, Inc., and Fred Kinsley. The joint venture aimed to extract and process clay material from the tract for a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers project. However, to conduct mining and excavation activities, the plaintiffs needed to change the zoning classification of the tract. Despite multiple applications for rezoning, the Parish Council denied the applications after hearing complaints from affected residents. The plaintiffs then sued the Parish and the Council, alleging that the denial of the rezoning application constituted a regulatory taking without compensation in violation of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. The plaintiffs also alleged violations of procedural and substantive due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a takings claim because their mineral lease was not yet in effect, meaning they had no vested property interest in the tract. The court interpreted the lease to have a suspensive condition that required the plaintiffs to obtain governmental approvals for the lease to become effective. As the plaintiffs had not obtained these approvals, the lease had not yet come into effect. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision but modified the judgment to be a dismissal without prejudice. View "Treme v. St. John the Baptist" on Justia Law