Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the claim brought by the Back Beach Neighbors Committee alleging that the Town of Rockport, Massachusetts committed a class-of-one equal protection violation by failing adequately to enforce local rules against scuba divers at Back Beach, holding that the district court did not err.The Committee brought this complaint claiming that the Town's failure consistently to enforce various rules as to Back Beach led to the singling out of the beach as a place "to welcome divers." The district court granted the Town's motion to dismiss as to six of the complaint's eight counts and then granted summary judgment for the Town on the remaining counts. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because the Committee did not plausibly allege the existence of similarly-situated comparators, its class-of-one equal protection claim failed. View "Back Beach Neighbors Committee v. Town of Rockport" on Justia Law

A 2008 Michigan initiative decriminalized marijuana for medical purposes; a 2016 law afforded legal status to medical marijuana dispensaries. In Detroit, the Buildings, Safety Engineering, and Environmental Department (BSEED) screened applications for such facilities. The code prohibits locating such a facility in a drug-free zone–an area “within 1,000 radial feet of the zoning lot” containing any one of several "sensitive places," including a school.Genie applied to run a medical marijuana distribution facility on Mack Avenue in Detroit. BSEED denied the application at the screening stage because the proposed site was in a drug-free zone based on a lot (in the neighboring community of Grosse Point Park) on which St. Clare School sits. Genie unsuccessfully challenged the determination through state administrative and judicial channels. Detroit deemed the St. Clare’s “zoning lot” to include land where the parish church sits (the church and school have separate lots of record), all of which is listed under a single tax parcel number.Genie sued in federal court, arguing that Detroit erred in measuring the distance between the proposed Genie site and St. Clare’s while approving other sites in violation of the equal protection and due process guarantees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Detroit. Genie had no property interest in its proposed facility. Detroit applied the same method of measurement to each comparable applicant. Although Genie cited two applications that were approved, many applications were rejected on that basis. View "Green Genie, Inc. v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

To improve a stretch of U.S. Route 22 near Altoona, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) sought two right-of-way easements from for new drainage pipes, covering less than one-tenth of an acre of Merritt's property. PennDOT initiated condemnation and over Merritts’s objections, acquired title to and possession of the easements. With no success in that state-court proceeding, Merritts filed a federal suit, claiming that PennDOT’s acquisition of the easements and the compensation offered for them violated the U.S. Constitution and Pennsylvania law.The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice, some based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, the remainder under “Burford abstention,” which protects “complex state administrative processes from undue federal interference.” The Third Circuit affirmed in part. The “Ex parte Young” exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity does not allow Merritts’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against the PennDOT officials in their official capacities because he does not seek prospective relief from an ongoing violation. Merritts’s section 1983 claims for damages against the PennDOT officials in their individual capacities for allegedly unlawfully acquiring the easements for PennDOT cannot be dismissed under Burford abstention; his claims for damages premised on the allegedly unlawful acquisition of the easements meet the conditions for dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but his claims concerning the denial of just compensation do not. The dismissals on Eleventh Amendment and Rooker-Feldman grounds should have been without prejudice. View "Merritts v. Richards" on Justia Law

In this case challenging the constitutionality of administrative rules governing access to Mauna Kea's summit under Haw. Const. art XII, 7, the Supreme Court answered questions reserved by the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit by holding (1) in a challenge to the constitutionality of administrative rules based on a violation of Haw. Const. art. XII, 7, the burden of proof does not shift to the government agency defendant and instead remains with the challenging party; and (2) the framework set forth in Ka Pa'akai O Ka'Aina v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 P.3d 1068 (Haw. 2000), applies to challenges to the constitutionality of an administrative rule based on an alleged violation of article XII, section 7, in addition to contested case hearings. View "Flores-Case 'Ohana v. University of Haw." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the trial court concluding that a constitutional taking of Landowners' property occurred from government-induced flooding, holding that whether the flooding's interference was substantial enough to create a taking was a question left unresolved by the trial court's findings.In 2009, the Town of Linden and Montgomery County approved a drainage-improvement plan that called for a reconstruction project that included a drainage easement on Landowners' property. After completion of the project, portions of Landowners' property flooded after any heavy rainfall, encumbering their farming enterprise. Landowners sued the Town and County for inverse condemnation. After remand, the trial court concluded that the project amounted to a taking. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order, holding (1) the trial court properly analyzed the government-induced flooding as a permanent physical invasion; and (2) the statutory right of entry set forth in Ind. Code Ann. 36-9-27-33 does not exempt a county from liability for a takings claim. View "Town of Linden v. Birge" on Justia Law

Schwab Multimedia received a construction permit from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). But Schwab never built its station. Though the FCC granted Schwab’s first three requests for more time, it denied Schwab’s fourth. Schwab appealed the FCC’s decision, claiming that it was arbitrary and capricious.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that the FCC based its denial of Schwab’s tolling request on three underlying determinations, and those determinations were reasonable. First, the FCC reasonably found that Schwab had no construction site. Indeed, Schwab admitted as much. It told the Media Bureau that the landlord of the original site had “rescinded [its] verbal agreement . . . to use the site.” And it offered no evidence to suggest that it had since secured the landlord’s permission. Second, it was reasonable for the FCC to conclude that site loss was the real reason Schwab could not build. Third, the FCC reasonably held that site loss is not a legitimate basis for tolling. Further, Schwab produced no evidence to show that good cause would support a waiver. View "Levine/Schwab Partnership v. FCC" on Justia Law

The Lunada Bay Boys (Bay Boys) are a group of young and middle-aged men local to the City of Palos Verdes (the “City”), who consider themselves to be the self-appointed guardians of Lunada Bay. One of their tenets is to keep outsiders away from the surf location. They accomplish this through threats and violence. Plaintiffs are (1) two non-locals who encountered harassment by the Bay Boys when they tried to surf Lunada Bay and (2) a non-profit dedicated to preserving coastal access. They brought suit against the Bay Boys, some of its individual members, and the City itself for conspiracy to deny access under the California Coastal Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the City conspired with the Bay Boys essentially to privatize Lunada Bay, depriving nonlocals of access. The trial court granted the City judgment on the pleadings.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an unpermitted “development” in the Bay Boys’ denial of access to the beach. Further, the court explained that parties can, in fact, be liable for Coastal Act violations under the doctrine of conspiracy. Conspiracy liability is not limited to tort; defendants may be liable if they agree to engage in conduct that violates a duty imposed by statute. The court wrote, at this point, Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an actionable conspiracy in which the City has participated. View "Spencer v. City of Palos Verdes Estates" on Justia Law

In the late 1930s, Milwaukee County built a dam on the Milwaukee River in Estabrook Park, an urban green space that runs along the east bank of the river where the City of Milwaukee borders suburban Shorewood and Whitefish Bay. In 2017 the County transferred the dam to the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District for the purpose of removing it. Demolition was completed the following year. With the dam removed, the water level immediately upstream fell by about four feet from its previous high-water mark. Kreuziger owns a home along this stretch of the river, and the drop in the water level exposed a ten-foot swath of swampy land on his waterfront that used to be submerged.Kreuziger sued the District and Milwaukee County, alleging that their removal of the dam amounted to a taking of his riparian right to the prior surface water level without just compensation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. the riparian rights of waterfront property owners are subordinate to the government’s authority to regulate navigable waterways under the public-trust doctrine. Kreuziger had no property right to have the river remain at the previous level. View "Kreuziger v. Milwaukee County" on Justia Law

Property owners sought compensation for an alleged taking pursuant to the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. 1241–51. When a railroad wishes to relinquish responsibility over a railroad corridor, it must seek permission to abandon the corridor. Under the Trails Act, before abandonment is consummated, other entities can intervene to railbank the corridor and preserve it for future railroad use. The railbanking intervention process allows a railroad to negotiate with the intervening entity to assume financial and managerial responsibility for the corridor by operating it as a recreational trail. The issuance of a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) allowing interim trail use and railbanking constitutes a Fifth Amendment taking if the railroad was granted an easement, interim trail use and railbanking were beyond the scope of that easement, and the NITU caused a delay in termination of the easement.The Claims Court found that the property interests at issue were easements, but that interim trail use was within the scope of the easements. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Claims Court erred in interpreting Missouri law and in concluding that interim trail use was within the scope of the easements; railbanking is not within the scope of the easements. With no causation dispute, the NITU issuance constituted a taking. View "Behrens v. United States" on Justia Law

The 1976 Magnuson–Stevens Act contemplated “[a] national program for the conservation and management of the fishery resources of the United States,” 16 U.S.C. 1801(a)(6), and established the United States 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A 2007 amendment established national criteria for quota-based fishing programs, (limited access privilege programs) and authorized the quota-based fishing permits and licenses at issue in this Fifth Amendment takings claim, in which fishing businesses challenged four different permitting, licensing, and endorsement requirementsThe Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for lack of a cognizable property interest in the fishing endorsements, licenses, and permits, separate from or appurtenant to their fishing vessels. Precedent establishes that fishing permits and licenses issued under the Act are revocable privileges, not compensable property interests. The Magnuson–Stevens Act refers to “congressional intent not to confer any right, title, or interest, and to preserve the government’s authority to revoke privileges enjoyed in” fishing licenses and permits. The National Marine Fisheries Service’s regulations did not create compensable property rights in permits or licenses. licenses; permits did not have the essential characteristics of compensable property—transferability and the right to exclude others. There is no inherent right in vessel ownership to fish within the EEZ. View "Fishermen's Finest, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law