Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit amended its certification order, in an appeal raising issues pertaining to Nevada state water law. The panel certified to the Supreme Court of Nevada the following questions: 1) Does the public trust doctrine apply to rights already adjudicated and settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation and, if so, to what extent? 2) If the public trust doctrine applies and allows for reallocation of rights settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation, does the abrogation of such adjudicated or vested rights constitute a “taking” under the Nevada Constitution requiring payment of just compensation? View "Mineral Country v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part, and dismissed as moot in part the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the the City of North Little Rock, the City's mayor, certain City Council members, and other City officials and dismissing Plaintiff's action challenging the City's decision to condemn certain property, holding that some of Plaintiff's arguments on appeal were moot.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiff's argument that the City Council proceeding did not contain any factual findings to support the condemnation and demolition of Plaintiff's property was moot; (2) there was no longer a justiciable controversy regarding Plaintiff's failure-to-exhaust argument, and therefore, the issue was moot; (3) summary judgment was properly granted to the City as to argument that the City's condemnation ordinance violated due process; (4) the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment on the claim that the City's ordinance was unconstitutionally vague; and (5) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant Plaintiff's renewed motion to strike the City's amended answer and affirmative defenses. View "Convent Corp. v. City of North Little Rock" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by Relators, who owned property over which Ohio Power Company sought to take easements by eminent domain, holding that Relators were entitled to a writ of prohibition to prevent Washington County Court of Common Pleas Judge John Halliday from proceeding with a compensation trial during the pendency of Relators' appeal.After Judge Halliday ruled that Ohio Power's takings were necessary for a public use Relators appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeals. Notwithstanding the appeal, Judge Halliday scheduled a trial on the issue of compensation. Relators commenced this action seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Halliday from holding the compensation trial while their appeal was pending. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) the appropriations in this case did not fall under any of the exceptions to the owner's right to immediate appeal under Ohio Rev. Code 163.09(B)(3); and (2) a compensation trial during the pendency of a section 163.09(B)(3) appeal is inconsistent with the court of appeals' jurisdiction. View "State ex rel. Bohlen v. Halliday" on Justia Law

Fisk, an LLC formed in 2018, had two members; one is an attorney. Fisk collaborated with the City of DeKalb regarding the redevelopment of a dilapidated property. Under a Development Incentive Agreement, if Fisk met certain contingencies, DeKalb would provide $2,500,000 in Tax Increment Financing. In 2019, Nicklas became the City Manager and opened new inquiries into Fisk’s financial affairs and development plans. Nicklas concluded Fisk did not have the necessary financial capacity or experience, based on specified factors.Fisk's Attorney Member had represented a client in a 2017 state court lawsuit in which Nicklas was a witness. Nicklas considered funding incentives for other development projects with which, Fisk alleged, Nicklas had previous financial and personal ties.The City Council found Fisk’s financial documents “barren of any assurance that the LLC could afford ongoing preliminary planning and engineering fees,” cited “insufficient project details,” and terminated the agreement. Fisk sued Nicklas under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Nicklas sought to retaliate against Fisk and favor other developers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. Fisk did not exercise its First Amendment petition right in the 2017 lawsuit. That right ran to the client; Fisk did not yet exist. Fisk had no constitutionally protected property right in the agreement or in the city’s resolution, which did not bind or “substantively limit[]” the city “by mandating a particular result when certain clearly stated criteria are met.” Nicklas had a rational basis for blocking the project, so an Equal Protection claim failed. View "145 Fisk, LLC v. Nicklas" on Justia Law

In response to a question certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit the Supreme Court answered that the statute of limitations for a regulatory takings claim brought under the Hawai'i Constitution is six years pursuant to the catch-all statute of limitations in Haw. Rev. Stat. 657-1(4).The underlying dispute arose from the State Land Use Commission's (LUC) reclassification in 2011 of 1,060 acres of land in South Kohala on Hawai'i Island. In 2017, DW Aina Le'a Development (DW) filed this complaint alleging that the reclassification was an unconstitutional taking because the LUC failed to compensate DW for damages resulting from the land's reclassification. The federal district court dismissed the case, applying the two-year statute of limitations found in Haw. Rev. Stat. 657-7. LW appealed, arguing that the "catch-all" six-year statute of limitations applied to the action. The Ninth Circuit certified to the question to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations for a takings claim under the Hawai'i Constitution is six years pursuant to Haw. Rev. Code 657-1(4). View "DW Aina Le'a Development, LLC v. State Land Use Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in this declaratory judgment action against Governor Holcomb, holding that the statute passed by the legislature in 2017 stopping the City of Bloomington's proposed annexation of several areas of land and prohibiting the City from trying to annex the areas for five years is unconstitutional special legislation in violation of Ind. Const. art. IV, 23.In 2017, the Bloomington mayor announced plans for a proposed annexation of several areas of land. After the City Council adopted the initiating resolutions and Bloomington took its initial steps toward annexation, the General Assembly passed legislation codified at Ind. Code 36-4-3-11.8 cutting off Bloomington's proposed annexation and prohibiting the City from trying to annex the same areas for the next five years. The City brought this suit seeking declarations that section 11.8 constitutes unconstitutional special legislation and violates article 4, section 19's single-subject rule. The trial court declared section 11.8 unconstitutional under article 4, sections 19 and 23 of the Indiana Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 11.8 constitutes impermissible special legislation. View "Holcomb v. City of Bloomington" on Justia Law

In May 2014, George Gonzalez pled guilty to two misdemeanor counts of using his premises without a permit or variance, and one count of maintaining an unauthorized encroachment. The trial court placed Gonzalez on probation for three years, subject to various stipulated conditions, including that he must bring all properties up to code. Gonzalez violated probation on five separate occasions; each time, the court revoked and then reinstated Gonzalez’s probation, with terms to which Gonzalez expressly agreed, including stayed terms of custody of increasing lengths. During a hearing on the third of these violations, Gonzalez agreed to additional specific probation conditions relating to property that he owned on Aldine Drive. Gonzalez specifically agreed to a probation condition that required he sell the Aldine Property for fair market value if he failed to comply with various probation conditions mandating that he undertake specified corrective work on the property. In March 2017, after admitting a fourth probation violation, Gonzalez agreed to an extension of the probationary period and to modify the stayed term of custod. After a hearing concerning the Aldine Property, the trial court found Gonzalez in violation of probation for a fifth time. Gonzalez was again given an opportunity to cure the violations prior to the next hearing; when conditions were not cured, the court ordered Gonzalez to sell the Aldine Property. Gonzalez challenged the order to sell the Aldine Property, arguing, among other things, the order to sell the Aldine Property was invalid because it was entered after the expiration of the maximum three-year probation period as authorized by his 2014 guilty plea, and an order directing the sale of real property was not specified as a potential punishment for municipal code violations in the San Diego Municipal Code. The Court of Appeal determined: (1) the order to sell the Aldine Property was a condition of probation, not a punishment; (2) Gonzalez’s takings claim was without merit; and (3) Gonzalez forfeited any challenge to the reasonableness of the probation condition by failing to raise such a challenge in the trial court or in his opening brief on appeal. The trial court’s order directing the sale of the Aldine Property was affirmed. View "California v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Defendants Shane and Trina Beattie appealed a superior court orderthat dismissed with prejudice their preliminary objection challenging the State’s taking of 0.93 acres of their land in fee simple, as well as permanent and temporary easements. The Beatties argued the trial court erred when, in dismissing their preliminary objection which challenged the necessity and net-public benefit of the taking, the trial court applied the fraud or gross mistake standard of review set forth in RSA chapter 230 rather than a de novo standard pursuant to RSA chapter 498-A. The State contended the trial court did not err because RSA chapter 230, not RSA chapter 498-A governed the outcome of the case. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the Beatties, reversed and remanded. View "New Hampshire v. Beattie" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding compensation totaling $4,625,967 for Elkhorn School District's taking of forty-three acres of Tribedo, LLC's property, holding that the district court did not err in its trial rulings nor in accepting the jury verdict for total compensation due to Tribedo.After the board of appraisers awarded $2,601,600 for the taking Tribedo appealed, alleging that the award did not reflect the fair market value of the property taken and did not adequately compensate for damages to the remainder of Tribedo's property. Following the jury's verdict, Elkhorn moved for a new trial. The district court denied the motion and granted Tribedo's posttrial motions for an award of interest and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no error in the proceedings below; (2) the district court did not err when it accepted the jury verdict; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Tribedo $590,925 in attorney fees. View "Douglas County School District No. 10 v. Tribedo, LLC" on Justia Law

Nevada Revised Statutes section 116.3116 gives a homeowners association (HOA) a superpriority lien on properties within the association for certain unpaid assessments. By foreclosing on a property, an HOA can extinguish other liens, including a first deed of trust held by a mortgage lender. The Ninth Circuit held that this scheme does not effect an uncompensated taking of property or violates the Due Process Clause.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, based on failure to state a claim, of Wells Fargo's quiet title action against the purchaser of real property at a foreclosure sale, an HOA, and the HOA's agent. In this case, because the enactment of section 116.3116 predated the creation of Wells Fargo's lien on the property, Wells Fargo cannot establish that it suffered an uncompensated taking. The panel also agreed with the district court's conclusion that Wells Fargo received constitutionally adequate notice of the foreclosure sale. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wells Fargo's motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), because Wells Fargo failed to raise its arguments earlier where the evidence on which it relied was theoretically available when it filed its first response to the motion to dismiss. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Mahogany Meadows Avenue Trust" on Justia Law