Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in this litigation related to the expansion of an agricultural zoning district through citizen initiative to include the area where Montana Artesian Water Company had been developing a large-scale water bottling plant, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.At issue on appeal was whether Montana Artesian's water bottling facility was a valid nonconforming use under the Egan Slough Zoning District Regulations. Montana Artesian raised numerous issues on cross appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly denied Montana Artesian's motion for summary judgment on the validity of the ballot initiative process; (2) did not err in affirming the conclusion that Montana Artesian's facility was a legal nonconforming use; and (3) did not err in concluding that the initiative was not unconstitutional or illegal reverse spot zoning. View "Egan Slough Community, Yes! v. Flathead County Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Five adjacent Burtonsville, Maryland parcels are restricted from receiving sewer service. Several previous attempts to obtain approval of water and sewer category change requests were unsuccessful. The owners' alternative plan was to sell to a religious organization. They believed that land-use regulations must submit to “[c]hurch use [which] cannot be denied.” They entered into a contract with Canaan, contingent on the approval of the extension of a public sewer line for a new church. Such an extension required amendment of the Comprehensive Ten-Year Water Supply and Sewerage Systems Plan, which involves the Montgomery County Planning Board, the County Executive, the County Council, public hearings, and the Maryland Department of the Environment.Following denial of their requests, the owners sued under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the claims. The land has been bound by decades of regulations restricting development for both religious and non-religious purposes. The parties were aware of the difficulties in developing the property when they entered into the contract; they could not have a reasonable expectation of religious land use. The restrictions are rationally related to the government’s interest in protecting the region’s watershed. View "Canaan Christian Church v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

New Harvest challenged a Salinas ordinance prohibiting religious and other assemblies from operating on the ground floor of buildings facing Main Street within the downtown area. The ordinance prohibited it from hosting worship services on the ground floor of its newly-purchased building. New Harvest claimed the ordinance substantially burdened its religious exercise and treated New Harvest on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The district court granted the city summary judgment. New Harvest sold the building; the Ninth Circuit treated claims for declaratory and injunctive relief as moot.Addressing claims for damages, the court reversed in part. The ordinance facially violated RLUIPA's equal terms provision. Other nonreligious assemblies, such as theatres, are permitted to operate on the first floor of the Restricted Area and are similarly situated to religious assemblies with respect to the provision’s stated purpose and criterion. New Harvest failed to demonstrate a substantial burden on its religious exercise; it could have conducted services on the second floor or by reconfiguring the first floor and was not precluded from using other available sites within Salinas. When it purchased the building, New Harvest was on notice that the ordinance prohibited services on the first floor. View "New Harvest Christian Fellowship v. City of Salinas" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the landlords' motion for a preliminary injunction in an action challenging the Minneapolis City Council's enactment of Ordinance No. 244.2030 under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause (and similar provisions of the Minnesota Constitution). The Ordinance requires landlords to evaluate applicants for rental housing by either (1) "inclusive screening criteria" or (2) "individualized assessment."The court concluded that the landlords have neither demonstrated a physical-invasion taking nor a Penn Central taking. The court stated that, due to the individualized assessment option, the Ordinance is a restriction on the landlords' ability to use their property, not a physical-invasion taking. Furthermore, the district court properly ruled that the landlords offered nothing but conclusory assertions of economic impact and interference with investment-backed expectations. Finally, the Ordinance withstands rational basis review where it does not infringe a fundamental right and where the government had a legitimate purpose in ameliorating problems that often prevent people from finding housing. View "301, 712, 2103 and 3151 LLC v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying relief to Appellant Advocates for School Trust Lands on its claim that House Bill 286 (HB 286), passed by the 2019 Montana Legislature and codified as Mont. Code Ann. 85-2-441, is unconstitutional, holding that there was no error.Appellant brought this action alleging that HB 286 is facially unconstitutional because it violates the State's trust obligations imposed by the 1889 Enabling Act and the Montana Constitution by creating a presumption against State ownership in ground water diverted from private property for use on leased school trust land, thereby reducing the value of those lands. The district court granted summary judgment to the State, concluding that Appellant's claim was unripe and that its proposed amendment was futile. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by granting summary judgment to the State; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to amend its complaint. View "Advocates v. State" on Justia Law

The Coalition filed suit to enjoin a renovation and expansion project under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, section 12900 et seq.). The Court of Appeal held, in light of Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (2015) 576 U.S. 519, that a disparate impact claim based on a gentrification theory is not cognizable under the Fair Housing Act. In the published portion of the opinion, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Coalition's gentrification-based claims under the FHA and FEHA. View "Crenshaw Subway Coalition v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Tyler owned a Minneapolis condominium. She stopped paying her property taxes and accumulated a tax debt of $15,000. To satisfy the debt, Hennepin County foreclosed on Tyler’s property and sold it for $40,000. The county retained the net proceeds from the sale. Tyler sued the county, alleging that its retention of the surplus equity—the value of the condominium in excess of her $15,000 tax debt—constituted an unconstitutional taking, an unconstitutionally excessive fine, a violation of substantive due process, and unjust enrichment under state law.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her complaint. Minnesota’s statutory tax-forfeiture plan allocates the entire surplus to various entities with no distribution of net proceeds to the former landowner; the statute abrogates any common-law rule that gave a former landowner a property right to surplus equity. Nothing in the Constitution prevents the government from retaining the surplus where the record shows adequate steps were taken to notify the owners of the charges due and the foreclosure proceedings. View "Tyler v. Minnesota" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Board of County Commissioners of Laramie County and Laramie County Assessor Kenneth Guille (collectively, the County) and concluding that the durational residency requirement in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 39-13-105(a)(vi) is constitutional, holding that there was no error.Section 39-13-105(a)(vi) grants qualified veterans an annual property tax exemption if they have been Wyoming residents for at least three years. Plaintiff brought this action seeking a declaration that the durational residency requirement for the veteran tax exemption is unconstitutional. The district court granted summary judgment for the County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 39-13-105(a)(vi) does not infringe on Plaintiff's fundamental right to travel, and therefore, the rational basis test applies; and (2) the statute does not violate either the equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment or the constitutional right to interstate travel. View "Martin v. Board of County Commissioners of Laramie County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Oakland’s Uniform Residential Tenant Relocation Ordinance, which requires landlords re-taking occupancy of their homes upon the expiration of a lease to pay tenants a relocation payment. Plaintiffs alleged that the relocation fee is an unconstitutional physical taking of their money for a private rather than public purpose, without just compensation. Alternatively, they claimed that the fee constitutes an unconstitutional exaction of their Oakland home and an unconstitutional seizure of their money under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Although in certain circumstances money can be the subject of a physical (per se) taking, the relocation fee required by the Ordinance was a regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship, not an unconstitutional taking of a specific and identifiable property interest. Because there was no taking, the court did not address whether the relocation fee was required for a public purpose or what just compensation would be. The court rejected an assertion that Oakland placed an unconstitutional condition (an exaction), on their preferred use of their Oakland home. The plaintiffs did not establish a cognizable theory of state action; Oakland did not participate in the monetary exchange between plaintiffs and their tenants. View "Ballinger v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

The Landowners own parcels of land adjacent to a 2.45-mile strip of a Union Pacific railroad line in McLennan County, Texas. Union Pacific’s predecessor in interest, Texas Central originally acquired the Line in 1902 through multiple deeds executed by the Landowners’ predecessors in interest. The Landowners sued, seeking compensation based on a theory that their predecessors in interest had conferred only easements to Texas Central, and that the Surface Transportation Board (STB) enforcement of the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. 1241, by “railbanking” amounted to a “taking” of their property. Railbanking involves the transition of unused railroad corridors into recreational hiking and biking trails, generally by a transfer of an interest in the use of a rail corridor to a third-party entity. The Claims Court interpreted the deeds as having conveyed fee simple estates, not easements.The Federal Circuit affirmed. No takings from the Landowners occurred when the government later authorized conversion of the railroad line to a recreation trail; the granting clauses of the subject deeds unambiguously conveyed fee simple interests in the land and not easements despite contradictory language elsewhere in the deeds. View "Anderson v. United States" on Justia Law