Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Gulfstream Café, Inc. owns a restaurant within the Marlin Quay Planned Development (PD) in Georgetown County, South Carolina. The PD includes a shared parking lot, with Gulfstream holding a nonexclusive easement for sixty-two spaces and owning seventeen additional spaces. In 2016, Palmetto Industrial Development, LLC purchased the marina and parking lot, demolished the existing structures, and sought approval from the Georgetown County Council to build a new restaurant. After several iterations and legal challenges, the Council approved a final plan (Ordinance 2018-40) for the new restaurant, which increased evening parking demand and allegedly harmed Gulfstream’s business.Previously, Gulfstream challenged the approval process and the impact on its easement rights in the Circuit Court for Georgetown County. The court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of the County, the County Council, and Councilmember Steve Goggans on all claims, including substantive and procedural due process, takings, inverse condemnation, and alleged impropriety in the approval process. Gulfstream appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case, applying a limited scope of review for factual findings and de novo review for legal and constitutional issues. The Court held that Gulfstream’s easement was nonexclusive and had not been deprived by the ordinance, that the County’s actions had a rational basis, and that the ordinance did not constitute a per se or regulatory taking under the Penn Central test. The Court also found no procedural due process violation, as Gulfstream received notice and an opportunity to be heard, and determined that Councilmember Goggans’ prior involvement did not invalidate the ordinance. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in all respects. View "The Gulfstream Café v. Georgetown County" on Justia Law

In this case, the owners of a residential property in Fayetteville, Arkansas, sought to rent their home as a short-term rental when not in residence. The City of Fayetteville had enacted an ordinance regulating short-term rentals, requiring a license for all such properties and a conditional-use permit for certain types in residential zones. The ordinance also imposed a cap on the number of these rentals. After applying for a conditional-use permit, the property owners’ application was denied by the Fayetteville Planning Commission, which found the proposed rental incompatible with the neighborhood due to the number of similar rentals nearby.Following the denial, the property owners attempted to appeal to the Fayetteville City Council, but their appeal was not sponsored by the required number of council members. They then filed an administrative appeal in the Washington County Circuit Court, along with claims for declaratory and constitutional relief. They also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the ordinance while their case was pending. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing the administrative appeal was untimely. The circuit court denied the preliminary injunction and dismissed the administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction, but left the constitutional claims pending.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed only the denial of the preliminary injunction, as the dismissal of the administrative appeal was not properly before it due to the absence of a final, appealable order. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction, finding no irreparable harm and no likelihood of success on the merits at this stage. The denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed, and the appeal of the administrative dismissal was dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. View "HAUSE v. CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE, ARKANSAS; THE FAYETTEVILLE PLANNING COMMISSION" on Justia Law

Owners of developed commercial and residential properties in Athens-Clarke County challenged the county’s stormwater utility charge, arguing that it was an unconstitutional tax rather than a fee. The charge, established by county ordinances in 2004, funds stormwater management services required by federal law, with the amount assessed based on impervious surface area and land-use classification. The ordinance exempts certain properties, such as public roads and sidewalks, and offers credits for on-site stormwater management. The funds collected are used for flood prevention, pollution minimization, and compliance with federal regulations.Previously, the Superior Court of Athens-Clarke County granted summary judgment to the county, finding that the stormwater utility charge was a fee, not a tax, and thus not subject to the Georgia Constitution’s taxation uniformity provision. This decision relied on the Georgia Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Homewood Village, LLC v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County, which had addressed the same ordinance and held it imposed a fee rather than a tax. The appellants also pursued related claims in federal court, but those were dismissed on abstention grounds.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that its prior decision in Homewood Village, LLC v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County controlled, reaffirming that the stormwater utility charge is a fee and not a tax, and therefore the uniformity provision does not apply. The court also rejected the appellants’ arguments that the charge constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Georgia and United States Constitutions, finding no basis for such a claim. Finally, the court found that the trial court had properly applied the summary judgment standard and had not improperly resolved factual disputes. The judgment in favor of the county was affirmed. View "HOMEWOOD ASSOCIATES INC. v. UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS-CLARKE COUNTY" on Justia Law

A billboard company sought to erect a sign in a Michigan township, but its application was denied because the proposed billboard did not comply with local height and size restrictions. Instead of appealing the denial or seeking a variance, the company filed a federal lawsuit challenging the township’s sign ordinance on First Amendment grounds, including claims that the ordinance imposed content-based restrictions, constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint, and was unconstitutionally vague. The company did not challenge the height and size restrictions themselves. The township’s ordinance only allowed billboards in certain industrial zones adjacent to interstate freeways, but, according to the company, no such zones existed in the township.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the township, finding the company lacked standing because its alleged injuries were not caused by the challenged provisions and would not be redressed by a favorable decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the company failed to meet the requirements for standing on any of its claims.Subsequently, the company filed a new lawsuit in the same district court, again alleging that the ordinance was a prior restraint on speech. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that res judicata (claim preclusion) barred the action. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that issue preclusion, not claim preclusion, applied. The court concluded that issue preclusion barred the company from relitigating its prior-restraint claim based on its earlier application, but did not bar claims based on new facts—specifically, the company’s allegation that it was self-censoring and not applying for any billboards due to the ordinance’s discretionary variance process. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the new factual allegations. View "Outdoor One Communications LLC v. Charter Twp. of Canton, Mich." on Justia Law

Amy Hadley’s home in South Bend, Indiana, was significantly damaged when law enforcement officers executed a search warrant in pursuit of a murder suspect they believed was inside her residence. The officers, acting on information that the suspect had accessed his Facebook account from Hadley’s IP address, obtained a warrant and forcefully entered the home, causing extensive property damage, including the use of tear gas and destruction of personal items. Hadley, who had no connection to the suspect, was denied compensation by both the City of South Bend and St. Joseph County for the $16,000 in damages.After her request for compensation was denied, Hadley filed suit in Indiana state court, seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, specifically invoking the Takings Clause. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Seventh Circuit precedent, particularly Johnson v. Manitowoc County, foreclosed her claim. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint, finding that the Takings Clause did not entitle her to compensation for property damage resulting from the execution of a lawful search warrant.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that, under its precedent in Johnson v. Manitowoc County, the Fifth Amendment does not require the government to compensate property owners for damage caused by law enforcement executing a valid search warrant. The court declined to overrule Johnson and found that Hadley’s arguments did not warrant revisiting the established rule. View "Hadley v. City of South Bend" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are homeowners and rental-property supervisors in New Orleans who challenged the City’s regulations governing short-term rentals (STRs), defined as lodging offered for less than thirty days. The City’s regulatory scheme requires permits for both owners and operators of STRs, restricts eligibility to “natural persons,” mandates that operators reside at the property, and imposes specific advertising requirements. The regulations were enacted in response to concerns about neighborhood disruption and loss of affordable housing attributed to the proliferation of STRs. Plaintiffs argued that these regulations violated various constitutional provisions, including the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the First Amendment, and the dormant Commerce Clause.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted summary judgment largely in favor of the City, upholding the constitutionality of most aspects of the STR regulations. The district court found that the City had authority under state law to regulate STRs and rejected the plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims, except for one provision not at issue on appeal. The court also upheld the advertising restrictions and the operator residency requirement, interpreting the latter as not requiring permanent residency.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Fifth Circuit held that the City’s prohibition on business entities obtaining owner or operator permits violated the Equal Protection Clause, as the distinction was arbitrary and not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The court also found that the requirement that each STR advertisement list only one dwelling unit violated the First Amendment. However, the court upheld the City’s authority to regulate STRs, the due process analysis, most advertising restrictions, and interpreted the operator residency requirement as not violating the dormant Commerce Clause. View "Hignell-Stark v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

A group of fourteen taxpayers, all out-of-state owners, operators, or lessees of multifamily housing developments in the City of Tuscaloosa, challenged a city ordinance that amended the business-license fee structure. The ordinance, effective April 2022, imposed a 3% business-license fee on rents received from student-oriented housing developments (SOHDs) with more than 200 bedrooms, while other rental properties remained subject to a 1% fee. The SOHD designation is determined by the city’s zoning officer based on a non-exhaustive list of characteristics and factors. The taxpayers alleged that the ordinance unfairly targeted out-of-state owners and was vague in its application.The taxpayers filed suit in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, seeking a declaration that the ordinance was invalid and a refund of taxes paid. They raised claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the dormant Commerce Clause, and argued that the ordinance was essentially a zoning ordinance adopted without following statutory notice requirements. The trial court granted the City’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), finding the complaint insufficient to state a claim.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether the complaint alleged sufficient facts to survive dismissal. The court held that the taxpayers’ claims under the Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause (vagueness), and dormant Commerce Clause were sufficiently pleaded to withstand a motion to dismiss, as the allegations, if proven, could entitle the taxpayers to relief. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claim that the ordinance was a zoning ordinance subject to statutory notice requirements, finding the ordinance did not regulate property use in the manner of zoning laws. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Campus Crest at Tuscaloosa LLC v. City of Tuscaloosa" on Justia Law

Ann Tierney Smith owned real property in West Virginia but failed to pay the assessed real estate taxes for 2016. As a result, the Mercer County Sheriff sold a tax lien on the property to Ed Boer. Boer sought a tax deed and provided the West Virginia State Auditor’s Office with a list of individuals to be notified about the right to redeem the property, including Smith. However, Boer did not include Smith’s current mailing address, which was available in county records. Notices sent by mail were returned as undeliverable, and attempts at personal service were unsuccessful, leading to notices being posted at the property and other addresses. After the redemption deadline passed, G. Russell Rollyson, Jr., an employee of the State Auditor’s Office, issued a tax deed to Boer. Smith learned of the deed in late 2020.Smith, and later her estate representatives, sued Rollyson and Boer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivation of property without due process. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted summary judgment to Rollyson, finding him entitled to qualified immunity. The court determined that while Rollyson could have directed Boer to search county records for Smith’s address after the mailed notices were returned, the duty to do so was not clearly established at the time. The estate representatives appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment and qualified immunity rulings de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that it was not clearly established on April 1, 2019, that Rollyson was required to have Boer search county records anew for Smith’s address after the mailed notices were returned. The court found that existing precedent did not prescribe a specific follow-up measure and that Rollyson’s actions did not violate clearly established law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Ann deWet v. G. Russell Rollyson, Jr." on Justia Law

Several development groups entered into a public improvement contract with a Texas city, purchasing over 60 acres of land, much of it in a flood zone. The developers received a variance from the city, exempting them from obtaining a federal floodplain permit (CLOMR), and invested significant funds in developing the property, including constructing a bridge. In 2018, the parties executed updated agreements, including a Master Development Agreement (MDA), which required certain conditions to be met within five years or the contract would automatically terminate, ending the city’s reimbursement obligations. As the deadline approached, the city informed the developers that they would now need to obtain the previously waived CLOMR, citing a later-enacted ordinance. Unable to comply in time, the developers sought an extension, which the city council denied, resulting in termination of the MDA.The developers sued in Texas state court, alleging the city’s actions constituted an unconstitutional taking under federal and state law, and also brought claims for breach of contract and violations of the Texas Vested Rights Statute. The city removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas and moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed the federal takings and declaratory judgment claims, finding the developers had not sufficiently alleged that the city acted in its sovereign rather than commercial capacity, and remanded the remaining state-law claims to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the developers’ allegations arose from a contractual dispute, not a sovereign act by the city, and thus did not state a plausible takings claim under the Fifth Amendment. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to dismiss the declaratory judgment claim, as the core issues would be resolved in the remanded state court action. View "Mesquite Asset Recovery Grp v. City of Mesquite" on Justia Law

A business operating a strip club featuring nude dancing and alcohol sales entered into a settlement agreement with DeKalb County, Georgia, in 2001, which was later amended in 2007. The amended agreement granted the club non-conforming status, allowing it to continue its business model for fifteen years, with the possibility of renewal, and required annual licensing fees. In 2013, the City of Chamblee annexed the area containing the club and subsequently adopted ordinances restricting adult entertainment establishments, including bans on alcohol sales, stricter food sales requirements for alcohol licenses, and earlier closing times. The City initially issued alcohol licenses to the club but later denied renewal, citing failure to meet new requirements and the club’s status as an adult establishment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed some of the club’s claims for lack of standing and granted summary judgment to the City on the remaining claims. The district court found that the club lacked standing to challenge certain ordinances as it was not an alcohol licensee, and that the City’s ordinances regulating adult entertainment and alcohol sales were constitutional under the secondary-effects doctrine, applying intermediate scrutiny. The court also determined there was no valid contract between the club and the City, rejecting the Contract Clause claims, and found no equal protection violation, as the club failed to identify a similarly situated comparator.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Eleventh Circuit held that the club lacked standing for equitable relief due to its permanent closure, but had standing for damages for a limited period. The court upheld the application of intermediate scrutiny to the ordinances, found no impairment of contract, and agreed that the club failed to establish an equal protection violation. The district court’s judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "WBY, Inc. v. City of Chamblee, Georgia" on Justia Law