Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Ann Tierney Smith owned real property in West Virginia but failed to pay the assessed real estate taxes for 2016. As a result, the Mercer County Sheriff sold a tax lien on the property to Ed Boer. Boer sought a tax deed and provided the West Virginia State Auditor’s Office with a list of individuals to be notified about the right to redeem the property, including Smith. However, Boer did not include Smith’s current mailing address, which was available in county records. Notices sent by mail were returned as undeliverable, and attempts at personal service were unsuccessful, leading to notices being posted at the property and other addresses. After the redemption deadline passed, G. Russell Rollyson, Jr., an employee of the State Auditor’s Office, issued a tax deed to Boer. Smith learned of the deed in late 2020.Smith, and later her estate representatives, sued Rollyson and Boer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivation of property without due process. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted summary judgment to Rollyson, finding him entitled to qualified immunity. The court determined that while Rollyson could have directed Boer to search county records for Smith’s address after the mailed notices were returned, the duty to do so was not clearly established at the time. The estate representatives appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment and qualified immunity rulings de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that it was not clearly established on April 1, 2019, that Rollyson was required to have Boer search county records anew for Smith’s address after the mailed notices were returned. The court found that existing precedent did not prescribe a specific follow-up measure and that Rollyson’s actions did not violate clearly established law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Ann deWet v. G. Russell Rollyson, Jr." on Justia Law

Several development groups entered into a public improvement contract with a Texas city, purchasing over 60 acres of land, much of it in a flood zone. The developers received a variance from the city, exempting them from obtaining a federal floodplain permit (CLOMR), and invested significant funds in developing the property, including constructing a bridge. In 2018, the parties executed updated agreements, including a Master Development Agreement (MDA), which required certain conditions to be met within five years or the contract would automatically terminate, ending the city’s reimbursement obligations. As the deadline approached, the city informed the developers that they would now need to obtain the previously waived CLOMR, citing a later-enacted ordinance. Unable to comply in time, the developers sought an extension, which the city council denied, resulting in termination of the MDA.The developers sued in Texas state court, alleging the city’s actions constituted an unconstitutional taking under federal and state law, and also brought claims for breach of contract and violations of the Texas Vested Rights Statute. The city removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas and moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed the federal takings and declaratory judgment claims, finding the developers had not sufficiently alleged that the city acted in its sovereign rather than commercial capacity, and remanded the remaining state-law claims to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the developers’ allegations arose from a contractual dispute, not a sovereign act by the city, and thus did not state a plausible takings claim under the Fifth Amendment. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to dismiss the declaratory judgment claim, as the core issues would be resolved in the remanded state court action. View "Mesquite Asset Recovery Grp v. City of Mesquite" on Justia Law

A business operating a strip club featuring nude dancing and alcohol sales entered into a settlement agreement with DeKalb County, Georgia, in 2001, which was later amended in 2007. The amended agreement granted the club non-conforming status, allowing it to continue its business model for fifteen years, with the possibility of renewal, and required annual licensing fees. In 2013, the City of Chamblee annexed the area containing the club and subsequently adopted ordinances restricting adult entertainment establishments, including bans on alcohol sales, stricter food sales requirements for alcohol licenses, and earlier closing times. The City initially issued alcohol licenses to the club but later denied renewal, citing failure to meet new requirements and the club’s status as an adult establishment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed some of the club’s claims for lack of standing and granted summary judgment to the City on the remaining claims. The district court found that the club lacked standing to challenge certain ordinances as it was not an alcohol licensee, and that the City’s ordinances regulating adult entertainment and alcohol sales were constitutional under the secondary-effects doctrine, applying intermediate scrutiny. The court also determined there was no valid contract between the club and the City, rejecting the Contract Clause claims, and found no equal protection violation, as the club failed to identify a similarly situated comparator.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Eleventh Circuit held that the club lacked standing for equitable relief due to its permanent closure, but had standing for damages for a limited period. The court upheld the application of intermediate scrutiny to the ordinances, found no impairment of contract, and agreed that the club failed to establish an equal protection violation. The district court’s judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "WBY, Inc. v. City of Chamblee, Georgia" on Justia Law

In 1922, the Territory of Hawai‘i issued a Land Patent for a 3.99-acre property to a trustee for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, with a deed restriction requiring the property to be used “for Church purposes only.” If used otherwise, the property would revert to the Territory. Over the years, the property changed hands several times, with each transaction referencing the original deed restriction. The current owners, Hilo Bay Marina, LLC and Keaukaha Ministry LLC, are not religious institutions and sought to have the restriction removed, arguing it was void under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 515-6(b), and violated both the Hawai‘i and Federal Establishment Clauses.The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit granted summary judgment for the State of Hawai‘i and its Board of Land and Natural Resources, finding that the deed restriction was a permissible form of early use-zoning, did not violate the cited laws, and was covered by the statutory exemption for religious use. The court also concluded that the restriction did not violate either the Hawai‘i or Federal Establishment Clauses, applying both the Lemon test and the more recent “historical practices and understandings” standard from Kennedy v. Bremerton School District.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the record did not support the lower court’s conclusion that the deed restriction was an early form of use-zoning. It held that the State’s enforcement of the restriction violated the Hawai‘i Establishment Clause, as it required the State to actively police religious use and entangled the government with religious affairs. The court reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment for the State, vacated its ruling on the Federal Establishment Clause, and held that summary judgment should be entered for the plaintiffs. View "Hilo Bay Marina, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

Several general law cities in California challenged the constitutionality of a state law, Senate Bill No. 9 (SB 9), which requires local agencies to ministerially approve two-unit housing projects and urban lot splits in single-family residential zones. The cities argued that SB 9 usurps their authority over local land use and zoning, imposes a uniform approach that disregards local needs and conditions, and is not reasonably related to its stated goal of ensuring access to affordable housing, as it does not mandate affordability for new units.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the cities’ complaint and the state’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and demurrer. The trial court concluded that, as general law cities, the plaintiffs could not invoke the municipal affairs doctrine under article XI, section 5 of the California Constitution, which provides certain protections only to charter cities. The court also found that the cities failed to identify any constitutional provision that SB 9 violated and determined there was no reasonable likelihood that the complaint could be amended to state a viable cause of action. Judgment was entered in favor of the state, and the cities appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that general law cities are not protected by the municipal affairs doctrine and must yield to conflicting state law. The court further found that the cities did not identify a constitutional right that SB 9 violated and failed to show that the statute was unconstitutional on its face or as applied. The court also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint, as no viable claim could be stated. View "City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. State" on Justia Law

Arron and Arthur Benedetti, along with the Estate of Willie Benedetti, challenged a provision in Marin County’s amended local coastal program (LCP) that allows owners of certain farmland to build additional residential units only if they record a restrictive covenant. This covenant requires the owner of the new units to be actively and directly engaged in agriculture, either through direct involvement in commercial agriculture or by leasing the property to a commercial agricultural producer. The Benedettis, who inherited farmland and sought to build a second residence, argued that this provision was facially unconstitutional, claiming it violated the nexus and proportionality requirements established in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, and infringed upon their substantive due process rights by compelling them to work in a specific occupation.The Marin County Superior Court initially ruled that the Benedettis could not bring a facial takings challenge under Nollan/Dolan and, applying rational basis review, denied their petition and complaint based on their due process theory. The trial court sustained a demurrer to one cause of action and denied relief on the others, leading to the Benedettis’ appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that, contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the Benedettis could raise a facial Nollan/Dolan claim. However, the court found that the restrictive covenant requirement had a sufficient nexus and rough proportionality to the county’s interest in preserving agricultural land and did not violate substantive due process. The court applied rational basis review and determined the provision was reasonably related to a legitimate legislative goal. The judgment of the Marin County Superior Court was affirmed. View "Benedetti v. County of Marin" on Justia Law

After failing to pay property taxes on her home in Maricopa County, Arizona, the plaintiff’s tax liens were sold to a private entity, which later foreclosed on the property. The plaintiff did not respond to the foreclosure action, resulting in a default judgment that extinguished her rights to the property. The property was then deeded to the private purchaser, who transferred it to another private party. The plaintiff subsequently challenged the foreclosure, the retention of surplus equity from the sale, and the constitutionality of the Arizona statute that allowed private parties to enforce tax liens without providing just compensation.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, finding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s injuries stemmed from the state court’s foreclosure judgment, which had already extinguished her property rights, and thus her federal claims amounted to an impermissible appeal of a state court decision. The court also dismissed her state law claims, except for one over which it declined supplemental jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the plaintiff’s claims that directly attacked the state court foreclosure judgment, such as those alleging the foreclosure was an unconstitutional taking or excessive fine. However, the court held that claims challenging the defendants’ post-judgment retention of surplus equity were not barred, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County, which recognized a property owner’s right to excess equity after a tax foreclosure. The court also found that the plaintiff’s facial challenge to the statute was not barred by Rooker-Feldman but was moot due to legislative amendments. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the surviving claims. View "SEARLE V. ALLEN" on Justia Law

A city filed a criminal complaint against a property owner, alleging that his property was in violation of certain provisions of the International Property Maintenance Code (IPMC), which the city had adopted by ordinance. The complaint stated that the property’s residence lacked water service, had holes in the roof, and that a break wall was collapsing into a river. It also alleged the presence of various items described as “debris,” such as barrels, lawn mowers, boats, trailers, propane tanks, and overgrown vegetation. The city claimed these conditions violated IPMC sections requiring properties to be maintained in a “clean,” “safe,” and “sanitary” condition.The property owner moved to dismiss the charges in the Huron Municipal Court, arguing that the IPMC provisions were unconstitutionally vague because the terms “clean,” “safe,” and “sanitary” were undefined. The trial court agreed, relying on a prior decision from the Seventh District Court of Appeals, State v. ACV Realty, which had found similar IPMC language void for vagueness. As a result, the trial court dismissed the relevant counts. The city appealed, and the Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the terms in question should be given their ordinary meanings and were sufficiently clear to inform property owners of the prohibited conduct.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to resolve a conflict between appellate districts. The court held that a defendant cannot successfully challenge a law as void for vagueness if his conduct clearly falls within the activities the law prohibits. Because the alleged conditions of the property—such as lack of water, structural decay, and accumulation of debris—clearly violated the IPMC provisions, the property owner’s vagueness challenge failed. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s judgment and remanded the case to the municipal court for further proceedings. View "Huron v. Kisil" on Justia Law

Members of the Crow Tribe who own trust allotments on the Crow Reservation challenged the loss of their historic water rights following the ratification of the Crow Tribe-Montana Compact and the Crow Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act. The Settlement Act, passed by Congress in 2010, codified a negotiated agreement among the Crow Tribe, the state of Montana, and the United States, which defined tribal water rights and provided substantial federal funding for water infrastructure. In exchange, the Tribe and allottees agreed to waive all other water rights claims. The Act required the Secretary of the Interior to publish a Statement of Findings certifying that certain conditions were met, which would trigger the waiver of prior water rights.After the Secretary published the Statement of Findings in June 2016—following a deadline extension agreed to by the Tribal Chairman and the Secretary—several allottees filed suit nearly six years later. They argued that the extension was invalid because, under the Crow Constitution, only the Tribal General Council or Legislature could authorize such an agreement. They also alleged that the Secretary’s action exceeded statutory authority, breached trust obligations, and violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the Secretary’s publication of the Statement of Findings constituted final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, but found the Secretary reasonably relied on the Tribal Chairman’s authority to extend the deadline. The court further held that the Settlement Act created specific trust duties, but the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege any breach. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims for takings, due process, and equal protection failed as a matter of law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Hill v. DOI" on Justia Law

Several landowners in Colorado owned property subject to a railroad easement held by Great Western Railway of Colorado, LLC. The railroad line, originally used for transporting sugar beets, had fallen into disuse except for railcar storage. In 2008, Great Western sought permission from the Surface Transportation Board (STB) to abandon the line. The STB granted this request and issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) to allow negotiations for possible interim recreational trail use. Negotiations failed, and the NITU expired. Instead of abandoning the line, Great Western repeatedly extended its abandonment authority and ultimately decided not to abandon the line, continuing to use it for storage and making some improvements.The landowners sued the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the issuance of the NITU constituted a temporary taking under the Fifth Amendment. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The Claims Court granted summary judgment to the government, finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the NITU caused a taking. Specifically, the court determined that Great Western would not have abandoned the line at the time of the NITU, so the NITU did not delay the vesting of the landowners’ reversionary interests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Claims Court’s decision de novo. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that to establish a compensable taking in a rails-to-trails case, plaintiffs must show that the issuance of the NITU caused a delay in abandonment that would have otherwise occurred, thereby postponing the vesting of their property interests. The court found that the evidence showed Great Western would not have abandoned the line regardless of the NITU, so causation was not established. The court also rejected arguments that state law abandonment or mere issuance of a NITU alone could establish a taking. The judgment for the government was affirmed. View "SAUER WEST LLC v. US " on Justia Law