Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants Fred and Jolene Fouse owned two parcels of land in Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania, identified which they used as their primary residence from the time they acquired the two parcels in 1976 and 1987, respectively. Eventually, the Fouses fell behind in paying their property taxes. As mandated by the Real Estate Tax Sale Law (RETSL), the Huntington County Tax Claim Bureau scheduled an upset tax sale. Appellees Saratoga Partners, LP submitted the highest bid. Three months later, in December 2016, the Fouses filed a “petition to redeem property sold at tax sale,” even though Huntington County, a sixth class county, prohibited post-sale redemptions. Instead, the Fouses asserted, inter alia, a right to redeem under section 7293 of the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens Act (MCTLA), by paying the amount paid by Saratoga at the tax sale. In their brief, the Fouses acknowledged that the MCTLA applied only to first and second class counties, but the absence of a right of redemption provision in the RETSL resulted in citizens of second class A through eighth class counties being treated less favorably than citizens of first and second class counties, in violation of the equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the General Assembly’s decision to omit the right of post-sale redemption from the RETSL was constitutional because it was rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's order upholding the denial of the Fouses' petition for redemption. View "Fouse v. Saratoga Partners, et al" on Justia Law

Freed owed $735.43 in taxes ($1,109.06 with penalties) on his property valued at about $97,000. Freed claims he did not know about the debt because he cannot read well. Gratiot County’s treasurer filed an in-rem action under Michigan's General Property Tax Act (GPTA), In a court-ordered foreclosure, the treasurer sold the property to a third party for $42,000. Freed lost his home and all its equity. Freed sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the Takings Clause and the Eighth Amendment.The district court first held that Michigan’s inverse condemnation process did not provide “reasonable, certain, and adequate” remedies and declined to dismiss the suit under the Tax Injunction Act, which tells district courts not to “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had" in state court, 28 U.S.C. 1341. The court reasoned that the TIA did not apply to claims seeking to enjoin defendants from keeping the surplus equity and that Freed was not challenging his tax liability nor trying to stop the state from collecting. The TIA applied to claims seeking to enjoin enforcement of the GPTA and declare it unconstitutional but no adequate state court remedy existed. The court used the same reasoning to reject arguments that comity principles compelled dismissal. After discovery, the district court sua sponte dismissed Freed’s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, despite recognizing that it was “doubtful” Freed could win in state court. The Supreme Court subsequently overturned the "exhaustion of state remedies" requirement for takings claims.The Sixth Circuit reversed without addressing the merits of Freed’s claims. Neither the TIA nor comity principles forestall Freed’s suit from proceeding in federal court. View "Freed v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Petitioners' real property was sold at a delinquent tax sale. They filed an action in circuit court to challenge the sale, and all parties consented to have the case referred to a special referee for trial. Petitioners agreed to allow defendants (respondents here) to present their evidence first. After the testimony of one witness, the county's tax collector, defendants moved to approve the sale. The special referee granted the motion. Petitioners objected, arguing they were not permitted to give their factual presentation of the case. The special referee denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. On appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, petitioners argued they were deprived of due process, including the right to be heard and the right to present witnesses and other evidence. The Supreme Court granted the petition, dispensed with briefing, reversed the court of appeals, and remanded to the circuit court for a new trial. "The special referee made factual findings and issued judgment in the middle of a trial after hearing from only one witness. ... The law ... does not permit a court to issue judgment against a party before giving that party an opportunity to present evidence in support of her position." View "Halsey v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Named plaintiffs filed a two-count class-action complaint on behalf of “all residents of the City of Chicago who have resided in an area where the City has replaced water mains or meters between January 1, 2008, and the present.” The complaint raises claims of negligence and inverse condemnation in relation to the replacement of water meters and water main pipes, as well as the partial replacement of lead service lines that run between the water mains and residences throughout Chicago. The complaint claimed the city’s actions created an increased risk that lead will be dislodged or leach from the residents’ individual service lines. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the complaint.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. The complaint did not allege that anyone is suffering from any physical impairment, dysfunction, or physically disabling consequence caused by the city's actions. An increased risk of harm is not, itself, an injury consistent with the traditional understanding of tort law. The plaintiffs have alleged only that the replacement of water mains and meters has made the proposed class members’ property “more dangerous.” The concept of “dangerousness” is not susceptible to objective measurement and, thus, cannot by itself constitute damage under the Illinois takings clause. View "Berry v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

International, an outdoor advertising company, sought to erect digital billboards in two separate locations within the City of Troy. International's permit and variance applications were denied. International filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), alleging that the ordinance granted unfettered discretion and contained unconstitutional content-based restrictions as it exempted from permit requirements certain categories of signs, such as flags and “temporary signs.” During the litigation, Troy amended the Ordinance.The Sixth Circuit remanded. The original Ordinance imposed a prior restraint because the right to display a sign that did not come within an exception as a flag or as a “temporary sign” depended on obtaining either a permit or a variance. The standards for granting a variance contained multiple vague, undefined criteria, such as “public interest,” “general purpose and intent,” “adversely affect[ing],” and “hardship.” Even meeting these criteria did not guarantee a variance; the Board retained discretion to deny it. The amendment, however, rendered the action for declaratory and injunctive relief moot. The severability of the variance provisions rendered moot its claim for damages. The court reinstated a claim that the ordinance imposed content-based restrictions without a compelling government interest for reconsideration under the correct standard. A regulation of commercial speech that is not content-neutral is still subject to strict scrutiny. View "International Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy" on Justia Law

In this case's second time before the Mississippi Supreme Court, the Court held in High v. Kuhn, 191 So. 3d 113 (Miss. 2016) (High I), that article 4, section 110, of the Mississippi Constitution forbade the condemnation of a private road across the property of Cheryl High for the benefit of Todd and Angela Kuhn. After the Court’s mandate, High moved the Harrison County Special Court of Eminent Domain for attorney fees pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 11-27-37 (Rev. 2019). The special court found that Section 11-27-37 did not apply. High appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the special court to consider the merits of the motion for attorney fees and the reasonableness of the amount of fees requested. On remand, High filed an amended motion requesting attorney fees for a frivolous filing under the Mississippi Litigation Accountability Act (LAA). After a hearing, the special court awarded attorney fees to High as a sanction for the Kuhns’ frivolous filing. The special court found that the $29,049.60 requested by High was reasonable and assessed that amount jointly and severally against the Kuhns and their attorney, Virgil Gillespie. The special court denied the Kuhns’ motion to reconsider and amended the judgment to add $1,000 in attorney fees that High had incurred in defending the motion for reconsideration. The Kuhns and Gillespie appealed, arguing that the special court erred by: (1) adopting High’s findings of fact and conclusions of law; (2) awarding a judgment to one of High’s attorneys who was not a party to the lawsuit; (3) imposing a sanction for a frivolous filing; (4) awarding interest; and (5) allowing attorney fees beyond those permitted by Section 11- 27-37. The Supreme Court concluded the special court of eminent domain did not abuse its discretion by imposing the sanctions nor did it err in its application of the law. The Court reversed in part only to correct a scrivener’s error in the amended judgment. View "Kuhn v. High" on Justia Law

Appellant Don Weaver brought a declaratory judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of S.C. Code Ann. section 6-11-271 (2004), which addressed the millage levied in certain special purpose districts. Appellant owned property and was a taxpayer in the Recreation District, a special purpose district created to fund the operation and maintenance of parks and other recreational facilities in the unincorporated areas of Richland County, South Carolina. Appellant first argued section 6-11-271 was unconstitutional because it violated the South Carolina Constitution's prohibition on taxation without representation. Appellant next contended section 6-11-271 did not affect all counties equally and was, therefore, special legislation that was prohibited by the South Carolina Constitution. Appellant lastly argued section 6-11-271 was void because it violated Home Rule as set forth in the state constitution and the Home Rule Act. The circuit court found Appellant failed to meet his burden of establishing any constitutional infirmity. To this, the South Carolina Supreme Court concurred and affirmed judgment. View "Weaver v. Recreation District" on Justia Law

The City of Oakland filed suit alleging that Wells Fargo engaged in discriminatory lending practices by issuing predatory loans to its Black and Latino residents in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA). On appeal, Wells Fargo challenged the district court's partial denial of its motion to dismiss the City's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).In Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami (Miami I), 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017), the Supreme Court held that to establish proximate cause under the FHA, a plaintiff must do more than show that its injuries foreseeably flowed from the alleged statutory violation. Rather, some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged is required. Pursuant to Miami I, the Ninth Circuit held, after reviewing the FHA's text and legislative history, that Congress clearly intended the nature of the statutory cause of action at issue in this case to be broad and inclusive enough to encompass less direct, aggregate, and city-wide injuries. Furthermore, all three of the Holmes factors support the panel's conclusion that it is administratively feasible for the district court to administer the aggregate, city-wide injuries that the City claims it suffered as a result of Wells Fargo's unlawful discriminatory lending practices throughout the City.The panel held that the allegations in the amended complaint are sufficient to plead that Oakland's reduced property-tax revenues, but not its increased municipal expenses, are proximately caused by Wells Fargo's discriminatory lending practices. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's denial of Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss as to the City's claims for lost property-tax revenues and the district court's grant of Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss as to Oakland's claims for increased municipal expenses. The panel also held that the FHA's proximate-cause requirement applies to claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court's denial of Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss as to the City's claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court affirming the Acting Roosevelt County Superintendent of School's grant of a territory transfer from Poplar Elementary School District No. 9 to Froid Elementary School District No. 65 pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 20-6-105, holding that the Acting Superintendent did not abuse her discretion, and that Poplar's constitutional challenges failed.On appeal, Poplar argued that the Acting Superintendent's decision granting the territory transfer petition constituted an abuse of discretion and that section 20-6-105, the territory transfer statute, is unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that the Acting Superintendent did not abuse her discretion in granting the petition to transfer the transfer territory; (2) the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred Poplar's facial constitutional challenge; and (3) Poplar's as-applied challenge failed because a school district does not have a constitutional right to due process. View "Poplar Elementary School District No. 9 v. Froid Elementary School District No. 65" on Justia Law

The Barack Obama Foundation selected Jackson Park in Chicago to house the Obama Presidential Center. Chicago acquired 19.3 acres from the Chicago Park District, enacted the necessary ordinances, and entered into a use agreement with the Obama Foundation. Construction will require the removal of multiple mature trees, the diversion of roadways, and will require the city to shoulder some expenses. Opponents sued, alleging that the defendants violated Illinois’s public trust doctrine, which limits the government’s ability to transfer control or ownership of public lands to private parties and that under Illinois law, the defendants acted beyond their legal authority in entering the use agreement because it delegates decision-making authority to the Foundation and grants the Foundation an illegal lease in all but name, Under federal law, they argued that, by altering the use of Jackson Park and granting control to the Foundation, the defendants took the plaintiffs’ property for a private purpose and deprived them of property in a process lacking in procedural safeguards.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the federal claims and held that the state claims should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Federal courts are only permitted to adjudicate claims that have allegedly caused the plaintiff a concrete injury. The federal claims allege a concrete injury, but the lack of a property interest is a fundamental defect. The state claims allege only policy disagreements. View "Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chicago Park District" on Justia Law