Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's dismissal of the Pearl Raty Trust's claim that it is an inhabitant of Salt Lake City and thereby entitled to the City's water under Utah Const. art. XI, 6, holding that the Trust failed to persuade the Court that the Utah voters who ratified the Constitution would have considered it an inhabitant of the City.The Trust sought water for an undeveloped lot it owned in Little Cottonwood Canyon. Although the lot sat in unincorporated Salt Lake County, the lot fell within Salt Lake City's water service area. The court of appeals ruled that the Trust was not an inhabitant of the City because it "merely holds undeveloped property within territory over which the City asserts water rights and extra-territorial jurisdiction." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Trust failed to persuade that the people who ratified the Utah Constitution understood the word "inhabitants" to encompass any person who owned property in a city's approved water service area. View "Salt Lake City Corp. v. Haik" on Justia Law

In 1999, the Taylors purchased land near a New Mexico Air Force base to raise calves. The Air Force began flying training missions over the land, sometimes “no more than 20 feet . . . off the deck.” In 2008, the Taylors granted Wind Energy an exclusive five-year option for an easement on the Taylors’ property, for “wind resource evaluation, wind energy development, energy transmission and related wind energy development uses.” In 2012, Air Force employees suggested to Wind Energy that the FAA would not issue a “No Hazard” designation for the air space above the Taylors’ land, which would be “fatal to the construction of planned wind turbines.” Wind Energy exercised its contractual right to terminate the agreement.The Taylors sued, claiming that the Air Force’s informal advice to Wind Energy caused a regulatory taking of their property interest in their contract and that the flyovers effected a physical taking. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Wind Energy’s termination was not a breach of the agreement so the Taylors had no property right in the continuation of that agreement nor did they have any investment-backed expectations. Any advice given by Air Force employees did not amount to an FAA denial. The Taylors did not provide factual allegations of how the flights “directly, immediately, and substantially interfere” with their quiet enjoyment and use of the land View "Taylor v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court determining that Appellant's claim for attorney fees and expenses should be decided by the court and not a jury, holding that Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights does not guarantee the right to a jury trial to determine an award of attorney fees and expenses.The two cases leading to the attorney fee dispute arose of the sale of real property to Appellant. The first lawsuit was filed in 2013, and the second lawsuit was filed in 2015. After the case was decided, the district court denied Appellant's request for a jury trial on the issue of attorney fees and expenses, determining that the issue would be heard by the court and not by a jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Kansas Constitution does not guarantee the right to a jury trial to determine whether attorney fees and expenses should be award; (2) Appellant waived her request for a jury trial to determine attorney fees in the 2013 case; and (3) Appellant's claim for attorney fees under the third-party litigation exception to the American rule is an equitable claim that should be decided by the court rather than a jury. View "Harder v. Estate of Foster " on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the circuit court invalidating, on due process grounds, an order ratifying the sale of Prime Realty's vacant property, holding that Maryland Rule 3-124(o), which allows for substituted service of process on an LLC by service on the State Department of Assessments and Taxation (SDAT), satisfies a litigant's due process rights.The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (the City) initiated a receivership action against Prime Realty Associates, LLC when property owned by Prime Realty fell into disrepair. The City attempted to serve Prime Realty's resident agent at the address on file with SDAT. When those attempts proved unsuccessful, the City made substitute service on SDAT pursuant to Maryland Rule 3-124(o). The property was subsequently sold, and the district court ratified the sale. Thereafter, Prime Realty moved to vacate the sale, arguing that its due process rights were violated because the City did not adequately serve Prime Realty. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the circuit court vacated the sale of the property, holding that Prime Realty's due process were violated. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the method of substituted service upon SDAT prescribed by Maryland Rule 3-124(o) satisfies a litigant's due process rights. View "Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Prime Realty Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

Matthew Wiggins appealed a decision of a special court of eminent domain to the County Court of Hinds County, Mississippi, approving the City of Clinton’s exercise of eminent domain. Wiggins bought property in March of 2016. At the time, the structures located there were dilapidated and were in need of extensive structural repairs. Soon after Wiggins took possession of the properties, Clinton found that the properties should be demolished due to neglect. Clinton assessed 1,434 separate code violations to property Wiggins owned. Wiggins pleaded guilty to the violations on January 26, 2017. Clinton then found additional violations against Wiggins at those properties and at other properties he owned in Clinton. Wiggins was found guilty of two violations by the County Court of Hinds County in 2018. The remaining violations were dismissed. In June 2018, Clinton adopted an urban-renewal plan. Wiggins' parcel was within the renewal area, and sought to take it. The special court found Clinton’s exercise of eminent domain proper. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found sufficient evidence in the special court record to support the taking my eminent domain. Similarly, the Court determined the record offered no evidence to demonstrate the determination of the special court was manifestly wrong. Therefore, judgment was affirmed. View "Wiggins. v. City of Clinton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court affirming the assessed value of Appellants' agricultural land by the Meade County Commission sitting as a board of equalization (the Board), holding that the circuit court did not err.Before the Board, Appellants argued that the director of equalization incorrectly applied statutory provisions to determine their land's production value. The Board further adjusted the assessment from an average of $519 per acre down to an average of $512 per acre. Appellants appealed the Board's decision to circuit court. After a trial de novo, the circuit court affirmed the Board's tax assessment of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it determined that (1) the Board complied with the statutory provisions for evaluating agricultural land in their assessment of Appellants' property; and (2) the Board's tax assessment of the property did not violate provisions of the South Dakota Constitution that require uniform taxation at no more than its actual value. View "Trask v. Meade County Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court awarding Plaintiffs compensation for a taking of various portions of their property with pre-judgment interest, holding that the portion of the trial court's order concerning the proper evaluation of the pre-judgment interest rate was contrary to this Court's precedents.In 1987, the General Assembly adopted the Roadway Corridor Official Map Act. In 1992 and 2006, portions of Plaintiffs' property were designated as within a roadway corridor pursuant to that statute. Plaintiffs filed an inverse condemnation complaint against the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) seeking compensation for the taking. Final judgment was issued awarding Plaintiffs $137,247 for the 1992 taking and $6,139 for the 2006 taking, both with pre-judgment interest at eight percent compounded annually. NCDOT appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err in proceeding to trial on the inverse condemnation complaint; (2) any error in the court's characterization of the taking was harmless; (3) the court's treatment of the reduced property taxes was proper; but (4) the trial court erred concerning the proper evaluation of the pre-judgment interest rate. View "Chappell v. N.C. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted a question certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and answered that a lender is entitled to equitable subrogation where it failed to correct a curable constitutional defect in the loan documents under Tex. Const. art. XVI, 50.Sylvia Zepeda obtained a loan from CIT Group and later refinanced her debt with a loan from Embrace Home Loans, Inc., using her homestead as collateral. Zepeda subsequently notified Embrace that the loan documents did not comply with section 50 because Embrace had not signed a form acknowledging the homestead's fair market value. Embrace subsequently sold the loan to Freddie Mac. When Freddie Mac did not respond to Zepeda's notification of the constitutional defect, Zepeda sued to quiet title, arguing that Freddie Mac did not possess a valid lien on her property. The federal district court concluded that Freddie Mac was not entitled to equitable subrogation because it was negligent in failing to cure the constitutional defect in the loan documents. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that, under Texas law, a lender who discharges a prior, valid lien on the borrower's homestead property is entitled to subrogation, even if the lender failed to correct a curable defect in the loan documents. View "Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Zepeda" on Justia Law

GIP purchased property from a steel mill’s bankruptcy estate, omitting the “Eastern Excluded Property” (EEP). GIP purchased some personal property located on the EEP, which contains two piles comprising slag (a steel manufacturing byproduct), kish (a byproduct of a blast furnace operation), and scrap. Each pile occupied more than 10 acres and was more than 80 feet high. GIP's "Itemization of Excluded Item from Sale” referred to: “All by-products of production other than kish and 420,000 cubic yards of slag” on the EEP “with a reasonable period of time to remove such items.” The EPA began investigating contaminants leaching from the piles. While GIP was negotiating for the separation of recoverable metals, the EPA decided to reduce the size of the piles. In 2009-2013, EPA contractors recovered and sold 245,890 tons of material and recovered and used 92,500 cubic yards of slag onsite for environmental remediation; they processed approximately 50% of the piles, spending about $14.5 million, about a million more than income from sales. The EPA compacted the materials to minimize leachate, leaving further remediation to state environmental authorities. GIP did not attempt its own recovery operation during the EPA remediation.GIP sued, alleging “takings” of the slag, kish, and scrap. The trial court awarded GIP $755,494 for the slag but awarded zero damages for the kish and scrap. The Federal Circuit vacated in part. GIP had no claim to any particular subset of slag. The trial court erred in finding that the EPA somehow prevented GIP from recovering its full allotment of slag; GIP cannot establish a cognizable property interest in the slag that was recovered. The court affirmed in part. GIP’s unreliable calculations left the trial court without competent evidence relating to a critical component of the damages calculation with respect to the kish and scrap. View "Gadsden Industrial Park, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Alaska Housing Finance Corporation (AHFC) held a promissory note and deed of trust executed in connection with a borrower’s purchase of his home. AHFC non-judicially foreclosed on the deed of trust without first providing the borrower an opportunity to present to a decision-maker his argument why under AHFC’s policies and procedures he was entitled to loan assistance to prevent the foreclosure. The borrower brought suit, alleging among other things, that he was denied procedural due process protections before AHFC took his property by foreclosure. The superior court rejected his due process argument and granted AHFC summary judgment on all issues. The sole issue presented to the Alaska Supreme Court on appeal was the due process question. The Court concluded that AHFC, a public corporation, was a “state actor,” that the foreclosure effected a deprivation of the borrower’s property, and that the borrower was not afforded a constitutionally required pre­ deprivation opportunity to be heard. The Court therefore reversed the superior court’s summary judgment decision on the due process question and remanded for further proceedings. View "Anderson v Alaska Housing Finance Corporation" on Justia Law