Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In the 1980s, Simonson began exploring for deposits of pumicite, a porous volcanic rock, which he thought had potential commercial applications. Simonson found high quality pumicite in Kern County and located 23 mining claims in his name. For two decades, Simonson commissioned scientific testing. Lab reports and industry analyses confirmed that pumicite could be useful in industrial paint and plastic manufacture; Simonson began taking orders. In 1987, Simonson submitted a Plan of Operations to Bureau of Land Management to mine 100,000 tons per year. BLM conditionally approved the plan, specifying that it had not yet determined whether Simonson had discovered valuable minerals under the General Mining Law, 30 U.S.C. 22. Simonson postponed mining until BLM completed its common/uncommon variety determination, but hired a consultant to generate investor interest. In 1989, the BLM concluded that Reoforce pumicite was an uncommon mineral, locatable under federal law, but did not establish that Simonson had a right to patent his claims. From 1987-1995, Simonson mined only 200 tons of pumicite and sold only five. In 1995, BLM stated that the lands encompassing 10 of the claims would be transferred to become part of Red Rock Canyon State Park. An agreement between BLM and California permitted some mining claimants to continue operating, depending on prior use of the mine, subject to California’s Surface Mining and Reclamation Act. Ultimately, BLM found pumicite not marketable and the claims invalid. The Department of the Interior later granted Simonson a conditional right to mine some claims. Simonson then sought compensation for a temporary taking (1995-2008). The Federal Circuit affirmed rejection of the claims. Although the character of the government's action did not weigh heavily against the taking claim, the economic-impact and reasonable-investment-backed-expectations factors weighed heavily against Simonson. View "Reoforce, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The City of Hot Springs passed an ordinance annexing two tracts of property under Ark. Code Ann. 14-40-501. Certain property owners filed a complaint to set aside the annexation, arguing that the statutory scheme authorizing the annexation was unconstitutional and, alternatively, that the annexed area did not fall within the statutory range. The circuit court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, concluding that the statute was constitutional and that the annexed area met the requirements set forth in section 14-40-501. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute is constitutional; and (2) the annexed area was properly annexed under the statute. View "Pritchett v. City of Hot Springs" on Justia Law

In 1997, Paul Haik argued before the federal district court that Salt Lake City and Alta’s refusal to extend adequate municipal water services to his undeveloped land in the Albion Basin Subdivision was a violation of equal protection and amounted to an unconstitutional taking. The federal court ruled against Haik. In 2012, Haik filed another federal lawsuit alleging different legal claims but, for the most part, the same facts. In the lawsuit, Haik again sought a determination that Salt Lake City was required to supply him with enough water to develop his property in Albion Basin. The federal court again ruled against Haik. Thereafter, Salt Lake City sued Haik in state court seeking, inter alia, to adjudicate Haik’s and others’ interests in water rights in Little Cottonwood Creek. Haik counterclaimed, adducing exactly the same facts as he put before the federal district court in 2012. The district court dismissed the counterclaims on the grounds that they were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Although Haik did not raise each and every claim in the federal court that he sought to raise here, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, on the operative facts before the Court, it was impossible for Haik to overcome the hurdle of claim preclusion. View "Salt Lake City Corp. v. Haik" on Justia Law

Larry Teeter, Donna Teeter, Amy Teeter Thomas, and Kevin Teeter (collectively, the Teeters) were awarded attorneys’ fees in a judgment arising from a condemnation proceeding. The City of Benton appealed, challenging the circuit court’s award of attorneys’ fees on the grounds that there is no statutory authority for awarding such fees against a municipality in a condemnation proceeding. The Teeters cross-appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying their request for payment of expert-witness fees. The Supreme Court reversed on direct appeal and affirmed on cross-appeal for the reasons stated in City of Benton v. Alcoa Storage Inc., handed down this same date. View "City of Benton v. Teeter" on Justia Law

Alcoa Road Storage, Inc. was awarded attorneys’ fees in a judgment arising from a condemnation proceeding. The City of Benton appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in awarding attorneys’ fees because there is no statutory authority for awarding such fees against a municipality in a condemnation proceeding. Alcoa cross-appealed, challenging the circuit court’s denial of its request for payment of expert-witness fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in awarding attorneys’ fees because attorneys’ fees are not expressly provided for in Ark. Code Ann. 18-15-307(c); and (2) did not err in finding that expert-witness fees incurred by a landowner to establish the calculation of its just compensation are not “costs occasioned by the assessment” pursuant to section 18-15-307(c). View "City of Benton v. Alcoa Road Storage Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants Ken and Rochel Parker and Appellees Andrew and Penny Leeuwenburg were neighbors with a contentious relationship. Appellees first sought to have Appellants secure a good behavior bond in 2011, but the parties reached an agreement without the issuance of the bond. Appellees again sought a good behavior bond in 2013; the parties agreed to a six-month bond, which was later extended for an additional six months, and that bond expired in December 2014. Appellees sought a second bond in January 2015, alleging that Appellants had: installed security cameras aimed at Appellees’ property; conversed with and “objected to the activities of a tree service hired by [Appellees]”; and used flashlights in a manner that disrupted the sleep of Appellees. Following a hearing a magistrate court issued a bond enjoining both parties from: having direct or indirect contact with the other. Appellants sought review of the bond by way of a petition for certiorari with the superior court. Later, however, Appellees agreed to dismiss the bond, and Appellants agreed to dismiss their appeal; a consent order memorializing the parties’ agreement was filed in June 2016. In that same month, Appellants filed a complaint in the superior court seeking, among other things, a declaration that OCGA 17-6-90 was unconstitutional. The trial court concluded that the statute was constitutional and granted summary judgment to Appellees. On appeal, Appellants continued to assert that OCGA 17-6-90 was unconstitutional. In response, Appellees argued that Appellants lacked standing to bring their challenge. With that contention, the Supreme Court agreed. View "Parker v. Leeuwenberg" on Justia Law

Defendant, a homeowner in Rancho Palos Verdes, submitted an application to his HOA, seeking to invoke the HOA's dispute resolution process against a neighbor who refused to trim trees blocking defendant's views. Plaintiff, another neighbor and HOA member, filed suit against defendant and the HOA, alleging that two of the offending trees were actually on his property, that the relevant tree-trimming covenant did not encumber his property, and therefore that defendant and the HOA were wrongfully clouding his title by seeking to apply such an encumbrance. The trial court granted defendant's special motion to strike the claims alleged against him under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. The court concluded that defendant made a prima facie showing that plaintiff's complaint arose from defendant's statements made in connection with an issue of public interest. Therefore, defendant's statements were protected under section 425.16. The court also concluded that plaintiff could not show a probability of success on the merits of his claims against defendant, particularly because defendant dismissed his application shortly after the lawsuit was filed and has never sought to invoke the HOA's tree-trimming process against plaintiff. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Colyear v. Rolling Hills Community Association" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs each owned real property in Van Buren County, Michigan in but failed to pay property taxes for 2011. In 2012, the properties became subject to forfeiture and foreclosure. In 2014, the circuit court issued a foreclosure judgment; title to the properties passed in fee simple absolute to the county. Months later, the county sold the properties at an auction. The minimum bid for each of the properties was calculated by totaling “[a]ll delinquent taxes, interest, penalties, and fees due on the property” plus the “expenses of administering the sale, including all preparations for the sale.” Wayside Church’s former property had a minimum bid of $16,750, but sold for $206,000. The minimum bid for the Stahl property was $25,000; the property sold for $68,750. The Hodgens property required a minimum bid of $5,900, but sold for $47,750. Plaintiffs sought return of the surplus funds, citing 42 U.S.C. 1983, and alleging that they had a cognizable property interest in their foreclosed properties and in the surplus proceeds generated by the sales, so that Defendants were required to pay just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit vacated dismissal for failure to state a claim and remanded for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. the district court erred in finding that the claims were not barred by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341, and the doctrine of comity. View "Wayside Church v. Van Buren County" on Justia Law

After Crook County Weed and Pest Control District applied herbicides to control leafy spurge found on property owned by Bush Land Development Company and Victoria Bush (collectively, Bush), many trees in the area of the spraying died. Bush filed this inverse condemnation action in the district court alleging that it was entitled to just compensation for the loss of its trees as a result of the District’s improper application of herbicides. The district court dismissed Bush’s claim, concluding that the action was not proper under the inverse condemnation statute. The Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds, concluding that the inverse condemnation was not properly before the district court because Bush failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before claiming inverse condemnation. View "Bush Land Development Co. v. Crook County Weed & Pest Control District" on Justia Law

After a nearby ditch began to erode causing significant property damage and mold-related health issues, Plaintiffs John and Patsy O’Callaghan filed an inverse condemnation action under the Takings Clause of the Mississippi Constitution, requesting that the City of Tupelo compensate the couple for both personal injuries and significant property loss. The City presented an interlocutory appeal challenging the County Court’s order denying its motion for summary judgment on the matter. Finding that personal injuries were not recoverable in a claim under the Takings Clause and that the three-year limitations period under Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49 was applicable to takings claims, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s ruling, rendering a decision for the City. View "City of Tupelo v. O'Callaghan" on Justia Law