Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2000, Uintah County conducted a tax sale but failed to provide the record mineral interest owners notice of the sale. More than a decade later, the individuals who were the record owners of the mineral interest prior to the tax sale and the purchaser of the tax title disputed who lawfully owned the mineral reserve. The district court granted summary judgment to the record mineral interest owners. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Utah Code 78B-2-206 was triggered by the County’s tax sale, which was conducted in violation of the Due Process Clause, the Court cannot apply that limitations statute to bar the record mineral interest owners’ suit; and (2) because a failure to provide notice to an interested party of a tax sale also serves as a jurisdictional defect, the County failed to obtain jurisdiction over the mineral interest, thereby preventing that property interest from passing at the tax sale. View "Jordan v. Jensen" on Justia Law

JB Enterprises (JBE) owned property located on a corner lot abutting Cliff Avenue and 63rd Street in Sioux Falls. Prior to initiating a public improvement reconstructing the interchange at Interstate 90 and Cliff Avenue, the State instituted a quick-take condemnation action against JBE, contesting JBE’s “control of access” to its property. The State ultimately changed the public improvement and left intact JBE’s curb cut along Cliff Avenue. After the State closed the intersection of 63rd Street and Cliff Avenue, JBE requested a jury trial on damages, alleging that the State owned JBE’s right to “control of access” to its property. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that the State’s public improvement did not result in a compensable taking because the State did not physically take any of JBE’s property and did not eliminate JBE’s direct access to Cliff Avenue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the State acquired the right to deprive JBE of access to Cliff Avenue, JBE must be compensated under the assumption that the State will do so. Remanded for a trial on damages. View "State v. JB Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

Carlyle Schleim owned, and Farmers State Bank of Canton held a mortgage on, property located near an intersection that was closed in connection with the State’s reconstruction of the interchange between Interstate 90 and Cliff Avenue. Schliem and the Bank brought an inverse-condemnation action against the State alleging that the closure of the intersection diminished the value of the subject property. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that Schliem did not identify a property interest that had been taken or damaged by the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Schliem did not suffer compensable loss by the intersection’s closure, and therefore, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment for the State. View "Schleim v. S.D. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dana Johno filed suit against Plaquemines Parish Government (“PPG”) and numerous other defendants alleging his house was unlawfully demolished by PPG and its agents after Hurricane Katrina. The plaintiff subsequently moved to have La. R.S. 9:2800.17, which provided retroactive statutory immunity to the government and its agents for certain actions taken in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, declared unconstitutional. The District Court granted the plaintiff’s motion. Significantly, the issue of immunity was never raised or argued by PPG. Only one of the defendants, Hard Rock Construction, LLC, one of the contractors for PPG, appealed the District Court’s ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed: "When a party acquires a right to assert a cause of action prior to a change in the law, that right is a vested property right which is protected by the guarantee of due process. Thus, a cause of action, once accrued, cannot be divested by subsequent legislation." Because the plaintiff’s causes of action accrued before effective date of the statute, the statute was unconstitutional as applied in this matter. View "Johno v. Doe" on Justia Law

This case arose after the City of Cleveland granted a production company a permit to close a portion of a street in downtown Cleveland for sixteen consecutive days so that the company could film scenes for a movie. The street’s closure cut off access to one of two entrances to a parking lot owned by Cuyahoga Lakefront Land, LLC (“Lakefront”) during the permit period. Lakefront brought this original action in the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which found that Cleveland had taken Lakefront’s property without just compensation and issued a writ of mandamus ordering Cleveland to commence appropriation proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no writ should issue because Lakefront failed to show that the temporary loss of access to one of the two entrances to the parking lot was a compensable taking of its property. View "State ex rel. Cuyahoga Lakefront, L.L.C. v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

Randy and Helen Strode owned real property in the City of Ashland, Saunders County. Since the time of the purchase, the Strodes operated a business for the manufacture of agricultural fencing and the storage of salvage on the property. In 2003, the district court held that Randy’s use of the property to store salvage was in violation of the zoning ordinance but found that the manufacture of agricultural fencing was permitted. In 2013, the Strodes filed suit against the City and the County for inverse condemnation based on the zoning ordinance and the load limit regulation of a bridge used by the Strodes for transporting commercial goods. The district court concluded (1) Randy’s zoning takings claim was barred by claim preclusion because the matter was litigated in the 2003 case, (2) determined that Helen’s regulatory taking lain was barred by the statute of limitations because she was aware of the effect of the zoning ordinance after 2003; (3) found that the regulation of the bridge structure was not a regulatory taking, and (4) the City and County were entitled to summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding in favor of the City and the County. View "Strode v. City of Ashland" on Justia Law

This putative class action was filed by a group of property owners who paid certain impact fees imposed by the Washington County Water Conservancy District (District) within a specific time period. Plaintiffs challenged the legality of the impact fees, arguing that the fees were in violation of the Impact Fees Act and amounted to a taking under the state and federal constitutions. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the District and then, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, certified the case for an immediate appeal under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Supreme Court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, holding (1) the case was not properly certified under Rule 54(b); and (2) the Court declines to exercise its discretion to grant interlocutory review. Remanded. View "Washington Townhomes, LLC v. Washington County Water Conservancy Dist." on Justia Law

The Court consolidated two cases in this opinion. Plaintiffs in both cases complained they were denied due process when the Board of County Commissioners of Elbert County (the Board) required them to rezone their properties before they could subdivide them. They argued that after the Board lost the documents reflecting the prior comprehensive zoning ordinance, it created new documents without following proper procedures for enacting an ordinance and covered up their misconduct. "Perhaps these allegations state a claim under Colorado law." After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that were not deprived of their right to due process under the United States Constitution. View "Onyx Properties v. Elbert Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

In February 2014, a jury found defendant Kenneth Davis guilty of two 2010 misdemeanors, diverting the natural course of a stream and petty theft (of water). It also found him guilty of a trespass injuring wood or timber in 2010 in another case (which was consolidated solely for purposes of trial) that involved a road he had bulldozed across neighboring property to his own. The court placed him on a three-year period of informal probation, conditioned on a 90-day jail term. Defendant appealed his conviction of petty theft of water, arguing there could not be a theft in this case as a matter of law because the natural stream at issue was nuisance groundwater that the owner was diverting from its property, and the State of California had only a regulatory interest in use of these public waters that otherwise were not personalty that can be the subject of a larceny. The Court of Appeal agreed that there could not be a simple larceny of uncaptured flowing water. The Court reversed and remanded for dismissal of that count. View "California v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation petitioned to acquire property owned by Amerco Real Estate Co. and occupied by U-Haul Co. by eminent domain, asserting that the property in question was necessary for a highway expansion project. U-Haul opposed the petition, asserting that the Department lacked authority to condemn its land on grounds that the statutory perquisites for acquiring land in the manner the Department used, were not met. The district court declined to dismiss the petition and instead granted the Department's motion for immediate possession. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the transportation commission's enabling legislation, to the extent that it purported to delegate to the Department the choice of particular properties to be taken for highway projects and the manner of their taking, was an unlawful delegation of the commission's statutorily imposed obligation. The case was remanded back to the district court for dismissal of the Department's original petition. View "Colorado Dept. of Transportation v. Amerco Real Estate" on Justia Law