Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants filed an inverse condemnation complaint against Washoe County alleging that the County approved subdivision maps, directed the flow of water, and accepted street dedications during the building process of two upstream developments that increased the flow of water to Whites Creek and caused flooding to Appellants’ property. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Washoe County, concluding that the County’s approval of subdivision maps and acceptance of dedications did not constitute substantial involvement sufficient to support a claim for inverse condemnation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the County’s action constituted substantial involvement in the drainage system sufficient to support a claim for inverse condemnation. View "Fritz v. Washoe County" on Justia Law

The Town of Mosses and its chief of police Jimmy Harris, separately petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Lowndes Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Geraldine Grant Bryson. The Court consolidated their petitions for the purpose of writing one opinion. At the time of the events giving rise to this action, Bryson operated an entertainment venue known as "The Spot." Bryson described "The Spot" as a "community center for all activities." Bryson requested that the Town grant her a liquor license, but the Town's council denied her request. In 2010, Bryson rented "The Spot" to a deejay, who planned to host a "beer bash" on its premises. Approximately 200 people turned out for the event even though the entertainment portion of the event was ultimately canceled by the deejay. Although Bryson, who was at "The Spot" on the night of the event, testified that she did not see anyone consuming alcoholic beverages at the event, she acknowledged that the deejay hosting the event had brought alcohol that he planned to "give ... away [to] the community for showing support for the center." The mayor saw one of the deejay's flyers promoting the event. The mayor, in turn, notified Harris. Harris saw one of the flyers, organized a task force of officers from multiple law-enforcement agencies, and entered "The Spot," observing alcohol being consumed. Bryson was ultimately arrested for selling alcohol without a license. The charges against Bryson were later dismissed because the Town was unable to produce a witness who could testify to paying an admission to "The Spot" and drinking alcohol on the premises. Bryson sued the Town and Harris asserting claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, and slander. When the trial court denied the Town and Harris' motions to dismiss, they sought mandamus relief. The Alabama Supreme Court directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Harris's summary-judgment motion as to the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims and to enter a summary-judgment for Harris on those grounds. To the extent Harris sought mandamus review of intentional infliction of emotional distress, harassment, libel, and slander, the petition was denied. The trial court was further directed to vacate its order denying the Town's summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment for the Town as to each claim asserted against it. View "Ex parte Town of Mosses." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-landowner Donald Gould appealed three superior court rulings pertaining to the Town of Monkton’s new zoning regulations. Landowner alleged that the new zoning regulations under a "UPD" or "Unified Planning Document" interfered with his long-held development plans and reduced the potential economic return on his property in Monkton. On appeal of the superior court's rulings, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred by finding: (1) that it had no jurisdiction to hear a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate the new zoning regulations; (2) that landowner had no due process interest in the process by which zoning regulations were adopted; and (3) that landowner had no due process property interest in the application of the previous zoning regulations. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gould v. Town of Monkton" on Justia Law

Appellant filed an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Scott County and Credit River Township, claiming that the County took his property without just compensation by placing conditions on the approval of his plat application. The County moved for summary judgment, arguing that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because Appellant’s exclusive avenue for review of the County’s decision was to seek a writ of certiorari from the court of appeals. The district court determined that it had jurisdiction over the action. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the County’s plat approval subject to conditions was a quasi-judicial action, which was reviewable only by certiorari appeal within sixty days. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction over Appellant’s section 1983 action. View "Zweber v. Credit River Township" on Justia Law

Zia Shadows, LLC operated a mobile-home park in Las Cruces, New Mexico, under a special-use permit from the City. In late 2000, a dispute over water-rights fees arose between Zia Shadows and the City, and principal Alex Garth protested these fees and lodged written and oral complaints with the City Council. This appeal arose out of that zoning dispute. Zia Shadows and its principals, Alex and William Garth (collectively, Zia Shadows), filed suit in federal district court, alleging the City’s delays in approval of a zoning request (and the conditions ultimately attached to the approval) violated Zia Shadows’ rights to due process and equal protection. Zia Shadows also alleged the City’s actions were taken in retaliation for Zia Shadows’ public criticisms of the City. The district court granted summary judgment to the City on Zia Shadows’ due-process and equal-protection claims, and a jury found in favor of the City on Zia Shadows’ First Amendment retaliation claim. Zia Shadows argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit: (1) that the district court erred in granting summary judgment; (2) the district court abused its discretion both in its instruction of the jury and its refusal to strike a juror; and (3) the jury’s verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding Zia Shadows failed to establish the requisite elements of its due-process and equal-protection claims and did not demonstrate reversible error in either the proceedings or verdict at trial. View "Zia Shadows, LLC v. City of Las Cruces" on Justia Law

The California Department of Water Resources (Department) sought to conduct environmental and geological studies and testing on over 150 privately-owned parcels of property that the state, in the future, might seek to acquire. Proceeding through the procedure established by the California Eminent Domain Law relating to precondemnation entry and testing, the Department sought a court order granting it authority to enter the properties to undertake environmental and geological testing activities. The trial court authorized the Department to enter the private properties and conduct environmental activities but denied the Department’s request to conduct geological testing. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of the Department’s proposed geological testing and reversed the trial court’s authorization of environmental testing, concluding that the procedure established by the precondemnation entry and testing statutes did not satisfy the demands of the California Constitution’s takings clause with regard to both the geological and environmental testing sought by the Department. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, assuming, without deciding, that the environmental and geological activities amount to a taking or damaging of property, the procedure established by the precondemnation entry and testing statutes satisfies the requirements of the California takings clause when the procedure is reformed to comply with the jury trial requirement of that clause. View "Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Claimants-Appellants appealed an award of summary judgment which forfeited to the United States various claimants’ interests in multiple properties, including a 36‐story office building located at 650 Fifth Avenue in Manhattan, real properties in Maryland, Texas, California, Virginia, and New York, and the contents of several bank accounts. Also at issue is the September 9, 2013 order denying a motion to suppress evidence seized from the Alavi Foundation’s and the 650 Fifth Avenue Company’s office. The court vacated the judgment as to Claimants Alavi Foundation and the 650 Fifth Ave. Co., of which Alavi is a 60% owner because there are material issues of fact as to whether the Alavi Foundation knew that Assa Corporation, its partner in the 650 Fifth Ave. Co. Partnership, continued after 1995, to be owned or controlled by Bank Melli Iran, which is itself owned or controlled by the Government of Iran, a designated threat to this nation’s national security; the district court erred in sua sponte considering and rejecting claimants’ possible statute of limitations defense without affording notice and a reasonable time to respond; in rejecting claimants’ motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a challenged warrant, the district court erred in ruling that claimants’ civil discovery obligations obviate the need for any Fourth Amendment analysis; and the district court erred in its alternative ruling that every item of unlawfully seized evidence would have been inevitably discovered. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re 650 Fifth Avenue and Related Properties" on Justia Law

This case was one of several cases involving litigation between Lands’ End and the City of Dodgeville challenging the City’s property tax assessment of Lands’ End’s headquarters. In 2009, Lands’ End made an offer of settlement, which the City rejected. Eventually, the court of appeals remanded the matter to the circuit court with directions to enter judgment in favor of Lands’ End in the amount of $724,292 plus statutory interest. At issue on remand was whether Lands’ End was entitled to interest at the statutory rate of interest in effect when the offer of settlement was made under Wis. Stat. 807.01(4) or at the statutory rate of interest in effect when Lands’ End recovered the judgment under the amended version of the statute. The circuit court awarded interest at “1 percent plus the prime rate,” the rate in the amended version of the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Lands’ End did not have a vested right in the twelve percent interest rate in effect in section 807.01(4) at the time Lands’ End made its offer of settlement; and (2) awarding interest under the amended version of the statute did not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. View "Lands' End, Inc. v. City of Dodgeville" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of property owners, sought compensation from the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, alleging flooding on their properties caused by the District’s diversion of stormwater into nearby creeks. The District cited a 1948 Illinois Supreme Court decision, Pratt, as holding that a temporary flooding cannot constitute a taking under the Illinois Constitution. The trial court denied a motion to dismiss and certified a question based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 holding that temporary flooding can constitute a taking under the federal constitution, Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States. The appellate court held that Arkansas Game overruled Pratt. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The Illinois takings clause provides greater protection for property owners than its federal counterpart, in providing a remedy for property that is damaged, but, what constitutes a taking is the same under both clauses. The holding in Arkansas Game is relevant to the determination of whether government-induced temporary flooding is a taking under the Illinois Constitution. That holding, however, does not conflict with Pratt. Pratt did not hold that temporary flooding can never constitute a taking, but only that the flooding, in that case, did not amount to a taking. Similarly, the facts alleged by plaintiffs are not sufficient to allege a taking. The complaint does not allege that the flooding “radically interfered” with use and enjoyment of the properties. The parties did not address whether the properties were "damaged." View "Hampton v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist." on Justia Law

The trial court issued a permanent injunction in 2014 barring the union from conducting demonstrations inside stores owned by Walmart. The union argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the injunction because the matter was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, the high court established an analytical framework to determine San Diego Unions v. Garmon preemption issues, including the application of the local interest exception, in the context of a California trespass case. Sears indicates that at least with respect to trespass claims, the trespass issue may properly be seen as distinct from violations of federal labor law arising out of the same conduct, and therefore not preempted; the Sears analysis is premised on the idea that two different legal controversies may arise out of one set of facts or form of conduct; and Sears indicates peaceful trespass may be an issue deeply rooted in local feeling such that the local interest exception to preemption may apply. Determining that Sears governs this case, the court concluded that Walmart's trespass action is not preempted by the NLRA because the local interest exception applies. Here, the gravamen of Walmart’s claim in the trial court was that the union activities were unlawful because they were occurring inside Walmart stores. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Walmart v. UFCW" on Justia Law