Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, about 400 homeowners whose homes were located in the upper White Oak Bayou watershed of Harris County, filed suit against the County, asserting a takings cause of action. Plaintiffs claim that the flooding of their homes was caused by the County’s approval of “unmitigated” upstream development, combined with a failure to fully implement the Pate Plan, a flood-control plan. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the County's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that, assuming all disputed facts in favor of the homeowners, the record is clear that the County never harbored a desire to cause flooding anywhere. In this case, assuming that a cause of the flooding was the affirmative act of approving private development, there indisputably were other causes: heavy rainfall, and, according to the homeowners themselves, the failure to fully implement the flood-control measures of the Pate Plan. The court concluded that the confluence of these circumstances does not give rise to a takings claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered judgment dismissing the case. View "Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr" on Justia Law

In 2013, Plaintiff, a participant in the Section 8 Federal Housing Choice Voucher Program, listed among her assets a trust that had been established in 2010 to hold Plaintiff's proceeds from a series of tort settlements. The Brookline Housing Authority (BHA) subsequently determined that Plaintiff was “over-income” for continued participation in the Program, as locally administered by the BHA. Plaintiff appealed, requesting that the BHA exclude at least some of these trust disbursements from its income calculation in reasonable accommodation of her disability. The BHA reaffirmed its determination. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued, alleging that the BHA had violated state and federal law by incorrectly calculating her income under the relevant federal regulations and by engaging in disability-based discrimination. The district court ruled in favor of BHA. The First Circuit (1) reversed the district court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim brought under the Housing Act, holding that the BHA misconstrued federal regulations in calculating Plaintiff’s income; (2) vacated the district court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s state and federal discrimination claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims as moot; and (3) affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s remaining claims. Remanded. View "DeCambre v. Brookline Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Water District No. 1 (WaterOne) of Johnson County filed an eminent domain petition seeking to condemn ten tracts of land. WaterOne pleaded that its interests would be “‘[s]ubject to existing easements of record.’” The district court granted the petition. D.P. and Wanda Bonham and their trust (collectively, the Bonhams) owned an easement in one of the ten condemned tracts. The Bonhams appealed the condemnation award and moved to void the district court’s order, asserting that WaterOne took their easement without complying with the Eminent Domain Procedure Act (EDPA) as to their easement. The district court denied the Bonhams’ motion to void, concluding that WaterOne did not condemn the Bonhams’ easement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that WaterOne’s petition contained no statutory defects; and (2) the Bonhams failed to establish an error in the journal entry. View "Water Dist. No. 1 of Johnson County v. Prairie Ctr. Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

Applicants Cynthia and Charles Burns wanted to make modifications to a two-unit residential building they owned in Burlington. A group of nineteen Burlington residents (neighbors) appealed a Superior Court, Environmental Division decision declining to reach the merits of neighbors’ claim that applicants converted their home into a duplex without a zoning permit on the grounds that the challenge was precluded by a prior decision under 24 V.S.A. 4472(d) or to consider whether a permit was required for applicants’ other modifications. On appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, neighbors argued: (1) that their challenge was not precluded under section 4472(d) because the prior decision had not been rendered by the Burlington Zoning Administrator as the statute requires; (2) that preventing an appeal without affording notice and opportunity to be heard violated their due process rights; and (3) that they were entitled to a determination by the Environmental Division of whether applicants’ other modifications violated the zoning ordinance because they were done without a permit. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Burns Two-Unit Residential Building (Long, et al. Appellants)" on Justia Law

Garofolo took out a $159,700 home-equity loan. She made timely payments and paid off the loan in, 2014. Ocwen had become the note’s holder. A release of lien was promptly recorded in Travis County, but Garofolo did not receive a release of lien in recordable form as required by her loan’s terms. Garofolo notified Ocwen she had not received the document. Upon passage of 60 days following that notification, and still without the release, Garofolo sued, alleging violation of the home-equity lending provisions of the Texas Constitution and breach of contract. She sought forfeiture of all principal and interest paid on the loan. The federal district court dismissed. The Fifth Circuit certified questions of law to the Texas Supreme Court, which responded that the constitution lays out the terms and conditions a home equity loan must include if the lender wishes to foreclose on a homestead following borrower default, but does not create a constitutional cause of action or remedy for a lender’s breach of those conditions. A post-origination breach of terms and conditions may give rise to a breach-of-contract claim for which forfeiture can sometimes be an appropriate remedy. When forfeiture is unavailable, the borrower must show actual damages or seek some other remedy such as specific performance. View "Garofolo v. Ocwen Loan Serv., L.L.C." on Justia Law

Because of zoning by Upper Arlington, a suburb of Columbus, Ohio, Tree of Life Christian Schools could not use its otherwise-unused land and building to operate a religious school. The government denied a rezoning application because such a use would not accord with provisions of the government’s Master Plan, which call for maintaining commercial use zoning to maximize tax revenue. TOL filed suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc– 2000cc-5, alleging that the government illegally failed to treat TOL Christian Schools on equal terms with nonreligious assemblies or institutions. The district court granted the government summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for resolution of the factual issue: whether the government treated nonreligious assemblies or institutions that would fail to maximize income-tax revenue in the same way it has treated the proposed religious school. View "Tree of Life Christian Schools v. City of Upper Arlington" on Justia Law

The City filed a petition for condemnation asking for a determination of just compensation for property taken and damages to the residue. The circuit court awarded Dominion SecurityPlus Self Storage, LLC $44,141 for the value of the fee take and more than $2.1 million for the damages to the residue, including loss of visibility and loss of direct access. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court awarding Dominion damages to the residue and entered final judgment in favor of the City on that claim, holding that Dominion failed to present any evidence by which any of over $2.1 in damages that the circuit court awarded could be apportioned to the City’s take of a utility easement and a temporary construction easement outside the area of reservation. View "City of Chesapeake v. Dominion SecurityPlus Self Storage, LLC" on Justia Law

This was an appeal of a district court order affirming in part an order issued by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources (“IDWR”). In response to a delivery call filed by Rangen, Inc., the Director had issued an order curtailing certain junior-priority ground water pumping in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer (“ESPA”). The order provided that the junior-priority ground water users could avoid curtailment by participating in an approved mitigation plan. The Idaho Ground Water Appropriators, Inc. (“IGWA”) filed several mitigation plans for approval. The Director issued an order conditionally approving IGWA’s Fourth Mitigation Plan, which proposed leasing water from another surface water right holder and piping the water to the Rangen facility. Rangen petitioned for review. The district court upheld the Director’s order in significant part. Rangen appealed. Finding no reversible error with the district court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rangen, Inc. v. Dept of Water Resources" on Justia Law

The Cordells were the record owners of a tract of land in La Plata County (Tract1), and Mr. Cordell was also the record owner of an adjoining tract that had been deeded to him by his grandmother (Tract2). After the Cordells failed to pay the taxes owed on these properties for three successive years, Brenda Heller purchased tax liens for each tract and later assigned these liens to Bradley Klingsheim. Thereafter, Klingsheim requested deeds for the properties from the Treasurer. The question this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review principally required the Court to determine the scope of a county treasurer’s duty of diligent inquiry, pursuant to section 39-11-128(1), C.R.S. (2015), in attempting to notify a taxpayer that his or her land may be sold to satisfy a tax lien. The Cordells contended that the deeds were void because the La Plata County Treasurer’s Office had not fulfilled its statutory duty of diligent inquiry in attempting to notify the Cordells that it would be issuing a tax deed for the Cordells’ properties. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that a county treasurer had an initial duty to serve notice of a pending tax sale on every person in actual possession or occupancy of the property at issue, as well as on the person in whose name the property was taxed or specially assessed, if upon diligent inquiry, such persons can be found in the county or if their residences outside the county are known. In addition, we hold that a treasurer owed a duty of further diligent inquiry after an initial notice has been sent only when the facts known to the treasurer show that the taxpayer could not have received the notice of the pending tax sale. The Court concluded the Treasurer satisfied its duty of diligent inquiry. In addition, the Court concluded that the notice that the Treasurer provided in this case satisfied due process requirements. View "Klingsheim v. Cordell" on Justia Law

Salt Lake City Corp. used its power of eminent domain to condemn land owned by Evans Development Group, LLC in order to exchange the property for another piece of property owned by Rocky Mountain Power. The City filed a complaint asserting several public uses and public purposes for the condemnation. Evans moved for summary judgment, arguing that the City lacked statutory authority to condemn its property because the condemnation was not for a public use as required by Utah Code 78B-6-501. The City filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment as to the issue of public use. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although a property exchange may not be completely prohibited by the relevant eminent domain statutes, it may not be accomplished in the manner attempted in this case. View "Salt Lake City Corp. v. Evans Dev. Group, LLC" on Justia Law