Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Rhode Island Department of Transportation (RIDOT) condemned a parcel of real property owned by Richard Deeble and his wife for highway purposes. The Deebles subsequently died. RIDOT utilized only a portion of the condemned property in furtherance of the relocation of an interstate. Plaintiff, the Estate of Richard Deeble, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against RIDOT, asserting that should RIDOT seek to sell or lease the condemned property, the Estate was entitled to a right of first refusal to repurchase or lease the land in accordance with article 6, section 19 of the Rhode Island Constitution. The superior court justice concluded that the provisions of article 6, section 19 did not pass to the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the rights guaranteed by article 6, section 19 terminate upon the death of the original condemnee. View "Estate of Richard J. Deeble v. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

The Northeast Mental Health-Mental Retardation Commission challenged the validity of a ninety-nine-year fixed-lease agreement with a private contractor, V.M. Cleveland. The Commission contracted to pay Cleveland $18,000 per month over a ninety-nine-year period to build and to lease a facility on land owned by the Commission. Payments continued uninterrupted for ten years, until the Commission became concerned about the agreement’s legality. The Commission stopped making payments and sought to rescind the agreement. The chancellor found that the agreement was enforceable and ordered the Commission to pay Cleveland $612,000 in back rent. The Commission appealed, arguing that the agreement’s ninety-nine-year duration rendered the agreement voidable at the Commission’s discretion as a matter of law due to the rule against binding successors. The Commission also argued that the specific terms of the agreement were unreasonable, illegal, or both, and thus void ab initio as a matter of law. The Supreme Court found that the agreement at issue here violated the common-law rule against binding successors, and as such reversed the chancellor’s judgment and rendered judgment in the Commission’s favor. View "Northeast Mental Health - Mental Retardation Commission v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

The Northeast Mental Health-Mental Retardation Commission challenged the validity of a ninety-nine-year fixed-lease agreement with a private contractor, V.M. Cleveland. The Commission contracted to pay Cleveland $18,000 per month over a ninety-nine-year period to build and to lease a facility on land owned by the Commission. Payments continued uninterrupted for ten years, until the Commission became concerned about the agreement’s legality. The Commission stopped making payments and sought to rescind the agreement. The chancellor found that the agreement was enforceable and ordered the Commission to pay Cleveland $612,000 in back rent. The Commission appealed, arguing that the agreement’s ninety-nine-year duration rendered the agreement voidable at the Commission’s discretion as a matter of law due to the rule against binding successors. The Commission also argued that the specific terms of the agreement were unreasonable, illegal, or both, and thus void ab initio as a matter of law. The Supreme Court found that the agreement at issue here violated the common-law rule against binding successors, and as such reversed the chancellor’s judgment and rendered judgment in the Commission’s favor. View "Northeast Mental Health - Mental Retardation Commission v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

The special court of eminent domain granted Todd and Angela Kuhn’s petition for a private road across Cheryl High’s property in Gulfport. As grounds for their claim, the Kuhns utilized Mississippi Code Section 65-7-201 (Rev. 2012), which created a statutory right for private citizens to petition the special court of eminent domain when a private road over the land of another is necessary for ingress and egress. Section 110 of the Mississippi Constitution empowered the Legislature to create the statutory right to “private roads, where necessary for ingress and egress” upon “due compensation” to the property owners, this section was equally clear “such rights of way shall not be provided for in incorporated cities and towns.” Because the private property the Kuhns sought to condemn for a private road was in the incorporated City of Gulfport, the special court of eminent domain could not condemn High’s property for the Kuhns’ private benefit. So the Supreme Court reversed the special court of eminent domain’s order granting the Kuhns a private road under Section 65-7-201. View "High v. Kuhn" on Justia Law

The High Line is an elevated “linear park” in New York City that runs along the west side of Manhattan from Gansevoort Street to 34th Street. The park, used for walking, jogging, and other recreational purposes, occupied the elevated viaduct of a former railway line. In 2005, the elevated viaduct was converted to a public recreational trail under the authority of the National Trails System Act. Before the Federal District Court of Appeals was a takings matter: appellant Romanoff Equities, Inc., contended that the conversion of the railway property to a trail entailed a taking of its property without just compensation. The Court of Federal Claims held, on summary judgment, that the conversion did not result in a taking of Romanoff’s property. Finding no reversible error, the Federal District appellate court affirmed. View "Romanoff Equities, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Ronald Davis, the owner of a corporation, was liable for over $1 million in unpaid federal employment taxes and penalties. After demands for payment went unanswered, the government filed suit against Ronald to reduce its tax assessments to judgment and sought to enforce its tax liens through the sale of the primary residence of Ronald and his wife, Diane. The government named Diane, who did not owe any unpaid taxes, as a defendant in the action because she had an interest in the properties. The district court issued an order of sale authorizing the sale of the primary residence. Diane appealed, arguing (1) the district court should have allowed the government to sell only Ronald’s interest in the property; and (2) the order of sale violated 26 U.S.C. 7403 and the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order of sale, holding (1) the district court did not err when it declined to limit the government to the sale of Ronald’s interest in the property; and (2) the order of sale did not violate section 7403 or the Just Compensation Clause. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

At dispute in this case was the statewide directive issued by David Harper, the Director of Property Valuation, to county appraisers requiring compliance with Kan. Stat. Ann. 79-1460. Under the statute, when a property owner successfully appeals a property valuation, the valuation may not be increased during the next two years unless certain conditions are met. In general, all other taxable real property is reappraised at fair market value annually. Petitioners, twenty-one boards of county commissioners, filed this original action in mandamus to challenge the constitutionality of section 79-1460 and Harper’s directive. The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus, holding (1) the statute is unconstitutional to the extent it prevents appraisers from valuing real property at its fair market value in any tax year; and (2) the constitutionally offending provisions are severable from the remainder of the statute. View "Bd. of Johnson County Comm'rs v. Jordan" on Justia Law

In 2013, the legislature amended the statutes governing Connecticut’s public land records system to create a two-tiered system in which a nominee of a mortgagee operating a national electronic database to track residential mortgage loans must pay substantially more in recording fees than do other mortgagees. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. (collectively, Plaintiffs), the only entities currently required to pay the increased recording fees, brought this action against Defendants - the governor, attorney general, treasurer, state librarian, and state public records administrator - seeking injunctive relief and a judgment declaring that this two-tiered fee structure violates various provisions of the federal and state constitutions. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the fees do not violate the equal protection guarantees of the state and federal constitutions or the dormant commerce clause of the federal constitution. View "MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. v. Malloy" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation (DOT) eliminated Hoffer Properties, LLC’s direct driveway connections to a controlled-access highway and separately exercised its power of eminent domain to acquire .72 acres of Hoffer’s land to extend Frohling Lane westward so as to connect Hoffer’s property to the highway. Hoffer appealed the amount of compensation, arguing that compensation for the .72 acre must include the diminution of value of the property due to the loss of direct access to the highway. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to DOT, concluding that Hoffer’s direct access to the highway was a noncompensable exercise of the police power and that reasonable access had been given as a matter of law. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that summary judgment was proper because DOT provided alternate access to Hoffer’s property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hoffer was precluded from compensation under Wis. Stat. 32.09(6)(b) because alternate access to the property was provided by the Frohling Lane extension. View "Hoffer Props., LLC v. State" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review concerned the authority of an Idaho court to impact property in Washington and whether the Washington Court had to respect that court's orders. This case arose through OneWest Bank FSB's attempted foreclosure of Washington property based on a reverse mortgage that an Idaho court ordered through Bill McKee's conservatorship proceedings. McKee's daughter, Maureen Erickson, challenged the foreclosure, claiming the reverse mortgage was void because she was the actual owner of the property and the Idaho court had no jurisdiction to affect Washington property. The trial court granted summary judgment to OneWest, allowing it to proceed with foreclosure, but the Court of Appeals reversed and granted summary judgment for Erickson. The Washington Supreme Court had to decide whether the lower courts were required to give full faith and credit to the Idaho court orders. After review, the Supreme Court held that full faith and credit was due and OneWest was entitled to foreclose its reverse mortgage on the Spokane property. View "OneWest Bank FSB v. Erickson" on Justia Law