Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2014, Perfect Puppy, Inc. signed a lease to use a City of East Providence building for a “Puppy Sales store.” Less than two months later, the East Providence city council formally passed an ordinance banning dog and cat sales. Perfect Puppy sued East Providence in state court. The case was removed to federal court on federal-question grounds. The district judge granted East Providence summary judgment on all claims except Perfect Puppy’s takings claim. As for any possible facial-takings challenge, the judge concluded that the claim lacked development. Noting that Perfect Puppy had not asked the state for compensation, the judge deemed the as-applied challenge unripe and remanded the suit to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed the judge’s handling of the facial-takings issue and dismissed Perfect Puppy’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction as to that part of the judge’s order remanding the as-applied claim to state court, holding (1) Perfect Puppy failed to bring a facial-takings challenge; and (2) the lack-of-jurisdiction ground for the remand of the as-applied challenge was colorable, which meant that the First Circuit lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the judge’s decision. View "Perfect Puppy, Inc. v. City of East Providence" on Justia Law

In November 2009, County of Alameda voters approved Measures I and J levying special parcel taxes by the Albany Unified School District. Plaintiff-appellant Golden Gate Hill Development Company, Inc. was the owner of a parcel of real property in the City of Albany subject to the tax. In February 2014, appellant filed suit against the County and District seeking a refund of taxes paid under the Measures. Golden Gage Hill alleged the tax rates in the Measures were improper because different rates are imposed on residential and nonresidential properties, as well as nonresidential properties of different sizes. The complaint referenced a recent decision in this district, “Borikas v. Alameda Unified School Dist.” (214 Cal.App.4th 135 (2013)), which declared invalid a different parcel tax with similar rate classifications. Respondents moved to dismiss, contending the complaint failed to state a claim because, under Code of Civil Procedure section 860, et seq. (“the validation statutes”), appellant was required to present its claims in a “reverse validation action” within 60 days of passage of the Measures. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Because appellant has not shown there was a basis for its refund claim independent of the alleged invalidity of the Measures, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Golden Gate Hill Development Co. v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate and/or prohibition asking the superior court to vacate its order granting the petition of real party in interest, the District, for a right of entry pursuant to the Eminent Domain Law, Code Civ. Proc., 1245.010 et seq. The superior court permitted the District to conduct certain investigations and environmental testing on petitioner's property. Petitioner argued that the District's actions constitute a taking requiring the District to file a condemnation suit to litigate the need for the taking and to provide petitioner with just compensation. The court concluded, however, that the District's proposed actions, which are temporary and limited intrusions on the property, neither violate the entry statutes nor do they constitute a taking requiring a jury determination of just compensation. Accordingly, the court denied the writ petition. View "Young's Market Co. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant Lisa Tagalakis Fedor was convicted by jury of knowingly keeping or maintaining a common nuisance. Defendant lived in Manchester with her boyfriend and her two children. In January 2013, the boyfriend approached defendant about allowing Robert Doane to move in with them. Doane was an acquaintance of the boyfriend’s from whom the boyfriend had purchased heroin. Defendant agreed to allow Doane to move into a spare bedroom. Defendant knew that Doane sold drugs and allowed him to continue to do so after he moved in, but asked him not to sell drugs inside the house. After moving in, Doane began selling heroin on the street outside of the residence. Inside the residence, Doane installed a padlock on his bedroom door, but defendant had witnessed Doane in his bedroom, packaging heroin into “individual baggies.” Doane, despite being a convicted felon, also obtained a stolen firearm that he kept in the house. Defendant was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit the sale of a controlled drug and one count of knowingly keeping or maintaining a common nuisance. Defendant moved for JNOV, or, in the alternative, to set aside the verdict. The trial court denied her requests for relief, and this appeal followed. Defendant argued on appeal that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied her motion for JNOV, specifically, that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that her residence was “used for the selling of the controlled drug heroin” because “drugs were not sold from inside the residence”; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that she “maintained a common nuisance under RSA 318-B:16” because she “did not control or ‘maintain’ Doane’s padlocked room.” The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict was supported by the evidence at trial, and did not constitute an unsustainable exercise of discretion. View "New Hampshire v. Fedor" on Justia Law

TAG filed suit against the City, arguing that the City's zoning policies perpetuated racial segregation and had a disparate impact, thus violating the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604. In 2010, a jury returned a verdict in favor of TAG on the disparate impact claim, but the district court granted the City's motion for a new trial. In 2012, a second jury returned a verdict in favor of the City on both TAG's perpetuation of segregation and disparate impact claims. The court held that TAG’s lost upfront economic expenditures on a detailed development proposal for a specific piece of property, coupled with the denial of a necessary special use permit, constitute injuries-in-fact that are fairly traceable to the City’s actions, thus affording TAG standing to maintain this action. The court also held that the City waived its argument regarding the inconsistency of the jury verdict; the district court should not have reached the merits of that argument, and it therefore erred when it ordered a new trial on that ground. Further, having concluded that the district court erred in ordering a new trial, and that the City has waived its remaining claims of error relating to the 2010 trial, the court reinstated the 2010 judgment in favor of TAG on its disparate impact claim; remanded with instructions that the district court grant a new trial limited only to the issue of damages unless TAG agrees to a remittitur reducing its award to $100,000; and denied reassignment on remand. View "The Anderson Group v. City of Saratoga Springs" on Justia Law

Trona is a sodium carbonate compound that is processed into soda ash or baking soda. Because oil and gas development posed a risk to the extraction of trona and trona worker safety, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which manages the leasing of federal public land for mineral development, indefinitely suspended all oil and gas leases in the mechanically mineable trona area (MMTA) of Wyoming. The area includes 26 pre-existing oil and gas leases owned by Barlow. Barlow filed suit, alleging that the BLM’s suspension of oil and gas leases constituted a taking of Barlow’s interests without just compensation and constituted a breach of both the express provisions of the leases and their implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal of the contract claims on the merits and of the takings claim as unripe. BLM has not repudiated the contracts and Barlow did not establish that seeking a permit to drill would be futile. View "Barlow & Haun, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Chicago’s Department of Administrative Hearings determined that Discount Inn had violated city ordinances, providing that “any person who owns or controls property within the city must cut or otherwise control all weeds on such property so that the average height of such weeds does not exceed ten inches” and that “it shall be the duty of the owner of any open lot ... to cause the lot to be surrounded with a noncombustible screen fence … . P. The owner shall maintain any such fence in a safe condition." Both ordinances provide for fines. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of constitutional challenges to the ordinances.The fencing of vacant lots is important to enable the identification of such land as being owned rather than abandoned, and to discourage squatters and the use of vacant lots as sites for the sale of illegal drugs. While expressing concern about the lack of a definition of “weed” and enforcement of the average height limit, the court stated that taken to its logical extreme, Discount Inn’s defense of the weed would preclude any efforts by local governments to prevent unsightly or dangerous uses of private property. View "Discount Inn, Inc. v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 1993, the Patereks, owners of PME, an injection molding company, relocated the business from Macomb County to the Village Armada, after purchasing a former high school auto shop. The Planning Commission issued the required Special Approval Land Use permit (SALU) with restrictions. Over the following years, the Patereks were occasionally in violation of the SALU, obtained modifications, and expanded the business. Paterek became involved in local government and was sometimes at odds with other local politicians, including a planning commissioner. Patereks ultimately filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, after the village declined perform inspections and to issue a certificate of occupancy for a 2013 expansion. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, reasoning that a jury could reasonably find that defendants retaliated against Patereks for having complained about officials, in violation of the First Amendment; that defendants arbitrarily and capriciously ticketed Patereks, in violation of substantive due process; that defendants, due to their animus against Patereks, subjected PME to disparate treatment, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause; and that the district court erroneously denied Patereks’ civil contempt motion. View "Paterek v. Village of Armada" on Justia Law

The Park, a mobile home park, filed suit against the City, challenging Ordinance 644, asserting claims for, among other things, violations of the Takings, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. Ordinance 644's purpose is to “stabilize mobile home park space rents” to, among other things, “[p]revent exploitation of the shortage of vacant mobile home park spaces,” “[p]revent excessive and unreasonable . . . rent increases,” and “[r]ectify the disparity of bargaining power” between park owners and mobile home owners. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss. The court held that no regulatory taking occurred here and that the Park’s self-styled “private takings claim” is not a separately cognizable claim. The court concluded that the Park’s “private takings claim” cannot serve as a means to evade Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York scrutiny. And in any event, as articulated here, such claim fails because it is a thinly veiled facial challenge, which is both time barred and lacks merit. Further, the court was not persuaded by the related due process and equal protection claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. View "Rancho de Calistoga v. City of Calistoga" on Justia Law

Appellant Columbia Venture, LLC, purchased approximately 4500 acres of land along the eastern bank of the Congaree River in Richland County, intending to develop the property. Columbia Venture knew at the time of the purchase that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was in the process of revising the area flood maps and designating most of the property as lying within a regulatory floodway. Pursuant to federal law, development is generally not permitted in a regulatory floodway. When Columbia Venture's efforts to remove the floodway designation were unsuccessful, Columbia Venture sued Richland County, alleging an unconstitutional taking. By consent, the case was referred to a special referee, who after numerous hearings and a multi-week trial dismissed the case and entered judgment for Richland County. The Special Referee concluded that Columbia Venture's investment-backed expectations were not reasonable in light of the inherent risk in floodplain development. Moreover, the Special Referee concluded that, on balance, the "Penn Central" factors preponderated against a taking and therefore that the County could not be responsible for any diminution in the property's value. Like the able Special Referee, the Supreme Court found Richland County's adoption of floodway development restrictions and the County's required utilization of FEMA flood data did not constitute a taking of any sort, and affirmed the Special Referee's decision. View "Columbia Venture v. Richland County" on Justia Law