Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, plaintiffs obtained a loan from Quicken and granted a mortgage on their property to Quicken’s nominee, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, “MERS.” The note and mortgage ultimately were conveyed to Bank of America. Plaintiffs defaulted. Bank of America foreclosed by advertisement under Mich. Comp. Laws 600.3201. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, “Freddie Mac,” purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. The plaintiffs did not exercise their “equity of redemption” within the six-month statutory redemption period under Michigan law. Freddie Mac initiated eviction. In their counter-complaint, plaintiffs argued that the foreclosure was fraudulent and violated Michigan law because there was no chain of title evidencing ownership by Bank of America, which, therefore, did not have standing to foreclose; Freddie Mac was negligent for failing to evaluate plaintiffs’ loan under the Home Affordable Modification Program; the foreclosure and subsequent eviction were “wrongful” under Michigan law; and Freddie Mac violated their due process rights because its status as a government actor precluded foreclosure by advertisement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims, reasoning that any negligence was not attributable to Freddie Mac and compliance with Michigan’s foreclosure-by-advertisement procedures satisfied the requirements of the Due Process Clause. View "Rush v. Freddie Mac" on Justia Law

Stars is a nude dancing establishment in Neenah, Wisconsin. When Stars opened in 2006, the County had a zoning ordinance governing Adult Entertainment Overlay Districts. Stars’s application was stalled because, all parties agree, the 2006 ordinance violated the First Amendment. Its owner sued in federal court, arguing that anything is legal that is not forbidden, and Staars was banned only by an unconstitutional ordinance: therefore, Stars was permitted in 2006 and is now a legal nonconforming use that cannot be barred by a later ordinance. The court granted summary judgment to Winnebago County, reasoning that it was possible to use the law’s severance clause to strike its unconstitutional provisions. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, agreeing that the permissive use scheme laid out in the ordinance was unconstitutional, but reasoning that, after the constitutional problems are dealt with, the remaining questions concern state law. Their resolution depends on facts that were not developed, and on the possible existence of a power not only to sever problematic language but to revise it—a power federal courts do not have. The district court should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and should have dismissed them without prejudice so that the parties may pursue them in state court. View "Green Valley Inv., LLC v. Winnebago Cnty." on Justia Law

This case concerns a plan to replace public housing units destroyed by Hurricane Ike in part by redeveloping on two of the sites destroyed by Ike. At issue are questions concerning the scope of standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.; whether Congress intended by that Act to abrogate States' sovereign immunity; and whether defendants can avail themselves of a safe harbor provision in the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended by the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, 42 U.S.C. 1437 et seq. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the dismissal of the Individual Plaintiffs and GOGP because they did not appeal; plaintiff has Article III standing to bring her claim that the planned redevelopment will deprive her of the social and economic benefits that result from living in an integrated community; Congress did not make clear an intent to abrogate States’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from suits brought under the Fair Housing Act, a conclusion reached by other courts considering the issue; and the district court properly granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants on plaintiff’s Fair Housing Act claim, concluding that plaintiff's claim was precluded by a safe harbor provision found at 42 U.S.C. 1437p(d). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McCardell v. HUD" on Justia Law

Carter lost his home in Crete, Illinois, after its mortgage foreclosed. He sued the financial institutions involved in making, servicing, or foreclosing his mortgage, alleging constitutional claims based on the fact that the “foreclosing entity” (not identified) did not hold the note or mortgage at the time of the foreclosure. The district court dismissed the suit as frivolous. The Seventh Circuit agreed that the suit and a similar pending suit are “indeed frivolous” and affirmed dismissal. In neither case did the complaint allege anything that might support an inference that the defendants were state actors under 42 U.S.C. 1983. A claim must be dismissed “if it is clear beyond any reasonable doubt that a case doesn’t belong in federal court, the parties cannot by agreeing to litigate it there authorize the federal courts to decide it.” View "Carter v. Homeward Residential, Inc." on Justia Law

The Yangs listed their building for sale. In February 2011 the restaurant leasing the property closed. The Yangs never sold the building or found another tenant. They continued to pay property taxes. The building was vandalized and started to fail. In October 2011, city officials posted an abandonment notice and mailed a copy to the owner listed in its files. The notice went to the abandoned building and named the previous owner. Nine months later, the city posted a “repair/demolish” notice and sent notices by certified mailing to the property’s address; the notices were returned. After a title search, which identified the Yangs, the city sent certified mail notices to their home in September 2012. Having no response, the city scheduled a November 1 hearing about demotion and sent the Yangs notice by regular mail, with a copy to their realtor. The post office returned as “unclaimed” the certified mailing. The non-certified mailing was not returned. The Yangs did not appear. Demolition was approved. The city mailed another notice to the home address, but got no response. In January 2013, the city razed the building and mailed a $22,500 bill. The Yings claim to remember getting mail that said something about fixing up the building but ignoring it and that they did not receive notice concerning demolition. The Yangs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the city provided all of the notice that was reasonably due. View "Yang v. City of Wyoming" on Justia Law

The City of Madison enacted an ordinance requiring landlords to obtain a license for each unit of rental property. The Rental Inspection and Property Licensing Act (RIPLA) conditioned the grant of a license on the landlord’s advance consent to property inspections. Kenneth Crook was convicted in municipal court of two counts of violating RIPLA by maintaining a rental unit without a rental license and sentenced to pay a fine of $300 on each count. After a bench trial, the County Court of Madison County affirmed. Crook then appealed to the Circuit Court of Madison County, which also affirmed. Crook then appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court assigned his appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. At each level of review, Crook argued that RIPLA’s inspection provisions violated the ban on unreasonable searches imposed by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that RIPLA was not unconstitutional because it required the City to obtain a judicial warrant if the landlord or tenant withheld consent to an inspection. The Supreme Court granted Crook’s petition for certiorari and reversed: RIPLA’s inspection provisions were constitutionally defective because, although RIPLA had a warrant provision, that provision allowed a warrant to be obtained “by the terms of the Rental License, lease, or rental agreement,” which was a standard less than probable cause. The Court reversed the lower courts' judgments affirming Crook's convictions, and rendered a judgment of acquittal. View "Crook v. City of Madison" on Justia Law

The predecessor(s) of defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company acquired the right to build a railroad over the property at issue in this case in the late 1880s. The railroad company provided not only public crossings over its tracks but also private crossings for the convenience of landowners, whose large tracts of land were divided by the railroad tracks. Sometime in 2006, Union Pacific began posting written notices at selected private railroad crossings, indicating its intent to close those crossings. In 2007, plaintiffs, who alleged their farming operations would be disrupted by the closure of the private crossings on which they relied to move farming equipment and materials from one section of farmland to another separated by the railroad tracks, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent Union Pacific from closing approximately ten private crossings and to require that Union Pacific reopen the private crossings it had already closed. Union Pacific removed the suit to the federal district court and filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to permit it to close the private crossings and to prevent the plaintiffs from interfering. Shortly after the filing of this litigation, the Louisiana Legislature passed 2008 La. Acts, No. 530 (effective August 15, 2008), enacting LSA-R.S. 48:394, which required the submission of an advance written notice, by registered or certified mail, to the Louisiana Public Service Commission (“LPSC”) and to the “owner or owners of record of the private crossing traversed by the rail line” by a railroad company desiring to close or remove a private crossing. The Louisiana Supreme Court accepted a certified question of Louisiana law presented from the federal district court, which asked: whether the application of LA. REV. STAT. section 48:394 to any of the properties in this case amounts to an unconstitutional taking of private property without a public purpose, in violation of Article I, Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that LSA-R.S. 48:394 did not effect an unconstitutional taking of private property as applied to the facts established in this case. View "Faulk v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Ad America owned commercial rental property. When Ad America’s tenants were informed that Ad America’s property would be acquired for Project Neon, a freeway improvement project, Ad America’s net rental income decreased, and Ad America could no longer meet its mortgage requirements. Ad America filed an inverse condemnation action against Nevada’s Department of Transportation (NDOT), the lead agency for Project Neon, seeking precondemnation damages for alleged economic harm and just compensation for the alleged taking of its property. The district court granted summary judgment for Ad America even though NDOT had not physically occupied Ad America’s property or taken any formal steps to commence eminent domain proceedings against Ad America’s property. At issue on appeal was whether a taking occurred where NDOT publicly disclosed its plan to acquire Ad America’s property to comply with federal law, the City of Las Vegas independently acquired property that was previously a part of Project Neon, and the City rendered land-use application decisions conditioned on coordination with NDOT for purposes of Project Neon. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus, holding that the undisputed material facts, as a matter of law, did not demonstrate that NDOT committed a taking of Ad America’s property warranting just compensation. View "State Dep’t of Transp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate orders to maintain stable markets for agricultural products. The marketing order for raisins established a Raisin Administrative Committee, which requires that growers set aside a percentage of their crop, free of charge. The government sells the reserve raisins in noncompetitive markets, donates them, or disposes of them by any means consistent with the purposes of the program. If any profits are left over after subtracting administration expenses, the net proceeds are distributed back to the growers. In 2002–2003, growers were required to set aside 47 percent of their raisin crop; in 2003–2004, 30 percent. The Hornes refused to set aside any raisins on the ground that the reserve requirement was an unconstitutional taking of their property for public use without just compensation. The government fined them the fair market value of the raisins, with additional civil penalties. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held that the requirement was not a Fifth Amendment taking. The Supreme Court reversed. The Fifth Amendment requires that the government pay just compensation when it takes personal property, just as when it takes real property. The reserve requirement is a clear physical taking. Actual raisins are transferred. Any net proceeds the growers receive from the sale of the reserve raisins goes to the amount of compensation, but does not mean the raisins have not been taken. This taking cannot be characterized as part of a voluntary exchange for a valuable government benefit. The ability to sell produce in interstate commerce, while subject to reasonable government regulation, is not a “benefit” that the government may withhold unless growers waive constitutional protections. The Court noted that just compensation can be measured by the market value the government already calculated when it fined the Hornes. View "Horne v. Dep't of Agriculture" on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of San Jose enacted an inclusionary housing ordinance that requires all new residential development projects of twenty or more units to sell at least fifteen percent of the for-sale units at a price affordable to low or moderate income households. California Building Industry Association (CBIA) filed this lawsuit, arguing that the San Jose ordinance was invalid on its face because the conditions imposed by the ordinance constituted “exactions” under the takings clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. The superior court agreed with CBIA and enjoined the City from enforcing the ordinance. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the superior court erred in interpreting the controlling constitutional principles and the decision in San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco as limiting the conditions that may be imposed by such an ordinance to only those conditions that are reasonably related to the adverse impact the development projects that are subject to the ordinance themselves impose on the City’s affordable housing problem. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the conditions that the San Jose ordinance imposes on future developments do not impose “exactions” upon the developers’ property. View "Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law