Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The State condemned two adjacent parcels of property that the owners had leased to Clear Channel Outdoor Inc. for outdoor advertising. Clear Channel had built a billboard on each parcel. The State maintained that its condemnation of the realty did not include the billboards themselves because they were removable property for which no compensation was due. Consistent with the State’s position, the special commissioners’ awards included no compensation for the billboard structures. The landowners and Clear Channel objected to the awards. In addition, Clear Channel counterclaimed for inverse condemnation of the sign structures. After a jury trial, the trial court awarded Clear Channel $268,235.27 for the billboards less credits for the amounts already received from the commissioners’ award, concluding that a billboard may be a fixture to be valued with the land. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Clear Channel’s billboard structures were fixtures and should have been valued as part of the land; and (2) while Clear Channel was due compensation for the sign structures, it was not entitled to value the structures based on the income from its advertising operations, and evidence of that income was inadmissible. Remanded. View "State v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc." on Justia Law

Taxpayers Don and Mary Frankenberg made improvements to their home in 2001. The Garvin County Assessor did not increase the fair cash value of the property for the improvements until 2012 when she visually inspected the property and discovered the improvements. The Assessor notified the Taxpayers of a new assessed fair cash value, which was a substantial increase from the previous valuation in 1999. The Taxpayers protested the assessment, arguing that under Art. X, section 8B of the Oklahoma Constitution, the fair cash value of the property could not be increased more than 5% in any year. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Taxpayers, and the Assessor appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the exception to the 5% cap for improvements to a property existed only for the year the improvements were made to the property and did not apply in the year when the Assessor first discovers the improvements. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Frankenberg v. Strickland" on Justia Law

The Clarke County Reservoir Commission, comprised of several agencies located in Clarke County, decided to move ahead with plans to build a new public reservoir for drinking water. The Commission filed a declaratory action seeking a declaration that the proposed reservoir was a public use that would allow the Commission to condemn private land. Defendants, landowners whose property was to be condemned for the project, alleged that the Commission did not have the legal authority to initiate this condemnation proceeding because the Commission included private members that lacked eminent domain authority. The district court ruled for the Commission, concluding that the project qualified as a public use and that the Commission, as then constituted, was a proper acquiring agency. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by ruling that the Commission, with private members, had eminent domain powers. View "Clarke County Reservoir Comm’n v. Abbott" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs obtained a home loan and granted a mortgage that was eventually assigned to Bank of America (BOA). Plaintiffs defaulted in 2007. In 2011, plaintiffs received a letter explaining the right to seek a loan modification. Plaintiffs sought assistance from NMCA; met with BOA’s counsel; provided information and forms prepared with help from NMCA; and were offered reduced payments for a three-month trial period. If all trial period payments were timely, the loan would be permanently modified. Plaintiffs allege that they made the three payments, but did not receive any further information, and that BOA returned two payments. BOA offered plaintiffs a permanent loan modification, instructing plaintiffs to execute and return a loan modification agreement. Plaintiffs do not allege that they returned the agreement. BOA never received the documents. BOA sent a letter informing them that because they were in default and had not accepted the modification agreement, a nonjudicial foreclosure would proceed. Notice was published. The property was sold at a sheriff’s sale. BOA purchased the property, and executed a quitclaim deed to Federal National Mortgage Association, which filed a possession action after the redemption period expired. Six months later, plaintiffs sued, claiming Quiet Title; violations of due process rights; and illegal/improper foreclosure and sheriff’s sale. The district court dismissed all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Michigan foreclosure procedure does not violate due process. View "Garcia v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2013, the City of Ada, Oklahoma passed Ordinance No. 13-02 to annex certain real property, located in Township 3 North, Range 6 East of the Indian Base and Meridian, Pontotoc County, Oklahoma, into its corporate city limits. Petitioners were residents of Pontotoc County, Oklahoma, who owned property within the annexed territory. They sought to set aside the ordinance, and City denied their request. They then filed their Petition for Declaratory Judgment and in the Alternative, for Detachment of Municipal Territory, seeking a determination that the City lacked jurisdiction to pass the ordinance due to lack of compliance with 11 O.S. 2011 sec. 21-103. The trial court denied Petitioners' request for relief but filed its Order Certifying Interlocutory Order for Immediate Appeal. The question this case presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court's review centered on whether the City fully complied with the Oklahoma annexation statutes when it annexed that territory near its city limits. The Court held that substantial compliance with the notice requirements was not sufficient under the applicable statutes in this case and reversed. View "In re: Detachment of Municipal Territory from the City of Ada" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree criminal mischief after aiding and abetting his son to shoot two state-owned deer decoys that they believed to be deer. Oregon’s criminal mischief statute prohibits persons from intentionally damaging “property of another.” The issue in this case was whether wild deer were “property of another” for purposes of that statute. Defendant appealed his criminal mischief conviction, arguing that the trial court had erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because wild deer do not become property until reduced to physical possession. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed: because the state, as a trustee, holds a legal interest in wildlife, the Court concluded that the state has a “legal * * * interest” in wildlife, as that phrase is used in ORS 164.305(2). Therefore, wild deer are “property of another,” for purposes of ORS 164.354 (1)(b) and ORS 164.305(2), and that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the second-degree criminal mischief count. View "Oregon v. Dickerson" on Justia Law

Appellants filed this putative class action challenging the California State Controller’s application of California’s Unclaimed Property Law (“UPL”), which provides for the conditional transfer of unclaimed property to the State of California. Appellants claimed that the procedures used both before unclaimed property is transferred to the Controller (“pre-escheat”) and after it is transferred (“post-escheat”) violate their due process rights. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Appellants’ argument that the pre-escheat notice provided by the Controller is constitutionally inadequate because the Controller does not attempt to locate property owners using the data sources required by Section 1531 of the UPL was based on a misinterpretation of the statute, and Appellants’ suggested requirement that the Controller use additional databases exceeded due process requirements; (2) Appellants’ argument that the Controller’s pre-escheat notice process is inadequate because it is carried out by companies that received a portion of the escheated value and therefore have a conflict of interest was not supported by law or the alleged facts; and (3) Appellants’ challenged to the post-escheat procedure was not ripe for review. View "Taylor v. Chiang" on Justia Law

Defendant executed a promissory note in favor of the entity that was soon to merge with First Tennessee Bank National Association. The note was secured by a deed of trust for property in California. First Tennessee later filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging that he was in default on the note and seeking damages in the amount of $274,467. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that First Tennessee’s claim was barred by a California statute of limitations. First Tennessee appealed, arguing that the district court erred in finding that the limitations period was not tolled by either a California statute or provision of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the California tolling statute could not be applied against Defendant, a nonresident of California, without violating the Commerce Clause; and (2) although Defendant was a member of the National Guard, he was neither on “active duty” during his membership nor had he ever been called to active service, and therefore, the SCRA provided no basis to toll the limitations period. View "First Tenn. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Newham" on Justia Law

Roca Solida, a non-profit religious organization, purchased a 40-acre Nevada parcel. A desert stream flowed across the property, the water rights to which Roca also purchased. The water supplied a recreational pond, used for baptisms. Roca’s property is situated within a national wildlife refuge, managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. An FWS water restoration project completed in 2010 “restored [the] stream to its natural channel,” the effect of which was to divert the stream away from Roca Solida’s property, depriving it of water it would have otherwise enjoyed. In federal district court in Nevada, Roca sought declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief on the basis of alleged violations under the First and Fifth Amendment and “at least $86,639.00 in damage[s]” under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671–80. It also sued in the Claims Court, seeking declaratory relief and compensatory damages on the basis that the diversion project constituted an unlawful taking and asserting FWS negligently executed the water diversion project, causing $86,639 in damages to “land, structures, and animals.” The Claims Court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in light of the pending district court action under 28 U.S.C. 1500. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Ministerio Roca Solida v. United States" on Justia Law

Amtrak appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing its federal Supremacy Clause claims filed against the Commissioner, claiming that the Supremacy Clause deprived the NYSDOT of authority to condemn Amtrak's property by eminent domain. The district court held that Amtrak's claims were barred under the Eleventh Amendment and, in the alternative, the claims were time-barred. The court concluded that, because one of the parcels of land is not subject to sovereign immunity, the statute of limitations issue must be resolved. Amtrak argued that it suffered two separate injuries: first, when it learned that NYSDOT planned to take its land, and second, when the Commissioner actually executed the takings. Under the circumstances of this case, the court concluded that Amtrak brought its federal claims more than six years afters its claims accrued. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court based on its alternative conclusion that the claims were time-barred. View "National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. McDonald" on Justia Law