Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from a series of contracts surrounding the construction of a custom home. Petitioners are soil engineering corporations that subcontracted with developer Sun Mountain Enterprises, LLC to perform soil analysis and soil engineering related to the construction of the home. SK Peightal Engineers, LTD entered an oral contract with general contractor Shannon Custom Homes. Petitioner Hepworth-Pawlak Geotechnical, Inc. entered into a written contract with Sun Mountain containing a duty of care provision. It was unclear whether SK Peightal's oral contact contained the same duty of care requirement. Sun Mountain planned on selling the completed home on the open market, but due to the economic downturn, the house sat until the construction loan contract matured and came due, at which point Sun Mountain and its lender entered into an "Agreement for Deed-in-Lieu of Foreclosure. Sun Mountain was thereby absolved of personal liability for the loan, and the bank took ownership of the house. After the lender took possession, large cracks formed in the walls of the home due to a settling of the soil beneath the home's foundation. The lender sued petitioner soils engineers for negligence. Petitioners moved for summary judgment under the economic loss rule, asserting that the lender was contractually interrelated through the deed-in-lieu and the loan contract to the duty provisions contained in petitioners' contracts with Sun Mountain, and thus the lender was barred from asserting a negligence claim for economic loss. The trial court rejected petitioners' motion. Petitioners then appealed. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the appellate court misinterpreted the case law authority pertaining to this case. View "S K Peightal Engineers, LTD v. Mid Valley Real Estate Solutions V" on Justia Law

Appellant Linda Vista Village San Diego Homeowners Association, Inc. appealed the dismissal of their request for a declaratory judgment and other relief. Appellant's complaint was filed in 2012 against defendants-respondents the City of San Diego and the predecessors of Tecolote Investors, LLC. Members of the HOA are sublessees of mobile home park lots subject to a 1979 master lease between the City and Tecolote Investors. Appellant argued that the park site was located on and should have been properly characterized as "Pueblo Lands" within the meaning of the San Diego City Charter (section 219). Section 219 and its predecessors since 1909 have been applied to certain Pueblo lands north of the San Diego River to require approval by City Council ordinance and City voters for any sale or lease of them for more than 15 years. Since no voter approval was sought or obtained for this transaction, Appellant alleged the City was without power to enter into the existing 55-year master lease of the park site with the Landlord Defendants (or their predecessors). As a consequence, Appellant sought decrees to invalidate the master lease and consequently its subleases, specifically attacking the 1983 City-approved provisions allowing periodic rent increases. Appellant also claims entitlement to various other types of relief, such as damages. In light of the applicable authorities, the recorded title documents for the parcels demonstrate as a matter of law that on this record, the restrictions of section 219 did not apply, the face of the pleading failed to state its causes of action, and the Landlord Defendants' demurrer was correctly sustained without leave to amend. Based on de novo analysis (akin to judgment on the pleadings),the Court of Appeal concluded the record fully supported the dismissal of all causes of action as to the City too. View "Linda Vista Village San Diego HOA v. Tecolote Investors" on Justia Law

The City of North Las Vegas publicly announced its intent to condemn a portion of Appellant’s land but delayed condemning the property. Appellant sold the property before it was condemned. Appellant filed a complaint against the City for inverse condemnation and precondemnation proceedings. The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In Buzz Stew I, the Supreme Court (1) reversed as to Appellant’s precondemnation damages claim, concluding that questions of fact remained regarding whether the City’s actions were unreasoanble and injurious; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of the inverse condemnation claim because Appellant had not stated a takings claim upon which relief could be granted. On remand, the jury returned a verdict for the City, finding that the City’s delay was not unreasonable. On appeal, Appellant contended that newly discovered evidence presented at trial demonstrated that a taking of its property occurred and that a new trial was required due to errors made with regard to the precondemnation claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial did not establish that a taking occurred while Appellant maintained an interest in the property; and (2) no error made below warranted a new trial. View "Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant Rodney Brossart guilty of terrorizing, preventing arrest, and failing to comply with the law for estray animals. In 2011, two of Brossart's adult children observed three cow-calf pairs loose on or near Brossart's property and they determined the cattle did not belong to Brossart. The cattle were secured in a fenced "missile site" Brossart leased. One of Brossart's children told him about the cattle after the cattle were secured. The following day, neighbor Chris Anderson discovered three cow-calf pairs had escaped from his fenced property. Anderson tracked the cattle to Brossart's property and spoke to Brossart about the cattle. According to Anderson, Brossart informed him that he would have to buy the cattle back. Anderson returned to his farm and contacted the Nelson County Sheriff's Department. Eric Braathen, a deputy for the Nelson County Sheriff's Department, contacted Fred Frederikson, a licensed peace officer and a brand inspector for the North Dakota Stockmen's Association. While driving to Brossart's farm, Braathen and Frederikson saw Brossart pumping water from a field. Braathen introduced Frederikson to Brossart and Frederikson asked about the cattle and whether he could go look at them. According to Braathen, Brossart informed the officers "if you step foot on my property, you are going to not be walking away." The situation quickly escalated, Braathen attempted to arrest Brossart, Brossart resisted, and Braathen used a taser on Brossart multiple times before he was handcuffed. Brossart was charged with failing to comply with the estray chapter and preventing arrest. He appealed his conviction. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not give the jury any instructions explaining what constituted a threat and that communications that are not a "true threat" are protected speech. The district court therefore did not correctly and adequately inform the jury of the applicable law and erred by failing to include a jury instruction defining what constituted a "threat." Brossart's terrorizing conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial on that charge. The Supreme Court affirmed in all other respects. View "North Dakota v. Brossart" on Justia Law

Plaintiff controls the Fig Garden Village outdoor shopping center, which has approximately 60 retailers. Plaintiff has a policy of prohibiting solicitation of donations on the shopping center property; it allows other forms of expressive activity, such as gathering petition signatures, in a designated public forum area only. Solicitors for Nu Creation solicited donations on sidewalk areas adjacent to the entrances of stores within the shopping center. Plaintiff explained its policy regarding solicitation and asked the solicitors to leave, but they refused. Officers would not arrest them without a court order. Plaintiff sought declaratory relief and a temporary restraining order. The trial court granted the ex parte application and issued a TRO. After a hearing, the court issued a preliminary injunction, which did not prohibit all solicitation on plaintiff’s property, but restricted it to a designated public forum area marked on a map attached to the preliminary injunction. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that the store entrances and aprons are not a public forum. View "Donahue Schriber Realty Grp., Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth filed a complaint alleging that Windsor Plaza Condominium violated Va. Code 36-96.3(B)(ii) by failing to make reasonable accommodations in rules or services that were necessary to afford Michael Fishel equal opportunity to enjoy his dwelling. Fishel and his wife moved to intervene in the lawsuit, alleging additional causes of action. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Windsor Plaza. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in ruling that the evidence relating to conversion of a bicycle storage space into an accessible parking space supported a claim for reasonable modification rather than a claim for reasonable accommodation; (2) did not err in ruling granting Windsor Plaza’s motion to strike; (3) erred in ruling that Windsor Plaza’s request for attorney’s fees against the Commonwealth was not barred by sovereign immunity, but the error was harmless; (4) did not err in concluding that the statute of limitations barred the Fishels’ additional claims; and (5) did not err by refusing to award Windsor Plaza attorney’s fees against the Fischels. View "Commonwealth v. Windsor Plaza Condo. Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law

After an investigation, the City of Houston declared the Park Memorial condominiums uninhabitable. Because the condominium owners did not apply for an occupancy certificate or make necessary repairs within the requisite period of time, the City ordered all residents to vacate the complex. A group of owners later brought this inverse-condemnation action, alleging that their property was taken when they were forced to vacate. The trial court sustained the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, concluding that the owners had not alleged a taking. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the condominium owners’ claim failed because they did not allege a taking. View "City of Houston v. Carlson" on Justia Law

The Morris Family LLC (Morris Family) owns certain property abutting U.S. Highway 212 in the City of Watertown. In a 1970 condemnation action against Morris Family’s predecessor in title, the State sought to acquire the necessary “right of way and rights of access” in accordance with its plan to turn Highway 212 into a four-lane, controlled-access highway. The parties to the condemnation action eventually settled. In 2010, Morris Family filed a complaint against the City and State, claiming unconstitutional taking or damaging of property for the loss of access from their property to Highway 212 and violation of due process stemming from the State’s and City’s denial of access. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the State was granted complete control of access for the land in the 1970 judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the motion for summary judgment was properly before the circuit court and that the court did not err when it granted summary judgment on all claims and dismissed the case. View "Morris Family LLC v. S.D. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

In 2011, a tornado ripped through the downtown area of the City of Springfield, Massachusetts and caused significant damage. City officials quickly determined that the South Commons Condominiums were among the properties that suffered substantial damage. The City hired a private company to demolish most of those buildings the next evening. The owners of the condos brought suit against the City, its officials, and the demolition company that took down the buildings, claiming violations of the owners’ procedural and substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as various violations of Massachusetts state law. The district court dismissed the federal claims for failure to state a claim and dismissed the state claims without prejudice as an exercise of its discretion to deal with pendent claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when a city decides buildings are so damaged that they must be immediately demolished, and when the city does so pursuant to a state law that authorizes the use of summary procedure to respond to such an emergency, the remedy for any wrong, absent behavior that objectively “shocks the conscience,” must come from the remedies the state itself supplies rather than from a federal suit premised on the U.S. Constitution’s due process clause. View "South Commons Condo. Ass’n v. Charlie Arment Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, in response to an increased number of foreclosures, the City of Springfield enacted two ordinances addressing properties left vacant during or after the foreclosure process. The mediation ordinance established a program requiring mandatory mediation between mortgagors and mortgagees. The foreclosure ordinance required owners of buildings that are vacant or undergoing foreclosure to register with the City. Six banks holding mortgage notes on properties in the City (Plaintiffs) filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the enforcement of the ordinances. The federal district court allowed the City’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed, and the First Circuit certified two questions to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Court answered (1) the foreclosure statute preempts the mediation ordinance in whole but does not preempt the foreclosure ordinance; (2) the foreclosure ordinance is preempted by the Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act and the state sanitary code; and (3) the foreclosure ordinance does not impose an unlawful tax in violation of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. View "Easthampton Savings Bank v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law