Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Municipalities City of Spencer and the Town of Forest Park, and Blaze’s Tribute Equine Rescue, acting under a search warrant, seized 44 abused and neglected horses from plaintiff-appellant Ann Campbell’s properties. After a forfeiture hearing, a state district court in Oklahoma issued an order granting Spencer and Forest Park’s joint forfeiture petition. Campbell later sued the municipalities (and Blaze) in federal court under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The district court dismissed Campbell’s complaint, applying both claim and issue preclusion to prevent relitigation of matters common to the state court forfeiture proceeding. Campbell appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court properly dismissed Campbell’s 1983 claims: because Campbell could have raised her constitutional claims in the forfeiture proceeding but did not do so, and because the Court's allowing her to raise these claims in this appeal would impair the Municipalities’ rights established in that proceeding, the Court held that the district court properly concluded that claim preclusion disallowed Campbell from pursuing her constitutional claims. View "Campbell v. City of Spencer" on Justia Law

After prevailing in a condemnation action, petitioners-landowners moved for an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to section 28-2-510(B)(1) of the Eminent Domain Procedure Act. Contrary to petitioners' view, the circuit court determined attorneys' fees should be awarded based on an hourly rate via a lodestar calculation rather than the contingency fee agreement between Petitioners and their attorney. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court interpreted section 28-2-510 and concluded the General Assembly intended for attorneys' fees to be awarded based on a constellation of factors. Specifically, section 28-2-510(B)(1) mandated that in order for a prevailing landowner to recover reasonable attorneys' fees he or she must submit an application for fees "necessarily incurred." Therefore, by implication, the General Assembly precluded a landowner from recovering attorneys' fees based solely on a contingency fee agreement without regards for section 28-2-510. The Court explained that even though the contingency fee agreement is not the sole element in the calculation, it is still a significant component as it may be used to explain the basis for the fee charged by the landowner's counsel. "Our decision should not be construed as somehow condemning or eliminating an attorney's use of a contingency fee agreement. To the contrary, we recognize that the use of these agreements is a legitimate and well-established practice for attorneys throughout our state. This practice may still be pursued. Yet, it is with the caveat that the terms of the agreement are not controlling. Rather, they constitute one factor in a constellation of factors for the court's consideration in determining an award of reasonable litigation expenses to a prevailing landowner under section 28-2-510(B)(1). The court may, in fact, conclude that the contingency fee agreement yields a reasonable fee. However, the court is not bound by the terms of the agreement. " For this case, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals misapplied case law precedent. Furthermore, the Court concluded the circuit court failed to conduct the correct statutory analysis, and remanded this matter to the circuit court. Petitioners' counsel was instructed to submit an itemized statement in compliance with section 28-2-510(B)(1) as counsel's original affidavit failed to identify the "fee charged" and the actual number of hours expended. View "South Carolina Dept. of Trans. v. Revels" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the free speech rights of residents in a high-rise cooperative apartment building. A resident who was a regular critic of the building's Board of Directors was interested in running for a Board seat. He asked the Board if he could distribute campaign materials in the building. The Board, citing a House Rule that barred soliciting and distributing any written materials, denied the request. On prior occasions, though, the Board had distributed written updates under apartment doors throughout the building, which criticized the Board's opponents. The resident filed a lawsuit and claimed that the House Rule was unconstitutional. "Different concerns arise when the speaker is an owner, not a visitor, who seeks to exercise the right to free speech in the common-interest community where he or she lives. [...] In those cases, courts should focus on the purpose of the expressional activity . . . in relation to the property's use, and conduct a more general balancing of expressional rights and private property rights." Here, the Board's policy violated the free speech clause of the State Constitution. "The important right of residents to speak about the governance of their community, which presents a minimal intrusion when a leaflet is placed under a neighbor s apartment door, outweighs the Board's concerns."View "Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Avenue Owners, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Major forest fires swept through areas south of Fairbanks in the summer of 2009 and approached properties owned by appellants (the landowners). Firefighters working under the direction of the State Department of Forestry intentionally set fire to the landowners’ vegetation. The burnouts deprived the advancing wildfires of fuel and saved the structures. But the landowners sued the State, bringing a takings claim under the eminent domain provision of the Alaska Constitution, article I, section 18, and tort claims for negligence and intentional misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of the tort claims because of governmental immunity; it reversed its dismissal of the constitutional claim, remanding it to the superior court for further consideration of whether the specific exercise of the State’s police powers at issue here was justified by the doctrine of necessity.View "Brewer v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Plaintiff/Petitioner owned a 64-acre site in Jackson, California (comprised of five assessor parcel numbers), which included an 11-acre portion of (historical) arsenopyrite mine tailings, known as “Tim’s Corner” (the property is also known as the Argonaut Mine Tailings Site). In 1998, the Department of Toxic Substances Control, after testing, constructed a fence around plaintiff’s property and posted a lien for $245,306.64. In November 2007, the Department made an imminent or substantial endangerment determination concerning the property. Plaintiff requested an evidentiary hearing to contest this determination; no hearing was provided, but the Department sent plaintiff a letter explaining the basis of this determination. Without notice to plaintiff, the Department secured two property inspection warrants, one in 2008 and another in 2010. In early February 2011, the Department advised plaintiff that it intended to update and increase its lien from $245,306.64 to $833,368.19. The Department also advised plaintiff, for the first time, of a right to a hearing concerning the placement of the lien on her property. On February 17, 2011, plaintiff, in a letter to the Department, requested a hearing on four issues, the propriety of the lien increase, the amount of the lien increase, the properties covered by the lien and additional information the Department obtained to justify the work performed. The Department did not provide a hearing as requested. Plaintiff then sued, seeking a writ of mandate to require the Department to hold the hearing. The Court of Appeal concluded that the procedure the Department used to deny plaintiff's appeal violated due process; its lien procedure failed to allow an affected landowner to dispute the amount of the lien, the extent of the property burdened by the lien and the characterization of the landowner as the responsible party.View "Van Horn v. Dept. Toxic Substances Control" on Justia Law

Section 11-41-2 of the Helena City Code (the Ordinance) places limitations on roofing materials used on structures located within the wildland-urban interface (WUI) district. The City filed suit against homeowners whose property was situated within the WUI zoning district (Homeowners), alleging violation of the Ordinance. Homeowners answered the complaint and petitioned for a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance was invalid on statutory and constitutional grounds. The district court granted summary judgment for Homeowners, concluding that the Ordinance was a building regulation, and the City was not authorized to adopt building regulations under the guise of a zoning ordinance. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err by determining that the Ordinance was an impermissible building code and not a zoning ordinance; (2) erred by concluding that Homeowners were ineligible for an award of attorney fees; and (3) did not err by denying and dismissing Homeowners' constitutional arguments.View "City of Helena v. Svee" on Justia Law

After the City decided to undertake road improvements along South Avenue in Missoula, Montana, Plaintiffs, a group of landowners who owned property along South Avenue, contested the City’s assessment of the width of the right-of-way on a section of the street. The district court concluded that the City’s actions constituted a taking. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for a redetermination of damages. Plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing asking the Court to award both attorney’s fees and costs incurred for the appeal. The Supreme Court denied the petition. On remand, Plaintiffs agreed to reduce their “taken property” value and asked the district court to assess both attorney’s fees and costs against the City for the appeal. The district court determined that Plaintiffs were the prevailing party on appeal and awarded them appellate attorney’s fees and costs. The City appealed, arguing that the Court’s refusal to award fees in its order on rehearing constituted “law of the case.” The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s award of appellate attorney’s fees and costs, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs had a constitutional right to be made whole through an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal.View "Wohl v. City of Missoula" on Justia Law

After defendants purchased the building where plaintiff was living in a rent-controlled apartment, defendants served plaintiff with a 60-day notice to quit. Plaintiff subsequently initiated unlawful detainer proceedings against defendants and then filed a complaint alleging several state claims. Plaintiff sought an order restoring him to his apartment, restitution, damages, and attorney fees. On appeal, defendants challenged the trial court's denial of their Code of Civil Procedure section 426.16 special motion to strike plaintiff's first amended complaint because their conduct was protected litigation activity. Plaintiff cross-appealed the trial court's denial of his request for attorney fees in defending the motion. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to strike where plaintiff's complaint was not directed at protected activity. However, the court reversed the denial of attorney fees and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether defendants' motion was frivolous, whether plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and if so, the amount of such fees.View "Ben-Shahar v. Pickart" on Justia Law

In 2012, St. Louis County adopted an ordinance that implemented a foreclosure mediation program requiring lenders to provide residential borrowers an opportunity to mediate prior to foreclosure. Two bankers filed suit against the County seeking a declaratory judgment establishing that the ordinance was invalid. The circuit court sustained the County’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the County possessed the charter authority to enact the ordinance, the ordinance was a valid exercise of the County’s police power, the ordinance was not preempted by state law, and the fees associated with the ordinance did not violate the Hancock Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance was void and unenforceable ab initio because the County exceeded its charter authority in enacting the ordinance.View "Mo. Bankers Ass’n, Inc. v. St. Louis County, Mo." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on the viability of the historic police power of the state in validating and regulating riparian rights and remedies where it was alleged that a downstream landowner subject to federal rail-safety regulations obstructed a natural watercourse causing upstream flooding and significant damage as a result. Hotel owner David Miller and his hotel (appellants) sought to hold the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") liable for water damage allegedly resulting from the negligent construction and/or maintenance of a nearby SEPTA-owned railroad bridge. Appellants purchased hotel property in 1996, and they claimed that the bridge thereafter obstructed the flow of a creek which ran under the bridge, causing the creek to flood appellants' upstream hotel on three separate occasions of extreme weather conditions. On each occasion, appellants experienced flooding that filled the hotel basement and first floor. In 2001, the hotel closed and appellants declared bankruptcy. "As this is an area of law that has been regulated by the Commonwealth for centuries," the Pennsylvania Court concluded that there was no clear and manifest federal congressional intention to preempt Pennsylvania law central issue of this case. The Court declined to "invalidate the rights and remedies afforded to appellants under the laws of this Commonwealth." The Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's order and remanded this case for further proceedings.View "Miller v. SEPTA" on Justia Law