Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, the City of Phoenix started installing light rail tracks along Jefferson Street, which abutted Appellant’s property. As part of the installation, the City erected a permanent concrete barrier between the tracks and Appellant’s property, thus blocking two driveways providing vehicular access from Jefferson Street to Appellant’s property. The property, however, still had access via Madison Street. The City subsequently filed an eminent domain action to determine the compensation it owed to Appellant for a temporary construction easement Appellant granted the City. Appellant counterclaimed, seeking damages for his permanent loss of access to Jefferson Street. The superior court granted summary judgment to the City on that claim, concluding that a property owner is not entitled to compensation for loss of access if he retains “free and convenient access” to the property. The court of appeals vacated the superior court’s ruling, concluding that the government may not eliminate a property owner’s established access to an abutting roadway without providing just compensation to the property owner. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under these circumstances, an owner may claim compensable damage to private property within the meaning of Ariz. Const. art. II, 17, even if other streets provide access to the property. View "City of Phoenix v. Garretson" on Justia Law

By 2013, the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) had purchased several hundred properties for the construction of a highway project known as the Northern Beltway. In 2010, Plaintiffs filed a complaint and declaratory judgment against NCDOT, asserting claims for, inter alia, inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs also sought class certification for themselves and all others similarly situated whose property NCDOT was “obliged to purchase.” The proposed class included over 800 property owners within the Northern Beltway. The trial court denied NCDOT’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim of inverse condemnation but denied class certification. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals, holding (1) the courts below erred in analyzing the substantive merits of Plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim at the class certification stage; and (2) the court of appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification because the unique nature of property, coupled with the large number of diverse tracts involved in this litigation, would make individual issues predominate over common issues of law and fact in a trial on the merits. View "Beroth Oil Co. v. N.C. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Howard Ross petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals affirming summary judgments in favor of West Wind Condominium Association, Inc. and Joseph London III. Ross owned four condominium units within the West Wind community. Ross and West Wind agreed that West Wind would accept maintenance and repair work from Ross in lieu of his paying the condominium association's monthly dues. West Wind informed Ross in September 2006 that further work would not be necessary and that he should start paying the dues. Ross paid his dues monthly starting in December 2006. When Ross made his payments for April and May 2007, West Wind rejected those payments and sent Ross a letter through its attorney disputing Ross's charges for the maintenance and repair work that Ross had performed. Through his own attorney, Ross submitted an itemized list of charges for his work done for West Wind, but Ross never received any further correspondence from West Wind. In 2007, West Wind recorded instruments in the office of the Probate Judge of Madison County claiming liens on Ross's four condominium units. In early 2008, West Wind published notice of a foreclosure sale on Ross's units in a local newspaper and continued publishing the notice for four weeks. A month later, West Wind conducted foreclosure sales on Ross's four condominium units and was the highest bidder on all of them. That same day, the auctioneer executed foreclosure deeds conveying the four units to West Wind. West Wind then conveyed two of the units to Jimmy Spruill and Cynthia Spruill, one unit to Joseph London III (who was president of West Wind), and one unit to Delvin Sullivan. Ross sued West Wind, London, Sullivan, and the Spruills alleging claims of wrongful foreclosure and seeking redemption of the properties. Ross sought an order setting aside the foreclosure sales, as well as redemption of the four condominium units. Ross claimed that West Wind had foreclosed on his units without giving him proper notice and that he had not learned of the foreclosures until after they had occurred. The trial court entered a default judgment against Sullivan, but it entered summary judgments in favor of London and the Spruills. West Wind also moved for a summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that it had the right to foreclose based on Ross's unpaid dues. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for West Wind and London, and that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that Ross had waived the argument that he had presented substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he had received proper notice. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ross v. West Wind Condominium Association, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of Sandy Springs and two individual homeowners, John E. Balsam and Jerry Burnstein, filed suit against Fulton County, its Board of Commissioners, and its Director of Public Works. Sandy Springs sought a declaratory judgment, mandamus, and injunctive relief on whether Fulton County retained ownership of and responsibility for two drainage retention ponds and a dam located within Sandy Springs. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Sandy Springs, and Fulton County appealed, contending that it was prohibited from maintaining the detention ponds pursuant to the Georgia constitution. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found that Fulton County retained current ownership of and responsibility for the easements it held over the dam and retention ponds located in Sandy Springs. However, any concomitant responsibility continued only until the easements at issue were legally transferred, terminated, or prospectively abandoned. As a result, to the extent that the trial court's order could be read to indicate that Fulton County had to maintain the easements in perpetuity, the Court reversed. View "Fulton County v. City of Sandy Springs" on Justia Law

CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Co., a gas pipeline company that has the power of eminent domain, filed a petition to condemn an easement on property owned by GSS, LLC. The circuit court entered an order of possession, and, after a trial, awarded GSS $64,000 as just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of value of a contiguous parcel of land from a separate case; (2) did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of CenterPoint on GSS’s counterclaims; and (3) did not err in granting summary judgment to CenterPoint. View "GSS, LLC v. Centerpoint Energy Gas Transmission Co." on Justia Law

Appellant entered into a mortgage with Aegis Lending Corporation. The mortgage was later assigned to Pacifica L. Ninteen, and the servicing rights were eventually transferred to Vantium Capital, Inc. (“Acqura”). After foreclosure proceedings were commenced against Appellant, Appellant filed suit against Acqura, alleging numerous state law claims. Specifically, Appellant claimed that Acqura’s violated its Servicer Participation Agreement with Fannie Mae by failing to follow guidelines applicable under the federal Home Affordable Modification Program. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, holding that Minn. Stat. 58.18(1) did not provide a private cause of action for Appellant to pursue damages for Acqura’s alleged violation of its agreement with Fannie Mae and that Appellant therefore lacked standing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 58.18(1) provides for a private right of action and therefore gave Appellant standing to pursue her claim. View "Gretsch v. Vantium Capital, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the cities, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., federal civil rights laws, and state laws stemming from the cities' demolition of his properties after declaring them nuisances. On remand, the district court concluded that plaintiff failed to state a claim under federal law and that the statute of limitations barred his FHA claims. The court concluded that the district court did not err by ordering the parties to brief the issue of whether plaintiff's complaints stated a claim under federal law; the district court properly considered the relevant evidence and did not err by excluding evidence plaintiff submitted; the district court did not err in concluding that the two-year statute of limitations barred plaintiff's FHA claims; the district court did not err in concluding that plaintiff's complaint, alleging 42 U.S.C. 1981-83 claims, failed to state a claim under federal law; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motions to alter or amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, et al." on Justia Law

The City of Lebanon sought to annex several hundred acres of nearby property. The owners of the property subject to the annexation, including Appellees, filed a lawsuit against the City to invalidate the annexation ordinance. The trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the City, by intentionally manipulating the annexation boundaries to guarantee a successful annexation, violated Appellees’ constitutional rights. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the boundaries of territory to be annexed must be “natural or regular” and that the boundaries of the proposed annexation in this case did not meet this standard. The Supreme Court reversed and declared the annexation valid, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in applying a “natural or regular” standard; and (2) the City’s annexation fully complied the the statutory requirements and did not violate Appellees’ constitutional rights. View "City of Lebanon v. Goodin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Fred Hector appealed the grant of summary judgment that dismissed his action against the City of Fargo for claims involving special assessments against his land. He argued the district court erred in granting Fargo summary judgment, because N.D.C.C. 40-26-07 authorized his action to judicially establish Fargo's special assessments as void to the extent the assessments exceeded Fargo's actual costs of improvements, and his claims were not barred by administrative res judicata. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded N.D.C.C. sections 40-26-01 and 40-26-07 authorized a court to review issues about a municipality's special assessments in the context of the adequate legal remedy of an appeal. Furthermore, the issues Hector raised in this action were res judicata. View "Hector v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Donald Pellicone appealed a Superior Court judgment confirming that New Castle County had certain easements on Pellicone's property. The County sought the easements' validation to carry out a flood control project targeting Little Mill Creek in New Castle County. The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the Flood Control Project legally constituted a County project; (2) whether the County's condemnation of Pellicone's property fell within the County's statutory eminent domain authority; (3) whether the County's action was a taking of Pellicone's property for a public use as defined by law; and (4) whether the procedures set forth in Chapter 12, Article 7 adhered to. Answering all questions raised on appeal as "yes," the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. View "Pellicone v. New Castle County" on Justia Law