Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Bernice Gustafson, as personal representative of the estate of Leonard, Brian, and Michael Gustafson, initiated an action to quiet title to certain mineral interests located in Burke County in October 2011 by service by publication in the Burke County Tribune. Gustafson ultimately applied for default judgment to grant quiet title. After a hearing, the district court found that notice and the summons had been served upon the defendants in the action, that more than 21 days had elapsed since service, that no answer or other proper response was received on behalf of the defendants, and that each of the defendants was wholly in default. The court entered default judgment. Burton Imboden, trustee of the Evans Family Trust, in an affidavit in support of his motion to vacate the default judgment, stated that after he received the summons and complaint, he called the office of Gustafson's attorney, to ask about the complaint and to inform her that he was opposed to what she was trying to accomplish with the complaint. He stated he left a voice message requesting that the attorney return his call, but he never received a call back. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the default judgment, because a message left for the opposing attorney on an answering machine was not an appearance entitling Imboden to notice before entry of the default judgment. View "Gustafson v. Gustafson" on Justia Law

This litigation arose from the City's recent efforts to complete its power system expansion plan first conceived in 1972 and re-affirmed in 2007. The City owns and operates Idaho Falls Power. Alliance sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the City lacked the power to condemn property outside its boundaries for the purpose of building electric transmission lines. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Alliance, finding that Idaho law did not grant the City (or, by extension, IFP) the power to condemn property outside its corporate limits for the purpose of constructing the transmission lines. Because the power to exercise eminent domain extraterritorially for the purpose of constructing electric transmission lines (1) has not been expressly granted to the City by the state, (2) cannot be fairly implied from the powers that the City has been given by the state, and (3) is not essential to accomplishing the City's objects and purposes, the City does not have that power. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Alliance v. City of Idaho Falls" on Justia Law

Several landowners whose land abuts navigable waters appealed the grant of summary judgments in favor of the State. The judgment held that the State owned the mineral interests under the land in the shore zone. Upon review of the dispute, the Supreme Court concluded that indeed the State owned the mineral interests under the shore zone of navigable waters since becoming a State in 1889 under the equal footing doctrine, and that N.D. Const. art. X, sec. 18, precludes construing the language now codified in N.D.C.C. 47-01-15 as a gift of the State's mineral interests under the shore zone to the upland owners. "If the chain of title reflects the State granted its equal footing interests to upland owners, those upland owners take to the low watermark, subject to the public trust doctrine and except where the deed provides otherwise. If the State is not in the chain of title for the upland owner's property, the anti-gift clause precludes construing N.D.C.C. 47-01-15 as a gift of the State's equal footing interests to upland owners." View "Reep v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

In two cases, Montgomery County took a portion of properties owned by Respondents. Because the parties disputed the value paid for either taking the County filed a complaint for condemnation. During the proceedings, the circuit court imposed discovery violation sanctions precluding Respondents from introducing evidence as to the fair market value of the taken properties. Respondents were therefore unable to generate a genuine issue of material fact concerning the County's appraisal valuations. As a result, the circuit court granted summary judgment for the County on the issue of just compensation. The court of special appeals reversed, concluding that summary judgment on the question of just compensation is not available in condemnation proceedings because a property owner cannot be deprived of the constitutional right to have a jury determine just compensation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) permitting summary judgment does not violate the constitutional right to have the opportunity for a jury trial to ascertain just compensation in compensation actions provided the landowner litigates the case according to the Maryland Rules; and (2) summary judgment was properly granted in each case because there was no genuine dispute of material fact and the County was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Montgomery County v. Soleimanzadeh" on Justia Law

PPM Atlantic Renewable (“PPM”) unsuccessfully requested that the Fayette County Zoning Board grant it numerous special exceptions and variances for it to build 24 windmill turbines on leased land. This matter involved whether an objector must comply with a county court order to post bond as a condition of appealing to the Commonwealth Court, where the developer was the appellant in the county court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court should not have quashed the objector's merits appeal based on the the objector's failure to post bond. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "PPM Atlantic Renewable v. Fayette County Zoning Hearing Board" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Nevada Tax Commission (NTC) promulgated Nev. Admin. Code 361.61038, which set forth an apportionment formula for calculating remainder-parcel property values for purposes of Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.4722. Respondent owned a parcel that was divided from a larger piece of land before the regulation's enactment and was properly characterized as a "remainder parcel" under section 361.4722(6). Appellant, the county assessor, valued the land under the approach he used before section 361.61038 was enacted. Respondent appealed, seeking application of the new regulation's apportionment formula. The NTC upheld the assessor's valuation and declined to apply its new regulation retroactively. The district court reversed the judgment of the NTC and directed it to apply section 361.61038 to Respondent's remainder parcel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in this case, (1) application of the regulation would be impermissibly retroactive; and (2) the methods the assessor used did not violate the Constitution. View "County of Clark v. LB Props., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1941, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers completed the Prado Dam on the Santa Ana River near Corona, California. Plaintiffs’ predecessors purchased property in the flood control basin. The Corps anticipated inundation of property in that basin and paid for flowage easements to an elevation of 556 feet. In the 1970s, the Corps planned to modify the Dam, raising its height, increasing the size of the spillway, and enlarging the reservoir. The project was expected to raise the flood inundation line by 10 feet. Under a 1989 agreement, local agencies undertook to acquire or condemn needed property and easements. In 1999, the Orange County Flood Control District offered to purchase the plaintiffs’ property. No agreement was reached. In 2003 the Corps issued new flood-plain maps. Local governmental agencies recorded a survey showing the 566-foot flood inundation line and arranged for placement of small surveyor’s markers at the 566-foot line. Chino rezoned the plaintiffs’ property below the 566-foot line for “passive recreation and open space use.” There has not been any flooding above the 556-foot line before or after the dam level was raised. In 2011, the plaintiffs sued, claiming a taking of a flowage easement over their property between the 556-foot and 566-foot lines. The Claim Court Claims dismissed, holding that absent actual flooding, the plaintiffs could not sustain their claim. The governmental actions, at most, support apprehension of future flooding. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation seeking to recover a masterpiece French impressionist painting by Camille Pissarro that was allegedly taken from their ancestors by the Nazi regime. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of the Foundation's motion to dismiss the complaint without leave to amend. Amended California Code of Civil Procedure 338(c)(3) provides for a six-year statute of limitations period for the recovery of fine art against a museum, gallery, auctioneer, or dealer. The court found that the district court erred in concluding that section 338 intruded on foreign affairs and concluded that the district court erred in striking section 338 down as unconstitutional on the basis of field preemption. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that the Foundation's due process challenge could not be resolved on the Foundation's motion to dismiss. The court further concluded that the Foundation failed to demonstrate that section 338(c)(3) burdened its rights to free speech and, therefore, section 338(c)(3) did not violate the Foundation's First Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection" on Justia Law

The Alabama Department of Transportation ("ALDOT") and its director, John Cooper, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss all claims filed against them by Asphalt Contractors, Inc. ("ACI"). Trichloroethylene ('TCE') and other chemicals were used by ALDOT since the early 1970s. TCE was used extensively by ALDOT as a degreaser and/or cleaning agent and/or as a solvent. TCE is now contained in shallow groundwater in North Montgomery. Since at least April 2009, ALDOT has pumped groundwater into a Dewatering Pond and from there onto a Transfer Pond and then to the South Pond. A portion of the South Pond and wetland area used in ALDOT's remedial efforts is being discharged onto ACI's property. In 2010, ACI demanded that ALDOT immediately cease all dumping of contaminated water on ACI's property. However, the dumping of TCE-laden water onto ACI's property continued to the date of ACI filing its lawsuit. The complaint asserted trespass to realty and inverse condemnation and made claims for injunctive relief. ACI requested damages for the full fair-market value of its property, consequential and incidental damages, compensatory damages, punitive and exemplary damages, expenses, costs, interest, and attorney fees. ALDOT and Cooper filed a motion to dismiss the complaint arguing qualified immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss ALDOT as a party to this action. Conversely, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss as to ACI's inverse-condemnation claim against Cooper in his official capacity. Further, the trial court properly refused to dismiss ACI's claim for injunctive relief against Cooper. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus in part and denied it in part. View "Asphalt Contractors, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Transportation " on Justia Law

Respondent Tamara Frizzell borrowed $100,000 from petitioner Barbara Murray, secured by a deed of trust on Frizzell's home. Frizzell defaulted and a nonjudicial foreclosure sale was set. Before the sale, Frizzell sued Barbara and her husband Gregory Murray, alleging several claims, and filed a motion for an order to enjoin the sale. A judge stayed the sale, unless Frizzell made a payment of $25,000 into the court registry by the following morning. Frizzell failed to make the payment and the sale took place. The trial court then dismissed Frizzell's claims on summary judgment, stating her failure to enjoin the sale resulted in a waiver of her claims. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, determining it would be inequitable to conclude Frizzell waived her claims. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that Frizzell waived her claims as to the foreclosure sale. The Court remanded her other claims to the trial court for consideration under RCW 61.24.127. View "Frizzell v. Murray" on Justia Law