Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

"Appellant and the Respondents are neighbors who obviously do not get along." Appellant Ursula Pallares brought suit alleging five claims against two of her neighbors, respondents Sharon Seinar and Lisa Maseng. Pallares claimed respondents had "mounted a campaign to harass and humiliate" her and to "drive her from her home." Pallares outlined four areas of conduct by one or both Respondents involving: (1) code violations; (2) nuisance animals; (3) a petition for a mental evaluation; and (4) requests for restraining orders, which Pallares averred gave rise to civil tort liability. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to Respondents on Pallares's claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy. Pallares appealed, and the Supreme Court certified the case for review. Based on careful consideration of the facts in record, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of partial summary judgment to Respondents on Pallares's claim for malicious prosecution. However, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment on Pallares's claim for abuse of process. View "Pallares v. Seinar" on Justia Law

After the City initiated a "quick take" proceeding to take the property of Clear Sky Car Wash, Clear Sky filed suit to challenge the City's actions. Clear Sky alleged that the City's conduct violated the mandatory real property acquisition policies set forth in the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (URA), 42 U.S.C. 4651, which were applicable to state agencies when, as here, federal funds were involved. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss. The court affirmed, concluding that section 4651 did not create enforceable rights. Therefore, Clear Sky lacked any basis for a private action to remedy violations under the URA. Further, 42 U.S.C. 1983 did not give Clear Sky enforceable rights to file suit. The court rejected Clear Sky's argument that it had an Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., claim against the USDOT to require it to enforce the policies of section 4651. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Clear Sky Car Wash LLC v. City of Chesapeake, VA" on Justia Law

Homeowners filed a complaint against the County and certain Developers, alleging that the Mayor had unlawfully exempted certain projects from a height restriction law (“Law”). On December 31, 2008, the circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Homeowners and entered an order for declaratory and injunctive relief. The circuit court subsequently denied Homeowners’ request for attorneys’ fees under the private attorney general doctrine. After the parties appealed, the Maui County Council passed a bill making the Mayor’s previously illegal conduct legal. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) (1) vacated the circuit court’s December 31, 2008 order because the Law issue was frustrated based on mootness, and (2) concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorneys’ fees. The Supreme Court (1) vacated that portion of the ICA’s judgment that vacated the circuit court’s judgments and order, holding (i) when a case is mooted while on appeal, the appellate could should remand the case to the trial court for a consideration of the vacatur issue, and (ii) the ICA did not properly analyze the vacatur issue; and (2) affirmed that portion of the ICA’s judgment that affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Homeowners’ request for attorneys’ fees. Remanded. View "Goo v. Arakawa" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs entered into a loan agreement with Potomac Realty Capital LLC (PRC) to rehabilitate and renovate certain property. As security for the loan, NV One granted a mortgage on the property. Plaintiffs later filed a complaint against PRC, asserting violations of the Rhode Island usury law, among other claims. The trial justice granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs with respect to the usury claim, entered an order declaring the loan usurious and void, and voided the mortgage. At issue on appeal was whether a usury savings clause in the loan document validated the otherwise usurious contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their usury claim because (1) the loan was a usury; and (2) the usury savings clause was unenforceable on public policy grounds. View "NV One, LLC v. Potomac Realty Capital, LLC" on Justia Law

The owners (Owners) of certain property in the Village of Memphis filed with the county judge an inverse condemnation petition against the Village and sought compensation for an unlawful taking, alleging that the Village deprived them of their property by maintaining a well, a buried powerline, and water pipes on their property without an easement. An appraiser awarded damages to the Owners. The Village appealed. Thereafter, the parties entered into a settlement agreement as to compensation to be paid to the Owners. The Owners subsequently moved for attorney fees and expenses under Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-720, which mandates that a property owner be allowed attorney fees if a public entity initiates condemnation proceedings without negotiating in good faith with the owner. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the Village did not fail to engage in good faith negotiations with the Owners. The Supreme Court affirmed because the record demonstrated that the Village engaged in good faith negotiations to settle with the Owners after the Village appealed to the district court. View "Village of Memphis v. Frahm" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs granted a mortgage on their property in Massachusetts to Ameriquest Mortgage Company, which assigned its interest in the mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (MERS). MERS later purported to assign Plaintiffs’ interest to HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. (HSBC). HSBC subsequently began foreclosure proceedings on Plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs filed an eight-count complaint against HSBC, claiming the assignment was void, and therefore, HSBC never acquired the mortgage to their property and had no right to initiate foreclosure proceedings. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that Plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the assignment because they were not a party to the assignment, nor were they third-party beneficiaries of the assignment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under Massachusetts law, homeowners in Plaintiffs’ position have standing to challenge a prior assignment of their mortgage on the grounds that the assignment was void, but because Plaintiffs did not set forth a colorable claim that the mortgage assignment in question was void, Plaintiffs lacked standing to raise certain claims; and (2) Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for promissory estoppel with respect to a loan modification. View "Wilson v. HSBC Mortgage Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, Joseph and Mary Romero signed a mortgage contract with the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as nominee for Equity One, Inc. They pledged their home as collateral for the loan. The Romeros alleged that Equity One urged them to refinance their home for access to the home's equity. The terms of the new loan were not an improvement over their then-current loan: the interest rate was higher and the loan amount due was higher. Despite that, the Romeros would receive a net cash payout they planned to use to pay other debts. The Romeros later became delinquent on their increased loan payments. A third party, Bank of New York (BONY), identified itself as a trustee for Popular Financial Services Mortgage, filed suit to foreclose on the Romeros' home. BONY claimed to hold the Romeros' note and mortgage with the right of enforcement. The Romeros defended by arguing that BONY lacked standing to foreclose because nothing in the complaint established how BONY held their note and mortgage, and that the contracts they signed were with Equity One. The district court found that BONY had established itself as holder of the Romeros' mortgage, and that the bank had standing to foreclose. That decision was appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in finding BONY's evidence demonstrated that it had standing to foreclose. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bank of New York v. Romero" on Justia Law

Dale Piercy appealed the district court’s dismissal of his amended action for declaratory relief, which challenged the validity of a herd district ordinance enacted in 1982 by the Canyon County Commissioners. The district court dismissed Piercy’s claim on the basis that it was barred by a seven-year statute of limitations or, in the alternative, a four-year statute of limitations. Piercy challenged the application of both statutes, and argued that Respondents Jennifer Sutton, Luis Guzman, and Canyon County waived any statute of limitations defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the district court. View "Guzman v. Piercy" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Department of Transportation (DOT) initiated condemnation proceedings for property owned by Brian McMeans. The condemnation petition named as defendants, inter alia, McMeans, and McMeans Leasing, Inc. (MLI), a corporation owned solely by McMeans. McMeans filed an answer acknowledging that he was the "owner of the property loosely described in" the condemnation petition, and alleging damages of at least $1.3 million. MLI filed an amendment to the answer McMeans filed in order "to provide that said Answer was for [MLI], a corporation solely owned by Brian K. McMeans." This pleading stated that McMeans was the owner of the property, that MLI was a leasehold tenant, and that MLI would sustain damages for business losses resulting from its removal from the property. At the same time, McMeans filed a pleading, "Answer of Brian K. McMeans," in which he alleged damages of at least $1.3 million as a result of lost uses of the property, interruption in his business income, loss of business, and damage to his business in addition to the value of the condemned real estate. Following a hearing, the trial court granted DOT’s motion and struck both pleadings. MLI filed a direct appeal, which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on jurisdictional grounds because it was not an appeal from a final judgment; McMeans filed an application for interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals, which was granted, and he appealed the trial court’s order striking his "First Amendment" to his answer. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that it erred to the extent it ruled that McMeans could not plead a business loss based on his failure to include it earlier and that he could not plead a loss from the business he owns and operates on the condemned property. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the appellate court erred in its decision. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals indeed erred in its decision, and reversed. View "Dept. of Transportation v. McMeans" on Justia Law

The New Mexico Cultural Properties Review Committee recognized approximately 400,000 acres of public land on Mount Taylor as a registered cultural property under the New Mexico Cultural Properties Act. One month after the Committee issued its final order, Rayellen Resources, Inc., and numerous other parties including the Cebolleta Land Grant (the Rayellen parties) appealed that decision. The Pueblo of Acoma, which joined the Committee in defending the listing, challenged whether the Rayellen parties who are private landowners had standing to appeal because they were explicitly excluded from the listing. In reaching the merits of the case, the district court found that the listing did not violate constitutional protections against the establishment of religion and that the Committee did not violate due process guarantees by following federal guidelines for the listing. The district court reversed the listing nevertheless on the grounds that personal notice of the permanent listing’s public comment period was not provided to all affected property owners, including mineral rights holders, in violation of due process guarantees, and that both the mountain’s sheer size and the private property exclusions made it impracticable to comply with provisions in the Cultural Properties Act relating to integrity of place, required inspections, and required maintenance. The district court also reversed the inclusion of the 19,000 acres of Cebolleta Land Grant common lands in the listing because land grant common lands are not subject to regulation as state land under the Cultural Properties Act. Acoma Pueblo petitioned for certiorari in the Court of Appeals on the three listing issues which the district court reversed, and the Rayellen parties cross-petitioned on other issues as to which they had not prevailed in the district court. The Court of Appeals granted those petitions as well as motions to intervene from Laguna Pueblo and the Committee. Without deciding any of the issues, the Court of Appeals then certified the entire case to the Supreme Court. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part the Committee’s decision and held that the Mount Taylor listing was lawful under the Cultural Properties Act and that the proceedings before the Committee did not violate the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. The Court reversed the Committee’s inclusion of 19,000 acres of Cebolleta Land Grant property and held that land grant property is not state land as defined in the Cultural Properties Act. View "Rayellen Resources, Inc. v. Lyons" on Justia Law