Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that he was entitled to use the Fortymile Trail for access to his state mining claims. Plaintiff sought a declaration that he was entitled to a right-of-way to access his state mining claims on the Fortymile Trail both under a federal statute commonly referred to as R.S. 2477 and because he has an easement by implication or necessity, and that the real property interests claimed by the non-federal defendants were subject to this right-of-way. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against all defendants and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims against the federal government were barred by sovereign immunity, but that the district court erred in concluding that his claims against Doyon Limited and Hungwitchin Corporation were barred by principles of prudential standing. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Mills v. United States" on Justia Law

In the 1830s, the Army Corps of Engineers began constructing harbor jetties into Lake Michigan near the St. Joseph River. In 1950 the Corps began encasing the jetties in steel-sheet piling. The project was completed in 1989. Plaintiffs own land along the lake shore, south of the jetties. The shoreline is eroding naturally, but plaintiffs allege that the jetties block the flow of sand and sediment from the river and the lakeshore north of their properties, interrupting the natural littoral drift and leading to increased erosion on their properties. In 1958, the Corps released a study that documented increased erosion in certain areas. Following another study, a mitigation plan was implemented in 1976, using fine sand. After 15 years of beach nourishment, efforts shifted to using coarser sediment; in 1995, the Corps dumped large rocks into the lake. The Corps released reports in 1973, 1996, 1997, and 1999 on the erosive effects of the jetties and the progress of mitigation. There was also a 1998 newspaper article concerning the erosion. In 1999, plaintiffs filed suit, alleging takings, 28 U.S.C. 1491. The Claims Court dismissed the actions as time-barred. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the court clearly erred in finding that plaintiffs knew or should have known of their claims before 1952 and violated the mandate of a previous remand.View "Banks v. United States" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case, Jimmie Jackson, E. Simms Hardin, and KSD Properties, LLC, untimely paid ad valorem taxes to the City of New Orleans on their respective properties, and were assessed penalties, fees, and interest thereon for various tax years between 2003 and 2009. Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against the City, seeking a declaration that Ordinance Number 22207, and the collection of any penalties, fees, and interest collected thereunder, violated the statutes and constitution of Louisiana, and that the application of Ordinance Number 22207 to this case violated U.S. Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. The district court issued rulings on the City's exceptions and on the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, which: granted the City's exception of no cause of action as to Jackson and Hardin, dismissing these plaintiffs (for failing to comply with the city ordinance requiring payment under protest); denied the City's objections of no cause of action and prescription as to plaintiff KSD; and granted KSD's motion for summary judgment (upon a finding of unconstitutionality as to Ordinance Number 22207). Both plaintiffs and the City filed motions for new trial. The City's motion was granted in part, to dismiss KSD's claims as to its 2008 tax penalty and fees for failure to state a cause of action and to amend the judgment accordingly (for KSD's failure to timely assert a protest as to the penalty and fees assessed for that year's delinquent tax payment); the motions for new trial were denied in all other respects. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the City argued the district court erred in granting summary judgment by declaring Ordinance Number 22207 unconstitutional. After review of the district court record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

Bernice Gustafson, as personal representative of the estate of Leonard, Brian, and Michael Gustafson, initiated an action to quiet title to certain mineral interests located in Burke County in October 2011 by service by publication in the Burke County Tribune. Gustafson ultimately applied for default judgment to grant quiet title. After a hearing, the district court found that notice and the summons had been served upon the defendants in the action, that more than 21 days had elapsed since service, that no answer or other proper response was received on behalf of the defendants, and that each of the defendants was wholly in default. The court entered default judgment. Burton Imboden, trustee of the Evans Family Trust, in an affidavit in support of his motion to vacate the default judgment, stated that after he received the summons and complaint, he called the office of Gustafson's attorney, to ask about the complaint and to inform her that he was opposed to what she was trying to accomplish with the complaint. He stated he left a voice message requesting that the attorney return his call, but he never received a call back. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the default judgment, because a message left for the opposing attorney on an answering machine was not an appearance entitling Imboden to notice before entry of the default judgment. View "Gustafson v. Gustafson" on Justia Law

This litigation arose from the City's recent efforts to complete its power system expansion plan first conceived in 1972 and re-affirmed in 2007. The City owns and operates Idaho Falls Power. Alliance sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the City lacked the power to condemn property outside its boundaries for the purpose of building electric transmission lines. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Alliance, finding that Idaho law did not grant the City (or, by extension, IFP) the power to condemn property outside its corporate limits for the purpose of constructing the transmission lines. Because the power to exercise eminent domain extraterritorially for the purpose of constructing electric transmission lines (1) has not been expressly granted to the City by the state, (2) cannot be fairly implied from the powers that the City has been given by the state, and (3) is not essential to accomplishing the City's objects and purposes, the City does not have that power. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Alliance v. City of Idaho Falls" on Justia Law

Several landowners whose land abuts navigable waters appealed the grant of summary judgments in favor of the State. The judgment held that the State owned the mineral interests under the land in the shore zone. Upon review of the dispute, the Supreme Court concluded that indeed the State owned the mineral interests under the shore zone of navigable waters since becoming a State in 1889 under the equal footing doctrine, and that N.D. Const. art. X, sec. 18, precludes construing the language now codified in N.D.C.C. 47-01-15 as a gift of the State's mineral interests under the shore zone to the upland owners. "If the chain of title reflects the State granted its equal footing interests to upland owners, those upland owners take to the low watermark, subject to the public trust doctrine and except where the deed provides otherwise. If the State is not in the chain of title for the upland owner's property, the anti-gift clause precludes construing N.D.C.C. 47-01-15 as a gift of the State's equal footing interests to upland owners." View "Reep v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

In two cases, Montgomery County took a portion of properties owned by Respondents. Because the parties disputed the value paid for either taking the County filed a complaint for condemnation. During the proceedings, the circuit court imposed discovery violation sanctions precluding Respondents from introducing evidence as to the fair market value of the taken properties. Respondents were therefore unable to generate a genuine issue of material fact concerning the County's appraisal valuations. As a result, the circuit court granted summary judgment for the County on the issue of just compensation. The court of special appeals reversed, concluding that summary judgment on the question of just compensation is not available in condemnation proceedings because a property owner cannot be deprived of the constitutional right to have a jury determine just compensation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) permitting summary judgment does not violate the constitutional right to have the opportunity for a jury trial to ascertain just compensation in compensation actions provided the landowner litigates the case according to the Maryland Rules; and (2) summary judgment was properly granted in each case because there was no genuine dispute of material fact and the County was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Montgomery County v. Soleimanzadeh" on Justia Law

PPM Atlantic Renewable (“PPM”) unsuccessfully requested that the Fayette County Zoning Board grant it numerous special exceptions and variances for it to build 24 windmill turbines on leased land. This matter involved whether an objector must comply with a county court order to post bond as a condition of appealing to the Commonwealth Court, where the developer was the appellant in the county court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court should not have quashed the objector's merits appeal based on the the objector's failure to post bond. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "PPM Atlantic Renewable v. Fayette County Zoning Hearing Board" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Nevada Tax Commission (NTC) promulgated Nev. Admin. Code 361.61038, which set forth an apportionment formula for calculating remainder-parcel property values for purposes of Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.4722. Respondent owned a parcel that was divided from a larger piece of land before the regulation's enactment and was properly characterized as a "remainder parcel" under section 361.4722(6). Appellant, the county assessor, valued the land under the approach he used before section 361.61038 was enacted. Respondent appealed, seeking application of the new regulation's apportionment formula. The NTC upheld the assessor's valuation and declined to apply its new regulation retroactively. The district court reversed the judgment of the NTC and directed it to apply section 361.61038 to Respondent's remainder parcel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in this case, (1) application of the regulation would be impermissibly retroactive; and (2) the methods the assessor used did not violate the Constitution. View "County of Clark v. LB Props., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1941, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers completed the Prado Dam on the Santa Ana River near Corona, California. Plaintiffs’ predecessors purchased property in the flood control basin. The Corps anticipated inundation of property in that basin and paid for flowage easements to an elevation of 556 feet. In the 1970s, the Corps planned to modify the Dam, raising its height, increasing the size of the spillway, and enlarging the reservoir. The project was expected to raise the flood inundation line by 10 feet. Under a 1989 agreement, local agencies undertook to acquire or condemn needed property and easements. In 1999, the Orange County Flood Control District offered to purchase the plaintiffs’ property. No agreement was reached. In 2003 the Corps issued new flood-plain maps. Local governmental agencies recorded a survey showing the 566-foot flood inundation line and arranged for placement of small surveyor’s markers at the 566-foot line. Chino rezoned the plaintiffs’ property below the 566-foot line for “passive recreation and open space use.” There has not been any flooding above the 556-foot line before or after the dam level was raised. In 2011, the plaintiffs sued, claiming a taking of a flowage easement over their property between the 556-foot and 566-foot lines. The Claim Court Claims dismissed, holding that absent actual flooding, the plaintiffs could not sustain their claim. The governmental actions, at most, support apprehension of future flooding. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law