Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The city of Laredo filed suit to condemn Respondents' property. A jury found that the City had no authorized public use for the property and awarded Respondents attorney's fees and expenses under Tex. Prop. Code 21.019(c), a fee-shifting statute that authorizes the trial court to award a property owner reasonable and necessary fees and expenses when condemnation is denied. The court of appeals reformed the award in part and, as reformed, affirmed. The City appealed, asking the Supreme Court to remand the attorney's fees award for reconsideration because of inadequacies in Respondents' proof. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that deficiencies remained in Respondents' proof of attorney's fees. Remanded. View "City of Laredo v. Montano" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the New Home Warranty Act ("NHWA") provided the exclusive remedy between a home builder and a purchaser of residential property, where the builder failed to disclose known defects in the home in a Residential Property Disclosure Statement. The NHWA provides the "exclusive remedies, warranties, and preemptive periods as between builder and owner relative to home construction," but, when the new home is occupied by the builder for some time period before being sold, the builder/seller must also comply with the provisions of the RPDA. As the RPDA does not "limit or modify any obligation between buyers and sellers created by any other statute or that may exist in law," a seller can be liable for fraud for violating the RPDA. In this case, the trial court found the Meltons committed fraud by making a willful misrepresentation of a known defect and this was not manifest error. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and held that the purchasers were not limited to the provisions of the NHWA under the facts of this case. View "Stutts v. Melton" on Justia Law

The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this case was whether the district court erred in proceeding in the underlying foreclosure suit after the defendant filed a motion giving notice of the plaintiff corporation's suspension in June of 2000 for failure to pay corporate franchise taxes; for the eleven months that the plaintiff was on notice that its suspension was an issue in the suit, the corporation failed to be reinstated; and title 68, section 1212(C) of the Oklahoma Statutes denies a suspended corporation the right to sue or defend. Upon careful consideration, the Supreme Court held that the district court did err in proceeding; the Court therefore issued a writ of mandamus to direct the district court to vacate all orders previously entered. View "Moncrieff-Yeates v. Kane" on Justia Law

Defendant City of Portsmouth (City), appeals a jury verdict awarding $128,111 as just compensation for the defendant’s taking by eminent domain of easement rights in property of plaintiff Houston Holdings, LLC. Defendant challenged the Superior Court’s ruling on a motion in limine and the Superior Court’s denial of a motion to set aside the verdict. Finding no error in the Superior Court's decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Houston Holdings, LLC v. City of Portsmouth" on Justia Law

In a foreclosure action, the trial court granted partial summary judgment to bankruptcy trustee J. Coleman Tidwell against National City Mortgage Company. Addressing its jurisdiction sua sponte, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the grounds that PNC Bank, N.A. was not a party to the foreclosure and therefore lacked standing to appeal the order entered against National City. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that PNC Bank lacked standing to appeal on behalf of its predecessor National City Mortgage Company. Because the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the appeal must be dismissed due to the trial court's failure to substitute or join PNC Bank as a party under OCGA 9-11-25 (c), the Court reversed and remanded the case for the Court of Appeals to address issues raised in this appeal. View "National City Mortgage Co. v. Tidwell " on Justia Law

Appellant was in the business of extending high-risk loans to customers with poor credit ratings and operated primarily in Louisiana. Appellees, who resided in Arkansas, obtained four loans from Appellant at its location in Louisiana. After Appellees failed to make payments on the loans, Appellant filed in an Arkansas circuit court a notice of default and intention to sell Appellees' home. Appellees asserted the defenses of usury, unconscionability, esoppel, unclean hands, predatory lending practices, and a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The circuit court found that the loans constituted predatory lending by a foreign corporation not authorized to do business in Arkansas and that the contract between the parties was unconscionable and could not be given full faith and credit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court's findings of unconscionability and predatory lending practices were not clearly erroneous; and (2) court did not err in refusing to enforce the mortgage, as to do so would contravene the public policy of the State of Arkansas. View "Gulfco of La. Inc. v. Brantley" on Justia Law

The City of Conway and Conway Corporation (collectively, "Conway") filed a land condemnation action against Petitioners, property owners. The morning of trial, Petitioners requested a continuance. The circuit court granted the continuance on the condition that Petitioners would be responsible for Conway's attorney's fees and costs associated with preparing for the trial. The continuance order also prohibited Petitioners from filing any additional pleadings until the attorneys' fees and costs were paid. Petitioners subsequently filed this motion for writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, writ of certiorari to rescind the order. The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition but granted the writ of certiorari, holding that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction and committed a manifest, clear and gross abuse of discretion in ordering Petitioners to pay Conway's attorney's fees and costs. View "Cooper v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Appellee Pamela Vukman appealed a superior court order that affirmed the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. That order granted appellees motion to set aside judgment and sheriff's sale, and dismissed appellant Beneficial Consumer Discount Company's praecipe without prejudice. Beneficial moved to foreclose appellee for being in default of her mortgage. The parties agreed to a settlement whereby Beneficial received judgment for the accelerated amount due on the mortgage as long as appellee made regular payments. Appellee eventually defaulted according to the terms of the settlement; Beneficial filed for a writ of execution. The property was sold at a sheriff's sale, and Beneficial was the successful bidder. Appellee then moved to set aside the sale, arguing Beneficial failed to comply with the requirements under the Homeowner's Emergency Mortgage Act. The court concluded that Beneficial did not follow the Act's requirements, and as a result, it id not have jurisdiction. Therefore the court set aside the sale and dismissed Beneficial's original complaint. Beneficial appealed; the superior court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Act's notice requirement did not implicate subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court, it reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Beneficial Consumer Discount Company v. Vukman" on Justia Law

St. Louis County appealed a judgment awarding property owners damages from the taking of their real properties by eminent domain. The County claimed the judgment should have been reversed because the trial record was inadequate for appellate review because portions were inaudible or not recorded. Further, the County claimed the trial court abused its discretion in its evidentiary rulings and that the verdict was excessive and unsupported by the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error, and that the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "St. Louis County vs. River Bend Estates Homeowners' Association" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff initiated a foreclosure action against defendant. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court had authority to open a judgment of foreclosure by sale and related supplemental judgments after title had passed to the purchaser when a series of errors by the court and the parties caused the purchaser to buy a property that, unbeknownst to him but actually known by the second mortgagee, was in fact subject to a first mortgage that was to be foreclosed shortly thereafter. The court concluded that the appellate court incorrectly determined that the purchaser lacked standing under the circumstances of the present case; defendants inadequately briefed the issue of 17 Ridge Road, LLC's standing to intervene as a defendant and, therefore, the issue was deemed abandoned; and the appellate court correctly determined that the passing of title divested the trial court of jurisdiction to open the judgment of foreclosure by sale. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the appellate court insofar as that court concluded that the trial court lacked authority to open the supplemental judgments. View "Citibank, N.A. v. Lindland" on Justia Law