Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The State appealed a jury verdict that awarded damages to L. Fred Weaver, Joan Weaver and Vicki Weaver. The Weavers had sued the State over negligent fire containment procedures on their real property. The State argued on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss the Weavers' negligence claim; (2) whether the trial court did not allow the State to assert a "public duty doctrine" defense; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the jury to find the state negligent without expert testimony to establish the standard of care; and (4) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the State's motion to change venue. Finding no errors or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Weaver v. DNRC" on Justia Law

Appellant Laura Lee Neva sued Appellee Jim Bates, arguing he violated Montana's Human Rights Act by halting necessary repairs to a commercial building she rented from him because she rebuffed his sexual advances. In her complaint to the Human Rights Commission, Appellant alleged violation of the Public Accommodations Provision but made no mention of the Real-Estate Transaction Provision. The Commission nevertheless found that Appellee violated the Real-Estate Transaction Provision by sexually harassing Appellant while she was leasing the space from him. The District Court reversed that decision, holding that the Commission’s action violated Appellee's right to due process. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the District Court erred in its conclusion that Appellee was not afforded due process when Appellant brought claims under section 49-2-304 of the Act, but that the Commission did not find he violated section 49-2-305. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, finding that the essential difference between a 49-2-304 claim and a 49-2-305 claim was the setting of the discrimination: a place of public accommodation as opposed to a real-estate transaction. "The setting here was fully litigated, as was the discrimination- Bates' sexual harassment of Neva." The Court concluded Appellee understood the issues as was afforded full opportunity to justify his conduct. Therefore, his due process rights were not violated. View "Bates v. Neva" on Justia Law

The Board of Equalization and Adjustment of Shelby County appealed a consent judgment reflecting an agreement between the Board and Shelby 39, LLC. The Board argued the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over certain matters decided by the consent judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Board of Equalization and Adjustment of Shelby County v. Shelby 39, LLC " on Justia Law

This case concerned efforts by the Town of Nags Head, North Carolina, to declare beachfront properties that encroach onto "public trust lands" a nuisance, and regulate them accordingly. In the related appeal of Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, the district court adjudicated the claims but concluded that it was inappropriate for a "federal court to intervene in such delicate state-law matters," and abstained from decision under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. The court reversed the district court's decision to abstain in this case where resolving the claims in this case was not sufficiently difficult or disruptive of that policy to free the district court from its "unflagging obligation to exercise its jurisdiction." Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko" on Justia Law

When passing a 1997 ordinance, the Anchorage Municipal Assembly amended the boundaries of a proposed Downtown Improvement District to exclude some properties on K and L Streets. The building at 420 L Street, the property owned by appellant L Street Investments, was in the original proposal but was subsequently carved out by the Assembly. In 2000 the Assembly extended the life of the District for ten years. Beginning in 2009, the Anchorage Downtown Partnership canvassed businesses hoping to extend the term of the District and expand it to include businesses between I and L Street. After the majority of business owners in the proposed District approved the extension and expansion, the Assembly extended the term of the District and expanded it to include businesses between I and L Streets, including the building at 420 L Street. L Street Investments filed suit, arguing: (1) Section 9.02(a) of the Municipality of Anchorage's Charter did not authorize the Municipality to finance services within the District by an assessment; and (2) the District is a "service area," and AS 29.35.450(c) prohibits the expansion of a service area unless a majority of voters in the area to be added vote in favor of expanding the service area. The Anchorage Downtown Partnership intervened, and all parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment to the Municipality and the Anchorage Downtown Partnership. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "L Street Investments v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

A 2010 fire at an apartment in Erie, Pennsylvania took the lives of a tenant and her guest. The third-floor bedroom purportedly lacked a smoke detector and an alternate means of egress, both of which are required under the Section 8 housing choice voucher program (42 U.S.C. 1437f) in which Richardson participated. The district court rejected a defense of qualified immunity in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by the estates of the deceased. The Third Circuit reversed. State officials’ approval and subsidization of the apartment for the Section 8 program, even though the apartment allegedly failed to comply with Section 8’s standards, did not constitute a state-created danger toward the apartment’s tenant and her guest in violation of their constitutional substantive due process rights. View "Henry v. City of Erie" on Justia Law

Frey has owned the Peoria commercial property, which contains a shopping center, for more than 40 years, without prior incident. In 2009, a tenant, ShopRite, was found to be illegally selling Viagra without a licensed pharmacist. The city took legal action against Patel (the franchisee) personally, and the business, then revoked the liquor license for the store and “site approval for the retail sale of alcoholic liquors at the location.” Frey asserted due process violations. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected the claims. Frey did not adequately explain a substantive due process claim and had no property right such that it was entitled to any process at all before revocation of its site approval, but Frey nonetheless received due process of law before the Peoria Liquor Commission. View "Frey Corp. v. City of Peoria" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class-action lawsuit in state court, alleging that the defendants had conducted non-judicial foreclosure sales that did not comply with Utah law. After removal, the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that whether federal law “incorporates Utah or Texas law, Recon[Trust] had not operated beyond the law by acting as a foreclosure trustee in Utah.” On the limited record presented on appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in determining it had jurisdiction to hear this case. View "Dutcher, et al v. Matheson, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioners, residents of Maui, challenged the Maui County Council's (MCC) passage of two bills related to the development of a residential community on 670 acres of land in Wailea (Wailea 670 project), arguing that MCC and its committee, the Land Use Committee (LUC) failed to satisfy the requirements of the State open meetings law, known as the Sunshine Law. Specifically, Petitioners claimed (1) the recessing and reconvening of two meetings without providing additional notice and opportunity for public oral testimony violated the Sunshine Law; and (2) the circulation of memoranda among the board membership outside a duly noticed meeting violated the Sunshine Law. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of Respondents, MCC, County of Maui, and the land developer. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the LUC and MCC did not violate the Sunshine Law by reconvening the two meetings beyond a single continuance without posting a new agenda and without accepting public oral testimony at every reconvened meeting; and (2) the MCC violated the Sunshine Law by distributing written memoranda among its members outside of a duly noticed meeting, but the violation did not require invalidation of MCC's passage of the Wailea 670 bills. View "Kanahele v. Maui County Council" on Justia Law

In 2007 Hamilton Township imposed impact fees of about $2,100 per lot on developers of residential property. Salt Run, a residential developer, sought to avoid the fees by annexation to the Village of Maineville. Unable to stop the annexation in court, Hamilton Township imposed a lien on the property. Salt Run ultimately defaulted on its loan as a result of funding an escrow so that it could sell the property, despite the lien. Salt Run sued the Township, alleging a takings claim. While the case was pending, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Hamilton Township had no authority to impose the fee. The district court granted judgment in favor of Salt Run on some claims but denied its claim that the lien amounted to an unconstitutional taking. Salt Run appealed that ruling and sought attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Salt Run was not a prevailing party and characterizing the suit as, at most, asserting an improper “collection mechanism.” View "Vill. of Maineville, OH v. Hamilton Twp. Bd. of Trs." on Justia Law