Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to determine whether: (1) the repeal of an ordinance mooted any challenges to that ordinance; (2) whether the Commonwealth Court may issue an opinion on the merits of certain issues where it subsequently remands the case for a determination of mootness on another issue; and (3) whether parties to a hearing can continue a challenge to a zoning ordinance once the original challenger has withdrawn. Because “parties to a hearing” are distinct from “party appellants,” unless the former have taken steps to become party appellants, the Supreme Court found they cannot continue the challenge. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court’s decision permitting parties to the hearing to continue the challenge brought by the original party appellant was reversed, and the attempted challenge was dismissed. View "Stuckley v. ZHB of Newtown Twp." on Justia Law

Woodboro has about 750 residents on 21,857 acres, within Oneida County. Woodboro’s 1998 Land Use Plan encourages low density single family residential development for waterfront properties and maintaining rural character. The 2009 Woodboro Comprehensive Plan incorporates that language. There are 177 parcels on Squash Lake, all but seven zoned for single-family uses. The seven parcels zoned for business were pre-existing uses under initial zoning in 1976. In 2001, Woodboro voluntarily subjected itself to the Oneida County Zoning and Shoreland Protection Ordinance, under which religious uses are permitted throughout the County and Woodboro. Year-round recreational and seasonal camps are permitted in 36 and 72 percent of the County; churches and religious schools are allowed on 60 percent of the land in the County. Churches and schools are permitted on 43 percent of Woodboro land; campgrounds (religious or secular) on about 57 percent. Eagle Cove sought to construct a Bible camp on 34 acres on Squash Lake in Woodboro, asserting that their religion mandates that the camp be on the subject property and operate year-round. The property is zoned Single Family Residential and Residential and Farming. Woodboro recommended denial. The County denied rezoning based on conflict with single-family usage. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the municipalities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and the Wisconsin Constitution. View "Eagle Cove Camp & Conference Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Woodboro, WI" on Justia Law

Taxpayer Brownington Center Church of Brownington, Vermont (now known as New Hope Bible Church and Ministries, Inc.) (the Church)), appealed a Superior Court determination that certain land and buildings owned by the Church were not exempt from real estate taxes for the tax year commencing April 1, 2009 under 32 V.S.A. 3832(2). The parties did not dispute that the property was dedicated for pious use and that it is owned and operated by the Church as a nonprofit organization. The issue was whether the property was excluded from the pious-use exemption of section 3802(4) by the language in section 3832(2). The Church argued that the property qualified for exemption, primarily because everything that occurred on the property facilitated its religious ministry and that “worship and service of the Believer in Christ” takes place everywhere on the premises. Under this belief, the Church maintains that the steel equipment building, the cabins, kitchen and the tent, are all church edifices. It defines “church edifice” to be a “structure or facility that is used exclusively or primarily to propagate a religious message to persons who receive that message for a worshipful purpose.” It contended that an overnight summer camp for religious purposes transformed the entire property into a place of worship and education. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the Superior Court. View "Brownington Center Church v. Town of Irasburg" on Justia Law

The city of Laredo filed suit to condemn Respondents' property. A jury found that the City had no authorized public use for the property and awarded Respondents attorney's fees and expenses under Tex. Prop. Code 21.019(c), a fee-shifting statute that authorizes the trial court to award a property owner reasonable and necessary fees and expenses when condemnation is denied. The court of appeals reformed the award in part and, as reformed, affirmed. The City appealed, asking the Supreme Court to remand the attorney's fees award for reconsideration because of inadequacies in Respondents' proof. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that deficiencies remained in Respondents' proof of attorney's fees. Remanded. View "City of Laredo v. Montano" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the New Home Warranty Act ("NHWA") provided the exclusive remedy between a home builder and a purchaser of residential property, where the builder failed to disclose known defects in the home in a Residential Property Disclosure Statement. The NHWA provides the "exclusive remedies, warranties, and preemptive periods as between builder and owner relative to home construction," but, when the new home is occupied by the builder for some time period before being sold, the builder/seller must also comply with the provisions of the RPDA. As the RPDA does not "limit or modify any obligation between buyers and sellers created by any other statute or that may exist in law," a seller can be liable for fraud for violating the RPDA. In this case, the trial court found the Meltons committed fraud by making a willful misrepresentation of a known defect and this was not manifest error. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and held that the purchasers were not limited to the provisions of the NHWA under the facts of this case. View "Stutts v. Melton" on Justia Law

The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this case was whether the district court erred in proceeding in the underlying foreclosure suit after the defendant filed a motion giving notice of the plaintiff corporation's suspension in June of 2000 for failure to pay corporate franchise taxes; for the eleven months that the plaintiff was on notice that its suspension was an issue in the suit, the corporation failed to be reinstated; and title 68, section 1212(C) of the Oklahoma Statutes denies a suspended corporation the right to sue or defend. Upon careful consideration, the Supreme Court held that the district court did err in proceeding; the Court therefore issued a writ of mandamus to direct the district court to vacate all orders previously entered. View "Moncrieff-Yeates v. Kane" on Justia Law

Defendant City of Portsmouth (City), appeals a jury verdict awarding $128,111 as just compensation for the defendant’s taking by eminent domain of easement rights in property of plaintiff Houston Holdings, LLC. Defendant challenged the Superior Court’s ruling on a motion in limine and the Superior Court’s denial of a motion to set aside the verdict. Finding no error in the Superior Court's decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Houston Holdings, LLC v. City of Portsmouth" on Justia Law

In a foreclosure action, the trial court granted partial summary judgment to bankruptcy trustee J. Coleman Tidwell against National City Mortgage Company. Addressing its jurisdiction sua sponte, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the grounds that PNC Bank, N.A. was not a party to the foreclosure and therefore lacked standing to appeal the order entered against National City. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that PNC Bank lacked standing to appeal on behalf of its predecessor National City Mortgage Company. Because the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the appeal must be dismissed due to the trial court's failure to substitute or join PNC Bank as a party under OCGA 9-11-25 (c), the Court reversed and remanded the case for the Court of Appeals to address issues raised in this appeal. View "National City Mortgage Co. v. Tidwell " on Justia Law

Appellant was in the business of extending high-risk loans to customers with poor credit ratings and operated primarily in Louisiana. Appellees, who resided in Arkansas, obtained four loans from Appellant at its location in Louisiana. After Appellees failed to make payments on the loans, Appellant filed in an Arkansas circuit court a notice of default and intention to sell Appellees' home. Appellees asserted the defenses of usury, unconscionability, esoppel, unclean hands, predatory lending practices, and a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The circuit court found that the loans constituted predatory lending by a foreign corporation not authorized to do business in Arkansas and that the contract between the parties was unconscionable and could not be given full faith and credit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court's findings of unconscionability and predatory lending practices were not clearly erroneous; and (2) court did not err in refusing to enforce the mortgage, as to do so would contravene the public policy of the State of Arkansas. View "Gulfco of La. Inc. v. Brantley" on Justia Law

The City of Conway and Conway Corporation (collectively, "Conway") filed a land condemnation action against Petitioners, property owners. The morning of trial, Petitioners requested a continuance. The circuit court granted the continuance on the condition that Petitioners would be responsible for Conway's attorney's fees and costs associated with preparing for the trial. The continuance order also prohibited Petitioners from filing any additional pleadings until the attorneys' fees and costs were paid. Petitioners subsequently filed this motion for writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, writ of certiorari to rescind the order. The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition but granted the writ of certiorari, holding that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction and committed a manifest, clear and gross abuse of discretion in ordering Petitioners to pay Conway's attorney's fees and costs. View "Cooper v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law