Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Colorado Supreme Court answered a question of Colorado law certified from the United States Court of Federal Claims. Plaintiffs were landowners who owned property abutting a former railroad right-of-way. The United States authorized the right-of-way to be used as a recreational trail pursuant to the National Trails System Act ("Rails-to-Trails" Act). The issue before the federal court was whether the United States took property for which Plaintiffs should have received compensation. The Colorado Court determined that the centerline presumption was a common law rule of conveyance that presumed a grantor who conveyed land abutting a right-of-way intended to convey land to the center of the right-of-way and absent a contrary intent on the face of the conveyance. Therefore, while the Court held that the centerline presumption applied to railroad rights-of-way, it also held that, to claim presumptive ownership to the centerline of a railroad right-of-way, an adjacent landowner must produce evidence that his or her title derives from the owner of the land underlying the right-of-way. View "Asmussen v. United States" on Justia Law

A bankruptcy court ordered that the Laurel Avenue house be vacated and authorized U.S. Marshals to physically remove plaintiff, the debtor's son, from the home. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of his suit, which alleged, inter alia, that his constitutional rights were violated when the house, its contents, and his person were searched and seized. The court found no error in the dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against the federal defendants where he did not allege a Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics action in the amended complaint, nor did he seek to amend to add the claim; plaintiff's section 1983 claim failed against the city and the city's officers where plaintiff failed to set forth sufficient facts to show a direct causal link between the city's policy or custom and the alleged violation of his constitutional rights; the district court did not err in dismissing his tort claims against the trustees under the doctrine established in Barton v. Barbour, which established that an equity receiver could not be sued without leave of the court that appointed him; and because the dismissal of plaintiff's federal claims was proper, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Alexander v. Hedback, et al." on Justia Law

Leonard and Kay Nettles purchased property and built a home in a remote subdivision in Rio Arriba County known as Ticonderoga. At the time of the Nettles purchase, the lots in Ticonderoga were subject to various covenants, and the subdivision was governed by a Homeowners’ Association. The Homeowners’ Association amended some of the covenants and its articles of incorporation. One of the amendments changed the definition of “common easements.” The new definition no longer included all roads in Ticonderoga, but specific roads that led to common recreation areas. The new definition now excluded the road that served specifically Nettles’ home as well as some other roads, but still included those roads that led to the majority of homesites in Ticonderoga. As a result of the changed definition, Nettles was still required to pay common assessments to fund the maintenance costs of these other roads, but was now required to maintain the their road privately, along with a few other owners of undeveloped lots on that road, at Nettles’ own expense. A second amendment allegedly diluted Nettles’ voting rights in the Homeowners’ Association. Nettles filed suit against the Homeowners’ Association. The Association filed for summary judgment, claiming that all the actions taken were explicitly authorized by the governing documents of the Association. Nettles countered, claiming that the amendments violated New Mexico law because the amendments were not uniform. The district court granted summary judgment for the Association. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that while Nettles failed to create a triable question on uniformity, the reasonableness of the amendment in this case should have been tried and not disposed of through summary judgment. View "Nettles v. Ticonderoga Owners' Assn., Inc." on Justia Law

Applicants challenged a Department of Development and Environmental Services order declaring the use of the property at issue here was not compliant with King County zoning ordinances. The assertion was that the use was established before the ordinances were revised and characterized as non-conforming. The hearing examiner found for the landowner (and county) on all relevant issues, but the superior court reversed. The appellate court reversed the superior court, and the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The Supreme Court held that the landowner's use was not established within the meaning of the county code. View "King County Dep't of Dev. & Envtl. Servs. v. King County" on Justia Law

Appellees, the Rubins, requested that the district court issue a Writ of Garnishment against the assets of Hamas and HLF after obtaining a judgment against Hamas for damages resulting from a terrorist attack in an outdoor pedestrian mall in Jerusalem. The district court executed the writ but the Rubins could not execute against HLF's assets because those assets had been restrained under 21 U.S.C. 853 to preserve their availability for criminal forfeiture proceedings. The district court subsequently denied the government's motion to dismiss the Rubins' third-party petition under section 853(n) to assert their interests in the restrained assets and vacated the preliminary order of forfeiture. The district court held that the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), Pub. L. No. 107-297, title II, 201, 116 Stat. 2337, allowed the Rubins to execute against HLF's assets not withstanding the government's forfeiture proceedings. The court reversed, holding that section 853(n) did not provide the Rubins with a basis to prevail in the ancillary proceeding; TRIA did not provide the Rubins a basis to assert their interest in the forfeited property; TRIA did not trump the criminal forfeiture statute; and the in custodia legis doctrine did not preclude the district court's in personam jurisdiction over HLF. View "United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kane Properties, LLC contracted to purchase a piece of property in Hoboken zoned for industrial use. It applied for the necessary variances to construct a residential building. The Zoning Board granted the requested variances. The principal objector to plaintiff's proposal, Skyline Condominimum Association, Inc. appealed to the Hoboken City Council. Before the hearing, Skyline's attorney accepted an appointment as the City Council's attorney. Plaintiff objected to the attorney's participation in the appeal, and the attorney recused himself. Council reversed the zoning board's decision. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the attorney's involvement in the Skyline appeal in spite of a conflict of interest had irreparably tainted the City Council’s decision. The trial court affirmed the City Council’s decision. Plaintiff then appealed to the Appellate Division. After applying an appearance-of-impropriety standard and finding a conflict of interest, the panel concluded that the attorney's participation in the appeal tainted the City Council’s action. The matter was remanded to the City Council for a proceeding de novo. But Plaintiff filed a petition for certification to the Supreme Court, arguing that a remand back to the City Council was inappropriate. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court set aside the City Council's decision because the Court found it was tainted by its new attorney's conflict of interest. View "Kane Properties, LLC v. City of Hoboken" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dennis Shaw and First Horizon Home Loan Corporation challenged an appellate court's ruling that "constructive fraud" was sufficient to void a request for release of a deed of trust, arguing that actual fraud is required under CRS 38-39-102(8). The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the statute creates a narrow exception that voids the public trustee’s release of a deed of trust only when proof of actual fraud is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Shaw v. 17 West Mill St." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court considered a reformulated certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: whether Colorado’s premises liability statute applied as a matter of law only to activities and circumstances directly or inherently are related to the land. The Supreme Court held that the statute is not restricted solely to activities and circumstances that are directly or inherently related to the land. Instead, the Court held that the premises liability statute applied to conditions, activities, and circumstances on the property that the landowner is liable for in its legal capacity as a landowner. View "Larrieu v. Best Buy Stores, L.P." on Justia Law

In 1997, the Bellevale Respondents sold an agricultural preservation easement on their dairy farm, Bellevale Farms, to a state agency (MALPF). Twelve years later, Bellevale asked MALPF to permit it to construct a creamery operation on the farm under the terms of the easement. MALPF approved the proposal, despite challenges from owners of real property adjacent to Bellevale Farms and a community association (collectively Petitioners). Petitioners filed this action against Bellevale Farms, MALPF, and others (collectively Respondents), seeking a declaration that the creamery violated the easement and an order prohibiting the construction of the creamery. The circuit court dismissed the action, concluding that Petitioners lacked standing to enforce the easement. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the easement constituted a charitable trust, and therefore, they possessed standing as "interested persons" under Md. Code Ann. Est. & Trusts 14-302(a). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the instrument creating the easement and the statutory scheme of the MALPF program through which the easement was purchased did not indicate that Respondents intended to or created a charitable trust with a charitable purpose; and (2) therefore, Petitioners did not have standing under 14-302(a) to maintain a cause of action to enforce the easement. View "Long Green Valley Ass'n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a district court's judgment to condemn an easement across the appellants' real property for an irrigation pipeline. The Supreme Court found no error in the district court's holding that there was a reasonable necessity required for condemnation of the easement in question. The Court vacated a portion of the judgment as it pertained to Defendants-Appellants Donald and Carolyn Cain's counterclaim and the award of a perpetual easement across their property, but the Court affirmed in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Telford Lands v. Cain" on Justia Law