Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Appellees owned a 166-acre farm in Lower Makefield Township. On December 6, 1996, Lower Maker Township condemned the property in order to build a public golf course. Appellees filed preliminary objections challenging the validity of using eminent domain for such a purpose. That issue was eventually appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which found the taking was for a legitimate public use. As the parties were unable to agree on damages, the matter proceeded to a jury trial for a calculation of the property's value. The trial lasted six days, and a total of 11 witnesses were called, one of whom was appellee Chester Dalgewicz. Mr. Dalgewicz testified regarding the farm's history and the interest shown by several developers in purchasing the property, and described some of the offers received both before and after the property was condemned, including a 1995 agreement of sale with Ryland Homes for $5.1 million, and a 1998 sales agreement with Toll Brothers for $7 million, contingent upon the condemnation being overturned. During Mr. Dalgewicz's testimony, he described a December, 1998 written offer from Pulte Homes, Inc., including a $8 million offer price; the offer letter was also introduced into evidence. The Township objected arguing the offer was inadmissible as it did not result in a sales agreement and any testimony concerning the offer price would be irrelevant and prejudicial. The Township appealed the Commonwealth Court's order affirming the trial court's ruling that testimony regarding a bona fide offer and the underlying offer letter itself could be introduced into evidence in a condemnation valuation trial. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. View "Lower Maker Township v. Lands of Chester Dalgewicz" on Justia Law

A port authority sought to purchase a parcel of land owned by trustees of a family trust. After negotiations failed, the port authority filed a petition for condemnation of the parcel. The trustees argued that the sole purpose for the taking was economic development, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 523.271, and that the taking was for private use, in violation of the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court ordered condemnation hearing, concluding (1) the taking did not violate section 523.271 because the taking would facilitate construction of a loop track and improve river commerce in addition to promoting economic development; and (2) the taking served the public purpose of promoting economic development. The trustees petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ because the circuit court failed to find any purpose for the taking that was not included in the legislature's definition of "economic development," and therefore, held that the proposed taking was in excess of the port authority's condemnation authority. View "State ex rel. Jackson v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Patrick and Terese Ayer appealed a trial court's order granting summary judgment to Frances Harris and Louis Hemmingway, III. The dispute arose over plaintiffs' attempts to collect a debt from defendant Hemmingway individually, and doing business as Hemmingway Construction. Plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against Hemingway in February 2001. Plaintiffs subsequently secured a nonpossessory writ of attachment against Hemingway's nonexempt goods and estate. In 2010, Frances Harris brought an unrelated action against Hemingway for damages. The trial court issued a stipulated judgment order that, among other things, awarded Harris judgment against Hemingway plus interest from September 8, 2005 until the release of the lien in favor of plaintiffs, required Hemingway to keep current on payments to plaintiffs pursuant to a written payment agreement signed by Hemingway and plaintiff Terese Ayer, and provided that if Hemingway defaulted on the lien, he would be liable to Harris for any costs, including attorney's fees, to obtain a release of the lien. In May 2011, plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to foreclose on their judgment lien. Plaintiffs cited a 2006 trial court order as controlling and asked the court to renew or revive it. Hemingway filed an unverified answer to plaintiffs' complaint, acknowledging his debt to plaintiffs and offering to make immediate payments pursuant to the 2010 agreement. Plaintiffs moved for a default judgment, but the court denied their request. Harris responded to this order; Hemingway did not. Harris later moved for summary judgment, and plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and default.  In January 2011, the trial court granted Harris's motion, and found that plaintiffs' judgment lien was no longer effective because more than eight years had elapsed from the issuance of the original final judgment on which it was based. In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected plaintiffs' assertion that the 2001 judgment had been renewed or revived by the 2006 stipulated amended order. This appeal followed. Agreeing with the trial court's reason to dismiss plaintiffs' motion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ayer v. Hemingway" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an action filed against the City of Lewiston by Tim Thompson, Janet Thompson, and Thompson's Auto Sales (collectively, Thompson). Thompson filed a claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), alleging the City negligently designed and installed a storm water drain system on a city street adjacent to Thompson's property, which caused storm water runoff to flow onto Thompson's property and damage it. After suit was filed, Thompson entered bankruptcy proceedings and the bankruptcy trustee, C. Barry Zimmerman, was substituted as Plaintiff in the action. The City moved for summary judgment on the grounds of discretionary immunity and design immunity. The district court denied the motion as to design immunity, but granted the motion on the ground of discretionary immunity. Zimmerman appealed, arguing that the discretionary immunity exception to liability under the ITCA does not grant immunity from liability for damage caused by negligent design and, alternatively, that even if discretionary immunity was considered, it was inapplicable in this case because the City's actions were not discretionary within the meaning of the exception. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the City was not entitled to immunity from liability under any exception to the ITCA. View "Zimmerman v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law

The underlying annexation suit was voluntarily dismissed in 2008 with certain terms and conditions imposed on plaintiff James Frisby. Plaintiff owns property in Harrison County. In 2007, he filed a Petition for Inclusion, seeking to have his property annexed by the City of Biloxi. Biloxi responded and asked the court to grant plaintiff's petition. Gulfport objected to the inclusion of plaintiff's property within the City of Biloxi. Harrison County filed an answer as an interested party and also objected. Plaintiff sought clarification of the terms set forth in the order of dismissal. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the case should have been dismissed as moot, because nothing remained to be decided on appeal. View "Frisby v. City of Gulfport" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified three questions regarding the operation of the State's law governing non-judicial foreclosure to the Georgia Supreme Court. After careful analysis, the Georgia Court concluded that current law did not require a party seeking to exercise a power of sale in a deed to secure debt to hold, in addition to the deed, the promissory note evidencing the underlying debt. The Court also concluded that the plain language of the State statute governing notice to the debtor (OCGA 44-14-162.2), required only that the notice identify "the individual or entity [with] full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all terms of the mortgage with the debtor." This construction of OCGA 44-14-162.2 rendered moot the third and final certified question. View "You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and their son appealed the district court's summary judgment holding that they were not entitled under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. 3601-3631, to an accommodation and a modification that they requested from the HOA. Plaintiffs had requested a modification to add a ramp leading to the front door of their home for use by their son, who required the use of a wheelchair. Plaintiffs also requested an accommodation to an HOA policy prohibiting the use of certain types of vehicles to allow the son to use an ATV within the community. The court vacated the district court's holding on the merits of the modification request for the wheelchair access ramp because that claim was not ripe; affirmed the district court's holding with respect to the accommodation request for permission to use an ATV because that request was not "reasonable" within the meaning of the Act; and affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' request for attorneys' fees and costs. View "Scoggins v. Lee's Crossing Homeowners Assoc." on Justia Law

Vincennes Indiana Girls, Inc. (VIG) deeded Camp Wildwood to the predecessor of Girl Scouts of Southern Illinois, Inc. (GSSI) on the condition that the property be used for scouting purposes for forty-nine years. The deed provided that ownership of the campground would revert to VIG if the scouting-use condition was breached during that time. After forty-four years, GSSI stopped using the camp as a Girl Scout facility and decided to sell. VIG sued to quiet title to Camp Wildwood and enjoin GSSI from selling the camp until the forty-nine-year period had expired. The trial court granted summary judgment quieting title in VIG. At issue on appeal was whether the forty-nine-year land use limitation was enforceable despite a subsequently enacted statute, Ind. Code 32-17-10-2, which purported to limit reversionary clauses in land transactions to a maximum of thirty years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 32-17-10-2 was unconstitutional as applied retroactively to the land-use restriction in VIG's deed to GSSI. View "Girl Scouts of S. Ill. v. Vincennes Ind. Girls, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Christina Deyeso appealed a superior court order that denied her petition for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and awarded summary judgment in favor of respondent Jules Cavadi, permitting the forced sale of Deyeso's home. Deyeso and Stephen Barnes have three children together but never married. Deyeso is currently married to Keith Walsh, with whom she lives in Stratham at a home that she purchased in 1997. Cavadi held a 1991 judgment against Barnes. In September 2004, in a common-law "reach and apply" action, he sued Barnes and Deyeso in a Massachusetts trial court, alleging that Barnes paid for certain real estate held in Deyeso's name in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, including the Stratham property. A Massachusetts superior court found that Barnes had an equitable interest in the Property valued at $94,854, thus entitling Cavadi to an equitable lien on the Property in that amount. After accounting for mortgages on the property, the equity value remaining in the Property was $72,373.41. Deyeso appealed the Massachusetts trial court's decision to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, which upheld the portion of the trial court's order declaring Barnes's interest in the Property to be $94,854. Cavadi then obtained an order in Massachusetts allowing a public auction of the Property to recover the amount of Barnes's interest. Deyeso claimed that both she and her husband were entitled to homestead protection under RSA 480:1 (Supp. 2012), which, given the prior mortgages, would leave no equity for Cavadi in the event of a forced sale. The trial court then ruled in favor of Deyeso, concluding that, although her husband could claim the homestead protection due to his lack of ownership, her homestead interest prevailed over Cavadi's equitable lien. Cavadi then moved for reconsideration, and the the trial court eventually granted Cavadi's motion, concluding that, Deyeso's "conduct in this case amounts to fraudulent behavior" and, therefore, permitted the court to use "its equitable powers to negate [her] homestead exemption." Upon review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed: "assuming, however, that Deyeso accepted the money from Barnes with the knowledge that he sought to avoid satisfying his debt to Cavadi, RSA 480:1 protects her homestead interest in the Property. . . . We therefore agree with Deyeso that, in the absence of a showing of fraud, deception, or other misconduct in the procurement of the funds used to purchase, invest in, or improve a homestead, the statutory homestead exemption applies ñ even when a judgment debtor's funds are so used with the intent of hindering or avoiding a creditor's legitimate claims." View "Deyeso v. Cavadi" on Justia Law

The Public Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Moongate Water Company (Moongate) a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CCN) authorizing Moongate, as a public utility, to provide water to an area located outside the city limits of Las Cruces (the "certificated area.") Las Cruces later annexed three undeveloped tracts of land within Moongate's certificated area, and Las Cruces committed itself to provide water to this area despite Moongate's CCN. The Supreme Court addressed two questions in this appeal: (1) did Moongate have a right to provide water within the certificated area to the exclusion of Las Cruces?; and (2) did Las Cruces engage in an unlawful taking of Moongate's property entitling Moongate to just compensation when Las Cruces chose to provide water within the certificated area? The Court answered both questions in the negative: (1) because Las Cruces was not subject to the Public Utilities Act (the PUA); and (2) because on the record before the Court, Moongate did not prove that it had established infrastructure and was already serving customers in the annexed area. "Absent such proof of a tangible loss, a public utility is not entitled to just compensation when a municipality lawfully exercises its right to serve in the public utility's certificated area." The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals and reversed the district court. View "Moongate Water Co., Inc. v. City of Las Cruces" on Justia Law