Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Since 1976, NAI has operated a flea market on 65.4 acres purchased from the Borough of Palmyra. In 2002, Palmyra began considering redevelopment, including NAI’s parcel. A site inspection uncovered the possible presence of unexploded munitions from a weapons-testing facility used by the Army during World War II. The parties entered into an access agreement, pursuant to which NAI could operate the Market on the weekends, while contractors conducted inspections and remedial work during the week. In 2008, however, an unexploded artillery shell was discovered flush with the surface of the Market’s parking lot. Because vendors often drove stakes into the ground to secure tents, this raised concerns of accidental detonation. After NAI refused to comply voluntarily, the police chief issued an emergency order, restricting access to the property. Hundreds of munitions were found on the property, both explosive and inert. NAI filed suit, claiming that the order was arbitrary under New Jersey law; violated procedural due process; and constituted a “taking” without just compensation. The Market was closed for five months before the parties entered a consent order that allowed the Market to reopen on weekends with barriers and security guards to prohibit public access to hazardous areas. The district court entered summary judgment for the borough and denied NAI attorney’s fees for its claimed victory with respect to the consent order. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra" on Justia Law

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) owned a piece of property on land adjacent to property owned by Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a condemnation action, asserting a right to condemn a portion of UDOT's parcel to construct an access road to the development Plaintiff planned to build on its property. The district court granted summary judgment for UDOT, finding that the two parties' uses were incompatible because the detention pond on UDOT's property left no room for Schroeder's proposed road. Plaintiff appealed, challenging the district court's invocation of the more necessary public use doctrine and its refusal to allow an exception under the doctrine of compatible uses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, absent any basis for a compatible use exception in this case, UDOT was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Schroeder Invs., L.C. v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Wolf Mountain and ASC Utah (ASCU) had been litigating their rights and responsibilities regarding development in a resort of several years. In 2011, the jury awarded ASCU $54,437,000 in damages. Wolf Mountain appealed. Meanwhile, in an effort to collect on the judgment, ASCU filed an application for writ of execution, listing Wolf Mountain's real and personal property. The court ordered Wolf Mountain's property to be sold, and after a public sale, ASCU purchased Wolf Mountain's interests in the claim asserted in this litigation. Wolf Mountain did not appeal from the writ of execution or any of the related orders or proceedings. ASCU then moved to dismiss Wolf Mountain's appeal as moot, arguing that because ASCU now owned Wolf Mountain's appellate rights, there was no longer a controversy. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) ASCU did not acquire Wolf Mountain's appellate rights, and therefore, an actual controversy existed; and (2) Wolf Mountain failed to demonstrate that the district court erred or abused its discretion in any way. View "ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C." on Justia Law

After the City of Moorhead annexed Americana Estates (Americana), a residential subdivision with sixty-five metered electric service accounts, the City filed a condemnation petition to begin municipal electric service to residents of Americana. After a hearing, a three-member commission of the district court awarded the Red River Valley Cooperative Power Association (RRVC), which previously served Americana, $307,214. Both parties appealed the commission's award of damages. After a jury trial, the district court awarded a total compensation award to RRVC of $385,311. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the City's valuation was inconsistent with the plain language of Minn. Stat. 216B.47 by failing to give meaningful consideration to four statutory factors and thus was properly excluded from consideration by the district court; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding portions of an untimely revised report submitted by the City dealing with facility replacement costs. View "City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley Coop. Power Ass'n" on Justia Law

Homeowner attended a first Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP) mediation with Citimortgage, after which Defendant was denied a loan modification. The district court subsequently ordered a second mediation. PennyMac Corp. later obtained beneficial interest in the deed of trust and promissory note and attended the second mediation. The mediator determined that PennyMac failed to bring the promissory note, deed of trust, and other documents to the mediation and that PennyMac's representative lacked authority to negotiate. Homeowner filed a petition for judicial review, requesting sanctions, attorney fees, and a judicially imposed loan modification. The district court imposed sanctions against PennyMac but declined to impose a loan modification or monetary sanctions beyond the amount of attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Homeowner had standing to challenge the district court's order on appeal; and (2) the district court acted within its discretion in denying an FMP certificate and in determining sanctions. View " Jacinto v. PennyMac Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this suit against the City and County of Honolulu and the State, challenging the approval of a rail project and arguing that state law required that an archaeological inventory survey be completed prior to any approval or commencement of the project. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and State on all of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment on Plaintiff's claims that challenged the rail project under Haw. Rev. Stat. 6E and remanded. Plaintiff subsequently requested that the Supreme Court award $255,158 in attorney's fees and $2,510 in costs against the City and State for work performed in the trial court. The Supreme Court (1) granted Plaintiff's request for appellate attorney's fees and costs against the City in the amount of $41,192 in attorney's fees and $343 in costs; (2) and denied Plaintiff's request for trial level fees and costs without prejudice, as Plaintiff's request for fees and costs attributable to work performed at the trial level was more properly within the trial court's discretion. View "Kaleikini v. Yoshioka" on Justia Law

Petitioner Peter Kaseburg was a littoral owner on Lake Pend Oreille who held an encroachment permit for a series of decaying wooden pilings that were driven into the lakebed in the 1930s. With the exception of a single piling that a neighboring marina uses to anchor one of its docks, the pilings never had any known navigational purpose. Petitioner applied to the Idaho Department of Lands (IDL) for a permit to replace ten of the wooden pilings with steel pilings, but failed to specify any navigational purpose for this proposal. The IDL considered the application a request for a nonnavigational encroachment permit and denied it after receiving several objections. While a final decision was still pending on the first permit application, Petitioner filed a second application for a permit to install a mobile dock system and mooring buoy. The IDL considered the second application a request for a permit for a navigational encroachment extending beyond the line of navigability. Again, the IDL received many objections and denied the application. Petitioner then sought judicial review, which reversed the IDL. The court held that all pilings were navigational encroachments as a matter of law, regardless of whether they have ever been used to aid navigation. The district court set aside both denials. The IDL appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court with respect to the first application, but affirmed the district court with respect to the second. View "Idaho Bd of Land Comm v. Kaseburg" on Justia Law

This dispute involved a revenue-sharing agreement between GCSD and SNW to build the Skywalk over the Grand Canyon on remote tribal land. GCSD filed suit against SNW seeking declaratory judgment that the Hualapai Tribe lacked the authority to condemn its intangible property rights and injunctive relief. After multiple hearings, the district court denied GCSD's temporary restraining order to enjoin SNW based on the principles of comity and ordered GCSD to exhaust tribal court remedies prior to review in federal court. The court affirmed and held that where, as here, a tribal court has asserted jurisdiction and was entertaining a suit, the tribal court must have acted in bad faith for exhaustion to be excused. The facts of this case did not support a finding of bad faith on the part of the tribal court. The submitted evidence supported the district court's finding that the tribal court operated independently from the tribal council and the evidence presented did not meet the narrow futility exception. The tribal court did not plainly lack jurisdiction because Montana v. United States's main rule was unlikely to apply to the facts of this case. Furthermore, the district court correctly relied on Water Wheel Camp Recreation Area, Inc. v. LaRance, which provided for tribal jurisdiction without even reaching the application of Montana. Even if the tribal consensual relationship with SNW or the financial implications of the agreement likely placed it squarely within one of Montana's exceptions and allowed for tribal jurisdiction. View "Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev. v. 'Sa' Nyu Wa Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Baltimore initiated a condemnation action to acquire an old theater once used as a vaudeville venue. The theater's owner (Owner) contested the action, arguing that the City had no right to condemn the property. Six weeks before trial, Owner filed an emergency motion demanding a postponement and an order requiring the City to pay to move all the junk out of the theater prior to trial so the jury would not view the property in its existing condition. The trial court denied the motion and the jury viewed the theater as is. The court of special appeals ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Owner's motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Owner was not entitled to a payment in advance of trial, and Owner suffered no prejudice from the denial beyond what it brought upon itself. View "A&E North, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute between the City and RBIII where the City demolished a dilapidated building on property that RBIII owned. The City did not provide notice to RBIII before razing the structure and RBIII filed suit against the City. The district court granted summary judgment for the City on all claims except a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim and a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim. Those claims were tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of RBIII. The City then appealed. The court agreed with the City's argument on appeal that the district court's jury instructions did not accurately reflect the applicable law and that, under the correct legal standards, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. Because the court vacated the trial court's judgment against the City, the court need not consider the other issues raised in the City's appeal. View "RBIII, L.P. v. City of San Antonio" on Justia Law