Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 1999, a jury awarded monetary damages and equitable relief to homeowner Kenneth Barngrover. The damages were paid to the trial court's registry shortly after entry of judgment on the verdict, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of Barngrover in 2001. In its 1999 judgment, the trial court ordered the City of Columbus to abate all nuisances created, maintained and in existence on Barngrover's property, and directed the City to restore the property to its undamaged condition. The trial court expressly retained jurisdiction pursuant to its equitable power to ensure completion of this equitable remedy. A week later, the trial court issued an order clarifying the nuisances to be abated as only those identified by the jury in its verdict. After several years of entering various orders in an effort to provide the equitable relief required by the jury's verdict, the trial court appointed a special master in 2007 to enforce the 1999 judgment. In 2011, the special master concluded that the structures on Barngrover's property were beyond repair, and recommended new ones be built. Further, the special master recommended implementation of the last of the City's abatement plans. Barngrover filed objections to the special master's report and moved to replace the special master. Over his objections, the trial court adopted the special master's report. This appeal to the Supreme Court followed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error with the trial court's orders, and affirmed. View "Barngrover v. City of Columbus" on Justia Law

The Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County adopted a Stormwater Utility Ordinance in 2004. Pursuant to the Ordinance, a stormwater utility and stormwater enterprise fund took effect in 2005, and landowners were required to pay certain fees based on their estimated relative contribution to stormwater runoff problems. Despite Unified Government sending Homewood Village, LLC a quarterly stormwater utility bill, Homewood Village did not pay any of their bills since the inception of the program. In 2010, Unified Government sued Homewood Village to recover, among other things, the unpaid fees. In 2011, Homewood Village filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, arguing that the Ordinance was an unconstitutional tax which could not be assessed involuntarily. The Superior Court granted Homewood Village's motion for partial summary on its contentions that : (1) Unified Government could not collect unpaid fees under a theory of unpaid account; and (2) Unified Government had not established any of the elements necessary to establish a claim for quantum meruit. In Case No. S12A1836, Homewood Village appealed the trial court's ruling that the Unified Government was authorized to collect stormwater fees from Homewood Village pursuant to its Ordinance, and in Case No. S12X1837 the Unified Government appealed the trial court's rulings in favor of Homewood Village on the issues of unpaid account and quantum meruit. In Case No. S12A1836, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the Ordinance imposed a permissible fee and properly granted summary judgment to the Unified Government on its claim to collect the unpaid fees. The Court vacated the judgment in Case No. S12X1837 in light of the trial court's correct decision to grant summary judgment to the Unified Government, Homewood Village's argument relating to quantum meruit or open account was rendered moot. View "Homewood Village, LLC v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the interplay between rulings and requirements relating to zoning in connection with a planned development and enforcement of restrictive covenants and deed restrictions applicable to property within the development. Plaintiff obtained municipal zoning approval to reconfigure the lot lines in her two-lot farmstead parcel within the Quechee Lakes subdivision, as well as to construct a dwelling on the second, yet-to-be-developed lot. The Environmental Division affirmed the zoning board's award of the latter permit. Notwithstanding that order, in a declaratory judgment action also initiated by plaintiff, the civil division concluded that plaintiff's proposed construction violated the applicable restrictive covenants and deed restrictions. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the Environmental Division's decision resolved the dispute, that the civil division improperly considered extrinsic evidence when the disputed deed restrictions were clear on their face, that defendants' challenge to plaintiff's right to build the proposed dwelling was time-barred, and that the character of the development had changed so much that the disputed deed restrictions are no longer valid. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff's theory of the case was that the deed language was ambiguous; plaintiff was instrumental in framing the trial court's task as one of construing ambiguous deed language; and plaintiff led the way in introducing extrinsic evidence in support of plaintiff's own interpretation. "Given this record, plaintiff cannot now challenge the trial court's consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret the documents." The Court concluded that plaintiff suffered no prejudice from the trial court's decision to consider the testimony about the context surrounding the disputed deed language - both that offered by plaintiff and by defendants. Finding no error in the trial court's decision to deny the motion for declaratory judgment, the Court reached no other issues plaintiff raised in her appeal and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Marsh Inter Vivos Trust v. McGillvray, et al." on Justia Law

The owner (an Asian Indian) of 60-room hotel in a manufacturing district near a major highway in Oak Forest, a Chicago suburb, sued the city, charging racial discrimination in zoning (42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982) and that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, based on the city’s refusal to allow it to sell the hotel for conversion to a retirement home to be owned by a church in which most of the membership is African-American. The city claimed that a retirement home would not be “highway oriented” and, after the plan was proposed, amended its ordinance so that the hotel became nonconforming, and denied a special use permit. The owner later lost the hotel in foreclosure; it is now operating as a hotel under new ownership. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting numerous irregularities in the zoning process, but stating that the owner presented no evidence that any comparable facility, serving a white clientele, has ever been permitted by Oak Forest in a comparable district. View "Parvati Corp. v. City of Oak Forest" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case arose from an administrative law court's (ALC) decision authorizing Respondent Kiawah Development Partners to construct a bulkhead and revetment on Captain Sam's Spit (the Spit) on Kiawah Island. In 1999, the Office of Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) established a baseline and building set back line twenty feet landward based on information that the Spit had accreted, and had not been subject to any significant, measurable erosion between 1959 and 1999. The movement of the baseline prompted Respondent to consider development of the Spit. On February 29, 2008, Respondent submitted an application to DHEC for a permit to construct a combination bulkhead and revetment in the area. On December 18, 2008, DHEC issued a conditional permit approving the construction of the erosion control structure for a distance of 270 feet. DHEC refused the permit request for a remaining 2,513 feet based on its concerns regarding cumulative negative impacts, including interference with natural inlet formation and possible adverse effects on wintering piping plovers. DHEC also determined that the project was contrary to the policies set forth in the Coastal Zone Management Program (CZMP). Respondent requested a final review conference by the DHEC Board, but the Board declined to hold a review conference. Respondent then requested a contested case hearing before the ALC, and challenged the denial of the construction of a bulkhead and revetment along the remaining 2,513 feet. The Coastal Conservation League (CCL) opposed the construction of any bulkhead or revetment on the Spit, and also requested a contested case hearing challenging the decision to authorize the 270 foot structure, but supporting denial of the remainder. The cases were consolidated. The ALC granted Respondent's permit to construct the bulkhead and revetment, subject to certain conditions reducing and altering its size. DHEC and CCL (collectively, Appellants) appealed the ALC's order. The Supreme Court reversed the ALC and remanded the issue in a decision published in late 2011. The Court subsequently granted Respondent's petition for rehearing, and accepted an amicus brief from the Savannah River Maritime Commission (the SRMC). The Court then withdrew its initial opinion, and issue this opinion, affirmed the decision of the ALC. "The essence of Appellants' argument is rooted in dissatisfaction with the verbiage and structure of the ALC's order, and not in actual errors of law or the absence of substantial evidence. The ALC acted within the permissible scope of its authority in modifying the existing permit to include a structure no larger than that requested by Respondent or initially reviewed by DHEC. On appeal of a contested case, we must affirm the ALC if the findings are supported by substantial evidence." View "Kiawah Development v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

In 1994, Plaintiff granted a drainage easement to Pennington County on land he owned. In 1996, silt began to accumulate near the bottom of the canyon on part of Plaintiff's land due to the County's repair of a section of road abutting Plaintiff's land. In 2010, Plaintiff filed suit against the County for nuisance, constructive taking, trespass, and unlawful taking. The trial court granted summary judgment for the County, determining that there was no continuing tort and that the statute of limitations had run. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for the County, as the County's actions did not constitute a continuing tort, and thus, Plaintiff's action was untimely filed. View "Brandt v. County of Pennington" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were a group of landowners who owned properties abutting South Avenue in the City of Missoula. This lawsuit arose out of dispute between Plaintiffs and the City concerning the width of a public right-of-way constituting South Avenue. Following a bench trial, the district court determined that the right-of-way was sixty feet wide. Because the City's recent improvements to South Avenue extended beyond this sixty-foot parameter, the district court concluded that the City had effected a taking of property and awarded Plaintiffs compensation for the taking as well as their requested costs and attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court on all but two issues, holding that the district court (1) applied an incorrect measure of compensation; and (2) erroneously barred Plaintiffs' counsel from passing on to his clients the costs and fees incurred in proving underlying litigation expenses other than attorney's fees. Remanded. View "Wohl v. City of Missoula" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal in this case related to attorney fees incurred in litigation arising from a construction contract for a custom cabin in Island Park, Idaho. There were two issues: (1) whether the district court erred in holding that the Maglebys were entitled to recover only $2,500 from defaulting parties by operation of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4); and (2) whether the district court erred in its decision regarding the Maglebys' entitlement to post-judgment attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4) did not limit the Maglebys' fees to the $2,500 pled in their complaint even though defendants did not contest them. The Court vacated the judgments of the district court as they related to attorney fees awards in light of I.C. sec. 12-120(5) and "ITP" and "Jenks." The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Magleby v. Garn" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Adriana Berneike appealed the district court’s dismissal of her Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), Utah Consumer Sales Protection Act (UCSPA), and breach of contract claims asserted against CitiMortgage, Inc. (Citi). In 2010, Plaintiff faxed twenty-eight different letters to Citi, her mortgage loan servicer, asserting that Citi was incorrectly billing her for overcharges and improper fees. She faxed a two more rounds of different letters, insisting Citi was overcharging her. Citi replied that Plaintiff's account was correct and that taxes and an escrow shortage caused billing fluctuation. Several months later, Plaintiff sent a third round of fort-seven different letters to Citi claiming billing errors. Altogether, Plaintiff faxed more than one hundred letters to Citi, and claimed that despite paying in full every bill she received, she continued to be overcharged and was facing foreclosure and bankruptcy. Plaintiff then filed suit in Utah state court. Among other damages, she sought $1,000 per violation of RESPA. Citi removed the case to federal court, and the court subsequently granted Citi's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims. Finding that the federal court did not err by dismissing Plaintiff's claims, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Berneike v. CitiMortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

McGuire leased farmland in Arizona from the Colorado River Indian Tribes with approval of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. After the BIA removed a bridge that he used to access portions of the leased property, McGuire filed a Fifth Amendment claim. McGuire does not claim that removal of the bridge was itself a taking, but rather that the BIA’s alleged refusal to authorize replacement of the bridge was a taking of his property rights. The Court of Federal Claims rejected the claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the regulatory takings claim never ripened because McGuire failed to pursue administrative remedies. Even if McGuire’s claim had ripened, he had no cognizable property interest in the bridge, which he neither possessed nor controlled because it was in a BIA right-of-way. No federal regulation gave him a property interest and he was not entitled to an easement by necessity. View "McGuire v. United States" on Justia Law