Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant City of Suwanee appealed a judgment in favor of Appellee Settles Bridge Farm, LLC in an inverse condemnation action. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the City of Suwanee's enactment of an amendment to its zoning ordinance was an unconstitutional regulatory taking of a large parcel of land owned by Settles Bridge and awarded Settles Bridge more than $1.8 million in damages. The City appealed, contending, inter alia, that the case was unripe for judicial review due to Settles Bridge’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the City that Settles Bridge should have exhausted its administrative remedies prior to initiating litigation in this matter, and therefore reversed the judgment entered against the City. View "City of Suwanee v. Settles Bridge Farm, LLC" on Justia Law

Interstate requested approval for nine outdoor advertising signs along U.S. Interstate-295, a major transportation corridor. The township then adopted an ordinance prohibiting billboards. The district court dismissed a constitutional challenge. The Third Circuit affirmed. A reasonable fact-finder could not conclude that there was an insufficient basis for the township’s conclusion that its billboard ban would directly advance its stated goal of improving the aesthetics of the community. The fact that Interstate will not be able to reach the distinct audience of travelers that it desires to target does not mean that adequate alternative means of communication do not exist. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that complete billboard bans may be the only reasonable means by which a legislature can advance its interests in traffic safety and aesthetics. View "Interstate Outdoor Advertising, L.P. v. Zoning Bd., Twp of Mount Laurel" on Justia Law

The Arkansas Department of Community Correction (DCC) owned a prison complex in Jefferson County that was part of several tracts of state land annexed to the City of Pine Bluff in 1999. The property was automatically zoned as residential. In 2011, DCC, with the approval of the Board of Correction, decided to use three existing buildings on its property to house persons who had been granted parole. The City objected to DCC's adding transitional housing to its prison complex. The circuit court granted declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in favor of the City, concluding that Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-1603 acted as a waiver of sovereign immunity and that DCC was subject to the zoning laws of the City. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that the General Assembly intended to waive the State's sovereign immunity in section 16-93-1603, and therefore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the City's petition pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. View "Ark. Dep't of Cmty. Corr. v. City of Pine Bluff" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case arose from a commercial lease dispute. Boise Mode, LLC leased space in its building to Donahoe Pace & Partners, Ltd. (DPP). Timothy Pace executed a personal guarantee for the lease. During the term of the lease, Boise Mode remodeled part of the building for another tenant. After raising concerns to Boise Mode about the adverse effects of the construction to its business, DPP eventually stopped paying rent and vacated the premises prior to the end of the lease. Boise Mode then brought an action against DPP, alleging breach of contract, and against Pace for breaching the guarantee. DPP counterclaimed, alleging that the disruption caused by the construction constituted breach of contract and constructive eviction. After Boise Mode moved for summary judgment on all claims and counterclaims, DPP requested a continuance to complete discovery. The district court denied DPP's motion and ultimately granted Boise Mode's motion for summary judgment. DPP appealed the grant of summary judgment as well as the district court's denial of its request for a continuance. Upon review, and finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roger Schanzenbach owned several properties in the town of Opal on which he intended to install mobile manufactured homes. He applied for permits with town authorities. The town council issued several building permits to Plaintiff but shortly thereafter enacted an ordinance that included a provision banning the installation of any manufactured home that was older than 10 years at the time of the relevant permit application (the 10-Year Rule). When the permits were about to lapse and Plaintiff requested an extension, the town council denied his request. It also rejected his applications for new permits because the proposed houses were more than 10 years old. Plaintiff then sued the town and town council asserting that the 10-Year Rule was preempted by the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974 as well as a variety of constitutional claims. The district court awarded summary judgment to the defendants. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaintiff raised claims based on preemption, equal protection, and substantive due process. Upon review, the Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on these claims. The 10-Year Rule was not preempted and the rule was sufficiently rational to survive an equal-protection or substantive-due-process challenge. View "Schanzenbach v. Town of Opal" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roger Schanzenbach owned several properties in the town of LaBarge on which he intended to install mobile manufactured homes. He applied for permits with town authorities. The town council initially granted him a building permit for one property but revoked it about two weeks later and then enacted an ordinance that included a provision banning the installation of any manufactured home older than 10 years at the time of the relevant permit application (the 10-Year Rule). Both of Plaintiff's homes were more than 10 years old. The town council denied Plaintiff's applications for a building permit, a variance, and a conditional-use permit to enable him to install the homes despite the 10-Year Rule. Plaintiff thereafter sued, arguing a variety of constitutional claims as well as a claim that the 10-Year Rule was preempted by the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974. The district court awarded summary judgment to the defendants. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaintiff raised issues regarding the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, procedural due process, preemption, municipal authority to enact the 10-Year Rule, and attorney fees. Upon review, the Court held that the takings claim was unripe, the due-process claim failed because Plaintiff did not have a protected property interest, the 10-Year Rule was not preempted, the town had authority to enact the rule, and the attorney-fee issue was moot. View "Schanzenbach v. Town of La Barge" on Justia Law

Appellant Camas County appealed an injunction granted by the district court against the enforcement of Camas County Ordinances 150 and 153, and Resolutions 96 and 103 (2007 zoning amendments). Plaintiff-Respondent George Martin opposed the zoning amendments at a public hearing of the Camas County Board of Commissioners. In late 2008 while this case was still being adjudicated, Martin filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against 2008 zoning amendments. Camas County removed the case to the federal district court, which ultimately granted Martin's requested relief to the 2007 amendments. The federal district court then remanded the case to the state district court. Martin was granted attorney fees and costs as a result of the federal district court's order; the court held that Camas County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Camas County appealed, maintaining that the district court abused its discretion in ordering the injunction and should have awarded the County attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the 2007 and 2008 zoning amendments were practically identical. Both cases involved the same property owned by Martin in Camas County. Thus, the facts between this case and the underlying case "Martin I" (concerning the 2007 amendments) were nearly identical. . . . as such, Martin properly conceded that the district court's injunction against the 2007 zoning amendments should have been reversed. Martin also properly conceded that his award of attorney fees by the district court also should have been reversed. The County was not entitled to a fee award. View "Martin v. Smith" on Justia Law

Leisnoi, Inc. retained the law firm of Merdes & Merdes to represent it in litigation against Omar Stratman over its certification of and title to certain lands Leisnoi claimed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Leisnoi and Merdes entered a contingency fee agreement under which, if Leisnoi was successful, Merdes would receive an interest in the lands Leisnoi obtained or retained. The case was resolved in 1992 in favor of Leisnoi, although Stratman appealed and the related litigation continued for another decade. In October 2008, the Stratman litigation finally concluded in Leisnoi's favor. The following year, Merdes moved the superior court to issue a writ of execution. Leisnoi opposed the motion, arguing among other things that the judgment was void under 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s restrictions on contingency fee contracts involving Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act lands. In January 2010, the Superior Court issued an order denying Leisnoi's motion and granting Merdes's motion to execute. Six months later, Leisnoi paid Merdes the remaining balance. Leisnoi then appealed the superior court's ruling. The issue before the Supreme Court concerned questions of waiver and whether the superior court's judgment was void or voidable. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded: (1) Leisnoi did not waive its right to appeal by paying Merdes the balance due on the judgment; (2) an Arbitration Panel's fee award and the superior court's 1995 entry of judgment violated 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s prohibition against attorney contingency fee contracts based on the value of Native lands that were subject to the Act; (3) the superior court's 2010 order granting Merdes's motion to execute on the 1995 judgment separately violated the Act's prohibition against executing on judgments arising from prohibited attorney contingency fee contracts; (4) notwithstanding the illegality of the Arbitration Panel fee award and the 1995 judgment, Leisnoi was not entitled to relief pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b) (the 1995 order was voidable rather than void for purposes of Civil Rule 60(b), and therefore not subject to attack under Civil Rule 60(b)(4)); and (5) Leisnoi was not entitled to relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6). Accordingly, Merdes was ordered to return Leisnoi's payment of the balance on the judgment, but Leisnoi was not entitled to recover payments made prior to the issuance of the writ of execution. View "Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C." on Justia Law

SM Energy Company appealed a summary judgment declaring that A.G. Golden and other plaintiffs were entitled to a four percent overriding royalty interest in leases and lands covered by a 1970 letter agreement and ordering SM to pay amounts due to Golden and the other plaintiffs for these interests, and an order denying SM's motion to amend or for relief from the judgment. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that SM through its predecessors in interest, expressly assumed an "area of mutual interest" clause in the 1970 letter agreement and in expanding the judgment to include unpled and unlitigated properties within the area of mutual interest. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court correctly ruled as a matter of law that SM owed Golden and the other plaintiffs retroactive royalty payments on production from a certain well located on the subject property. View "Golden v. SM Energy Company" on Justia Law

Petitioner Charlene Burnett filed this action against James H. Woodall, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., and fifty unnamed individuals. The complaint asserted violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (USCPA), and other related claims arising out of the foreclosure of her home. The district court dismissed Petitioner's complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and she appealed that decision. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court: "We will not review an issue in the absence of reasoned arguments advanced by the appellant as to the grounds for its appeal." View "Burnett v. Mortgage Electronic, et al" on Justia Law