Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Norma Fitzpatrick, Barry Fitzpatrick and George Elrod, (taxpayers), own parcels of land in Madison County. Following a valuation of those properties for tax purposes by the Madison County Board of Assessors, the taxpayers appealed the valuation to the Madison County Board of Equalization. The Board of Equalization denied the appeal. Subsequently, the taxpayers filed an appeal in superior court, but the Board of Assessors refused to certify the appeal to the superior court unless the taxpayers first paid the filing fee to the superior court clerk. Thereafter, the taxpayers contended that, except for appeals to an arbitrator pursuant to OCGA 48-5-311(f), a taxpayer is not required to pay any fee at all for an appeal. Based on this argument, the taxpayers filed a declaratory action seeking a ruling to this effect. The trial court issued an order finding that the taxpayers are responsible for paying the filing fee, which prompted the taxpayers to appeal to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the applicable statute, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Fitzpatrick v. Madison Co. Bd. of Tax Assessors" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether an appellate court should review a non-final order denying a claim of sovereign immunity by Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens), a state-created entity that provides property insurance, in a bad faith action stemming from the entity's handling of a property damage claim. The issue arose in the context of the broader question of when appellate courts should use common law writs to review non-final orders involving claims of immunity prior to the entry of a final judgment and when the Supreme Court should expand the list of non-final appealable orders. While the Court did not resolve the broader issue in this case, it determined that Citizens' claim of immunity was not reviewable by the appellate courts either through the writ of certiorari or the writ of prohibition, and the Court declined to expand the list of non-final orders reviewable on appeal to include the discrete legal issue presented in this case. View "Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a circuit court judgment affirming the classification of real property for tax purposes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly found that the Arkansas Constitution and the Assessment Coordination Rules and Regulations allowed the land at issue to be classified as residential and not timber land; (2) ad hoc requirements were not imposed only on Appellants by Appellee Pope County Board of Equalization (BOE); (3) Appellants failed to demonstrate that they were similarly situated to any other taxpayer or landowner within the city limits, and therefore, Appellants' equal-protection claim that the circuit court erred in denying Appellants' petition without considering similarly situated property owners with similar property classified as timber and pasture within city limits was without merit; and (4) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a site visit by BOE's expert witness between the first day of trial and the second day of trial. View "McWilliams v. Pope County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

The Idaho Department of Fish and Game (IDFG) appealed the district court's post-judgment orders (1) refusing to lift a portion of an injunction and (2) declaring the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act unconstitutional. In 2004, IDFG made a public proposal to renovate the Farragut Shooting Range, (owned and operated by IDFG since World War II), based on the "Vargas Master Plan." Citizens Against Range Expansion (CARE), an unincorporated non-profit association comprised of individuals who reside near the range, contended that the plan would greatly increase range usage, and harm the community. CARE sued IDFG in 2005 for nuisance and other related causes of action regarding the range's operation. CARE's claims were grounded in both safety and noise concerns regarding the increased use of the range, and its proposed expansion. Among other relief, CARE sought to enjoin IDFG's operation of the range. The case proceeded to a court trial in December of 2006 and in February of 2007 the court issued its memorandum decision wherein it determined that CARE was entitled to relief enjoining further operation of the Farragut Range until IDFG completed certain safety improvements. Upon completion of its range improvements, IDFG filed a Motion for Partial Lifting of Injunction. CARE then moved for summary judgment, claiming that the Act was a special law in violation of art. III, sec. 19 of the Idaho Constitution, and a deprivation of judicial power in violation of art. V, sec. 13. The district court issued summary judgment in favor of CARE on the constitutional issues in March of 2011. In its order, the court found that the Act was unconstitutional as a special law and a deprivation of judicial power. For this reason alone, it denied IDFG's Relief Motion with regard to the 501-shooter component. The court found that there remained disputed issues of fact regarding range safety. On August 25, 2011, following the evidentiary hearing on safety issues, the district court denied IDFG's Relief Motion with regard to the one component of the injunction. IDFG timely appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court: 1) reversed the district court's order holding that IDFG did not comply with the "500-shooter" component of the injunction; 2) concluded as a matter of law that IDFG complied with the 500-shooter component, and lifted that component of the injunction; 3) reversed the district court's order holding the Act to be unconstitutional; 4) remanded this case to the district court to determine whether IDFG has complied with the "501-shooter" component of the injunction. View "Citizens Against Range Expansion v. Idaho Fish & Game" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the lawfulness of a portion of the City of Portland's Willamette River Greenway Plan that regulates uses of industrial and other urban land along a portion of the Willamette River known as the "North Reach." Specifically, the issue was whether the City of Portland (city) had authority to regulate development within the North Reach. Petitioners represented various industrial interests within the affected area of the city's plan. They contended that the law permitted the city to regulate only "intensification" or "changes" to existing uses and otherwise does not permit the regulation of existing industrial or other urban uses or other changes to such uses within the North Reach. The Land Use Board of Appeals rejected that argument, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court likewise rejected petitioners' argument and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Gunderson, LLC v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

This appeal questioned the validity of certain conditions a grantor placed on a dedicated public-street easement. The easement in question provided for a 100-foot-wide public right of way, but the instrument dedicating the land also provided that the street's curb lines were to be fifteen feet inside the street's boundary lines. The issue was whether this curb-line condition limited the dedication such that only the seventy-foot area between the curb lines could be used for vehicular traffic. The court of appeals concluded that the curb-line condition effectively limited the public easement in this way. The court further suggested that the State would have to use its eminent domain powers if the public roadway needed to be improved or widened beyond the existing curb lines. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the State need not condemn property already already dedicated for a public street before widening the existing roadway; and (2) therefore, the State had the right to improve the existing roadway to the boundary of the dedicated street line notwithstanding the curb-line condition. View "State v. NICO-WF1, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was (1) whether an ordinance authorizing the acquisition of an easement by condemnation also confers the authority to acquire the easement by an action to quiet title, and (2) whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the circuit court's ruling that the City of Virginia Beach proved an implied dedication of the disputed easements and whether the court erred in ruling that Lynnhaven Dunes Condominium Association was not entitled to compensation for its loss of riparian rights. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the authorizing ordinance fully encompassed the City's actions in bringing this condemnation proceeding, and the evidence was sufficient to support the circuit court's ruling that the City had proven it had acquired the easements by implied dedication; but (2) the circuit court erred in ruling that Lynnhaven's loss of riparian rights was non-compensable. View "Lynnhaven Dunes Condo. Ass'n v. City of Virginia Beach" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether a condemnor may, in an eminent domain proceeding, alternatively assert ownership rights in the condemned property. The Court further considered whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the circuit court's ruling that the City of Virginia Beach proved an implied dedication of the disputed property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by allowing the City to condemn property that it also claimed to own; and (2) the evidence demonstrated that the City acquired the easements through an implied dedication based on the continued public use and the City's efforts in maintaining and patrolling the property. View "3232 Page Ave. Condo. Ass'n v. City of Virginia Beach" on Justia Law

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation commenced this foreclosure action before it obtained an assignment of the promissory note and mortgage securing the Plaintiffs' loan. Plaintiffs maintained that Federal Home Loan lacked standing to sue. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Federal Home Loan and entered a decree of foreclosure. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Federal Home Loan had remedied its lack of standing when it obtained an assignment from the real party in interest. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the cause, holding (1) standing is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court, and therefore it is determined as of the filing of the complaint; and (2) thus, receiving an assignment of a promissory note and mortgage from the real party in interest subsequent to the filing of an action but prior to the entry of judgment does not cure a lack of standing to file a foreclosure action. View "Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Schwartzwald" on Justia Law

The dispute before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on interest earned on block grants made to Indian tribes pursuant to the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act. Specifically, Appellant Muscogee (Creek) Nation's Division of Housing challenged both a regulation placing a two-year limit on the investment of grant funds and two notices issued by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development stating that any interest accrued after the expiration of this two-year period must be returned to the Department. The Nation sought declaratory relief invalidating the regulation and notices as well as an injunction to prevent HUD from recouping interest earned on grant funds. The Nation also sought recoupment of the approximately $1.3 million of earned interest it wired to HUD after HUD sent a letter threatening an enforcement action based on the Nation’s investment of grant funds for longer than two years. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that HUD’s sovereign immunity was not waived by the Administrative Procedures Act and, in the alternative, that the Nation had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted because HUD’s interpretation of the statute was permissible. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that HUD was authorized to promulgate a regulation limiting the period for investments, and required to demand remittance of interest earned in violation of the regulation. The Nation was therefore not entitled to recouping the interest it paid to HUD pursuant to HUD's enforcement of its rules. View "Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. HUD, et al" on Justia Law